The role of castles in the political and military history of the Crusader States and the Levant 1187 to 1380 by Molin, Bengt Kristian
The role of castles in the political and military
history of the Crusader States and the Levant
1187 to 1380.
by
Bengt Kristian Molin
Submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of PhD.
The University of Leeds
School of History
October 1995.
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own
and that appropriate credit has been given where reference
has been made to the work of others.
ABSTRACT
This thesis deals with the various functions of Latin and
Armenian fortifications in Cilician Armenia, Greece,
Cyprus, Syria and Palestine between 1187 and c.1380.
Offensively, such structures were needed as starting
points for both land based and naval campaigns into enemy
territory, and could thereafter be used to colonize and
suppress newly acquired land. Defensively, individual
strongpoints could also prevent Greek, Bulgar or Muslim
attackers from making any permanent conquests, whilst at
the same time protecting local farmers and traders against
the ravages of war. In addition, they were frequently
relied on to maintain internal security and to deter
hostile locals from rebelling against their overlords. The
security provided by fortifications meant that they also
fulfilled a wide variety of non-military functions as
prisons, residences, courthouses and administrative
centres. Most importantly, however, they enabled heavily
outnumbered Latin newcomers to conquer large parts of the
eastern Mediterranean without having to match their
opponents man for man, or risking a direct confrontation
with numerically superior invasion forces. These factors
made castles and urban fortifications vital to the entire
crusading movement, and they will therefore be discussed
in great detail, with reference to a variety of
contemporary chronicles and documents. In addition,
extensive use will be made of archaeological and
architectural evidence, for the design of an individual
fortress was clearly determined by the numerous military,
economic and political functions which it was expected to
fulfil.
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5PREFACE
THE AIMS OF THIS THESIS
Since the middle of the last century, an ever increasing
number of books and journals have been produced on the
fortifications constructed by the Armenians and the west
European settlers of the eastern Mediterranean. These
works have greatly enhanced our knowledge of the subject,
but many of them are nevertheless constrained by certain
limitations which I hope to address in this thesis.
Firstly, there has been a propensity in the past for
scholars to concentrate on the archaeological and
architectural remains of fortifications rather than their
various functions. As a result, highly detailed studies
already exist for many of the areas covered in this
thesis, including Cyprus , Cilician Armenia , Frankish
Greece and the Holy Land . These contain the results of
surveys and archaeological digs, but often give the
history of individual sites in isolation, and do not
always attempt to interpret the role of fortifications
over a wider area.
1 C. Enlart, L'art gothigue et de la Renaissance en
Chypre, (2 vols., Paris 1899).
2 R.W. Edwards, 'The Fortifications of Armenian
Cilicia', Dumbarton Oaks Studies, XXII (Washington DC,
1987); H. Hellenkemper, Buren der Kreuzritterzeit in der
Grafschaft Edessa und im Königreich Kleinarmenien, (Bonn,
1976)
A. Bon, La Morée frangue: recherches historigues,
topographigues et archéolo g i gues sur la principauté
d'Achaie (1205-1430), (2 vols., (one being a volume of
plans and plates) Paris 1969).
P. Descharnps, Les Châteaux des croisés en Terre-
Sainte, I: Le Crac des Chevaliers (Paris 1934); II: j
Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem (Paris 1939); III: La
Defense du comté de Tri poli et de la Principauté
d'Antioche (Paris 1973).
6Secondly, a disproportionate amount of research has been
carried out on fortifications in the Holy Land rather
other areas of the eastern Mediterranean. To some extent,
historians have also placed greater emphasis on the
twelfth century, and have often looked at the role of
crusader castles during the initial Latin conquest, or the
reign of Saladin, rather than the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries.
Finally, both archaeologists and historians have sometimes
tended to make sweeping generalizations when discussing
crusader fortifications. Hence many older works on the
subject, such as T.E. Lawrence's Crusader Castles (ed. D.
Pringle, (Oxford 1988)), assume that military architecture
developed in clearly defined stages, until the rudimentary
towers built by the Franks early in the twelfth century
had been completely replaced by advanced concentric
fortresses such as Crac des Chevaliers. It has also been
argued that strongholds can be placed in categories
depending on whether they were constructed by the
Hospitallers, Templars or Teutonic Knights, or were
influenced by Roman and Byzantine precedents. These
theories ignore the fact that the Latins and the Armenians
built a bewildering array of both complex and simple
fortifications throughout the crusader period.
Similarly, the belief that Frankish towers in Greece were
primarily used to safeguard strategic lines of
communication continued to dominate for many decades,
despite the fact that most of these structures are
situated well away from any roads or hill tops.In the Holy
Land Rey5
 and others also argued that fortifications were
E.G. Rey, Etude sur les monuments de l'arcitecture
militaire des croisés en S yrie et dans l'Ile de Chypre,
(Paris 1871).
7primarily designed to prevent hostile forces from crossing
Frankish frontiers, even if they were situated on the
coastal plain or in other strategically vulnerable areas.
Likewise, numerous defences in the Peloponnese have
commonly been attributed to the Latins, although they
clearly contain extensive remains from the pre-Frankish
Byzantine period.
Scholars have either reached these erroneous or
oversimplified conclusions because they have failed to
study the archaeological and the historical evidence
together, or because they have used the information
available to them selectively, in order to back up their
own theories. Hence Hey's argument regarding the frontier
castles of the Holy Land tends to ignore twelfth century
accounts of Saladin's campaigns in the area, which clearly
indicate that these structures had no hope of halting
Muslim invasion forces. In Frankish Greece, on the other
hand, misinterpretations have been made because too much
attention has been paid to the written sources rather than
the archaeological evidence, even at famous medieval sites
such as Mistra.
In order to get a more accurate impression of what
functions Latin and Armenian fortifications fulfilled, it
is therefore important to study a wide variety of sources,
ranging from charters and chronicles to archaeological
reports and the accounts of medieval travellers. These
sources should not be viewed separately, nor should
strongpoints be looked at in isolation without reference
to surrounding geographical, political, military and
economic factors. The first historian to adopt this
strategy was Smail, who originally challenged Rey's
findings on the Holy Land in the 1950s, and produced
numerous examples from the written evidence to illustrate
the various military and non-military uses of local
8castles. 6
 Small's research, however, only dealt with the
period before 1192, and did not continue into the
thirteenth century.
The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to carry out a
similar investigation of castles, urban fortifications and
other minor defences, but to concentrate on the period
after the battle of Hattin in 1187. This investigation
will also be extended beyond the Holy Land to include less
famous strongpoints in the kingdom of Cyprus, Frankish
Greece and Cilician Armenia, until around 1380. In the
Holy Land, this has to some extent already been done by
Marshall and Kennedy, both of whom have written about
thirteenth century castles and strongpoints in recent
years. 7 In addition, a growing number of scholars working
in this area, such as the archaeologist Denys Pringle,
have also adopted Smail's research methods. Hence
Pringle's book The Red Tower (London 1986) is partly an
archaeological report, and partly a general survey of
crusader and Mamluk fortifications in southern Galilee,
which does not merely describe these structures, but
analyses how the Franks used them to cultivate and defend
the surrounding area. As a result, my chapter on the
kingdom of Jerusalem, the county of Tripoli and the
principality of Antioch is a continuation of work carried
out by Marshall, Pringle, Kennedy and others.
However, the role of fortifications in Cilician Armenia,
Frankish Greece and Cyprus has not previously been studied
in any great depth. As has been mentioned, general surveys
R.C. Small, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193),
(Cambridge 1956); 'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth
Century', Cambridge Historical Journal, X (1951), 133-149.
C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291,
(Cambridge 1992); H. Kennedy, Crusader Castles, (Cambridge
1994).
9have been produced detailing many of the strongpoints in
these areas, but these are usually purely descriptive
rather than analytical. Hence it is quickly apparent, for
example, that in terms of their appearance and defensive
strength, castles in Frankish Greece were not as well
built as their neighbours in the Holy Land. It is only by
studying contemporary sources such as the Chronicle of
4orea, 8 however, that we find the real reasons for this,
and what it reveals about the political, economic and
military differences between the two regions. Once again,
therefore, the functions of individual strongholds, whose
strategic importance would otherwise remain obscure, can
only be assessed by making a much wider comparative study
of fortifications using a variety of sources.
I would not have been able to undertake this thesis, let
alone finish it, without the considerable help and support
of several people. Firstly, I would like to thank my
supervisor, Dr. Graham Loud, whose guidance and expert
advice have proved invaluable throughout the last four
years. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr.
Peter Lock for his suggestions regarding Frankish Greece.
In September 1994 I had the opportunity to visit numerous
crusader sites in Israel, and this would not have been
possible without the generosity of the Seven Pillars of
Wisdom Trust, kindly suggested by Professor Bernard
Hamilton, and the travel scholarship provided by the
University of Leeds. I am also very grateful to Jim, whose
generosity enabled me to keep studying through my third
year, and Jason, for all his help with the printing and
computing. Finally, I would like to thank Carol for all
her love and encouragement, and my parents, who have
helped and supported me so much both before and during my
time at Leeds.
The Chronicle of Morea exists in several versions.
See bibliography.
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CHAPTER ONE
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION: WARFARE AND FORTIFICATIONS IN
THE LATIN EAST, 1187-c.1380.
More than any other event, the battle of Hattin, fought
between Christians and Muslims in July 1187, determined
the history of the crusader states during the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries. This catastrophic defeat
precipitated a massive revival in crusading acticity, and
inspired a whole series of European expeditions intent on
recapturing Jerusalem. It also contributed indirectly to
the Latin conquest of other territories, most notably
Cyprus and the Byzantine empire, as the whole idea of
crusading evolved and became tarnished by the purely
economic and political concerns of nations such as Genoa
and Venice.
In the short term, Saladin's triumph also had a disastrous
effect on the Holy Land itself. By the end of 1190,
Christian territories here had been reduced to the city of
Tyre in the south, and a few isolated outposts,
particulalyAntioch, Tripoli, Tortosa, Chastel Blanc, Crac
des Chevaliers and Chastel Blanc, in the north. The rest
of the kingdom of Jerusalem had been lost in its
entirety,' while most smaller or undermanned castles and
For more details on Saladin's campaign in Palestine,
see L'Estoire de Eracles empereur et la con gueste de la
Terre d'Outremer, RHC Oc. I-Il (hereafter Eracles), II,
62-110, 187-88; Les Gestes des Chiprois, RHC Arm. II, 659-
661; Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, ed.
W. Stubbs, 2 vols., Rolls Series (1864) (hereafter
Itinerarium), I, 16-30; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
ed. H.R. Luard, 7 vols., Rolls Series, (1872-83), II, 328-
30; Abu Shama, Le Livre des Deux Jardins, RHC Or. TV-V,
IV, 260-351, 381-406; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel-Altevarykh,
Or. I-Il, I, 683-716, 734-44; Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes et
beaux traits de la vie du sultan Youssof, RHC Or.III, 92-
106, 118-20, 129-32.
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settlements in Syria had also been overrun. 2
 Although this
situation was rectified somewhat by the Third Crusade,
whose participants captured Acre in July 1191, and thereby
enabled Richard I to reconquer coastal areas as far south
as Jaffa, the Franks still found themselves in a
precarious position by the time Richard left the Holy
Land in September 1192.
The following year, however, the death of Saladin sparked
off a lengthy succession dispute between his sons and his
brother al-Adil, and meant that the Ayubid rulers of
Egypt, Damascus and Aleppo spent much of the late twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries fighting each other rather
than their Frankish enemies. 4 This in turn enabled the
Christians to regain several twelfth century possessions
by force or treaty, including Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla and
Nazareth, which the Muslims gave up peacefully in 1204.
2 For more details on Saladin's campaign in Syria, see
Eracles, II, 71-72, 119-20; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV,
349-81; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, I, 716-34; Baha'-
al-Din, Anecdotes, pp.105-18; Deschamps, La Défensedu
comté de Tri poli, pp.l27-33.
For the events of the Third Crusade, see Eracles,
II, 124-203; Itinerarium,I, 31-138, 205-441; Ambrojse,
L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, ed. G. Paris, (Paris 1897),
cols.57-64; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, II, 334-36,
353-92; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 406-522, V, 3-81; Ibn
al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, II, 3-67; Baha'-al-Din,
Anecdotes, pp.132-35O; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, RHC Or. I, 61-
66. By the terms of the treaty which Richard established
with Saladin in the summer of 1192, the Franks demolished
Ascalon, but kept Jaffa, Arsuf, Caesarea, Haifa, Acre and
Tyre. See Itinerarium, I, 428-29; Eracles, II, 198-99;
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, II, 391-92; Baha'-al-Din,
Anecdotes, pp.342-SO; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 63-80.
For more details on this dispute, see P. Thorau, The
Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the
thirteenth century , trans. P.M. Holt, (London 1992), p.8;
P.M. Holt, The A ge of the Crusades:The Near East from the
eleventh centur y to 1517, (London 1986), pp.60-62.
Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, II, 96; Abu'l-Fida,
Annales, p.83. In theory the Franks already held Jaffa and
half of Ramlah and Lydda, although they may not actually
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In 1197 German crusaders also captured Beirut, whilst the
Embriaco lords of Gibelet reoccupied their old castle
through diplomacy. 6 At about the same time the
Hospitallers consolidated their position in the county of
Tripoli by strengthening the castles of Margat and Crac
des Chevaliers, and launching punitive raids against the
inland Muslim cities of Hama and Horns.7
Thus from the mid-1190s onwards, the Franks managed to
survive, and gradually even prosper, 'because of the
constant discord of the [Muslimi princes of the land,
which was highly favourable to the Christians' 8 After al-
Adil's death in 1218, for example, renewed Muslim fighting
between al-Kamil of Egypt and the Ayubids of Syria
resulted in further Christian land gains. 9 In 1229
Frederick II, who claimed the throne of Jerusalem by
virtue of his marriage to Isabella of Brienne, negotiated
the treaty of Jaffa with al-Kamil, whereby the German
emperor received Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, the
territory of Toron, those parts of the lordship of Sidon
previously held by the Muslims, and the site of the
Teutonic Knights' new castle at Montfort. In return, al-
Kamil could feel secure that Frederick would not attack
Egypt, and also created a Christian-held buffer zone
have inhabited them. See Abu'l-Fida, nrjales, p.66.
6 Beirut: Eracles, II, 227-28; Abu Shama, Deux
Jardins, V, 116-17; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, II,
86-87; Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica Slavorum, MGHSS, XXI,
205-6, and see below, p.112. Gibelet: Eracles, II, 224-26.
See below, pp.45-46, 116-17, 120-21.
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, ed. I-I.
Hoogeweg, Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins in
Stuttgart, CCII, (1894), 245.
For a brief outline of this conflict, see Holt, The
Age of the Crusades, pp.64-65; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt,
pp.9-10.
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between himself and Syria.'0
This pattern of Muslim in-fighting and Christian expansion
repeated itself following the death of al-Kamil in 1238,
which precipitated a civil war between al-Salih of Egypt
and al-Salih Ismail of Damascus. 11
 The Franks offered
their support for this latter contender in exchange for
Toron (Tibnin), Saphet, Cave de Tyron, Beaufort,
Châteauneuf (1-lunin), Belvoir and Tiberias; an agreement
which the Egyptians, fearing a Franco-Syrian invasion,
were forced to recognize in 1241.12 At this time the
crusaders were also able to reoccupy Jerusalem, which they
had lost briefly during the Ayubid clashes of 1239-4O)
These significant gains were achieved by Theobald of
Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, who led separate but
overlapping crusades to the Holy Land during the early
1240s. These men also managed to rebuild the citadel of
Ascalon, which had lain in ruins since 1192, thereby
strengthening the kingdom's southern frontier and
Eracles, II, 369-74; Matthew Paris, Chronica
Maiora, III, 159-61, 172-77; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V,
186; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 175-76; al-'Ayni,
Le Collier de Perles, RHC Or. II, 187-94; Marino Sanudo
Torsello, or the Elder, Liber secretorum fidelium crucis,
ed. J. Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos, sive orientalium
expeditionum et re gni Francorum Hierosolimitani Historia
a variis, sed illius aevi scriptoribus litteris
commendata, II, (Hannau 1611), 213. For Montfort, see
below, pp.58-59.
For a brief outline of this dispute, see Thorau,
The Lion of Egypt, pp.12, 14-16; Holt, The A ge of the
Crusades, p.65.
12 Eracles, II, 416-19; Continuation de Guillaume de
Tr de 1229 a 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin, Oc.
II, 554 (hereafter Rothelin); Matthew Paris, Chronica
Maiora, IV, 64-65, 140-43; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, pp.120,
122; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 193 (mentions Beaufort).
See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp.18-19.
13 Abu'l-Fida, Annales, pp.117-18; al-Ayni, Collier de
Perles, pp.196-97; Rothelin, pp.529-31.
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expanding its borders to their greatest extent since the
twelfth century.14
From the mid-1240s onwards, however, Latin fortunes
deteriorated rapidly, as a series of military and
political upheavals forced the Franks onto the retreat.
The first of these occured in 1244, when a combined force
of Egyptians and Khwarizmians, a violent tribe of nomadic
horsemen who had already overrun Jerusalem,' 5
 routed the
Latins and their Damascene allies at the battle of La
Forbie. As a result Ascalon, Tiberias and surrounding
territories all fell to the Egyptians. 16
 From 1260 onwards
the Franks were also confronted by Baybars (1260-77), one
of the first Mamluk sultans of Egypt after the downfall of
14 Eracles, II, 413-22; Rothelin, pp.526-56; Gestes,
pp.725-26; Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. R. Röhrict and G.
Raynaud, Archives de l'Orient Latin, II (1884), 427-61, at
440; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 25-30, 71, 78-80,
138-45, 166; For more details on these crusades, see P.
Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-41 and their Aftermath'
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, L
(1987), 32-60, and see below, p.53.
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 299-311, 337-
40; Rothelin, pp.561-63; Eracles, II, 427-28; al-'Ayni,
Collier de Perles, p.198.
Gestes, p.740; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
pp.2l7-l8; Eracles, II, 429-33, 741; Rothelin, pp.564-65;
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 341-43; Annales de
Terre Sainte, pp.441-42; John of Joinville, Histoire de
Saint Louis, ed. N. de Wailly, (Paris 1874), pp.288-90;
Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 193-94; Abu'l-Fida, Annales,
pp.122-25; Ibn al-Furat, Selections from the Tarikh al-
Duwad wa'l-Muluk, in A yyubids, Mameluks and Crusaders, ed.
and trans. U. and M.C. Lyons, with notes and an
introduction by J.S.C. Riley-Smith, (2 vols., Cambridge
1971), II, 4-8, 10-11, 46. The capture of Tiberias and
Ascalon may not have happened immediately after La Forbie,
and can only be dated to the period 1244-47 with
certainty. However, most sources date these events to
1247.
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the Ayubid dynasty.' 7 Between 1262 and 1271 Baybars
campaigned relentlessly in Syria and Palestine, reducing
Christian territories to a narrow coastal strip between
Latakia in the north and Pilgrims' Castle in the south.18
Many of the last remaining outposts in this region were
gradually picked off by the Mamluks during the l280s,
until Acre itself was finally lost in 1291.19
To some extent, Baybars and his successors were only able
to make these conquests because of the Mongols. During the
first half of the thirteenth century these aggressors had
gradually moved west, conquering everything in their sight
until in 1260 they invaded Muslim Syria. 20
 As we shall
see, this initially benefitted the Armenians and the
Antiochene Franks, but it also meant that when the Mongols
were defeated by the Egyptians ,just a few months later,
Ayubid power in Syria had collapsed, enabling Baybars to
occupy Damascus and Aleppo with relative ease. As a
For more details on Baybars's early years and rise
to power, see Thorau, The Lion of E gypt, pp.27-58, 79-98;
R. Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle A ges: The early
years of the Mamluk Sultanate, 1250-1382, (London 1986),
pp.37-46.
18 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 50, 56-59, 66-158,
161-62; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de
l'Egypte, ed. and trans. M.E. Quatremère, (2 vols. in 4
parts, Paris 1845),I(a), 194-200, 231-40, 1(b), 1-89, 127;
Thorau, The Lion of E gypt, pp.142-210.
19 Margat fell in 1285: see below, p.49. Latakia fell
in 1287: see Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.229.
Tripoli fell in 1289: see below, p. 64. Acre and other
remaining outposts fell in 1291: see Gestes, pp.805-18;
Marina Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.229; Annales de Terre
Sainte, pp.460-61; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans,
11(a), 120-31; Chronigue d'Amadi, Chroni gues d'Amadi et de
Strambaldi, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, (Paris 1891), pp.219-26;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue de l'Ile de Chypre, ed. R. de
Mas Latrie, (Paris 1886), pp.119-25.
20 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(a), 76-102;
Gestes, pp.750-52; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 41-42.
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result, Egypt and Syria were firmly united under one ruler
for the first time since the reign of Saladin, 21
 and
subsequent Frankish efforts to join forces with the
Mongols failed because successive Mongol invasions were
pushed back by the Mamluks. Hence Mamluk sultans rarely
had to deal with the kind of internal clashes between
Egypt and Syria which had kept their Ayubid predecessors
tied up for years at a time.22
Until the reign of Baybars, however, it is clear that the
Franks were able to maintain their position in the Holy
Land because their opponents were weak internally. During
the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries similar
circumstances enabled them to conquer various territories
which belonged to, or had recently broken away from, the
declining Byzantine empire. Hence when Richard I landed at
Limassol in May 1191, Cyprus was ruled by the rebellious
Isaac Comnenus, who refused to acknowledge the imperial
overlordship of Constantinople, and relied on brutal
methods to suppress his own subjects. 23 As a result, 'the
21 al-Makrjzi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(a), 102-13;
Gestes, pp.752-55; Rothelin, pp.636-37. For more details
on these events, see also P. Jackson, 'The Crisis in the
Holy Land in 1260', EHR, XCV (1980), 481-514; Holt, Th
Age of the Crusades, pp.86-88; Irwin, The Middle East in
the Middle Ages, pp.33-34; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt,
pp.63-79, and see below, pp.l14-lS.
22 Hence in 1271 a Christian attack on Qaqun was
halted after the Franks' Mongol allies had been forced to
retreat by Baybars. See Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 155,
and below, p.112. See also Thorau, The Lion of Egypt,
pp.223, 235-40; Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages,
pp.46, 66-67; Holt, The Age of the Crusades, pp.98-97,
102.
For more details on Isaac Comnenus and the
political situation on Cyprus at the time of Richard's
invasion, see W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, L'empereur Isaac de
Chypre et sa fille, 1155-1207', in Familles de l'Orient
Latin XIIe-XIVe siècles, (London 1983), c.1, pp.123-77,
particularly at pp.127-46.
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natives detested him', and Isaac 'was only tolerated, not
beloved' even by his own troops. 24 This no doubt explains
why Richard, who invaded Cyprus in order to gain booty and
rescue some English troops previously captured by Isaac,
met with very little determined resistance during his
rapid conquest of the island.25
This conquest was carefully described by English
chroniclers wishing to enhance Richard's reputation as a
warrior, and therefore provides us with much valuable
information about the state of Byzantine fortifications in
Cyprus at the very beginning of the crusader domination.
In particular, it is clear that there already existed
castles or towers at Limassol, Nicosia and Famagusta,
which were occupied briefly by Isaac Comnenus as he fled
further and further away from Richard's invasion forces.
All these sites, as well as another stronghold at Paphos,
were subsequently overrun by the English, indicating that
they were poorly defended, and perhaps even in a state of
disrepair. 26
 However, the castle of Kyrenia, an important
24 Vinsauf, Itinerary of Richard I and others to the
Hol y Land, cited in Supp lementary
 Excerpts on Cyprus, or
further materials for a history of Cyprus, ed. T.A.H.
Mogabgab, (Nicosia 1941), pp.11, 14.
For a full description of Richard's invasion, see
Itinerarium, pp.181-205; Ambroise, L'Estoire de la Guerre
Sainte, cols.37-57;Richard of Devizes, Cronicon de Tempore
Reg is Ricardi Primi, ed. J.T. Appleby, (London 1963),
pp.35-38; Gesta Re g is Henrici Secundi Abbatis, ed. W.
Stubbs, 2 vols., Rolls Series, (1869), II, 162; Roger of
Howden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, 4 vols., Rolls Series,
(1868-71), III, 105-12; Vinsauf, Itinerar y of Richard I,
pp.3-15; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.80-82; Florio Bustron,
Chronigue, pp.46-49; Leontios Makharias, Recital
Concerning the Sweet Land of C yprus entitled 'Chronicle'
ed. R.M. Dawkins, (2 vols., Oxford 1932), I, c.10-12,
p.11.
26 Limassol: see below, p.175. Nicosia: see below,
p.189. Famagusta: see below, p.177 Paphos: see below,
p.l83.
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strongpoint along the north coast of Cyprus, was described
as 'very strong' even at this date, while the mountain
fortresses of St.Hilarion, Buffavento and Kantara 'could
never have been stormed by the machines of any enemy,
unless by treachery or famine' . It is likely, therefore,
that these four castles were not captured because their
fortifications were dilapidated or inadequate, but because
their Greek defenders felt very little real loyalty toward
Isaac Comnenus.27
After Richard I had conquered Cyprus, he sold it to the
Templars, whose brief occupation came to an end after a
major Greek rebellion in Nicosia. 28 As a result, the
island was resold to Guy of Lusignan (ruled 1192-94),
whose successors ruled Cyprus firmly and peacefully until
the death of Hugh I in 1218.29 However, Hugh's son Henry
was only eight months old at this point, and so a power
struggle concerning who should act as regent subsequently
broke out between the powerful Ibelin family, and those
nobles who supported Frederick II, the suzerain of
Cyprus. 30 When Frederick himself arrived at Limassol in
2? Kyrenia: Roger of Howderi, Chronica, III, 111.
Mountain fortresses: Vinsauf, itinerary of Richard I,
p.14. See also Itinerarium, pp.203-4; L. de Mas Latrie,
Histoire de l'Ile de Chypre sous le règne des princes de
la maison de Lusignan, (3 vols., Paris 1852-61), I, 11-12.
28 Chroni gue d'Amadi, p.83; Florio Bustron, Chronigue,
p.49.
Itinerarium, p.351; Eracles, II, 191. For more
details on the Lusignan settlement of Cyprus, see Eracles,
II, 191-92; Leontios Makharias, Recital, c.26-29, pp.25-
29; P.W. Edbury, The kin gdom of Cyprus and the Crusades,
1191-1374, (Cambridgel99l), pp.13-22.
Gestes, pp.668-76; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.117-24;
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II a g ainst the
Ibelins in S yria and Cyprus, ed. and trans. J.L. LaMonte,
(New York 1936), pp.61-73. For the political background to
this war, see also Eracles, II, 360-62; Edbury, Th
jpgdom of Cyprus, pp.48-57; Mas Latrie, Histoire, I, 225-
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1228, this struggle spilled over into open war, because
John of Ibelin refused to surrender the regency to the
emperor and fled to the castle of St.Hilarion. 31 Here he
stayed for a while until Frederick persuaded him to give
up, and placed Cyprus under the rule of five imperialist
baillis, who were expected to run the island on
Frederick's behalf after he returned to the west.32
However, the baillis' authority was inevitably weakened as
soon as the emperor departed. In July 1229 they were
defeated outside Nicosia, and lost control over all of
Cyprus except for Kantara and St.Hilarion, which were so
strong that they held out for almost a year. 33 Once the
Ibelins had taken these castles in May 1230, peace was
restored for a while, but in 1231 Frederick II sent a new
force of Lombard troops east under the imperial marshal
Richard Filangeri, who immediately set about besieging
John of Ibelin's castle at Beirut. 34
 This in turn
undermined the Ibelin position on Cyprus so much that the
imperialists regained power, and laid siege to Ibelin
supporters who had fled to St.Hilarion. But meanwhile
Richard Filangeri was faring so badly at Beirut that in
38; G. Hill, A History of Cyprus, (4 vols., Cambridge
1940-52), II, 83-94; J.S.C. Riley-Smith, The Feudal
Nobility and the Kingdom of Jerusalem 1 1174-1277, (London
1973), pp.159-66.
31 Gestes, pp.676-82; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, pp.74-82; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.124-30;
Florio Bustron, hronigue, pp.63-68; Eracles, II, 367-69.
Eracles, II, 369, 376; Philip of Novara, The Wars
of' Frederick II, pp.85, 88-94; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.131-
34; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.68-73.
Eracles, II, 376-77; Gestes, pp.684-94; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, pp.74-79; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.136-
46; Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.97-103.
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.11'T-
34; Gestes, pp.699-706; Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.80-
88; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.147-58; Eracles, II, 386-93.
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April 1232 he retreated to his base at Tyre, enabling John
of Ibelin and his Genoese allies to return to Cyprus,
defeat the imperialists at the battle of Agridi and
relieve their friends at St.Hilarion. These events
effectively ended Hohenstaufen rule on Cyprus, although
many Lombard troops and supporters of Frederick II
continued to hold out at Kyrenia for a further twelve
months before hostilities finally came to a close.35
After 1233, open conflict on Cyprus became extremely rare,
and was normally limited to palace coups rather than large
scale warfare. Hence between 1306 and 1310 Amaury of Tyre
deposed his brother king Henry II (1285-1324), and ruled
as 'governor' until he was murdered because of his
increasingly brutal regime. Initially, however, he had
seized power with the consent of most of the nobility, who
felt that Henry had not done enough either to protect
Cyprus against the Mamluks, or to take the initiative in
regaining the Holy Land. 3 Ironically, Henry's successor
Peter I (1359-69) was subsequently assassinated for doing
too much, for he imposed crippling taxes on his subjects
in order to pay for ambitious naval campaigns against Asia
Minor and Egypt. This policy was so loathed by many
Cypriot barons, and in particular Peter's brothers James
Eracles, II, 393-403; Gestes, pp.707-24; Florio
Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.87-104; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.158-
63; Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.137-68.
H Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.241-54, 259-69, 271-80, 298-
391. See also Gestes, pp.857-62, 865-66; Florio Bustron,
Chronigue, pp.135-41, 148-62, 176-243; Diomedes
Strambaldi, Chronigue, in Chroni gues d'Armadi et de
Strambaldi, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, (Paris 1891), pp.18-25;
Leontios Makharias, Recital, c.42-63, pp.43-59; Philip of
Mézières, Le Songe du Vieil Pèlerin, extract cited in Mas
Latrie, Histoire, III, 115-16; Amaury of Tyre's election
charter of 1306, in 'Documents chypriotes du debut du XIVe
siècle, ed. C. Kohier, EQk, XI, (1905-8), 440-52, at 444-
52, and in Mas Latrie, Histoire, II, 101-2. For more
details on this dispute, see also Edbury, The Kingdom of
Cyprus, pp.109-31; Hill, Histor y of c yprus, II, 219-69.
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and John of Lusignan, that they were probably directly
involved in the king's murder at Nicosia in 1369.
From 1291 onwards, Cypriot kings also feared an imminent
Mamluk invasion, for they could no longer rely on
Christian territories on the mainland to act as a buffer
between themselves and the Muslims. In addition, the fall
of Acre attracted both the Genoese and the Venetians to
Cyprus in far greater numbers than ever before, which was
good for the prosperity of Famagusta, but meant that the
Lusignans found themselves embroiled in the constant
struggles between the two trading nations. During most of
this period, the Cypriots tended to favour the Venetians,
and felt that Genoa was abusing her trading privileges in
order to cover up the corrupt activities of her merchants.
This situation deteriorated steadily in the course of the
fourteenth century, and led to a Genoese raid on Paphos in
1316, followed by another more serious incursion in
1373, 38
 which was itself only a preliminary offensive
3? Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.259-76; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.408-26; Strambaldi, Chroni g ue, pp.35-114;
Leontios Makharias, Recital, c.90-281, pp.81-269; William
of Machaut, La Prise d'Alexandrie ou chronigue du roi
Pierre ler de Lusi gnan, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, (Geneva
1877), pp.l9-265. The above chroniclers, and in particular
Leontios Makharias (c.234-81, pp.215-69), generally claim
that Peter I was murdered because he became an insane
tyrant. However, modern scholars have shown that Peter's
high taxes and blatant disregard for local customs had
more to do with it. See J. Richard, 'La revolution de 1369
dans le royaume de Chypre, Bibliothègue de l'Ecole des
Chartes, CX (1952), 108-23; P. Edbury, 'The Murder of King
Peter I of Cyprus (1359-1369)', Journal of Medieval
History , VI, (1980) 219-33; idem, 'The Crusading Policy of
King Peter I of Cyprus, 1359-1369', in The Eastern
Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades, ed.
P.M. Holt, (Warminster 1977), pp.90-105; idein, The Kingdom
of Cyprus, pp.175-79. for more details of Peter's naval
campaigns, see below, pp.221-22.
38 For a brief outline of these disputes up to 1373,
see Edbury, The Kin gdom of Cyprus, pp.109-il, 132-33, 155-
56, 199-204. 1316 and 1373 raids: see below, pp.181-B2.
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before the invasion of 1374. This last attack resulted in
the Genoese conquest of Famagusta, which was not finally
recaptured by the Cypriots until 1464. It also caused
further splits in the Cypriot nobility, for it gave Peter
I's widow Eleanor of Aragon a chance to seek revenge
against many of her husband's killers by siding with the
Genoese 40
Returning to the earliest days of crusader rule on Cyprus,
it has been suggested that Richard I's initial invasion
was made easier by the fact that Byzantine control over
the island had crumbled, and had been replaced by Isaac
Comnenus's loathed and inefficient administration.
Similarly, from the mid-twelfth century onwards the
Armenians became virtually independent because Byzantine
power on the Cilician plain collapsed. 41 The leading
Leontios Makharias, Recital, c.378-531, pp.359-525;
Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.155-217; Chronjgue d'Amadi,
pp.444-73; Florio Bustron, Chronjgue, pp.302-32. See also
Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, pp.204-il. For details of
the recapture of Famagusta in 1464, see Hill, Histor y of
Cyprus, III, pp.589-91.
40 Eventually Eleanor broke off her alliance with the
Genoese, but still had Peter's brother John of Lusignan
(titular prince of Antioch) murdered. See Leontios
Makharias, Recital, c.355, p.335, c.423, pp.403-5, c.460,
p.445. For more details on Eleanor's career, see Hill
History of Cyprus, II, 417-27. Hill follows the
traditional line that John of Lusignan had little to do
with Peter's murder. This is challenged by Edbury, 'The
Murder of King Peter', 223-27.
41 For more details on Armenian expansion until the
accession of Leon II in 1187, see the Constable Sempad,
Chronigue attribue au Connétable Smbat, ed. and trans. G.
Dédéyan, (Paris 1980), pp.45-58; idem, Chroni gue d
Royaume de la Petite Arménie, RHC Arm. I, 610-28; Michael
the Syrian, Chronigue, RI-IC Arm. I, 324-96; Vahram of
Edessa, Chroni g ue Rimée des Rois de la Petite Arménie,
Arm. I, 493-510; T.S.R. Boase, 'The History of the
Kingdom', in The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, ed. T.S.R.
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figure amongst the Armenians at this time was Leon II,
ruler of the powerful Roupenid dynasty. During the 1180s
and 90s Leon worked hard to unify his people and to stamp
out any resistance to his rule from the other leading
families in Cilicia. This process culminated in his
coronation as the first king of Armenia in 1198, a title
bestowed on him by the German emperor Henry VT. 42 Leon's
decision to become a king rather than a mere warlord also
belonged to a wider policy of 'westernization', which
included the granting of lands and privileges to the
Italian city states and the Military Orders. This policy
was intended to strengthen Leon's position internally,
whilst at the same time bringing financial and military
assistance against the Seijuk Turks of Anatolia. After
Leon's death in 1219, similar strategies were adopted by
his successors, many of whom also agreed to recognize
papal supremacy, or even replace the Armenian Church with
Roman Catholicism, in exchange for more western aid
against the Muslims.43
However, from the rnid-1260s onwards these measures could
not halt the relentless Mamluk attacks carried out on
Cilicia by Baybars and his successors, who 'made a desert
of the land of the Armenians' . For a while the Armenians
could depend on their Mongol allies, who had defeated the
Seijuks during the 1240s, to protect them against this
threat, 45 but it gradually became apparent that the
42 Constable Sembat, Chroniq, ed. Dédéyan, pp.58-81;
Boase, 'History of the Kingdom', pp.1S-19.
See below, pp.260-61, 266-77, 284-90.
Samuel of Ani, Extrait de la Chronographie de
Samuel d'Ani, RHC Arm. I, 468.
Seljuk defeat: Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, p.461;
Boase, 'History of the Kingdom', p.25. The Mongol alliance
had been established during the late 1240s and 1250s. See
Constable Sempad, Chronigue, RHC Arm. I, 646-47, 651;
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Mongols were often too far away to send reinforcements to
Cilicia every time the Mamluks were about to attack. In
addition, the Mongols themselves were unreliable and
unpredictable, and in 1307 they even murdered the Armenian
king Leon IV. Hence the Armenians could do very little to
prevent the Mamluks from organizing ever larger invasions,
which eventually culminated in the fall of Sis, the
Armenian capital, in 1375.46
In some ways, the history of Cilician Armenia was very
similar to that of Frankish Greece. Here, the Franks and
the Venetians were able to capture Constantinople, and
thereafter conquer much of the Byzantine empire, because
their Greek opponents remained divided or even leaderless
throughout the period of the Fourth Crusade. 47 Thus from
1204 onwards Boniface of Montferrat, one of the most
idem, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.98-100; Vahram of Edessa,
Chroni g ue Rimée, p.519; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of
Gregory Abu'l Fara.j, the son of Aaron1 the Hebrew
Physician, commonl y known as Bar Hebraus, trans. E. A.
Wallis Budge, (Oxford 1932), p.418; Boase, 'History of the
Kingdom', p.25.
46 1307: Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, p.466. For a
brief history of Cilician Armenia, 1198-1375, and more
details on Mamluk and Mongol attacks, see Boase, 'History
of the Kingdom', pp.19-33, and below, pp.245-46.
For the conquest of Constantinople and the
background to the Fourth crusade, see Geoffrey of
Villehardouin, La conguëte de Constantinople, ed. M.N. de
Wailly, (Paris 1882), pp.2-iSO; Robert of Clan, La
conguête de Constantinop le, ed P. Lauer, (Paris 1924),
c.1-81, pp.1-81; Libro de los fechos et conguistas del
princi pado de la Morea, ed. A. Morel-Fatio, (Geneva 1885),
c.1-52, pp.1-14; Livre de la con gueste de la princée de
l'Amorée. Chronigue de Morée (1204-1305), ed. J. Longnon,
(Paris 1911), c.6-56, pp.3-17; Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum
Venetum, ed. E. Pastorello, RISNS, XII(a), (1938), 276-79;
Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, MGHSS, XXIII (1874),
882-84; Nicetas Choniates, Historia, ed. J.P. Migne, PG,
CXXXIX (1894), cols.919-66. See also J. Longnon, L'Empire
Latin de Constantinople et la Principauté de Morée, (Paris
1949), pp.19-48; J. Godfrey, 1204, The Unhol y Crusade,
(Oxford 1980), pp.11-133.
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important leaders of the crusade, and Baldwin of
Flanders, the new Latin emperor, swept through northern
Greece, occupying cities and castles whose demoralized
garrisons usually surrendered straight away. 48
 Indeed,
Boniface of Montferrat did not meet any serious resistance
until he reached Corinth and Nauplia, 'two of the
strongest cities in the world', which only surrendered in
1210 and 1211-12 respectively.49
Following the initial conquests of 1204-05, several new
Frankish and Venetian states were set up around the
Aegean. The Latin empire itself encompassed Thrace and the
northern fringes of Asia Minor, 50
 while Macedonia and
northern Thessaly formed the kingdom of Thessalonika,
48 Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, p.885;
Villehardouin, La Conguéte, pp.l60-78, 190-92; Robert of
Clan,	 La	 Con g uëte,	 c.99-11l,	 pp.96-105;	 Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, cols.983-87, 1023-27; George
Acropolites, Annales, ed. J.P. Migne, P0, CXL (1887),
cols.999-1002; L. de los f., c.52, p.14; Nicephorus
Gregoras, Byzantina histonia, ed. L. Schopen and I.
Bekker, CHSB, (3 vols, 1839-55), I, 14.
Quote: Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.192. See also
L. de la c., c.99-103, pp.32-33; L. de los f., c.92-93,
pp.23-4, c.96-105, pp.24-26; Nicetas Choniates, Historia,
cols.991, 998, and see below, pp.305-6.
50 The borders of the Latin empire were established at
the time of the Fourth Crusade. See G.F.L. Tafel and G.M.
Thomas, LJrkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte
der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Bzanz
und die Levante, Fontes rerum Austriacarum, (3 vols,
Vienna 1856-57), I, 473-79, 491-92, 494-95. See also
Nicephorus Gregoras, Byzantina historia, I, 14; Martin da
Canal, La Chronigue des Veneciens, ed. G. Galvani,
Archivio storico italiano, VIII (1845), c.58-61, pp.343-
45.
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which was established by Boniface of Montferrat. 51 Further
south, Boniface granted the duchy of Athens, which covered
Boeotia and Attica, to Othon de la Roche, who remained in
Greece until the 1220s. 52 Below Athens, the Franks also
overran the Peloponnese, which formed the principality of
Achaea and was held by the famous Villehardouin family
until the early period of the fourteenth century. 53 In
addition, the Venetians, who had played such a vital role
in the Fourth Crusade itself, established a number of
important colonies in the Aegean, particularly at Modon,
Coron, Constantinople and Crete. 54 They also dominated
51 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp.154-56; Robert of
Clan, La Congute, c.110, pp.104-5; L. de la c., c.67,
pp.20-21; Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, p.885.
for the foundation of the duchy of Athens, see L.
de la c., p.61n1; aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica,
p.885; Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'Empereur Henri
de Constantinople, ed. J. Longnon, (Paris 1948), c.681,
p.115. The duchy later also incorporated the city of
Thebes. See L. de los f., c.190, p.44; Innocent III,
Innocenti III Romani Pontificus O pera Omnia, ed. J.P.
Migne, k, CCXIV-CCXVII, CCXVI, no.110, col.470. See also
Longnon, L'ernp ire latin, pp.75-76, 119, 166; W. Miller,
The Latins in the Levant: a Histor y of Frankish Greece
(1204-1455), (London 1908), pp.34-35, 66; J. Longnon,
'Problèmes de l'histoire de la pnincipauté de Morée', in
Journal des Savants, (1946), 77-92, 147-61, at 88-90.
L. de la c., c.104-36, pp.34-49; L. de los f.,
c.105-45, pp.26-34. For a brief history of Latin states in
southern Greece until the death of Isabelle of
Villehardouin in 1311, see K.M. Setton, 'The Frankish
States in Greece, 1204-1311', in HO, II (1962), 235-74.
Modon and Coron: Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum,
pp.283, 367; Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia, ed. L.A.
Muratori, RIS, XXIII (1733), col.986; Martin da Canal, La
Chronigue des Veneciens, c.67, pp..349, 351; Marino Sanudo
(the Younger), Vite de' Duchi di Venezia, ed. L.A.
Muratori, RIS, XXII (1733), col.536; Tafel and Thomas,
Urkunden, II, 97-100; L. de la c., c.190, p.68. See also
Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.152-53; K. Andrews,
Castles of the Morea, (Princeton 1953), pp.13-15, 58-61.
Constantinople: Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.282;
Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia, cols.984-86; Robert of
Clan, La Conguête, c.107, p.102; Villehardouin, k
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numerous islands which lay within the Venetian sphere of
influence, or were colonized by individual Venetian
citizens. These included Corfu, Cephalonia and Euboea,55
as well as the Cyclades, which formed the duchy of the
Archipelago under the rule of the Sanudo dukes of Naxos.56
Other islands were controlled by rival powers, most
notably the Genoese, who held Chios and several
neighbouring trading posts for most of the fourteenth,
Conq uête, p.136. See also R.L. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of
Constantinople, 1204-1261', in HC, II (1962), 187-233, at
193-95; J.K. Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the
Archipelago, (Oxford 1915), pp.46-47. The Venetians bought
Crete from Boniface of Montferrat in 1204, and colonized
it after a brief struggle with Genoese pirates based
there. See Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.280;
Marino Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, cols.533, 536; Tafel and
Thomas, Urkunden, I, 512-15; Andrea Navagerio, Storia
Venezia, cols.984-85, 987-89; Martin da Canal, La
Chroni que des Veneciens, c.68, p.351; See also Andrea
Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, pp.283-84, 367; Fotheringham,
Marco Sanudo, pp.81-87.
Corfu: Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.283;
Marino Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, col.536; Andrea Navagerio,
Storia Venezia, cols.986-87; Martin da Canal, La Chronique
des Veneciens, c.64, p.347. For the subsequent history of
Corfu, see Miler, The Latins in the Levant, pp.512-49.
Cephalonia: Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.284. The
rulers of Cephalonia largely remained independent
throughout the thirteenth century, and avoided coming
under direct Achaean rule until 1324. For these and
subsequent events, see P.W. Topping, 'The Morea, 1311-
1364', in HO, III, (1975) 104-40, at 121-23; Miller, The
Latins in the Levant, pp.260, 292. Euboea: Venice
augmented its power over Euboea in 1204 and 1209, and
ruled the island directly from 1216 onwards. See Tafel and
Thomas, Urkunden, I, 469, II, 90-96, 175-84; Andrea
Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.284; Longnon, L'empire
latin, pp.119-20; Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.76-
79.
Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.282; Marino
Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, col.545; Andrea Navagerio, Storia
Venezia, col.986; IL Sauger, Histoire nouvelle des anciens
ducs de 1'Archipel, (Paris 1699), extract cited in
Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.113-22, at pp.113, 115-17.
See also Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.40-44, 56-61, 68-
80.
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fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,57
To a large extent, this massive expansion of Latin power
was only made possible by further instability and internaj
fighting amongst the Greeks. In the wake of the Fourth
Crusade, the Greeks established three new states on the
edges of their former empire, whose capitals la y at
Trebizond, Nicaea and Arta in Epirus. 58
 All three of those
lordships, and in particular the latter two,	 saw
themselves as the natural heirs to the Byzantine empire.
Furthermore, the powerful Bulgars, who were often allied
with an equally aggressive tribe of horsemen known as the
Cumans, coveted the wealth of Constantinople just as much
during the thirteenth century as they had done before
1204. All these rivals posed a major threat to the Franks
of central and northen Greece, but because they were so
keen to prevent each other from being the first to
recapture Constantinople, they tended to fight amongst
themselves, instead of presenting a united front against
Genoese involvement with Chios probably began
during the 1260s, when Genoa allied itself with the Greeks
against Venice. See H. Balard, La Romanie génoise (XIIe
debut du XVe siècles, (2 vols., Rome and Genoa 1978), I,
38-55, 119-26; idem, 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204-
1566)', in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Hedkteranca
after 1204, ed. B. Arbel, B. Hamilton, D. Jacoby, (London
1989), pp.158-74, at pp.161-71; Longnon, 'Problèmes de
l'histoire de la principauté de Morée' , 16i . For the later
history of Chios, see also W. Miller, Essaysq thjjj
Orient, (Cambridge 1921), pp.298-313.
58 Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, pp.885-86;
Nicephoras Gregoras, B yzantina historia, I, 13; Ljje los
f., c.53, p.14, c.54, p.15; Villehardouin, jj9jffi,
pp.178, 186. For a brief outline, see also Wolff, 'The
Latin Empire', 200-201; Miller, The Latins in the Levaj,
pp.41-42; D.M. Nicol, The Des potate of E pijj, (Oxford
1957), pp.11-23.
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the Latins. 59
 These rivalries were only resolved after the
battle of Pelagonia in 1259, when Michael VIII Palaeologus
of Nicaea (1259-82) defeated the combined forces of Achaea
and Epirus. 60
 Only then did he feel secure enough to
attack Constantinople itself, which the Franks finally
lost in 1261.61
By this point, however, Latin territories all over
mainland Greece •
 were already coming under far greater
military pressure. Indeed, Thessaloniki had fallen to
Theodore Comnenus, the despot of Epirus (1224-30), as
early as 1224, despite Honorius III's efforts to organize
a crusade for the defence of the city. 62
 At about the same
For a brief outline of how rivalries between
Epirus, Bulgaria and Bicosia, as well as serbia and
Albania, saved Constantinople until 1261, see Wolff, 'The
Latin Empire', 187-233, particularly at 210, 220-33.
60 George Acropolites, Annales, cols.1195-99; George
Pachymeres, De Michaele et Andronico Palaeologus libri
XIII, ed. I. Bekker, CHSB, (2 vols, 1835), I, 85-89;
Nicephorus Gregoras, B yzantina historia, I, 74-75, 79-80;
L. de la c., c.254-329, pp.92-123; L. de los f., c.246-
309, pp.55-69 Marino Sanudo (Torsello, or the Elder),
Istoria del regno di Romania sive re gno di Morea, ed. C.
Hopf, in Chroni g ues g réco-romanes inédites ou peu connues,
(Berlin 1873), pp.107-8. For the background to this
battle, see also Longnon, L'empire latin, pp.223-25; D.J.
Geanakoplos, 'Greco-Latin Relations on the eve of the
Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of Pelagonia, 1259',
Dumbarton Oaks Pa pers, VII (1953), 101-41.
61	 George	 Acropolites,	 Annales,	 cols.1207-11;
Nicephorus Gregoras, Byzantina historia, I, 85-86; Andrea
Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, pp.311, 369; George
Pachymeres, De Michaele, I, 140-48; Andrea Navagerio,
Storia Venezia, col.199; Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.115; L.
de los f., c.84-85, p.21, c.241, p.54; L. de la c., c.83-
85, pp.26-27.
62 Salonika appears to have fallen late in 1224, after
a lengthy siege. See Nicephorus Gregoras, Byzantina
historia, I, 25-28; George Acropolites, Annales,
cols.1035-38; B. Sinogowitz, 'Zur Eroberung Thessalonikes
im Herbst 1224', BZ, XLV (1952), 28. Theodore's conquests
in northern Greece preceding this siege are badly
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time that the Latins were being pushed out of northern
Greece, they also lost their coastal outposts in Asia
Minor following John Ducas Vatatzes (1222-54) of Nicaea's
victory at the battle of Pimanon in 1225.63 In addition,
the Franks of Constantinople rarely enjoyed any real
authority beyond the walls of their city during the
thirteenth century, because Thrace was regularly overrun
by Greek and Bulgar invaders, most notably in 1206, 1235
and 1236.64
Further west, Michael Palaeologus's triumph at the battle
of Pelagonia also resulted in the capture of William II of
Villehardouin, prince of Achaea (1246-78), who only
managed to secure his release by offering the Greeks
Mistra, Old Mania and Monemvasia as a ransom (1262).
These three powerful fortresses were located in the south
recorded, although some information can be gleaned from
letters regarding Honorius's crusade. See Re g esta I-Ionorii
papae III, ed. P. Pressutti, (2 vols., New York 1978), I,
no.3478, p.565, II, no.3877, p.56 (showing that by March
1222 Theodore had taken the Macedonian city of Serres),
nos. 4059, 4060, p.83, nos. 4353, 4354, 4358, p.l34,
no.4758, p.207, no.5270, p.298, no.5464, p.333. After the
fall of Salonika, Honorius's crusade collapsed. See
Benvenuto di San Giorgio, Historia Montisferrati, ed. L.A.
Muratori, RIS, XXIII, (1733), cols.381, 382. See also
Nicol, The Des potate, pp.4'7-5l, 57-64; Longnon, L'empire
latin, pp.162-64.
63 Nicephorus Gregoras, B yzantina historia, I, 25;
Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, p.911; George
Acropolites, Annales, cols.1038-39. Vatatzes's victory
eventually also enabled him to dominate wide areas on the
European side of the Bosphorus, and forced the Franks to
abandon efforts to retake the Macedonian city of Serres
from Theodore of Epirus. See Philip Mousket, Chronigue
Rimée, ed. baron de Reiffenberg, in Collection de
Chronigues bel ges inédites, (2 vols, Brussels 1838), II,
408-9, and below, p.357.
64 1206: see below, p.358. 1235 and 1236: see below,
pp . 359-60.
See above, p.29n60.
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eastern Peloponnese, and consequently provided the Greeks
with a perfect bridgehead from which to reconquer Latin
territories to the north and west. This process continued
sporadically until the 1420s, when the last Frankish
remnants of the principality were swallowed up and
incorporated into the Byzantine province of Mistra.66
From the mid-thirteenth century onwards, Michael
Palaeologus and his son Andronicus II (1282-1328) also
launched several attacks against the duchy of Athens and
neighbouring Latin areas to the north of Achaea. 67
 In
order to stop these incursions duke Walter I of Athens
employed a ferocious band of Catalan mercenaries who had
previously fought for Andronicus II against the Turks.
However, after an argument broke out between Walter and
the Catalans over pay, they turned against their new
employer, and in March 1311 they defeated him along with
his Achaean allies at the battle of Cephissus. 68 As a
result, the Catalans managed to capture the entire duchy
66 Greek attacks from Mistra were most common until
the death of Michael Palaeologus in 1282 (see L. de la c.,
c.330-97, pp.123-54. , c.456-70, pp.l76-82, c.494-96,
pp.193-94; L. de los f., c.310-74, pp.69-83; Marino
Sanudo, Istoria, pp.116-18, 120-34; George Pachymeres, De
Michaele, I, 204-9, 324-36, 410-13, 508-19; Geanakoplos,
'Greco-Latin Relations', 110n48), during the 1320s (see L.
de los f., c.641-54, pp.l40-43; L. de la c., pp.404-5;
Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.202; Miller, The Latins in the
Levant, pp.258-59; Longnon, L'em p ire latin, p.311), and
during the 1420s (see ibid, pp.348-52). For the history of
Mistra under the Greeks, see S. Runciman, Mistra, (London
1980), pp.36-117.
Marino Sanudo, Istoria, pp.120-21, 136; George
Pachymeres, De Michaele, I, 322-36.
68 Nicephorus Gregoras, B yzantina historia, I, 244-54;
L. de los f., c.546-51, pp.119-20; L. de la c., p.402;
Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.117; Ramon Muntaner, L'expedició
dels Catalans a Orient, ed. L. Nicolau d'Olwer,
(Barcelona, 1926), c.240, pp.177-82; K.M. Setton, Catalan
Domination of Athens, 1311-1388, (cambridge MA, 1948),
pp.6-13; Longnon, L'emp ire latin, pp.295-301.
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of Athens, which they continued to rule in relative
tranquility until the 1380s, 69 when a rival company of
Navarese mercenaries, aided b y the lords of Corinth, made
inroads into Attica and southern Boeotia. 70
 By this point,
however, these clashes were becoming irrelevant, as the
Turks began to overrun all of Greece and incorporate it
into the Ottoman empire. This process continued during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the last Venetian
colonies and Latin held islands in the area, including the
kingdom of Cyprus, gradually fell under Turkish control.71
So far, the erosion of Latin territories from the mid-
thirteenth century onwards has been discussed almost
purely in terms major external invasions by the Greeks of
Nicaea, the Ayubids, Mamluks and Ottoman Turks. However,
apart from these offensives, there were three other
factors which contributed to the fall of Christian states
in the east, even if they were not as decisive. Firstly,
numerous rebellions organized by native Greeks and Muslims
tended to undermine the Latins. It has already been noted,
for example, that the Templars left Cyprus in 1192 after
a major Greek uprising at Nicosia. Another such incident
involved no less than 15,000 Muslim peasants, who
ransacked Jerusalem in 1229.72
69 Ramon Muntaner, L'expedició, c.240-44, pp.182-95;
L. de los f., c.552-55, pp.120-21; Setton, Catalan
Domination, pp.13-20. For a history of Catalan Athens
until the 1380s, see K.M. Setton, 'The Catalans in Greece,
1311-1380', in	 III (1975), 167-224.
70 Setton, 'The Catalans in Greece', pp.215-24.
71 For a brief outline of Turkish conquests in the
eastern Mediterranean, see H. Inalcik, 'The Ottoman Turks
and the Crusades, 1329-1451' and 'The Ottoman Turks and
the Crusades, 1451-1522', HC, VI (1989), 222-75, 311-53.
72 Nicosia: see below, p.l8V Jerusalem: see below,
pp.135-36.
33
Secondly, many islands and coastal areas in the eastern
Mediterranean were frequently ravaged by pirates and
seaborne attackers. Cyprus, for example, was targeted by
Greek raiders in 1192, and other pirates from Rhodes in
1303. In 1220 the Muslims also sacked Limassol because
the Franks were using it to supply the Fifth Crusade in
Egypt, whilst in 1271 Baybars made another failed attack
on the town in order to divert the Latins' attention away
from his assault on Montfort. 74
 Moreover, during the
middle years of the fourteenth century both Hugh IV (1329-
59) and Peter I of Cyprus had to deal with large numbers
of Turks and marauders 'who went pillaging and murdering,
and did great damage'. 75 Indeed, piracy appears to have
been particularly common throughout the Mediterranean at
this time, for in 1358 the ruler of Achaea granted the
castellany of Corinth to the Florentine lord Niccolo
Acciajuoli, whose specific task it was to defend and
recolonize surrounding areas devastated by Greek, Turkish
and Catalan raiders.76
Finally, many Christian states in the east were torn apart
by civil wars between political rivals and baronial
factions. Such clashes have already been discussed in some
detail on Cyprus, because this particular crusader state
hardly ever experienced any other form of warfare.
However, internal struggles were just as common elsewhere,
including Cilician Armenia, where a group of
traditionalist nobles and churchmen frequently rebelled
against the pro-western reforms introduced by Leon II and
See below, pp.175, 191.
14 See below, p.175.
Leontios Makharios, Recital, c.64, p.61.
76 See below, p.339.
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many of his successors. 77
 Further south, the Cypriot war
of the late 1220s and early 1230s also spread to the
kingdom of Jerusalem, where the Lombards of Tyre and the
Ibelins of Acre remained at loggerheads until Frederick
II's troops were finally driven out of Tyre in 1242.78 As
we shall see, this was only one of many internecine
struggles in the Holy Land, which virtually continued
right up until the fall of Acre in 1291. Similarly, the
history of Frankish Greece provides us with countless
examples of damaging conflicts between fellow Latins.
Hence between 1208 and 1209 the Latin emperor Henry (1206-
16) had to deal with a rebellion by Lombard barons in
Thessaly, who were plotting to overthrow Boniface of
Montferrat's infant son and heir Demetrius. 80
 From the
early fourteenth century onwards, both the Angevin princes
of Achaea and the Aragonese dukes of Catalan Athens were
also increasingly absent in western Europe, and rarely
even visited Greece. 8 ' As a result, central authority in
See below, pp.265-69, 285-86.
78 1242: Gestes, pp.732-35; Philip of Novara, The Wars
of Frederick II, pp.178-84.For an outline of this entire
dispute, both in Cyprus and the Holy Land, see ibid,
pp.61-184; Edbury, The Kingdom of C yprus, pp.55-69, 81-82;
Riley-Smith, The Feudal Nobilt y , pp.159-84, 198-212.
See below, pp.142-50.
80 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.560-687, pp.55-118. See also Longnon, L'em pire latin,
pp.106-il; Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.72-75, and
see below, pp.382-83.
81 The Angevins gained control over Achaea by virtue
of a treaty made between William II of Villehardouin and
Charles of Anjou during 1260s, whereby the latter
inherited the principality because William died without a
male heir. See L. de la c., c.415, p.160, c.441-55,
pp.170-76; L. de los f., c.413-14, p.91, c.418, p.92;
Longnon, L,empire latin, pp.230-40; Marino Sanudo,
Istoria, pp.118-19. The ducal title of Athens passed to
the Aragonese royal family soon after the Catalan conquest
of 1311. See Ramon Muntaner, L'ex pedició, c.242, pp.185-
86; Setton, 'The Catalans in Greece', pp.172-74.
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the region deteriorated rapidly, leaving the Venetians,
the Hospitallers, the Navarese, the Catalans, the
archbishops of Patras, the Acciajuoli lords of Corinth and
the Greeks of Mistra to fight it out amongst themselves,
and to cope as well as they could against the Ottoman
Turks 82
The history of the Latin east from 1187 onwards was
therefore turbulent and at times even anarchic, but
amongst all the warfare and bloodshed it is also possible
to identify certain distinct political phases. In
particular, it is clear that there was a period of western
and Armenian expansion during the first half of the
thirteenth century, which was facilitated by in-fighting
amongst the Greeks and the Muslims. In Greece this was
brought to an end by Michael Palaeologus, who dominated
his Epirote rivals after the battle of Pelagonia and
finally captured Constantinople in 1261. At about the same
time a similar process of unification also took place in
Egypt and Syria, whose Mamluk rulers rarely had to deal
with protracted civil wars after 1260. Thus the Mamluk and
Byzantine empires were being strengthened and unified just
as many Latin and Armenian territories were experiencing
more and more baronial rebellions and internal struggles.
During the fourteenth century the divided and leaderless
westerners of southern and central Greece eventually found
themselves in the same predicament against the even more
powerful Ottoman empire. It is possible to conclude,
therefore, that their initial sucesses and subsequent
failures had relatively little to do with the Latins
themselves, for their fate was largely determined by
political events which were beyond their control.
82 For a brief outline of events in central and
southern Greece and the steady decline in central
authority there, c.1307-146O, see Longnon, L'em p ire latin,
pp.292-355, particularly pp.314-16; Bon, La Morée frangue,
pp.231-32, 261.
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The changing fortunes of the Latins can also be used to
illustrate their military strengths and weaknesses On the
plus side, it is clear that they usually dominated the
sea, especially because of the immense naval power of the
Italian city states, whose war fleets initially outclassed
and outnumbered anything the Greeks and Muslims could
muster. Thus the defenders of Constantinople appear to
have been powerless to stop the Venetians from scaling the
city's sea walls in 1203 and 1204.83 Similarly, it seems
that Isaac Comnenus lacked a fleet with which to prevent
the English from landing on Cyprus, whilst the total
absence of any sea walls at several crusader sites,
including the town of Pilgrims' Castle, suggests that the
Muslims were often equally under strength in this
respect. 84 Indeed, the Mamluk raid on Limassol in 1271 is
specifically said to have failed because the Muslim
sailors leading the attack were inexperienced and
incompetent, and therefore steered their ships onto reefs.
Although the Ottoman Turks later rectified this problem by
building up a large navy of their own, the Latins
therefore enjoyed far more control over the Mediterranean
than their opponents for much of the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries.85
Their great skill and courage in battle appears to have
been another factor which helped the Franks to succeed.
The many victories which they scored over numerically
superior opponents, such as the defeat allegedly inflicted
83 See below, pp. 297-98.
84 Cyprus: see above, pp.16-17. Pilgrims' Castle: C.
Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle ('Athlit). The
ancient tell and the outer defences' QDAP, III (1933-34),
145-64, at 145.
85 See below, p.175. See also Inalcik, 'The Ottoman
Turks and the Crusades, 1329-1451', 222-26.
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on 33,000 Bulgars by a mere 2,000 Franks in 1208, suggest
that in the right conditions heavily armed and well
protected knights could still outfight almost any
opponent. 86 This in turn appears to have given the Latins
an almost legendary warrior status amongst their enemies,
and it has even been suggested that in 1260 the Mongols
failed to attack Christian territories in the Holy Land
because they feared a confrontation with the supposedly
invincible Franks.8'1
As the thirteenth century progressed, however, the
inherent weaknesses of the Latins became more and more
apparent. Most notably, they very often found themselves
massively outnumbered by the land armies of their various
opponents. At the battle of La Forbie, for example, the
Khwarizmians were said to have numbered 20,000 horsemen,
without including their Egyptian allies. 88 It has also
been calculated that the numerous Mamluk invasions of
Palestine, Syria and Cilician Armenia undertaken by
Baybars and his successors rarely involved fewer that
12,000 troops, and sometimes many more. 89
 Indeed, at the
final siege of Tripoli in 1289 the Muslims reputedly
deployed 30 archers against each individual arrow slit in
the city walls, to prevent the Christian defenders from
86 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.543-44, pp.46-47; letter from the emperor Henry to
Innocent III, September 1208, RHGF, XIX (18 ), 514.
87 P. Jackson, 'The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260',
XCV (1980), 481-514, at 496-99.
88 Eracles, II, 428; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.217.
89 D. Ayalon, 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk
Army', Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies, XV,
(1953), 203-28, 448-76, XVI, (1954), 57-90. See in
particular XV, 222 and XVI, 70-71. al-Makrizi, Histoire
des Sultans, 1(b), 151, says that Baybars used 12,000
troops in his campaign against the Seijuk Turks in 1277.
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firing back. 9° Further afield, contemporaries reported
that 14,000 Cumans, as well as countless other troops
under the command of the Bulgar leader loannitsa, were
present when the first Latin emperor Baldwin was defeated
and captured outside Adrianople in 1205.91 In 1374 14,000
troops and sailors also participated in the Genoese
invasion of Cyprus; a clear indication why the Lusignans
feared Genoa just as much as Mamluk Egypt after the fall
of Acre in 1291.92
Latin settlers in the east had little hope of matching
these opponents man for man. It is unlikely, for example,
that they committed more than 2,000 knights to the battle
of La Forbie, whilst it has already been mentioned that a
similar force took on sixteen times as many Bulgars in
1208. In 1291 the Muslim besiegers of Acre were likewise
said to have outnumbered the city's entire population of
40,000 people, and as a result the 200 knights and 500
footsoidjers sent there by king Henry of Cyprus must have
seemed like a drop in the ocean! 94
 The Armenians often
experienced similar difficulties, for there are several
recorded cases of just a few thousand of their men
confronting Mamluk armies which may have been ten times
90 Gestes, pp.804, 806-7.
91 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.208, and see pp.206-
14.
92 çhroni g ue d'Amadi, p.446; Strambaldi, Chronigue,
P .i5 5; Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, p.302; Edbury, The
Kingdomof Cyprus, p.2O4.
La Forbie: Riley-Smith in Ibn al-Furat, Selections,
p. l73n2.
Gestes, pp.806-7; Marino Sanudo, Ljher sietorum,
p.231. Contemporary figures for the number of Muslim
besiegers at Acre vary considerably. See Marshall, Warfare
in the Latin East, p.219,
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larger. 95
 Some of these huge differences in troop numbers
should no doubt be put down to the imagination of medieval
chroniclers, but even allowing for contemporary
exaggeration, both the Latins and the Armenians clearly
suffered from a desperate shortage of manpower.
Inevitably, this problem was most acute in geographically
exposed areas, which were far harder to defend than
islands or mountainous regions. As a result, vulnerable
crusader territories such as the coastal strip of Syria
and Palestine, or Thessaly and the Latin empire, tended to
lack money and other essential resources just as much as
soldiers in the field.
It was hoped that these difficulties could be overcome in
two ways. Firstly, regular appeals were made to western
Europe for financial aid and for crusaders to come and
fight in the east. this tactic did bring some relief,
particularly during the Third Crusade and the crusade of
St.Louis (1248-54), who refortified many sites in the Holy
Land after he had been defeated in Egypt. Both Louis and
the papacy also donated considerable amounts of money
toward the upkeep of fortifications at Constantinople,
Antioch, Jaffa and elsewhere. 97 Secondly, the Franks often
made alliances with their neighbours in the east, which
had the dual advantage of boosting troop numbers and at
See below, p.247.
96 Third Crusade: see below, p.52. Crusade of
St.Louis: see below, pp.50, 54.
Constantinople: Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis,
p.78; Philip Mousket, Chroni gue Rimée, pp.622-23; Wolff,
'The Latin Empire', pp.226-33. For more evidence on the
terrible poverty of Constantinople, see also R.L. Wolff,
'Mortgage and redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and
the Latin Empire of Constantinople', S peculum, XXIX,
(1954), 45-84. Antioch: Joinville, Histoire de Saint
Louis, pp.258, 286; Matthew paris, Chronica Maiora, V,
228. Jaffa: Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p.306;
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp.141-42.
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the same time encouraging potential enemies to fight each
other. Thus by joining forces with the Bulgar leader Slav,
the Latin emperor Henry managed to defeat both the Cumans
and Slav's rival Boril, thereby stabilizing his northern
frontier and neutralizing the Bulgar threat in general.98
Similarly, both the Armenians and the Franks of Antioch
made spectacular territorial gains by participating in the
Mongol invasion of Syria.99
However, by relying on external allies, the Latins were
again placing their destiny in the hands of others, for
any number of unforseen factors could change events
dramatically. Frederick II, for example, had been unable
or unwilling to go on crusade for many years before he
finally fulfilled his vow and came east in l228.
Similarly, most crusaders tended to return home when it
was convenient for them to do so rather than the Franks in
the east. Thus in 1218 Andrew II of Hungary left the Fifth
Crusade before it had even reached Egypt, where several
further disputes between eastern and European crusaders
later contributed to the collapse of the entire
expedition. 11 Inevitably, such problems were even
likelier to arise with Muslim, Greek or Mongol allies, who
were often unreliable because of strong cultural and
religious differences. Hence Franks who fought at the
battle of Pelagonia in 1259 later accused their Epirote
98 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.504-49, pp.28-50, particularly at c.506, p.30, c.546-49,
pp.48-50.
See below, p.tS.
For a brief outline of Frederick's crusading plans
and problems up to 1228, see T.C. Van Cleve, 'The Crusade
of Frederick II',	 II (1962), 429-62, at 429-51.
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.168;
Eracles, II, . For a full account of the Fifth Crusade,
see S. Runciman, A Histor y of the Crusades, (3 vols.,
Cambridge, 1951-55), III (1955), pp.147-7O.
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allies of abandoning them on the eve of the conflict,
while it has already been mentioned that in 1307 Mongol
troops ruthlessly murdered Leon IV.102
But even if their participants had the best of intentions,
many expeditions designed to help the Latins were too
small, temporary or badly organized to be of any real
assistance. In 1269, for example, an Aragonese crusade to
the Holy land enabled the Franks to launch a raid against
Muslim villages near Montfort with an army of 130
knights. 103 However, this force was far too small to
recapture any Christian territories lost to the Mamluks,
or indeed risk a direct confrontation with Baybars, who
was said to have had such a large field army operating in
the area that one contingent alone supposedly numbered
15,000 men. Moreover, during skirmishes just outside Acre
some Aragonese leaders of this campaign, declaring that
they had come to fight for Christ, were needlessly killed
because they simply charged into the enemy ranks, and were
immediately cut down by the Muslims. Hence the Aragonese
crusade had achieved nothing permanent, had wasted
Christian lives, and had provoked Baybars into carrying
out a damaging counter-raid against Acre. 104
 In addition,
it should be noted that many expeditions of this kind,
including the lord Edward's crusade to Acre between 1271
and 1272, were badly affected by disease, starvation and
102 1259: Geanakoplos, 'Greco-Latin Relations', 132-34.
1307: Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, p.466.
103 Gestes, p.767. for a brief outline of the Aragonese
crusade, see Thorau, The Lion of Eg ypt, pp.199-201.
104 Gestes, pp.767-68; Ibn al-Furat, Selections,
pp.137-39; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 77. The
figure of 15,000 Muslims was reported b y a Frankish knight
held prisoner at Saphet, who later escaped to Acre. See
Gestes, p.768.
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the harsh local weather.15
While many campaigns undertaken by the Latins did not have
the numbers, resources and overall leadership needed to
make any real impact, their opponents, and in particular
the Muslims, were getting stronger militarily as well as
politically. After the battle of Hattin, Saladin failed to
capture some Frankish strongpoints, most notably Tyre and
the crusader camp outside Acre, because various members of
his family and entourage were constantly arguing over
strategies and tactics. In addition, he found it very
difficult to maintain his field army, which was largely
composed of seasonal troops obliged to serve the sultan
during the summer in exchange for land or money. These men
tended to be badly trained, ill-disciplined and more
interested in loot than complex notions of holy war. They
were also drawn from all over Saladin's vast dominions,
and consequently felt greater loyalty toward their own
amirs and fellow countrymen than they did toward the
greater good of Is1am. By the mid-1260s, however, these
problems had largely been eradicated through various
reforms and the growing use of Mamluks, professional
soldiers who were instilled with a great sense of loyalty
toward their sultan from an early age. Hence Baybars's
campaigns during the 1260s and 70s were undertaken by a
highly skilled force of siege engineers and other troops,
none of whom ever questioned the sultan's decisions.
Indeed, in 1270 we even find Baybars attacking Margat in
the depth of winter, something which would have been
1D5 Eracles, II, 461; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, p.155;
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.455 (text B). For a brief
outline of the lord Edward's crusade, see S. Runciman,
'The Crusader States, 1243-1291', in HC, II, (1962),
pp.582-83.
106 Smail, Crusadin g Warfazi, pp.64-75.
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unthinkable during the reign of Saladin.107
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the Latin
conquests made during the first half of the thirteenth
century give a somewhat misleading impression of military
strength, for they were generally achieved because of the
internal weaknesses of the Greeks and the Muslims. In
reality, the Latins, and to some extent also the
Armenians, had so few troops at their disposal that they
could not rely on sheer weight of numbers to defend
themselves against hostile invasion forces, prevent local
people from rebelling, keep their own followers in check,
or even put an end to piracy and other forms of localized
warfare. Alliances with neighbours or help from western
Europe could only provide a temporary and somewhat
unreliable solution to this problem, which in fact got
worse after the battle of Pelagonia and the accession of
Baybars. It is against this background that the various
functions of crusader fortifications in the eastern
Mediterranean should be discussed, for the Latins relied
on castles and urban defences more than anything else to
make up for their lack of troops, and thereby address the
numerous political and military weaknesses which have been
mentioned in this chapter.
107 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 78. For
improvements in military discipline and training
introduced by Baybars, see Ayalon, 'The Mamluk Army', XVI,
67-70; Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, pp.98-100, 175, 196.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE ROLE OF FORTIFICATIONS IN THE KINGDOM OF
JERUSALEM, THE COUNTY OF TRIPOLI AND THE
PRINCIPALITY OF ANTIOCH, 1187-1291.
It has been argued that the history of the crusader states
was to a large extent dictated by events which were beyond
the control of Latin settlers in the east. They were
successful whenever their opponents were divided, or they
received help from external allies such as the Mongols or
the Franks of western Europe. On the other hand, they were
powerless to prevent crusaders from returning to the west,
or to halt the rise of Baybars; important factors which
both contributed to the fall of Acre in 1291.
Consequently, castles and urban fortifications provided
the Frankish inhabitants of Palestine and Syria with the
only reliable and permanent means of defending their
territories and compensating for their lack of troops.
Unlike European expeditions or Muslim power struggles,
such structures could last for decades, or even centuries,
and remained firmly under the control of local settlers.
A closer study of individual strongholds in the area will
not only confirm these observations, but will also shed
more light on the functions of crusader fortifications in
general.
These fortifications can be divided into categories,
depending on their size, location and design. In the
north, Margat, Chastel Blanc (Safitha) and Tortosa
represented some of the largest and most powerful
fortresses ever built by the Franks. The outer walls of
Margat, for example, enclosed a huge triangular mountain
spur which dominated the strategic coastal route between
Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. Indeed, Margat
covered such a large area that it contained a small town,
which was situated to the north of the inner citadel and
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separated from it by a rock cut moat. The citadel itself
was composed of numerous towers and buildings ranged
around an inner courtyard, whose design suggests that they
were either constructed in the first half of the twelfth
century, or date from the period after 1186, when the
Hospitallers bought Margat from its original Frankish
owner. Perhaps the most significant structure from this
later phase was the keep, a huge, round tower with walls
5.5 metres thick, which stood at the southern tip of the
fortress, and was attached to several adjoining
fortifications along the east and west curtain walls.1
The layout of Margat's defences compares very closely with
the design of Crac des Chevaliers, which was situated on
a hill top overlooking the important land corridor between
Tripoli and the Muslim interior. Crac des Chevaliers was
another former baronial castle, whose earlier
fortifications were considerably improved after the
Hospitallers acquired it in 1142.2 This was done by adding
several flanking towers and an enormous talus to the south
and west sides of the inner fortress, and subsequently
constructing a whole new curtain wall around the entire
site. As a result, Crac des Chevaliers also had awo lines
of defence, and an inner citadel which surrounded a
central courtyard. Even more significantly, the new keep
1 Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de
St-Jean de Jerusalem (1100-1310), ed. J. Delaville Le
Roulx (4 vols., Paris, 1894-1906), I, no.783, 491-496,
no.809, 505. Description based on Deschamps, La Defense du
comté de Tripoli, pp.272-84; Rey, Etude, pp.19-38; W.
MUller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, trans. J.M.
Brownjohn, (London 1966), pp.57-58; H. Kennedy, Crusader
Castles, (Cambridge 1994), pp.167-79; Lawrence, Crusader
Castles, p.88; C. Cahen, La S yrie du Nord a l'épogue des
croisades et la princi pauté frangue d'Antioche, (Paris
1940), pp.l7l-'?2.
2 Cartulaire, I, no.144, pp.116-18, no.391, pp.266-68.
Fig.3. Crac des Chevaliers. From Muller-Wiener, Castles of
the Crusaders, p.61.
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constructed by the Hospitallers did not stand in
isolation, but formed the central flanking towers along
the south curtain of the inner bailey. 3 Both Crac des
Chevaliers and Margat therefore had donjons which were
integrated with, rather than separate from, surrounding
outer defences. These major alterations appear to have
been undertaken after the devastating earthquakes of 1170
and 1202, but architectural evidence such as masonry
marks, vaulting and the type of stonework used indicate
that they were probably completed by c.1220. Bearing in
mind that the Hospitallers did not acquire Margat until
1186, this suggests that the Order carried out its
building programme in the thiry years following Saladin's
invasion of Syria.4
Tortosa, which lay about forty miles up the coast from
Tripoli, and Chastel Blanc, situated on a rocky knoll a
few miles inland, were also considerably rebuilt during
the crusader period. However, this was done at a much
earlier stage, involved very different architectural
techniques, and was carried out by the Templars rather
than the Hospitallers. Indeed, a document dating from 1152
reveals that the Tempiars had already acquired Chastel
Blanc by this stage, and were in the process of
constructing new defences at Tortosa. 5 These were
dominated by the vast, rectangular keep, which stood in
Description based on Deschamps. Le Crac des
Chevaliers, pp.142-305; Rey, Etude, pp.39-67; MUller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp.59-62; Lawrence,
Crusader Castles, pp.7'7-88; Kennedy, Crusader Castles,
pp.150-63.
Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.279-83; idem,
La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.283-84.
J.S.C. Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and the Castle of
Tortosa in Syria; an unknown document concerning the
acquisition of the fortress', EHR, LXXXIV, (1969), 278-88,
at 284-86.
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the north west corner of the site, and was flanked by two
corner towers situated at the water's edge. The land
approaches to this structure were guarded by two
successive ditches and curtain walls, equipped with
several further flanking towers and shooting galleries.
Beyond these defences the actual town and cathedral of
Tortosa were protected by another rampart, which was not
as powerful as those of the citadel, but could still halt
minor incursions by rebels and Muslim raiders.6
The defensive strategy used at Tortosa also appeared at
Chastel Blanc, where the Templars constructed another
rectangular keep which could only be entered via a small
door siyuated two metres above ground level. In order to
reach this door, an attacker would first have to breach
the outer curtain walls, which were built around the lower
slopes of the site and had their own elaborate gateways.
The design of these fortifications makes it extremely
likely that they too were completed in the middle years of
the twelfth century, or perhaps after the earthquake of
117O.
Thus the donjons at Margat and Crac des Chevaliers were
rounded or even circular in design, and were attached to
surrounding structures, whereas those of Chastel Blanc and
Tortosa were rectangular and stood in isolation. However,
the sheer size of these strongholds, as well as their
close proximity to each other, meant that the history of
all four sites often overlapped. In 1188, for example,
Saladin failed to capture any of them, and only managed to
6 Rey, Etude, pp.69-83, 211-14; Deschamps, La Defense
du comté de Tripoli, pp.289-91; Kennedy, Crusader Castles,
pp.134-44.
Rey, Etude, pp.85-92; Muller-Wiener, Castles of the
Crusaders, pp.51-52; Deschamps, La Defense du comté de
Tripoli, pp.252-58; Lawrence, Crusader Castles, pp.55-58;
Kennedy, Crysader Castles, pp.138-41.
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sack the town of Tortosa before continuing north toward
Antioch. 8
 Seventeen years later Aleppine forces attacking
Crac des Chevaliers and Margat were equally unsuccessful,
although they did take considerable amounts of booty with
them from the surrounding countryside. 9 Another Aleppine
army which invaded the area in 1218, thereby hoping to
divert Frankish resources away from the crusade in Egypt,
appears to have achieved more, for Oliver of Paderborn
reported that it attacked Chastel Blanc and 'destroyed
its towers'.' 0
 However, this must either be an
exaggeration, or only refer to the outer defences of the
fortress, because the architectural evidence proves that
Chastel Blanc's keep cannot date from the period after
1218. Consequently this structure may have thwarted the
Muslims besieging it in the same way that the citadel of
Tortosa proved too strong for Saladin in 1188.11
Further evidence of the virtual impregnability of Tortosa,
Chastel Blanc, Margat and Crac des Chevaliers dates from
the mid-thirteenth century. All four castles clearly
withstood the 10,000 Seljuk Turks sent against Tripoli by
the ruler of Aleppo in 1252, as well as the 20,000
Khwarizmians who overran the region in 1244.12 Admittedly,
both these aggressors were probably more interested in
8 Baha' al-Din, Anecdotes, pp.106-7; Abu Shama, Deux
Jardins, IV, 349-63; Eracles, II, 119-22.
ai-Makrizi, Histoire d'. gypte, trans. E. Blochet,
RQk, IX, (1902), 6-163, at 139n1.
10 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, ed. H.
Hoogeweg, Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins in
CCXX, (Tflbingen 1894), 235. See also Abu Shama,
Deux Jardins, V, 166; Kamal-ad-Din, L'Histoire d'Alep,
trans. E. Blochet, ROL, V, (1897), 37-107, at 55.
11 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, p.257.
1252: Cartulaire, II, no.2605, pp.726-28. 1244:
Eracles, II, 427-28; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.217.
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acquiring loot than Frankish castles, and are unlikely
even to have contemplated besieging such powerful
strongholds. Consequently, they posed less of a threat
than Baybars, who spent most of his reign systematically
picking off crusader fortifications. In Syria, he began to
do so during the mid-1260s, when huge raids were launched
against the county of Tripoli, which were intended to
undermine the local economy and destroy crops needed to
feed Frankish garrisons. 13 The Mamluks carried out similar
attacks in 1270, when they were only prevented from
capturing Margat by the appaling weather. 14 However, the
following spring Baybars returned, and finally succeeded
in taking Crac des Chevaliers, Chastel Blanc and several
neighbouring castles, whose demoralized and underfed
garrisons surrendered in a matter of weeks. 15 This only
left Tortosa, which the Templars evacuated after the loss
of Acre, 16 and Margat, whose valiant defenders managed to
defeat one Muslim besieging force in 1281, before
surrendering to another only four years later.'7
Margat, Tortosa, Chastel Blanc and Crac des Chevaliers
also shared several characteristics with larger Frankish
strongholds located further south. Sidon, for example, can
13 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 27-28, 52;
Ibn aJ.-Furat, Selections, II, 85-86, 87, 116-18.
14 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 78-79; Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 139-40.
15 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 84-85; Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 143-49; Gestes, 777;
Eracles, Il, 460; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.224;
Annalesde Terre Sainte, pp.454 (text A), 455 (text B).
16 Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.232; al-Makrizi,
Histoiredes Sultans, 11(a), 126.
1281: Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.228;
Gestes, p.786; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.457 (text A).
1285: al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(a), 80; Geste,
p.792; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.229.
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be compared with Tortosa, for both were coastal
settlements which appear to have been completely destroyed
in the course of the twelfth century. At Tortosa, this had
probably been done by Nur ad-Din during the spring of
1152, while Sidon's defences had been demolished by
Saladin at the time of the Third Crusade. 18 As we have
seen, the Templars re-established Latin control over the
former site by constructing a powerful new citadel, and a
similar process subsequently also took place at Sidon.
This process started during the winter of 1227-28, when
European crusaders waiting for the arrival of Frederick II
built Sidon's sea castle, a compact fort composed of two
interconnected towers, which was situated on a small
island forty metres off the coast) 9
 Until this time the
site appears to have been completely uninhabited, but
during the next 25 years a new settlement must have sprung
up, for in 1253 Louis IX deemed it neccesary to provide
Sidon with a town wall and another citadel, which stood on
a small hill opposite the sea castle. 20
 Despite a Mongol
raid in 1260, these defences subsequently remained under
Latin control until 1291, when its garrison tried to make
a brief stand in the sea castle, before withdrawing to
18 Tortosa: Riley-Smith, 'The Tempiars and the Castle
of Tortosa', 278-79, 284-85. Sidon: Abu Shama, Deux
Jardins, IV, 462.
Gestes, p.676; Eracles, II, 365; Deschamps, La
Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem, pp.229-33; Rey, Etude,
pp.154-59; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, 122-24; Muller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p.70.
20 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.302, 336;
Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem, pp.227-29;
Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p.121; Muller-Wiener, Castles
of the Crusaders, p.70. The theory that Sidon remained
uninhabited until the late l220s is based on a comment,
made by a passing pilgrim in 1211, that the town lay in
ruins. See Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium Terrae
Sanctae, ed. S. de Sandoli, Itinera Hierosolymitana
Crucesignatorum, III, (Jerusalem 1983), p.202.
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Cyprus in the face of overwhelming Muslim forces.21
A similar strategy of concentrating almost all one's
efforts on the citadel rather than the outer
fortifications of a site was also employed by the Franks
elsewhere along the coast. At Beirut, the German pilgrim
Wilibrand of Oldenburg described the citadel as a large,
imposing structure, built on a rocky knoll and defended by
a deep ditch, several towers and two successive curtain
walls. 22
 This stronghold had been left intact by Saladin,
was strengthened by the German crusaders who recaptured it
in 1197, and was later considerably improved by the new
Ibelin lords of Beirut early in the thirteenth century.23
Consequently, it successfully withstood the Lombard siege
of 1231-32, despite being mined and bombarded almost
constantly for several months. It must therefore have been
considerably stronger than the town wall of Beirut, which
was demolished by Saladin, and subsequently replaced by a
rampart which the Lombards breached in the space of just
one night.24
Similar observations can also be made about Caesarea,
1260: see below, pp.103-4. 1291: Gestes, p.817; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(a), 130-31.
22 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.204. Philip
of Novara called the moat at Beirut 'one of the finest in
the world'. See The Wars of Frederick II, p.121.
23 1197: Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp.205-
6. Ibelin improvements Gestes, pp.678-79.
1231-32: Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick
II, pp.120, 120-22, 128-37; Gestes, p.701; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.148-49; Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.81, 82-
88.Saladin captured Beirut in 1187 and demolished its
outer walls in 1190. See Eracles, II, 71, 140. The
crusader town wall at Beirut probably resembled its later
Ottoman replacement. See IL Du Mesnil du Buisson, 'Les
anciennes defenses de Beyrouth', S yria, II, (1921), 235-
57, 317-27, at 235, 251, 317-26.
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Arsuf, Jaffa and Ascalon, all of which had either been
partially or totally destroyed by Saladin. 25
 Between 1191
and 1192 Richard I reoccupied these sites, and may have
carried out repairs at Caesarea and Arsuf. He also built
more extensive new fortifications at Ascalon and Jaffa,26
which successfully withstood a Muslim attack shortly
afterwards. 27
 However, the sheer speed with which Richard
erected these defences suggests that they only amounted to
a limited reconstruction of older structures, particularly
at Ascalon, where the inner curtain wall around the town
was hastily rebuilt, but many of the powerful outworks
protecting the site in the twelfth century must surely
have been left in ruins. 28
 Moreover, even these efforts
were shortlived, for Jaffa was sacked and demolished by
the Muslims in 1197,29 and Ascalon was destroyed as part
of the peace treaty with Saladin, 30
 In addition, Caesarea
25 For a full list of these and other castles
sleighted by Saladin, see Itinerarium, pp.28O-82;
Ambroise, L'Estoire de la guerre sainte, lines 6,840-69,
col.183; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 462.
26 Caesarea: Itinerarium, pp.254-56; H. Benveisti, The
Crusaders in the Hol y Land, (Jerusalem 1970), p.138.
Arsuf: Itinerarium, p.282; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
II, 376. Jaffa: Itinerarium, p.284; Eracles, II, 186;
Ambroise, L'Estoire de Ia guerre sainte, lines 6,941-
7,053, cols.185-88. Ascalon: ibid, lines 7,778-8,086,
cols.208-16; Itinerarium, pp.315-17; D. Pringle, 'King
Richard I and the walls of Ascalon', CXVI, (1984),
133-47, at 136-42.
27 See below, p.93.
28 Rey, Etude, pp.205-I0; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in
the Hol y
 Land, pp.121-25; p. Deschamps, 'Les entrées des
châteaux des croisés en Syrie et leurs defenses', Syria,
XIII (1932), 369-87, at 386.
29 Eracles, II, 218-21; Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica
Slavorum, p.204; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 116, 152;
Abu'l-Fida, Annales, p.74; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh,
II, 84-86.
30 See above p.11.
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was considerably strengthened at the time of the Fifth
Crusade (1218), whilst in 1211 Arsuf's population still
lived in constant fear of local bandits. 31 This implies
that these sites were lacking adequate urban
fortifications, and were only protected by isolated
citadels during the two decades following the battle of
Hattin.
Subsequent efforts to maintain or reestablish Frankish
control over Caesarea, Ascalon, Jaffa and Arsuf were often
equally tentative. Ascalon, for example, lay in ruins
between 1192 and 1240, when its citadel was rebuilt by
Theobald of Champagne's followers. 32
 This project was
completed by Richard of Cornwall in 1241, after which
the castle was entrusted to the Hospitallers, who held
Ascalon until it was recaptured by the Egyptians a mere
six years later. 34
 Similarly, Jaffa may well have remained
31 Caesarea: Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina,
pp.168-70; Eracles, II, 325. Arsuf: Wilibrand of
Oldenburg,Itinerariuin, p.232.
32 Rothelin, pp.531-32, 553; Eracles, II, 413-14;
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.215. Pringle ('King
Richard I and the walls of Ascalon', 143-44) and
Benvenisti (The Crusaders in the Holy Land, pp.120, 126)
both argue that there were no attempts to rebuild
Ascalon's town walls after 1192.
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 143. See also
Rothelin, pp.555-56; Eracles, II, 421. Pringle (King
Richard I and the walls of Ascalon', 144-46) and
Benvenisti (The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.125-26)
disagree on the exact location of this citadel. See also
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.102.
Hospitallers: Cartulaire, II, no.2320, p.615.
Egyptian attack: Rothelin, p.565; Eracles, II, 741;
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 343; Annales de Terre
Sainte, p.442; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 10-11; Abu
Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 194; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, p.125.
Fig. 4. Caesarea: the citadel and Louis Ix's town walls. Frctn
Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy Land, p.l40.
54
unoccupied from 1197 onwards, 35 while the defences erected
at Caesarea in 1218 were promptly destroyed by the ruler
of Damascus within a few months of their completion. 36
 It
seems that these places were then abandoned until
Frederick II provided them with new citadels in the late
1220, and they may not have been properly recolonized
until the mid-thirteenth century, when Louis IX finally
built new town walls at both sites. 38
 Although their
citadel was strengthened by John of Ibelin in 1240, and
later described as 'very strong' by Joinville, 39
 the
inhabitants of Arsuf may also have remained largely
unprotected until the 1260s, when the I-Iospitallers
acquired this lordship and extended its urban defences
considerably. 40
 By this point, however, Frankish control
over the entire coastline was quickly being eroded by
Baybars, who captured Arsuf and Caesarea in 1265, and
Jaffa in 1268.41
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.l4O. For
more details on the history of Jaffa, see ibid, pp.139-44.
36 Eracles, II, 334; OLiver of Paderborn, Historia
Damiatina, p.244; James of Vitry, Lettres, ed. R.B.C.
Huygens, (Leiden 1960), pp.101-2.
Chronigue d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed.
L. de Mas Latrie, (Paris 1871), pp.458-61; Eracles, II,
373; Matthew Paris, Chronica Malora, III, 175.
38 Jaffa: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 107; Jonville,
Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.282-84, 306-8. Caesarea: ibid,
pp.256, 258, 336; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy
Land, p.141.
Gestes, p.728, Annales de Terre Sainte, p.440.
Quote: Joinville, iiistoire de Saint Louis, p.308.
40 Cartulaire, III, no.2972, p.1, no.2985, p.6; RRH,
no.1302, p.341, no.1313, p.343; Gestes, pp.758-59; J.S.C.
Riley-Smith, The Kni ghts of St.John in Jerusalem and
Cyprus, 1050-1310, (London 1967), pp.133-34.
41 Arsuf and Caesarea: Gestes, p.758; Eracles, II,
450; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.222; Annales de
Terre Sainte, pp.451-52; al-Makrizi, Hjstoire des Sultans,
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To the north of these sites, the Franks also held
Pilgrims' Castle, one of the largest coastal strongholds
in the kingdom of Jerusalem. This fortress had been
constructed in 1218 by Tempiars, Teutonic Knights and
members of the Fifth Crusade, and consequently provides us
with a rare example of a thirteenth century castle which
was built from scratch. It was located on a narrow
headland, whose landward side was protected by two
successive curtain walls incorporating several flanking
towers, elaborate gateways, shooting galleries and murder
holes. Particularly impressive were the two rectangular
towers of the inner rampart, which were so tall that they
enabled the garrison to observe an approaching enemy as
far as eight miles away, and therefore formed a kind of
inner citadel in the same way that the southern towers at
Crac des Chevaliers did. 42 Pilgrims' Castle can also be
compared with Tortosa, for it was held by the Templars,
and proved so strong that it never fell to the Muslims,
but was simply evacuated by the Order in August 1291.
1(b), 6-15; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 70-71, 73-82.
Jaffa: Gestes, p.771; Eracles, II, 456; Marino Sanudo,
Liber secretorum, p.223; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans,
1(b), 51; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 106-8.
42 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.169-71.
See also James of Vitry, Lettres, pp.99-100; Matthew
Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 14; Burchard of Mount Sion,
Descriptio Terrae Sanctae, ed. J.C.M. Laurent, (Leipzig
1873), p.83; C.N. Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle
('Atljt): The Ancient Tell and the Outer Defences of the
Castle', QDAP, III, (1933-34), 145-64, at 152-64; C.N.
Johns, Guide to 'Atlit: the Crusader Castle, Town and
Surrouridins, (Jerusalem 1947), pp.36-67. Briefer
descriptions also in Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de
Jerusalem, pp..32-33; Rey, Etude, pp.95-100; Benvenisti,
The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.l'79-82; Kennedy,
Crusader Castles, pp.124-27.
Gestes, p.818; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.232.
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Like Tortosa, Pilgrims' Castle also had a small town
attached to it, which was defended by a much lower and
weaker rampart. 44 This settlement was probably overrun in
1220, when al-Muazzam of Damascus tried and failed to
capture the newly completed fortress. 45 In 1265 it
suffered a similar fate at the hands of Baybars, who
destroyed its buildings and cut down the nearby
orchards. 46 Baybars also ravaged the territories around
Pilgrims' Castle in 1264 and 1266, but he never attempted
to besiege the actual fortress itself. 47 Consequently,
this stronghold epitomized the defensive strategy adopted
by the Franks at all the coastal sites which have been
mentioned so far. Frankish efforts to protect these
settlements always centred around a compact and heavily
fortified citadel. At some sites, most notably Ascalon,
the crusaders never got beyond this stage, and there is no
evidence that the twelfth century town was properly
reinhabited, either in 1192 or between 1240 and 1247. At
other places, such as Sidon, Tortosa, Jaffa and Caesarea,
the construction of a castle merely provided a first step
toward urban regeneration, while at Pilgrims' Castle, a
new fortress spawned an entirely new settlement.
Pilgrims' Castle can therefore be placed in the same
category as its coastal neighbours further north.
Similarly, Chastel Blanc, Margat and Crac des Chevaliers
bear a close resemblance to the inland strongholds which
C.N. Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle
(' At li t ) : The Faubourg and its Defences', QDAP, I, (1932),
111-29, at 112-24; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy
Land, pp.l78-'79; Johns, Guide to 'Atl 1 t, pp.74-76, 81-85.
See below, p.85.
46 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 8; Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 72.
41 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(a), 239, 1(b),
28; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 67, 86-87.
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the Franks held in Galilee. This point can be illustrated
by looking at the castle of Montfort, which became the
headquarters of the Teutonic Knights during the middle
third of the thirteenth century, and lay at the heart of
an extensive lordship held by the Order a few miles north
east of Acre. Montfort was situated on a precipitous spur
acquired by the German knights in 1228, and it therefore
dates entirely from the thirteenth century. 48 Its defences
were arranged around a large 'D' shaped keep, which stood
in isolation at the eastern tip of the spur. Consequently,
the extensive outer fortifications and residential
buildings to the west of this structure were largely
designed to prevent attackers from gaining access to it.
Although the site is generally steeper and less
accessible, the strong emphasis on an isolated keep is
therefore similar to that of Chastel Blanc.49
To the east of Montfort and overlooking the river Jordan,
the castle of Saphet can be said to represent the Galilean
equivalent of Crac des Chevaliers. This is implied in the
scant archaeological remains still visible at the site, as
well as the famous anonymous description of the fortress
known as De constructione castri Saphet. Between them
these sources indicate that the Templar castle built from
1240 onwards consisted of an outer wall approximately 22
metres high and 825 metres long, which ran around a second
and much higher inner rampart dominated by a large,
circular keep. The exact appearance of' this keep is
difficult to establish, for it was later replaced by a
48 See below, pp.l51-52.
D. Pringle, 'A thirteenth century hail at Montfort
castle in western Galilee', Anti quaries Journal, LXVI,
(1986), 52-82, at 54-56. See also E.W.G. Masterman, 'A
Crusaders Fortress in Palestine', Q, (1928), 91-97, at
94-97; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.335-
37; Rey, Etude, pp.146-51; Marshall, Warfare in the Latin
East, pp.108-li; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp.129-31.
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similar Mamluk structure, but it may have been one of the
seven towers of the inner citadel mentioned in De
constructione castri Saphet. This document also indicates
that the outer wall was flanked by a further seven towers,
and was provided with underground tunnels which led to
several casemates guarding the castle's outer moat.
Consequently, Saphet's defences were arranged in
successive rings, and its keep may have been an unusually
large flanking tower rather than an isolated structure.50
This concentric design was taken one step further at
Belvoir, an almost symmetrical fortress whose defences
were composed of two successive walls forming a square
within a square. Belvoir was constructed in the twelfth
century to guard the Jordan crossings south of Lake
Tiberias, and although it was restored to the Franks in
1241, it remains uncertain whether the Hospitallers
actually reoccupied it during the brief period before the
Egyptian and Khwarizmian conquests of 1244_47.51
The concentric fortifications built at Crac des
Chevaliers, Belvoir and Saphet were intended to defend
hill tops whose slopes were relatively accessible. At
50 'Un nouveau traité du texte De constructione castri
Saphet', ed. R.B.C. Huygens, Studi Medievali, ser.III, vi,
part 1, (1965), 335-87, at lines 160-93, pp.383-84; D.
Pringle, 'Review Article: Reconstructing the Castle of
Safad', CXVII, (1985), 139-49. Another description of
Sasphet is given by I-Iuygens in his introduction to the
medieval text (De constructione castri Saphet, 370-77),
although Pringle ('Review Article, 141, 142, 145)
criticizes many of his conclusions. See also Deschamps, La
Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem, pp.140-42; Benvenisti,
The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.199-201; Kennedy,
Crusader Castles, pp.128-29.
51 1241: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 142. For
a brief description of Belvoir, see J. Prawer, The Latin
Kingdom of Jerusalem, (London 1972), pp.300-7. Marshall
(Warfare in the Latin East, pp.20-21) and Riley-Smith (The
Knights of St.John, pp.415-1G, 436-37) disagree on whether
Belvoir was properly regarrisoned after 1241.
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Montfort, however, the east side of the castle was far
steeper, and therefore less fortified, than the western
approaches to the site. Likewise, both Beaufort and Mt
Tabor could, to a certain extent, rely on their isolated
location to protect them against besiegers. Beaufort, for
example, could not be attacked from the east, where an
almost sheer cliff dropped away to the Litani river,
hundreds of metres below. The outcrop on which this castle
stood was also separated from surrounding hills to the
north, south and west by deep gorges and ditches excavated
during the crusader period. Consequently, the outcrop
itself formed an isolated stronghold which required
relatively few flanking towers apart from those which
guarded the actual gateway. Most of these structures
either date from the twelfth century, or the period after
1268, when Baybars captured the fortress. The only
significant addition made by the Franks between 1240 and
1268 appears to have been the new citadel constructed by
the Templars on the plateau opposite the south side of the
castle. This plateau was occupied by a walled town during
the thirteenth century, but also represented the most
obvious spot for potential attackers to deploy siege
engines against Beaufort itself. Consequently, the Templar
citadel was probably intended to protect both the town and
the strategic ground it stood on.52
Although Beaufort can justifiably be described as a
mountain castle, it still therefore had a weak side which
could be exploited by the Muslims. This became apparent in
1268, when Baybars did indeed seize the southern plateau,
52 Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem,
pp.198-208. See also Muller-Wiener, Castles of the
Crusaders, pp.62-63; Rey, Etude, pp.l27-32.
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and then besieged the fortress from there. 53 Mt Tabor,
however, had such steep slopes, rising 400 metres above
the plain of Galilee, that its summit was almost equally
inaccessible on all sides. In 1211 al-Adil strengthened
this site even further by encircling it with a vast
curtain wall, 1,750 metres in length and flanked by ten
powerful towers. 54 Its garrison launched regular attacks
against Acre, which were so damaging that they may have
acted as a catalyst for the Fifth Crusade. Although this
expedition subsequently failed to capture Mt Tabor, 55
 it
persuaded the Muslims to demolish their new castle rather
than risk losing it to a similar Frankish campaign in the
future. 56
 As a result, Mt Tabor remained unfortified
between 1218 and 1255, when the Hospitallers acquired
it)' This Order held the mountain until it was taken by
Baybars in 1263, but the speed with which he did this,
combined with the lack of archaeological evidence,
suggests that the Hospitallers merely occupied, and
perhaps fortified, the small monastery in the south east
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 108-12. See also al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 51; Gest, p.771;
Fracj, II, 456.
Eracles, II, 317; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.206; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, pp.86-8'?; Benvenisti, Th
Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.360-61.
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.165-67;
Eracles, II, 324; James of Vitry, Lettres, p.98; Abu
Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 163-64.
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.171-72;
James of Vitry, Lettres, p.108; Eracles, II, 330-31;
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 14; Abu Shama, Deux
Jardins, V, 165-66.
57 Cartulaire, II, no.2726, p.'?77, no.2811, pp.815-i'?;
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.220; Eracles, II, 442;
Riley-Smith, The Kni ghts of St.John, pp.413-i'?, 427-28. It
seems very unlikely that this site was reoccupied
following the Christian gains of 1241. See Benvenisti, Iii
Crusaders in the Hol y Land, p.360.
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corner of al-Adil's ruined stronghold.58
The total absence of major Hospitaller defences on Mt
Tabor after 1255 can probably be explained in terms of
limited financial resources and deteriorating military
circumstances. Consequently, even though it was
strategically important, it did not put up as much
resistance against Baybars as Montfort, Saphet and
Beaufort. Saphet, for example, withstood six weeks of
almost constant mining and bombardment, and only
capitulated after Baybars had managed to sow discord
amongst its defenders (1266). Montfort caused the
Mamluks even more problems, and did not finally surrender
until 1271, after an earlier failed siege in 1266.° In
addition, it has been noted that the Franks lost Beaufort
in 1268, making it one of the last inland fortresses
captured by Baybars in the kingdom of Jerusalem. 61 This
latter castle had also resisted Saladin for over a year
between 1189 and 1190, while all three strongholds appear
to have withstood the Khwarizmian assault of 1244 with
ease. 62
 Moreover, in 1260 the Franks may well have been
58 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 56n1; Benvenisti, The
Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.361-62.
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 27-31; Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 88-96; Gestes, pp.764-G€;
Eracles, pp.454-55; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorurn,
pp.222-23.
1266: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 87; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 27; Annales de Terre Sainte,
p.452 (text B). 1271: ibid, p.455; Ibn al-Furat,
Selections, II, 106-12; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans,
1(b), 87; Eracles, II, 460; Gestes, p.778.
6! See above, pp.59-60.
62 1189-90: Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 395-400, 441;
Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, I, 738-39; Abu'l-Fida,
Annales, p.61; Eracles, II, 110-11, 187-88. 1244: the
sources only mention Saphet individually during this
period, but it is self-evident from later events that
62
thinking of these sites when they acknowledged that even
if the rest of the kingdom were overrun by the Mongols, a
few of the most powerful castles would still hold out.63
The compact design and inaccessible location of castles
like Beaufort and Montfort forms a sharp contrast with the
numerous urban fortifications built or inherited by the
Franks. These defences were intended to protect large,
sprawling settlements in low lying areas and therefore
they could not always depend on physical isolation to
enhance their overall strength. This was certainly the
case at Acre, where vast fortifications were needed to
compensate for the almost completely flat terrain of the
surrounding coastal plain. Thus in 1335 a German traveller
wrote that 'this famous city situated on the coast is
constructed using extraordinarily large blocks of stone,
with high and strong towers standing scarcely a stone's
throw away from each other. Each gate is flanked by two
towers. The walls were, and still are, so thick that two
chariots going in opposite directions could easily meet on
them. On the landward side they were also extremely
powerful, with very deep ditches, further protected by a
series of bastions and outworks of various types'.64
Similar descriptions recorded by other pilgrims, as well
as contemporary maps of the city, enable us to build up a
fairly accurate picture of Acre's thirteenth century
Montfort and Beaufort also remained in Frankish hands. See
Rothelin, p.562; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 338.
63 Jackson, 'The Crisis', 492.
64 Ludoif of Sudheim, De itinere Terrae Sanctae, ed.
F. Deycks, Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins in
Stutt g art, XXV (Stuttgart 1851), 39-40.
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defences. 65
 These Were dominated by the double ramparts
which ran from the city's outer harbour as far inland as
the Accursed Tower and the Tower of King Henry, before
continuing north toward the far shoreline beyond the
suburb of Montmusard. 66 This latter section of the walls
was strengthened by Louis IX, but accounts of the Third
Crusade make it clear that Montmusard was already
fortified in some way long before the 1250s. 67 Acre's
ramparts were also flanked by numerous alternating towers
and salients, some of which had gates incorporated into
their side walls. 68
 In addition, the approaches to the
city were guarded by various earthworks and pallisades,
particularly around the exposed angle of the Accursed
Tower. King Hugh III of Cyprus (1267-84), the lord Edward
and the countess of Blois (who came to Acre on crusade in
1287) all built new fortifications in this area during the
final years of Frankish rule, and these bore the brunt of
65 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.200;
Burchard of Mount Sion, Descriptio, p.23. The famous
fourteenth century Genoese map of Acre is reproduced at
the back of Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, and also in
D. Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the thirteenth century: urban
layout and topography', in idem, Studies on the Crusader
States and on Venetian Expansion, (Northampton 1989), c.5,
1-45, at figs.1-4.
66 G. Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie de la yule
d'Acre au XIIIe siècle', Mémoires de la société nationale
des antiquaries de France, XXXIX, (Paris 1878), 115-45, at
118-32; MUller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp.72-74;
Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y
 Land, pp.93-95.
Louis IX: Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis,
pp.334, 336; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.219.
Montmusard during the Third Crusade: Matthew Paris,
Chronica Maiora, II, 360. For more evidence on this, see
D. Jacoby, 'Montmusard, suburb of crusader Acre: the first
stage of its development', in idem, Studies on the
Crusader States, c.6, 205-17, especially at 213.
68 Towers: Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.200;
Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie', 124-25, 130, 132. Gates:
ibid, 125-26, 131; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy
Land, p.95.
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the Muslim attack in 1291.69 The extensive defences which
protected Acre were probably also very similar to those of
Tripoli, another coastal settlement which could easily be
approached from inland. Consequently, this side of the
city was guarded by a double wall, strong towers and deep,
wide ditches. According to Wilibrand of Oldenburg,
Tripoli's gates were also strengthened by elaborate
barbicans and other complex outworks, which ensured that
the city remained in Frankish hands until
The city of Jerusalem, which lies in a valley surrounded
by higher ground, was, if anything, even more exposed than
both Acre and Tripoli. During the crusader period it was
surrounded by a single curtain wall, which was protected
by an adjoining rock cut moat in certain areas, and had
four principal gateways incorporated into it (St.Stephen's
or the Damascus gate to the north, Zion gate to the south,
David's gate to the west and the Golden gate to the east).
It is relatively easy to establish where this wall stood,
for it generally followed the same course as the present
Ottoman ramparts.71
After the Muslims captured Jerusalem in October 1187, they
initially repaired and maintained its defences, but these
were subsequently sleighted by al-Muazzam in 1219, as part
of the same scorched earth tactic which had led to the
Gestes, pp.808-9; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
pp.229, 230; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.459; Rey, 'Etude
sur la Topographie', 127-29; Deschamps, 'Les entrées des
châteaux', 386-87.
70 Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.210. 1289:
Abu'l-Fida, Annales, 162-63; Gestes, pp.802-4; Marino
Sariudo, Liber secretorum, pp.229-30; Annales de Terre
jnte, p.460; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(a),
101-3.
71 Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy Land, pp.49-
52.
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destruction of Mt Tabor 72
 Archaeological evidence
suggests that ten years later Frederick II tried to
rectify this situation by repairing Zion gate and
St.Stephen's gate, where remains have been found of
flanking towers protecting an 'L' shaped entrance. These
improvements may have been carried out by the Teutonic
Knights, whom Frederick gave several properties in the
city and relied on to garrison his new acquisition.4
However, the apparent ease with which 15,000 Muslim
peasants broke into and looted Jerusalem soon after
Frederick's departure, suggests that its walls were never
adequately reconstructed after 1219. Consequently, life
must have been difficult for the few Latins who returned
to the city between 1229 and 1244, when Jerusalem was
finally lost to the Khwarizinians. 76 Similarly, it seems
unlikely that the Franks built new town walls at Tiberias,
which they recovered in 1241, but had already lost by
1247. Indeed, although its lord, Odo of Montbéliard, built
a new citadel at Tiberias during this period, it cannot be
proved that the town itself was ever recolonized by the
Latins. 77 This may also apply to the towns of Ramlah and
1187 onwards: Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 49-51.
1219: EracJ.es, II, 339; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.208; Matthew Paris, Chronica Malora, III, 39; Abu'l-
Fida, Annales, p.91; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 173-75.
BenvenIsti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, p.51.
See also Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 177;
Rothelin, p.529.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, ed. E. Strehlke,
(Berlin 1869), no.69, p.55; C.N. Johns, 'The Citadel,
Jerusalem: a Summary of Work since 1934', QDAP, XIV,
(1950), 121-90, at 167; I. Sterns, 'The Teutonic Knights
in the Crusader States', in HG, V (1985), 315-78, at 365.
Eracles, II, 384-85.
76 See above, p.l4.
Eracles, II, 432-33; Joinville, Histoire de Saint
Louis, pp.288, 290. 1241: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
IV, 142. 1247: see above, p.14.
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Lydda, whose twelfth century defences were destroyed by
Saladin, and still lay in ruins when Wilibrand of
Oldenburg passed by in 121l.
The only other fortified cities held by the Franks during
the thirteenth century were Tyre and Antioch. Unlike the
settlements mentioned so far, both these sites could in
fact rely on their location as well as their defences for
protection. This was particularly true of Tyre, a
fortified island which was only linked to the mainland by
a narrow causeway. At least three successive curtain walls
and as many as five separate gateways guarded this
causeway, which was also severed by a vast uioat
occasionally filled with sea water. In addition, the rest
of Tyre was surrounded by a double wall, so that it was
almost equally well defended against seaborrie attaekers.
As a result, Saladin failed to capture the city in the
autumn of 1187,even though he deployed both his fleet and
his land forces against it. Saladin's failure may also
have deterred his successors, for the Muslims never tried
to attack the city again, and in 1291 it was evacuated by
its Christian inhabitants.8
78 Itinerarium, p.280; Ambroise, L'Estoire de la
guerre sainte, line 6,855, col.183; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel
Altevarykh, II, 52; Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes, p.268. 1211:
Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.238. See also
Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, p.171.
William of Tyre, Chronigue, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, (2
vols, Turnhout 1986), Bk.13, c.5; Willbrand of Oldenburg,
Itinerarium, p.202; Burchard of Mount Sion, Descriptio,
p.25; Ibn Jubayr, Extrait du vo yage d'Ibn DjobeIr, RHC Or.
III, 451-52. For further descriptions of Tyre up to the
last century, see Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de
Jerusalem, pp.135-37.
80 1187: Eracles, II, 105-9; Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes,
pp.98-99, 102-3; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 341-45; Ibn
al-Athir, Kamel AI.tevar ykh, I, 694-96. 1291: al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 11(a), 126-27; Marino Sanudo, Liber
secretorum, p.231; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.460 (text
B); Gestes, p.815.
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Unlike Tyre, Antioch relied on rugged terrain rather than
water to give it added strength, for the city was built on
the slopes of Mount Silpius, and its walls formed a
triangle whose apex was situated at the summit of the
mountain. These fortifications, which were more than 12
kilometres long and were renowned for their size and
strength, had in fact been constructed during the reign of
Justinian, and therefore probably only incorporated minor
Frankish repairs and improvements. 8 ' Indeed, the Franks
were lucky to have inherited such powerful urban defences,
for they deterred Saladin from besieging Antioch, and
subsequently ensured that the principality survived into
the thirteenth century, even though many smaller crusader
castles to the north and east had either been destroyed or
captured in 1188. Further south, Saladin had also seized
Latakia and Saone, thereby virtually severing the city's
land links with the county of Tripoli, and turning it into
a somewhat isolated Frankish outpost until it was stormed
by Baybars in 1268.82 This in turn had a severe impact on
Antioch's economic welfare, for much of the twelfth
century trade which had passed through the city on its way
to Aleppo or the port of St.Simeon shifted to the harbours
of Latakia, Ayas and Corycos after 1188.83
81 Rey, Etude, pp.l85-204; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord,
pp.127-33; Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli,
pp.46-47.
82 For details of Saladin's conquests around Antioch,
see Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes, pp.108-18; Abu Shama, Deux
Jardins, IV, 364-81; Eracles, II, 122-23; Deschamps, La
Defense du comté de Tri poli, 127-33. 1268: Ibn al-Furat,
SeIections, II, 121-26; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans,
1(b), 52-54; Gestes, pp.771-'72; Annales de Terre Sainte,
pp.453-54; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.223;
Eracles, II, 456; Bar Hebraeus, Chronography, p.448.
Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.689-91. Baybars
deliberately sacked St.Simeon, the port of Antioch, in
1268 (and also six years earlier) to deter the Franks from
returning to the area. See Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II,
50, 121, 124.
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Baybars appears to have been the first and last Muslim
aggressor to attack Antioch directly during the thirteenth
century, but its walls also sheltered the city's
inhabitants against numerous other invaders in the years
preceding 1268, most notably the Seljuk Turks, who ravaged
the surrounding area in 1247 and 1250.84 Similarly,
Tripoli's walls were so powerful that in 1188 Saladin did
not even attempt to breach them, 85
 and in 1244 this city,
Acre and Tyre all survived the Khwarizmian invasion
intact; a clear indication that they were far better
protected than Jerusalem. 86
 During the 1260s, Baybars also
carried out several raids in the vicinity of Acre 87
 and
Tyre, 88
 and in 1262 he made an earlier failed assault on
Antioch. 89
 In addition, Acre successfully withstood
earlier Ayubid incursions in 1218 and 1253.98
Consequently, these sites were almost entirely dependent
upon long, stout circuit walls to defend them, but it is
also important to remember that they were additionally
protected by individual citadels. At Antioch such a
structure had been added to the Justinianic ramparts
during the tenth century, and its location at the top of
84 Eracles, II, 435; Rothelin, p.624.
85 Avoiding Tripoli itself, Saladin merely carried out
raids between the city and Crac des Chevaliers, before
heading north. Meanwhile, reinforcements sent by the king
of Sicily arrived at Tripoli. See Abu Shama, Deux Jardins,
IV, 349-51; Eracles, II, 119-21.
86 Rothelin, p.565; Eracles, II, 427-28.
87 See below, p.103n197.
88 See below, p.103n198.
89 See below, p.97.
1218: Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina,
p.245; James of Vjtry, Lettres, pp.101-2. 1253: Eracles,
Il, 440-41; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, V, 398;
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.445 (text B); Marino Sanudo,
Liber secretorum, p.220.
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Mount Silpius rendered it virtually impregnable. 91
 Acre's
citadel was far less powerful, however, for it straddled
the city's inner wall in the vicinity of Montmusard, and
must therefore have lost much of its strategic value when
this suburb was fortified and an outer rampart constructed
further inland. 92
 Likewise, the citadel of Tyre probably
contributed very little to the overall strength of this
site, for it was rarely mentioned in contemporary sources
and never included in pilgrims' descriptions of the
city. 93
 This also applies to a similar stronghold at
Tripoli, which had originally been constructed at the
beginning of the twelfth century in order to blockade the
city when it was still held by the Muslims. As a result,
this structure was not attached to the urban defences, but
stood on a rocky knoll some distance inland, and
eventually formed the nucleus of an entirely new suburb.94
Indeed, apart from the mountain castle at Antioch, the
only other major urban citadel held by the Franks which
clearly did enhance surrounding fortifications was that of
Jerusalem. This compact fortress, which was incorporated
into the western wall of the city, was dominated by the
Tower of David, a huge Herodian structure whose masonry
was so massive that one contemporary said it resembled 'a
91 Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, p.129; Rey, Etude, p.190.
Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie', 131; Benvenisti,
The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, p.95.
Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem,
p.l3'T; Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.98.
Imperialists took shelter here briefly when Frederick II's
enemies captured Tyre in 1242. See above, pp.33-34.
William of Tyre, Chronigue, Bk.1O, c.26; Deschamps,
La Defense du comté de Tripoli, pp.293-95; MUller-Wiener,
Castles of the Crusaders, pp.42-43; Kennedy, Crusader
Castles, p.63. The Mainluks rebuilt the citadel early in
the fourteenth century. See al-Makrizi, Histoire des
Sultans, 11(b), 281.
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single stone from its base up' . Between 1229 and 1244
this tower withstood at least two sieges, and its
strategic importance will be discussed in more detail
below.96
In addition to the citadels, town walls and strongholds
already mentioned, the Franks also held numerous smaller
fortifications dotted across the countryside. Although it
would be impossible to name these structures individually,
the vast majority of them were either fortified enclosures
or individual towers. A good examp'e of the former type
was the Castle of Roger the Lombard situated a few miles
south of Caesarea. This small fort, which was probably
established by Roger at the very beginntng of the twelfth
century, consisted of a number of vaulted structures built
around a central yard. the outer walls of these structures
were roughly 1.6 metres thick and had very few openings in
them, so that they created a kind of fortified farm house
measuring approximately 33 metres square. Although the
Castle of Roger the Lombard presumably continued to be
occupied by the Franks until the fall of Caesarea in 1265,
its design was not necessarily European, because similar
structures had been built in the east for many
centuries
Elsewhere the Franks constructed strongholds which were
also square or rectangular, but were larger and more
The pilgrim abbot Daniel, cited in Johns, 'The
Citadel, Jerusalem', 164. See also ibid, 140-44, 165, and,
for more details on the crusader citadel in relation to
the present Ottoman castle, 169-88. See also Benvenisti,
The Crusaders in the Holy Land, pp.52-53.
See below, pp.89-91.
Pringle, The Red Tower, pp.15, 18-19, 73-75 (and
for more examples of similar structures see p.20); S.
Tibble, Monarchy and Lordships in the Latin Kingdom of
Jerusalem 1
 1099-1291, (Oxford 1989), p.139.
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complex than the Castle of Roger the Lombard. Thus
Coliath, a F-1ospitaller fortress which lay on the coastal
plain about 20 kilometres north of Tripoli, measured 63
metres by 56 metres, had four small corner towers, and was
also provided with a fifth salient guarding the actual
gateway. 98 Although it is not recorded in the contemporary
sources, it seems unlikely that this structure could have
withstood Saladin in 1188. However, it must have been
reoccupied by the Hospitallers soon after, for in 1207-08
al-Adil stormed the castle before systematically
demolishing most of its defences. 99 Coliath had still not
recovered from this blow when Wil].brand of Oldenburg saw
it four years later, but the bewildering mixture of
masonry types still visible in its present remains
confirms that it was rebuilt a second time between 1211
and 1266, when Baybars overran it and again left it in
ruins.' 90 Architecturally, it is also possible that
Coliath represents a copy of earlier Roman and Byzantine
structures, and it is therefore sometimes referred to as
a castrum fortification. However, comparisons between
medieval strongholds, Arabic farmsteads and classical
garrison forts should not, perhaps, be taken too far, for
a square or rectangular enclosure was such an obvious way
of defending a low lying site that this design could
equally well have been reinvented by the Franks
themselves. liii
98 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli, pp.311-
12; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p.78.
1188: Saladin ravaged surrounding areas, and
Coliath probably suffered even though sources do not name
it individually. See Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 352-53.
1207-08: Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, II, 106.
100 1211: Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.2O8.
1266: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 85-86; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 27. See also Deschamps,
Defense du comté de Tri poli, 312.
101 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.100.
Fir.	 •
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Fig. 6. Coliath; a classic castrurn. Fran Descharnps, La Dfense
du cctnte de Tripoli, p.311. Tukhlah; a typical Frankish tower
similar to Qacjun and the Red Tower. Fran Rey, Etude, p.101.
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The architectural uncertainties surrounding Coliath and
the Castle of Roger the Lombard do not apply to Frankish
towers built in the Holy Land, which were almost certainly
based on similar structures in the west. One such tower
which has been investigated by archaeologists in recent
years is Qaqun (Caco), located on the Sharon plain about
25 kilometres south east of Caesarea. The remains of this
building indicate that it measured 14.53 by 17.65 metres,
that its walls were 2.8 metres thick, and that it had two
vaulted storeys with a crenellated terrace above. The
ground floor had no doors or windows, and must therefore
have acted as a storage space reached via an internal
ladder. The upper floor, on the other hand, probably had
three arrow slits in its east and west walls, and two in
its north and south walls. Presumably the main entrance
also existed at this level, whilst traces of clay piping
indicate that the tower had its own cistern, so that its
defenders could even withstand a limited siege. Additional
protection against aggressors was provided by a small
perimeter wall, which has now virtually disappeared.1U2
These defences were almost identical to those of Chastel
Rouge, a Hospitaller stronghold roughly halfway between
Chastel Blanc and Tortosa, which consisted of a central
tower measuring 14 by 16 metres, surrounded by a
rectangular curtain wall and a small outer ditch.1U3 Qaqun
and Chastel Rouge also shared certain historical
similarities, for both were captured by Saladin, but were
subsequently regained by the Franks until the Mamluk
102 Pringle, The Red Tower, pp.15, 63-68, 70.
103 Pringle, The Red Tower, pp.16-18; Deschamps, j
Defense du comté de Tripoli, pp.317-l9; Kennedy, Crusader
Castles,	 pp.73-75;	 Muller-Wiener,	 Castles	 of	 the
Crusaders, p.52.
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conquests of the late thirteenth century)04 The same fate
no doubt befell those Frankish towers of the interior
which were not even protected by an outer rampart. Hence
the Tower of Tukhlah stood in isolation on a hill top near
Chastel Blanc, and must therefore have been lost when
Baybars captured this latter fortress in the spring of
1271 105
Towers and castrum-type strongholds were therefore built
according to fairly standardized designs, particularly if
they were situated on the coastal plain. Other smaller
castles differed considerably according to local
circumstances. Cave de Tyron, for example, was literally
carved into the side of a mountain hundreds of metres
above sea level, opposite the town of Sidon. This cave
fortress, which could only be approached along a path
barely one metre wide, was perfectly situated for its tiny
garrison to keep an eye on the surrounding network of
roads between Sidon, Beirut and Damascus. 106 A similar
role was no doubt performed by the defenders of Akkar
(Gibelcar), a mountain stronghold whose elevated position
to the north of Tripoli gave it perfect intervisibility
with Crac des Chevaliers, Chastel Blanc and other
fortifications in the neighbourhood. Indeed, this castle
was so remote that after Baybars captured it in 1271, he
boasted of his achievement in a mocking letter to Bohemond
104 Qaqun would have fallen at about the same time as
Caesarea, both in 1187 (Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 301)
and in 1265 (Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 70-71). Chastel
Rouge fell in 1188 (Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 352) and
in 1289, along with Tripoli (al-Makrizi, Histoire des
Sultans, 11(a), 103; MUller-Wiener, Castles of the
Crusaders, p.52).
105 1271: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 143; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 84-85. Tukhlah: Rey,
Etude, pp.101-2; Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp.75-77.
106 Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem,
pp.211-13, 217-20.
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VI, where the sultan described 'how we transported the
mangonels there through mountains where the birds think it
too difficult to nest; how patiently we hauled them,
troubled by mud and struggling against rain' . Thus
Akkar, whose man made defences amounted to little more
than a square keep and enclosing curtain wall, caused
Baybars just as much trouble as Crac des Chevaliers,
because of its isolated arid inaccessible location.108
Whilst Akkar probably represented a scaled down version of
Montfort, several minor coastal strongholds were, in a
sense, smaller copies of Pilgrims' Castle. The most
notable of these was Nephin, a baronial castle which stood
on a small promontory just to the south of Tripoli. This
promontary had been separated from the mainland by two
rock hewn ditches, and in 1283 the pilgrim Burchard of
Mount Sion wrote that it was defended by no less than
'twelve good towers'. 109 For most of the twelfth century
Nephin was held by the same Frankish family which
controlled Maraclea, another coastal settlement located
between Tortosa and Margat. This latter site does not seem
to have been particularl y well fortified, for in 1188 it
was evacuated just before the arrival of Saladin, and in
1271 Baybars probably occupied it soon after the fall of
Crac des Chevaliers.' 1 ° However, at some point after 1277
107 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 148. See also ibid,
II, 147-49; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 85;
Gestes, p.7'?'?; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.224;
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.455 (text B).
1118 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri p loi, p.309;
Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p.68.
109 Burchard of Mount Sion, Descriptio, p.28, and see
pp.27-28; Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.206;
Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli, pp.300-1.
110 1188: Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, I, 718. 1271:
According to Muslim chroniclers, Baybars held Maraclea by
this date. See Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 150, 166; al-
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Bartholomew de Ravendel, whose family had acquired
Maraclea almost eighty years earlier, returned to the site
and built an immensely strong tower on a rock 50 metres
off the coast. Although this structure was demolished in
1285 as part of a peace treaty with Kalavun, its design
and location can be compared with the Frankish sea castle
at Sidon. Bartholomew never returned to Maraclea after
1285, whilst Nephin was lost along with Tripoli a mere
four years later.112
Further south, other coastal sites were protected by less
isolated defences. The citadel of Gibelet, for example,
stood at the south east corner of the town walls, and
consisted of a large central keep surrounded by a
rectangular castrum. 113
 This stronghold dates from the
early twelfth century, but, apart from a brief period
between 1188 and 1197, the Embriaco lords of Gibelet held
it throughout the crusader period, and may even have been
allowed to cultivate surrounding estates after the fall of
Tripoli.' 14
 It is possible that Gibelet's fortifications
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 100. For a general
history of Nephin and Maraclea during the crusader period,
see Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.297-300,
323-26.
Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim, Vie de Kalavun, extract cited
in J.F. Michaud, Bibliothègue des Croisades, IV (Paris
1829), 551-52; Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli,
pp325-26. The exact history of Maraclea during the 1270s
and 80s remains unclear. See R. Irwin, 'The Mamluk
Conquest of Tripoli', in Crusade and Settlement, ed. P.W.
Edbury, (Cardiff 1984), pp.246-49, at pp.248-49. For
Sidon's sea castle, see above, p.50.
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.230.
113 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.208-
15; MÜl lerWiener , Castles of the Crusaders, pp.64-65;
Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp.65-66.
114 1188-97: Eracles, II, 72, 227, 228, and see above,
. 1,6. 1289 onwards: Irwin, 'The Mamluk Conquest of the
County of Tripoli', p.249. For a general history of
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also resembled those of Haifa, a small port located half
way between Acre and Pilgrims' Castle. That this
settlement had a citadel and town walls is confirmed by
Muslim chroniclers, who noted that these defences were
demolished during the Mamluk attack on Haifa in 1265.115
They may well have been constructed between 1211, when
Haifa's ramparts were said to have been in ruins, and
1227, when a document referred to a town gate at the site
facing north towards Acre.'16
This brief outline of crusader fortifications in the Holy
Land is by no means exhaustive, but can nevertheless be
used to illustrate many aspects of their design and
function. Architecturally, it is clear that some
strongpoints, and in particular Beaufort, Cave de Tyron,
Montfort, Akkar, the citadel of Antioch and the city of
Tyre, were fortified in such a way that they merely
enhanced the natural strength and remoteness of these
sites. Indeed, it has already been shown that the
rudimentary defences at Akkar were almost more difficult
for Baybars to capture than the complex fortifications at
Crac des Chevaliers, simply because the former castle
stood on a mountain summit, whereas the latter fortress
occupied a spur which was relatively easy to approach,
particularly from the south. Likewise, one historian has
argued that Montfort 'was hardly as impressive' as
Gibelet, see Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli,
pp.203-8.
115 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 8; Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 72. Haifa was subsequently returned
to the Franks in a peace treaty of 1268. See ibid, II,
129-30.
1211: Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.232.
1227:	 EJi, no.983, p.259.
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Saphet; a sentiment echoed by other scholars, who point
to Montfort's relatively poor masonry as proof that it was
architecturally inferior to the larger concentric castles
built by the Franks. This argument can also be backed up
by looking at contemporary records, which confirm that the
German Order needed considerable financial assistance to
complete its castle. 118 However, the fact that Baybars
needed two attempts to capture it, but only one to take
Saphet and Crac des Chevaliers, also suggests that in some
ways Montfort was the strongest of the three. In other
words, the Teutonic Knights did not need concentric
ramparts and massive blocks of masonry to strengthen a
site which was already relatively easy to defend, and the
absence of such fortifications should not make us think
that Montfort was strategically inferior.119
This point also illustrates why it is difficult, and often
even misleading, to try to identify general trends and
developments within military architecture. It has often
been argued, for example, that isolated keep towers, whose
garrisons could do little more than wait for their
besiegers to run out of food or enthusiasm, were less
sophisticated than donjons incorporated into surrounding
fortifications, whose defenders could organize a more
active resistance against their opponents by means of
flanking fire and limited counter- attacks. This theory
fits the evidence at Crac des Chevaliers, Margat,
Pilgrims' Castle and possibly Saphet, where one or more
flanking towers replaced the earlier isolated donjons at
11? A. Forey, TheMilitar y Orders from the Twelfth to
the Earl y Fourteenth Centuries, (London 1992), p.63.
118 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.64, p.53, no.66,
p.54, no.72, pp.56-57; Prawer, The Latin Kingdom, pp.308-
9; Pringle, 'A thirteenth century hall', 53; Kennedy,
Crusader Castles, pp.l29-3l.
119 See above, p.61.
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Tortosa, Chastel Blanc and Gibelet. It does not, however,
explain why the Teutonic Knights constructed an isolated
keep at Montfort as much as seventy years after the
Hospitallers completed a perfect concentric stronghold at
Belvoir. Nor does it take the historical evidence into
account, which suggests that Montfort fared better against
Baybars than Saphet, and that the supposedly more
primitive rectangular donjons of Chastel Blanc and Tortosa
both withstood Saladin with relative ease. It would
therefore be wrong to assume that the Franks built
isolated keep towers early in the crusader period, and
that they subsequently rejected this design in favour of
more sophisticated concentric fortresses. It is probably
more accurate to conclude that the crusaders were aware of
both types of fortification from the very beginning, and
simply adapted and developed them to meet local demands.
Thus the exposed situation of Tortosa meant that the
Templars required a far larger keep here than the counts
of Tripoli did at Akkar, while it has already been noted
that concentric defences would simply have been a waste of
time and money at more mountainous sites such as Montfort.
Other attempts to categorize fortifications on
architectural grounds have also led to misconceptions. The
theory that Templar strongholds tend to have square ur
rectangular towers, whereas those built by the
Hospitallers are usually rounded or circular, Ls laroly
based on the present remaiixs at Margat, Crac des
Chevaliers, iilgriins' Castle arid UhasLe]. Blanc,' 1 This
has led to a hider belief that these Lwo Orders ised very
distinct building techniques throughout the eastern
Mediterranean, including Cilicin Armenia, where one
scholar has written recently that their castles could not
'be more dissimilar In their masonry and architectural
Lawrence, Crusader Castles, pp.70-88.
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features'.' 2 ' Yet a closer look at the evidence, and in
particular the round Templar towers at Saphet, indicates
that in many cases this is an erroneous
oversimplification. 122 Similarly, it is often true that the
Franks in general constructed more rounded salients during
the thirteenth century than the twelfth, presumably
because these were found to be more effective against
earthquakes and siege engines. Once again, however, the
square towers of Crac des Chevaliers's north postern and
the rectangular salients along Caesarea's town walls, all
of which were completed in the mid-thirteenth century,
indicate that for every category an exception can be
found. 123
Sweeping generalizations should therefore be avoided, and
comparisons should be restricted to clear cut examples,
such as the Hospitaller defences at Crac des Chevaliers
and Margat, which are so similar that they may well have
been built by the same workmen. 124 On a smaller scale,
however, it is possible to identify certain defensive
elements which did indeed reoccur at many different
Frankish sites. Hence numerous strongholds were equipped
with catapults, or large crossbows, which were designed to
destroy siege engines and cut down attackers before they
got close enough to inflict any real damage on castle
walls. The Templars may have been particularly keen on
such weapons, because they installed them at Jaffa after
they acquired this lordship in 1266, and employed
Edwards, The Fortifications, p.32.
Prinle, 'Review Article', 143.
123 Crac des Chevaliers: Deschamps, Le Crac des
Chevaliers, pp.147-50. Caesarea: Benevisti, The Crusaders
in the Hol y Land, pp.140-45; Muller-Wiener, Castles of the
Crusaders, p.74. ; Rey, Etude, pp.221-27.
24 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli, pp.233-
84.
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'crossbowmen with large crossbows' to guard the outer moat
at Saphet. 125 In 1220 catapults positioned on the walls of
Pilgrims' Castle also inflicted such heavy casualties on
al-Muazzam's besieging forces that he was forced to
withdraw. 126
Even if attackers managed to survive this terrifying
onslaught, they would still often be confronted by
elaborate outer defences similar to those already
mentioned at Acre. At Nephin, for example, the double
ditches separating the promontory from the mainland were
both roughly 80 metres long, 12 to 15 metres wide, 8 to 10
metres deep, and possibly filled with sea water. 127
 A
contemporary account of the siege of Acre also describes
how one tower along the city walls had wooden hoardirigs
with huge iron spikes attached to its base, suggesting
that even if ditches were dry, they often contained
obstacles which could prove lethal for infantry and
cavalry alike. 128
 In addition, the bridges spanning these
ditches were frequently made out of wood, so that they
could be raised or destroyed at the approach of a
besieging army. Thus in 1291 the Templars defending the
sea castle of Sidon appear to have demolished part of the
bridge connecting it with the mainland, forcing the
Mamluks t.o build a new causeway. It was only when this
causeway was nearing completion that the Templars finally
125 Jaffa: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 90-91; Thorau,
The Lion of E gypt, p.169; Marshall, Warfare in the Latin
East, p.142. Saphet: De constructione castri Saphet, lines
177-78, p.383.
126 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.255-56.
In 1188 Saladin may also have been prevented from storming
the citadel at Tortosa because of its Templar crossbowmen.
See Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 353-55; Eracles, II, 121-
22.
127 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tripoli, p.300.
128 Gestes, p.814.
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gave in and fled to Cyprus.129
On other occasions, however, the Muslims prefered to
bombard and undermine strongholds from a relatively safe
distance, in order to avoid the problems encountered by
al-Muazzam at Pilgrims' Castle. The Franks dealt with such
tactics by building massively thick curtain walls, which
often rested on sloping revetments intended to minimize
the damage caused by sapping and earthquakes. A good
example of such a revetment, or talus, survives along the
south and west faces of Crac des Chevaliers's inner
ramparts, and similar structures can be seen at Caesarea
and Belvoir.130 These defences were additionally
strengthened by bonding together individual blocks of
stone with molten lead or iron clamps; a method used at
Beirut, Sidon, Pilgrims' Castle and Maraclea.' 3 ' Many of
these sites had also been occupied in classical times, and
therefore provided the Franks with a ready supply of vast
Herodian masonry. At Pilgrims' Castle, for example, stones
quarried or recycled locally were so large that they
'could barely be pulled in a cart by two oxen'.' 32 Roman
columns were also incorporated into numerous
fortifications including Ascalon and the citadel at
Caesarea, where they had been 'placed horizontally in the
body of the wall, in such a way that they had nothing to
fear from sapping, and could not fall, even if they were
129 Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de Jerusalem,
pp.229-31. 1291: see above, pp.50-51.
130 Crac des Chevaliers: Deschamps, Le Crac des
ChevaliL, pp.189-90. Caesarea: see above, note 123.
Belvoir Prawer, The Latin Kingdom, p.301.
131 Beirut: Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.204.
Sidon: Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de Jerusalem,
p.232. Pilgrims' Castle: Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims'
Castle: The faubourg and its defences', 123. Maraclea:
DeschampS, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, p.326.
132 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.170.
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undermined' 133
These techniques strengthened ramparts considerably, but
other strategies were needed to protect gateways. thus the
tactic of placing entrances in the side walls of flanking
towers, which has already been described at Acre, was also
adopted at Pilgrims' Castle and Tortosa, and ensured that
these weak spots could not be bombarded with catapults or
attacked in a direct assault. 134 Many gatehouses were also
equipped with portcullises, arrow slits and murder holes,
making it extremely hazardous for attackers to enter
castles even after their outer doorways had been breached.
In 1276, for example, Templar troops besieging Nephin
managed to reach the main gate safely, only to find
themselves trapped after their opponents inside the castle
lowered the portcullis behind them. 135 Similarly, the
principal route between Crac des Chevaliers's inner and
outer baileys consisted of a long, twisting ramp, which
the Hospitallers could defend from a bewildering array of
posterns, arrow slits and other vantage points.' 36
 Limited
counter attacks could also be launched from further
posterns situated along the castle's outer ramparts, and
at the north west corner of the inner ward. As a result,
Crac des Chevaliers's garrison could continue the fight
and inflict heavy casualties on besieging forces until
almost every single building in the fortress had been
Ascalon: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 143.
Caesarea: al-Makrizi, 1-Iistoire des Sultans, 1(b), 7.
134 Acre: see above, p.63. Pilgrims' Castle: Johns,
'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle: The ancient Tell and the
Outer Defences', 157. Tortosa: Deschamps, La Defense du
iip ii , pp.289-90; Rey, Etude, pp.72-73.
135 Gestes, p.782, and see below, p.146. For more
details on defensive features of this kind, see
BenveniSt 1 , Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.286-89.
136 Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.17'7-82.
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captured. 137
Many Frarikj gh strongholds were consequently built on a
vast scale, and incorporated so many ingenious defences
that they were virtually impregnable. In addition, the
architectural evidence confirms that sites like Crac des
Chevaliers and Pilgrims' Castle were built by highly
skilled craftsmen, who often used well cut and good
quality stone to construct windows, doorways and vaulting
according to the latest gothic styles fashionable in
Europe at this time. 138 Vast amounts of money were also
spent on such structures, for in 1253 Joinville reported
that the papal legate Odo of Châteauroux, who was helping
Louis IX refortify the town of Jaffa, spent a staggering
30,000 livres on just one particular gateway and adjoining
curtain wall. This implies that Louis himself, who built
a further two gates and all the other ramparts, spent at
least three times as much money on this particular
site 139
However, it is equally clear that at other times the
Franks were prepared to cut corners, either by occupying
much older fortifications, as they did at Antioch, or by
constructing relatively simple defences at sites which
nature had already rendered inaccessible. Indeed, in a
later chapter we shall see that such tactics became
commonplace in Frankish Greece, where even the most
powerful lords continued to erect very primitive
strongholds well into the thirteenth century. Once again,
137 Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.l47-SO, 155-
56, 183, 185-87.
138 The gallery of the great hall at Crac des
Chevaliers, for example, was built in the same style as
mid-thirteenth century ecclesiastical structures in
France. See Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.216-24.
139 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.306-8.
84
therefore, it is dangerous to assume that Frankjsh
military architecture evolved steadily and consistently,
rather than sporadically and according to local needs.140
Having looked at the architectural evidence, it is
possible to link this with the historical facts in order
to highlight the various military functions of crusader
fortifications in more detail. Defensively, for example,
the events of 1187 and 1188 made it clear that only the
very strongest fortresses were able to hold out against
large scale invasion forces. The major building programmes
undertaken at Tortosa and Chastel Blanc during the 1150s,
60s and 70s indicate that the Templars had already
realized this in the twelfth century, while at Margat and
Crac des Chevaliers the Hospitallers may well have
constructed their new defences from the late 1180s
onwards, in direct response to Saladin's Syrian campaign.
Consequently, along with Tripoli itself, these fortresses
were quite literally intended to save the county of
Tripoli from destruction, and some at least may have been
deliberately strengthened in case the disasters of Hattin
were ever repeated. Similarly, the massive urban defences
of Tyre and Antioch ensured that the kingdom of Jerusalem
and the northern principality survived into the thirteenth
century, even though most, if not all, surrounding castles
had been lost to Saladin.
During the next century the Franks continued to rely on a
select group of strongholds to maintain their position in
the east. It has been shown, for example, that Antioch,
Tripoli and the largest Syrian castles of the Military
Orders withstood repeated Seijuk and Aleppine incursions
virtually unscathed, and that even Baybars had to content
himself with raids rather than direct attacks against some
140 See below, pp.324-29.
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fortresses, especially Pilgrims' Castle. Reference has
also been made to the Khwarizmian invasion of 1244, Which
was supposedly undertaken by 20,000 horsemen. Frankish
efforts to halt this offensive in the field ended in
disaster at the battle of La Forbie, and the Latins were
far too outnumbered to stop the Khwarizmians from
occupying all of Palestine briefly, along with countless
smaller castles and poorly defended settlements such as
Jerusalem. In theory, this could only have been prevented
by constructing a continuous barrier like Hadrian's Wall
or the Great Wall of China, but even if this had been
physically possible, tens of thousands of men would have
been needed to garrison such a structure.'4'
Consequently, the countryside had to be abandoned, so that
for much of 1244 'the Christians only held the
fortresses'.' 42 Inland, these included Saphet, Montfort,
Beaufort, Crac des Chevaliers and Chastel Blanc, whilst
along the coast the Franks successfully defended all their
major strongholds except Ascalon. As a result, the
Khwarizmians, who were a nomadic people and lacked their
own siege equipment, were able to inflict terrible damage
on the rural economy, but could not make any permanent
conquest 5
 of their own. This enabled the Franks to wait
securely inside their castles until lack of food and
shelter, combined with a realization that further progress
would be almost impossible, forced their opponents to
retreat 143
These tactics could work equally well against aggressors
who were more disciplined and more capable of undertaking
a siege than the Khwarizmians. In 1220, for example, al-
141 See above, p.14.
142 Rothelin, p.565.
143 See above, p.14n16.
86
Muazzam appears to have reached Pilgrims' Castle, which
lay at the very heart of the kingdom of Jerusalem, without
meeting any resistance. Once he got there, however, al-
Muazzam failed to breach the fortress's massive new
defences, which were manned by more than 4,000 Christian
warriors. 144
 Consequently, the Franks had prevented al-
Muazzam from conquering areas around Pilgrims' Castle
without having to guard lengthy frontiers or blockading
important roads and valleys. During the Third Crusade,
Saladin used a similar strategy against Richard I, for by
ravaging areas east of Jaffa, but at the same time
strengthening Jerusalem's defences, he made it impossible
for the crusaders to win back their former capital.' 45
 For
his part, Richard knew that it would be sutcidal to
proceed into a desolate wasteland and besiege a city
without adequate food, water or shelter, and so he was
obliged to retreat.' 46 Thus it was far more important to
defend individual strongholds than the countryside which
surrounded them, for outlying areas could easily be
reoccupied, provided that larger castles and cities
successfully withstood a temporary invasion. In a 1ater
chapter it will be seen that in Frankish Greece, the
Catalans, Latins and Greeks all used exactly the same
tactic to withstand hostile incursions.147
By constructing just a handful of extremely powerful
castles, the Franks could also force their opponents to
abandon some campaigns before they had even begun. In
144 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.254-56;
James of Vitry, Lettres, p.138.
145 Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, Iv, 462, v, 49-51;
Itinerarium, pp.280-82; Ambroise, L'Estoire de la guerre
sainte, lines 6,840-68, col.l85.
146 Itinerarium, pp.38O, 394.
141 See below, pp.358-62.
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1221, a large Muslim army gathered at Horns, in the hope of
launching an attack against the county of Tripoli which
would direct Christian resources away from the Fifth
Crusade. However, eventually it was decided to cancel the
offensive and march south to Egypt, because the Muslims
'reflected that the castles of the Hospitallers or the
Templars could not easily be captured in a short time'.148
Similar worries may explain why the Mongols, having
conquered all of Muslim Syria and the near east, did not
invade the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1260. It has been
argued that they did not do so because they hoped to forge
an alliance with the Franks against the Egyptians, but
this theory has been challenged recently by Peter Jackson,
who believes that a fear of Frankish military might caused
the Mongols to hesitate. If this is the case, then it
suggests that the Mongols, despite numbering as many as
20,000 men, were afraid to enter a region defnded by a
series of strongholds which would probably have taken them
years to capture. To some extent, the reign of Baybars
subsequently proved them right, for although this sultan
spent most of the 1260s and early 1270s campaigning
against the Franks, even he failed to capture all their
castles and fortified cities.'49
Hence the Latins managed to retain at least some of their
territories beyond the 1270s, because they could rely on
their largest strongpoints to compensate for their lack of
troops. Indeed, many Frankish castles were deliberately
148 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.268.
149 Jackson, 'The Crisis', 481-514, particularly at
496-99. Baybars failed to capture Frankish strongholds
along the coast between Pilgrims' Castle and Latakia. See
above, p.1, 18. However, it has also been argued that for
economic reasons Baybars deliberately allowed the franks
to retain the coast, and in particular Acre. See Riley-
Smith in Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, xi-xii; Thorau,
Lion of Egypt, p.148.
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constructed in such a way that they could be defended by
relatively few men against far larger besieging armies.
Thus the Tower of David was so powerful that according to
one chronicler it only required a garrison of fifteen to
twenty soldiers, while the anonymous author of
constructione castri Saphet noted that far more troops
would be needed to attack this fortress than to defend
it.' 50 This comment appears to have been verified by
subsequent events, for Saphet is reported to have had a
garrison of 2,200 in times of war, and Baybars may well
have needed as many as 12,000 troops to capture it.151
Although it is extremely difficult to calculate exact
totals, other Frankish garrisons are likely to have been
equally outnumbered, for in 1281 a mere 600 Hospitallers
are said to have driven off 6,000 Muslims who were
besieging the castle of Margat. These figures indicate why
the Franks rarely faced their opponents in open battle,
and preferred to concentrate their meagre forces inside
strongholds rather than trying to defend their
frontiers 152
At times, however, the Latins were so outnumbered that
they even lacked the troops to defend their own
fortifications. Town walls were particularly vulnerable in
this respect, as far more men and resources were needed to
garrison and maintain such defences than compact
strongholds like Beaufort or Chastel Blanc. Hence it has
already been noted that Antioch's walls were 12 kilometres
150 Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosol ymitana, ed.
H. Hagenmeyer, (Heidelberg 1913), p.285; De constructione
castri Saphet, lines 232-39, p.385.
151 De constructione castri Saphet, lines 205-6, p.384,
and see above, p.1, 89.
152 Gestes, p.786. See also Marino Sanudo, Liber
secretorum, p.228; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.457 (text
A).
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long and covered an entire mountain side. These ramparts
had originally been designed to protect 300,000 Greeks
rather than the 100,000 people who lived there during the
crusader period, and as a result the Frankish rulers of
Antioch must have had trouble finding enough troops to
guard every tower, postern and gateway of their
capital.' 53 Similarly, we have seen that Jerusalem's walls
may not even have formed a complete circuit during the
1230s and 40s, and even if they did, it seems that there
were not enough Christians left in the city to defend and
maintain them. Thus in 1239 one western chronicler wrote
that Jerusalem 'had not been fortified strongly except the
keep...which was called the Tower of David'.154
The historical evidence confirms that this comment is
correct, for during the Muslim rebellion of 1229 15,000
peasants appear to have entered Jerusalem unhindered, but
failed to break into the citadel, where the beleaguered
Christians took shelter until a relieving force arrived
from Acre and drove the Muslims back into the hills.155
Ten years later this stronghold withstood another attack
by al-Salih of Egypt, 156
 and although Malik an-Nasir
Dawud, ruler of Kerak, finally captured it shortly
afterwards, its defenders still managed to hold out for
153 See above, pp.67-68. al-Makrizi, Histoire des
Sultans, 1(b), 53.
154 Rothelin, p.529. A severe lack of troops had of
course also contributed to the fall of Jerusalem in 1187,
even though the walls were still intact at this stage. See
Eracles, II, 82-98; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 317-41.
Eracles, II, 384-85.
Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia, ed. H.R. Luard,
in Annales monastici, III, Rolls Series (1866), 150. This
siege was recorded in few of the contemporary sources, and
remains something of a mystery. See Marshall, Warfare in
the Latin East, pp.243-45; Jackson, 'The Crusades of 1239-
41 and their Aftermath', 38.
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over three weeks, despite lacking adequate supplies.157
These incidents suggest that the Latin population of
Jerusalem, which may have numbered a mere five to ten
thousand people, effectively abandoned any hopes of
garrisoning the city's ramparts, and concentrated their
limited resources on the citadel, and in particular the
Tower of David. 158
 Consequently, Dawud's campaign of 1239
may have proved decisive, for although the Christians
subsequently regained Jerusalem by treaty, the Muslims did
not hand the city over until they had sleighted its
citadel, and had even managed to shift some of the
gigantic Herodian masonry blocks at the base of the Tower
of David. It seems unlikely that the Franks had the time
or the resources to rebuild this structure properly before
1244, leaving them wholly at the mercy of the dreaded
Khwarizmians p159
In a sense, therefore, the Latins only lost Jerusalem once
they had lost its citadel. Likewise, the new strongholds
constructed at Ascalon and Teras 3rng t'ne early l2Us
may have represented other, less successful attempts to
defend and even recolonize settlements without having to
construct extensive urban fortifications. It is also
interesting to note that shortly after Frederick II
acquired Jerusalem in 1229, the Templars were thinking of
constructing a brand new castle there to boost the city's
defences. Presumably they too had realized that a compact
and well garrisoned structure of this kind would be much
157 Rothelin, pp.529-30; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II,
62; al-'Ayni, Collier de Perl, pp.l96-97; Abu'l-Fida,
Annales, pp.117-l8.
158 The population estimate is based on the
contemporary assertion that the Khwarizmians killed around
7,000 people at Jerusalem in 1244. See Matthew Paris,
Chronica Maiora, IV, 309.
159 Johns, 'The Citadel, Jerusalem', 169, and see note
157. Khwarizmian attack: see above, p.14.
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easier to defend than a long, sprawling circuit wall.160
This certainly proved to be the case at Antioch almost
forty years later, because Baybars managed to storm the
city's ramparts in a mere three days, but the citadel atop
Mount Silpius only surrendered when the thousands of
people who had taken shelter there found that they lacked
the supplies to survive a protracted siege.161
However, although this strategy proved more successful at
Jerusalem than it did at Antioch, and enabled Christians
living in the holy city to survive the rebellion of 1229
and the first Muslim siege of 1239, it was still little
more than a stop gap measure. Ultimately the only
realistic way to protect cities inhabited by thousands of
Christians, or to repopulate former Frankish settlements
such as Tiberias, was to build vast urban fortifications
which were properly garrisoned and regularly repaired. But
the fate of Antioch, which fell 'because there was not in
it a force sufficient for its defence', 162
 proved that the
Franks were incapable of maintaining existing city walls,
let alone constructing new ones. This explains why they
never returned to Ascalon, Tiberias or Jerusalem after the
rnid-1240s.
Apart from Ascalon, which probably remained uninhabited
anyway, all the citadels discussed so far were attached to
cities located inland. The defensive role of these
structures differed considerably from their coastal
neighbours at Acre, Tyre and Tripoli, whose strategic
insignificance has already been referred to. This can
probably be explained in terms of the far greater
160 Matthew Paris, Chronica Malora, IV, 290.
161 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 122; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 53, and see below, p. 161.
162 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , p.448.
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concentration of Latin settlers living in these cities,
which ensured that there were not just adequate resources
to construct powerful curtain walls, but enough soldiers
available to guard them. Consequently, citadels were not
needed to compensate for undermanned or incomplete urban
fortifications in quite the same way as they were at
Jerusalem and Tiberias)63
However, most other Frankish sites located along the coast
can in fact be compared with Jerusalem, because they were
dominated by a strong central fortress, and were
surrounded by much weaker outer defences. This point
applies to less extensive towns such as Caesarea, as well
as the even smaller settlements (or bourgs) which sprung
up around strongholds like Pilgrims' Castle. Hence we have
seen how this latter community was destroyed by Baybars in
1265, but the sheer strength of Pilgrims' Castle itself
ensured that the site as a whole remained in Christian
hands until 1291. Similarly, Saladin's attack on the town
of Tortosa in 1188 only had a very temporary impact
because the Templars successfully defended their inner
citadel. It has also been noted that in 1232 the Lombards
failed to capture the castle of Beirut, even though they
managed to storm the town in the space of a single
night 164
Thus aL Acre, Tyre and Tripoli, far greater emphasis was
placed on urban fortifications, whereas at most other
sites which had some kind of settlement attached to them,
castles and citadels were considered more important than
town walls. However, it is also important to remember that
regardless of whether they had citadels or ramparts to
163 See above, p. JT, 92,3,4. Acre was said to have had
a population of 40,000 in 1291. See Gestes, p.807.
164 1265: see above, p.56. 1188: see above, pp.47-48.
1232: see above, p.51.
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protect them, coastal sites in general were better off
than strongpoints inland, which could not benefit from the
considerable naval superiority of the Latins. This point
can be illustrated by returning to the successful defence
of Pilgrims' Castle against al-Muazzam in 1220.The core
garrison of this fortress was gradually strengthened by
the arrival of Frankish contingents from Acre and Cyprus,
who 'brought a great supply of soldiers and funds' with
them. Indeed, news that more reinforcements were being
prepared by the lords of Gibelet and Tripoli contributed
to al-Muazzam's decision to call off the siege, suggesting
that Pilgrims' Castle would have been blockaded for much
longer, and perhaps even forced to surrender, if it had
not received a steady flow of seaborne assistance.165
No doubt Saladin would also have captured the newly
rebuilt Frankish citadel of Jaffa, which he besieged in
July 1192, if Richard I had not arrived to relieve the
garrison of this fortress with a hastily organized fleet
from Acre. Like al-Muazzam, Saladin did not have the
necessary naval strength to prevent Richard from mounting
a rescue operation of' this kind, and so he was obliged to
retreat. 166
 Moreover, even if Saladin had been able to
blockade Jaffa by sea as well as by land, he may still
have encountered problems, for in 1232 John of' Ibelin
managed to send reinforcements into the castle of Beirut
by ordering his troops to swim past the Lombard ships
guarding the harbour under cover of darkness. Eventually,
John's son also slipped through the Imperialist blockade
aboard a small boat carrying 100 further troops, and soon
165 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Dmiatina, p.255.
166 inerarium, pp.396-423; Matthew Paris, Chronica
Maiora, II, 387-90; Eracles, II, 196-97; Baha'-al-Din,
Anecdot, pp.323-33; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 67-71;
Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 64-65.
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after the Lombards raised the siege and withdrew to
Tyre 167
Help could also be sent to cities or castles which were
under threat, even if they were not actually under siege.
Hence the arrival of 130 Cypriot knights at Acre in 1265
boosted this city's defences just as Baybars was besieging
Caesarea and Arsuf a few miles to the south. 168 Many years
earlier Saladin had also been deterred from attacking
Tripoli after a contingent of Sicilian knights turned up
to help defend the city. Indeed, both Tyre and Tripoli
presented Saladin with a terrible dilemma, for the longer
he left them in Frankish hands, the more reinforcements he
would receive from the west; yet he was reluctant to
besiege these strongpoints as long as there were other,
less powerful castles still to be taken elsewhere.169
Their naval power therefore enabled the Latins to protect
coastal fortifications which would otherwise have been
lost to the Muslims, or in the case of Beirut, a rival
western faction. But it should also be noted that even
when a city or fortress could no longer be defended
against such opponents, lives could still be saved if the
Franks had some way of escaping by sea. Thus in 1218 a
Genoese fleet sent to relieve Caesarea, which was being
besieged by a large Damascene army, could do nothing to
save the city, but did at least manage to rescue its
defenders and take them to Acre. 17° It has also been
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.131-
33; Gestes, pp.704-8; Chronigue d'Amadi, p.155; Florio
Bustron, Chroni gue, p.86.
168 Gestes, p.758.
169 See above, p.68n85.
170 Eracles, II, 334; Oliver of Paderborn, Historia
Damiatina, p.244; James of Vitry, Lettres, pp.101-2, and
see above, p.54.
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mentioned that in 1291 the garrison of Sidon was able to
get away unscathed by initially withdrawing to the sea
castle, and then sailing to Cyprus once any further
resistance against the Muslims became pointless. 171
 The
significance of the sea as a means of escape can further
be illustrated by looking at the contrasting fate of Haifa
and Arsuf, both taken by Baybars in 1265. Whereas almost
all the inhabitants of Haifa managed to flee in boats just
as the Muslims broke into the town, the Hospitallers
defending Beirut were prevented from making contact with
Frankish ships trying to assist them, and were
consequently all killed or captured.'72
Such incidents confirm that access to the sea became an
important element in the defensive strategy of all coastal
cities and fortresses. The site of Pilgrims' Castle, for
example, was regarded as ideal by contemporaries not only
because of its location on a promontory, but because it
had 'a naturally good harbour'. 173
 Similarly, one of the
principal reasons why Richard of Cornwall decided to
refortify Ascalon in the 1240s was that it could be
reached by sea if it ever came under attack.174
Moreover, the archaeological remains of several crusader
171 See above, pp.50-51.
172 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 72, 75, 77; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 8, 10; Marino Sanudo,
Liber secretorum, p.222; Gestes, p.758; Eracles, II, 450
(mentions only Arsuf).
173 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.171. See
also Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, III, 14; Johns, Guide
to 'Atlit, pp.49-5O.
174 Matthew paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 143. Pringle
argues that the harbour was not in fact very accessible,
and could only be used by very small boats. See Pringle,
'King Richard I and the walls of Ascalon', 144-48.
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ports suggests that they were often heavily fortified, and
were within easy reach of a castle wherever this was
possible. At Sidon a small jetty on the landward side of
the sea castle once formed the anchorage which the city's
defenders presumably sailed from in 1291. ' Further
south, the citadel of Caesarea acted as the southern
breakwater of this harbour, and must have been easy for
the Genoese relieving force to reach in 1218.116 The
entrances to many larger crusader ports were also
protected by flanking towers, usually with a chain between
them, which could be raised during a siege to prevent
hostile ships from gaining access. Such structures existed
at Beirut, and it is interesting to speculate whether they
played any role in the Lombard siege of 1231-32.
Similar defences also existed at Tyre and at Acre, where
the Venetians and the Genoese periodically fought for
control over the fortified reef guarding the harbour
entrance 178
The Latins therefore did everything in their power to
defend their harbours and keep the sea routes between
their possessions in the east open. This strategy ensured
Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem,
pp.229-31; Rey, Etude, p.157.
176 The northern breakwater of this harbour was built
out of Roman columns; another example of crusader
recycling. See Rey, Etude, pp.222-23; Benvenisti, The
Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.143-44.
177 Rey, Etude, pp.173-74; Du Mesnil du Buisson, 'Les
anciennes defenses de Beyrouth', 244.
178 Tyre: In 1242 Ibelin opponents of Frederick II
lowered the harbour chain at Tyre in order to let their
Venetian allies into the city. See Gestes, pp.732-35;
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.178-84, and
above, p.34. I, 78. See also Deschamps, La Defense du
royaume de Jerusalem, p.136; Rey, Etude, pp.167-69. Acre:
Gestes, pp.768-69; Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the
thirteenth century', 8-10.
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that many of their coastal strongholds survived until
1291, but it meant very little in the interior, where the
Muslims held the initiative, and often outnumbered their
Christian opponents by as much as ten to one. These
considerable differences in troop numbers prevented the
Franks from relieving inland cities and fortresses in the
same way that they had done at Pilgrims' Castle in
122O. Admittedly, there were incidents of field armies
rather than seaborne forces coming to the rescue of
strongholds, such as the Armenian-led troops who prevented
Baybars from capturing Antioch in 1262, or the Frankish
knights from Acre who drove the Muslims out of Jerusalem
in 1229.180 However, it is significant that this latter
example concerned a rebellion rather than an Ayubid army,
and that the relief of Antioch involved a large Mongol
contingent rather than a purely Christian force. Indeed,
there is no evidence that Baybars ever had to abandon a
siege because a Christian field army turned up and forced
him to retreat. The Franks quite simply lacked the troops
and resources to mount such an expedition, particularly
inland, where a Latin force of two or three thousand men
could easily be ambushed, or even annihilated, by a far
larger Muslim army.
Their overwhelming superiority on land therefore enabled
the Muslims, and in particular the Mamluk sultans of the
later thirteenth century, to besiege Frankish strongpoints
of the interior almost at will. Although the presence of
21 Muslim galleys at the siege of Ascalon in 1247 suggests
that they did sometimes have enough ships at their
disposal to blockade coastal sites, such incidents appear
179 See above, pp.37, 93.
180 1262: Gestes, p.755; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.450
(text B); Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.221; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(a), 177-78; Ibn al-Furat,
Selections, II, 50. 1229: Eracles, II, 384-85.
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to have been rare, but inland there was nothing to stop
the Muslims from surrounding individual castles with
relative ease.181
By cutting their intended target off from the outside
world, the Muslims made it even more difficult for the
Franks to send a relieving force, and also prevented the
Christians they were besieging from escaping in the way
that the remaining occupants of Sidon had done in 1291. As
a result, inland sieges often concluded with appaling
massacres and devastating looting sprees. Such atrocities
occured at Saphet an at Antioch, where virtually the
entire population was either killed or enslaved, and
centuries of Byzantine culture were wiped out in a matter
of hours.182
These factors explain why Frankish control over inland
regions crumbled decades earlier, and why the vast
majority of fortifications built or repaired during the
thirteenth century were located along the coast. In 1253,
for example, Louis IX decided to rebuild Sidon's defences
rather than construct a new fortress in the interior,
because the local barons advised him that such a place
would be too exposed to Muslim attacks without any access
to the sea. 183 In 1230 Gregory IX expressed similar
concern for the castle of Montfort, because it was located
several miles inland, and was consequenbly proving costly
to build and difficult to defend properly.184
181 Gestes, p.741; Eracles, II, 433, says 22 galleys.
182 Saphet: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 93-96; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 30; Gestes, pp.764-
66. Anti.och: al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 52-
54; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 122-26.
183 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Lok, p.302.
184 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.72, pp.56-57.
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The history of the crusader states in the Holy Land was
therefore dictated by the fact that the Christians usually
dominated the sea, whereas the Muslims normally triumphed
on land. The Franks tried to compensate for their lack of
troops in the field by constructing vast fortifications,
so that garrisons of two or three thousand men could
withstand invasion forces of anything up to 20,000 mounted
troops. This tactic worked successfully against the
Seljuks, Khwarizmians and Mongols, as well as numerous
Ayubid incursions such as al-Muazzam's attack on Pilgrims'
Castle. However, other aggressors who besieged Frankish
strongholds more systematically, and in particular Baybars
and his Mamluk successors, proved that even the strongest
castles were eventually forced to surrender if the Muslims
were allowed to blockade and attack them unhindered.
Without an adequate field army at their disposal, the
Franks could not prevent such sieges, and could not
therefore halt the gradual erosion of their territories.
It has been shown that Christian cities were even more
vulnerable in this respect, because far more troops and
resources were needed to build and defend urban
fortifications than individual castles. As we have seen,
these problems were more pressing at Antioch and Jerusalem
than the much wealthier and more densely populated cities
of Acre, Tyre and Tripoli. However, even at these latter
sites the task of garrisoning urban defences had to be
shared between many different nations and organizations.
The Hospitallers, Templars and Teutonic Knights were
especially important in this respect, and their
contribution to the defence of these cities will be
discussed in more detail below. 185 At Acre the much
smaller Order of St.Lazarus also guarded the northern tip
185 See below, pp.160-61.
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of Montmusard's fortifications, 186 whilst medieval maps
and descriptions of the city indicate that other sections
of the ramparts were entrusted to the Italian city states
or important figures in the Latin clergy. Thus more
soldiers must have been stationed in these cities than any
other Frankish strongpoints in the east.187
So far, we have looked almost exclusively at the role of
major fortifications as a means of defending territory,
but such structures were also relied on to protect people.
As far as large urban sites were concerned, this point is
fairly self-explanatory, for city walls were expected to
shelter tens of thousands of unarmed civilians. Indeed, it
has already been noted that 100,000 people lived at
Antioch in Lhe thirteenth century, although the vast
majority of them were presumably Greek rather than west
European. 188 We have also seen how many smaller towns and
urban communities were fortified, including Sidon, Jaffa
and Caesarea, which were provided with new town walls by
Louis IX, as well as Arsuf, Beirut, Gibelet, Tortosa,
Haifa and, for a short time during the Third Crusade,
Ascalon. None of these sites appear to have been defended
by anything more than a single rampart and outer moat,
although these structures mau have varied somewhat, for
the urban fortifications at Caesarea seem to have been far
186 Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie', 132; Marshall,
Warfare in the Latin East, p.67.
18? See above, p.JT65 Leave note in!. Muller-Wiener's
plan of Acre, representing a modern interpretation of
medieval maps, shows more clearly towers garrisoned or
paid for by the Genoese, the Venetians, the English, the
papal legate and the Military Orders. See Castles of the
Crusaders, p.73.
188 See above, p.88.
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larger than those of Tortosa or Beirut. 189
 In addition,
other communities which were often known as bourgs sprung
up next to large fortresses. Such settlements have been
mentioned at Pilgrims' Castle, Beaufort and Margat, and
other examples were to be found on the relatively flat
ground to the south of Crac des Chevaliers, as well as the
slopes below the fortress of Saphet. Again, these bours
were normally defended by a single curtain wall, although
some, and in particular those at Margat, Saphet and
Pilgrims' Castle, .iere so large that they became towns in
their own right. 198 Finally, it should be noted that there
were many people living in the countryside who were not
necessarily protected by fortifications in peace time, but
had deliberately settled close to castles so that if
necessary they could find shelter relatively quickly and
easily. Thus the author of De constructione castri Saphet
wrote that once this fortress had been completed, 10,000
Christians living in 260 villages recolonized an area of
central Galilee which had previously been considered too
dangerous to inhabit)91
By living in or near fortified sites, the civilian
population hoped to protect itself against a whole variety
of external aggressors. Clearly, the most dangerous of
these were those attackers who undertook large scale
invasions of Christian territories. Thus in 1188 civilians
as well as Templar garrison troops no doubt took shelter
189 Caesarea: Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy
Land, pp.140-45; Rey, Etude, pp.221-27; Muller-Wiener,
Castles of the Crusaders, p.74. Tortosa: see above, p46.
Beirut: see above, p.51n24.
190 Margat: see above, pp.44-45. Saphet: De
constructiorie castri Saphet, line 255, p.386. Pilgrims'
Castle: see above, pp.55-56. Beaufort: see above, p.59.
Crac des Chevaliers: Rey, Etude, p.40.
91 De constructione castri Sa phet, lines 256-58,
p.386.
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in the citadel at Tortosa, thereby avoiding death or
enslavement at the hands of Saladin. 192 Similarly, anyone
fortunate enough to reach one of the castles or cities
which successfully resisted the lchwarizmians in 1244
escaped being massacred in the same way that 7,000
unfortunate Christians were at Jerusalem. 193
 During the
reign of Baybars, Mamluk forces also found hundreds or
even thousands of non-combattants sheltering inside many
of the strongholds they captured, including Akkar,
Beaufort, Saphet, Chastel Blanc 194
 and Antjoch, where
'eight thousand fighting men, Over and above women and
children, crowded together in the citadel'.'95
At other times the Mulims launched more localized raids
which were only designed to bring them slaves, cattle and
booty, and to inflict severe damage on the local economy.
Indeed, from the early 1260s onwards, Baybars made such
raids part of his overall war strategy, because he knew
that by destroying crops and orchards one year, he would
leave the Frankish garrisons of neighbouring castles
dangerously short of food when he returned to besiege them
the following spring. In a later chapter it will be shown
that this tactic contributed to the fall of major
strongholds like Crac des Chevaliers,' 96 but as far as
192 Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 353-54; Eracles, II,
120-22.
193 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 309.
194 Akkar: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 148-49; al-
Makrizi-' Histoire des Sutans, 1(b), 85. Beaufort: ibid,
1(b), 51; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 112. Saphet: ibid,
], 94_95; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 30.
Chastel Blanc: ibid, 1(b), 84; Ibn al-Furat, Selections,
II, 143'
195 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 122. See also al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 53.
196 See below, pp.415-16.
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Christian civilians were concerned, the need to find
shelter from these attacks inevitably became a more
pressing issue than the long term security of Latin
territories. Thus the citizens of Acre and Tyre, as well
as people living in the surrounding countryside, survived
successive Mamluk incursions carried out during the 1260s.
These campaigns devastated neighbouring orchards and
farmlands, and led to the destruction of many outlying
agricultural buildings, but were not strong enough to
challenge the massive defences of Acre 197
 and Tyre198
directly. Likewise, it has already been shown that when he
attacked Pilgrims' Castle in 1265, Baybars had to content
himself with sacking the outer bour, whose inhabitants
would have retreated inside the fortress itself.199
This point can also be illustrated by taking a closer look
at the history of Sidon during the thirteenth century.
After members of Frederick II's crusade had completed
Sidon's sea castle, and the town had been at least
partially reoccupied, Louis IX sent a contingent of his
army to construct a second fortress and new urban
fortifications there in the summer of 1253. However, while
this work was still going on the Muslims launched a
surprise raid on the Franks, which resulted in the death
of 2,000 Christians, most of whom were killed because
197 Raids on Acre occured in 1263 (Eracles, II, 446-47;
Ibn al-FUrat, Selections, II, 57-59; al-Makrizi, Histoire
des Sult ans , 1(a), 199-200), in 1265 (ibid, 1(b), 7; Ibn
al-Furat, SelectiQfl . , II, 71), in 1266 (ibid, II, 87;
Eracles, II, 454-55; Gestes, p.764; al-Makrizi, Histoire
des Sultans, 1(b), 27-28), in 1267 (ibid, 1(b), 42; Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 102-3; Gestes, p.766; Eracles,
II, 455), and in 1269 (see above, p.41.)
198 Raids on Tyre occured in 1266 (see note 197, for
1266), and in 1269 (Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 132-34;
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 68-69.
199 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 8; Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 72.
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there was not enough room for them in the sea castle. As
a result Louis decided to supervise the rest of the
project in person, so that it was completed before he
returned to France the following year.200
Six years after Louis IX's departure, Julian, lord of
Sidon, made a rash incursion into Mongol held territories
to the east of Beaufort, which precipitated a devastating
Mongol counter attack against Sidon itself. However,
thanks to Louis's new defences, Julian was able to hold
the Mongols off at the gate just long enough for the
Christian population of the town to escape into the land
and sea castles. Consequently, when the Mongols finally
broke into the town, all they could do was to carry out
widespread looting and dismantle the walls, but they made
no attempt to attack either citadel. Louis IX's wish that
the massacre of 1253 should not be repeated had therefore
been fulfilled, and the presence of strong fortifications
had once again ensured that lives were saved even if homes
were destroyed.201
However, the Franks were not always capable of resisting
their opponents as successfully as the inhabitants of
Sidon were in 1260. But whenever a Christian stronghold
did fall to a besieging army, its civilian population as
well as its fighting garrison stood a far greater chance
of survival if it could escape by sea. Thus we have
already seen how all Christians, regardless of whether
they were combattants or non-combattants took to their
boats and fled from Haifa in 1265.202 Three years later
200 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.302, 336,
and see above, p.50.
201 Gestes, p.752; Eracles, II, 444; Jackson, 'The
Crisis', 499-500.
202 See above, p.95.
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there were no such options for the unfortunate citizens of
Antioch, who found themselves trapped by their own
ramparts once the Muslims began to swarm into the city,
and could not even escape through any of the gates, which
Baybars had deliberately sealed off in order to prevent
any loot from being carried away.03
Similar scenes of devastation accompanied the fall of
Tripoli in 1289 and Acre in 1291, for although these
cities were located on the coast, and a fair percentage of
their inhabitants could therefore flee in ships, many
others were cut down by the Muslims as they retreated in
panic. These events shed further light on the strategic
limitations of citadels which were situated inland.
Indeed, contemporary sources do not mention anyone seeking
shelter in Acre's citadel, which would, in a sense, have
become more of a trap than a refuge once the Muslims
controlled the streets around it. Instead about 10,000
Christians made their way to the headquarters of the
Templars, which stood at the water's edge in the south
west corner of the city. This structure had very strong
walls and towers, as well as a postern giving access to
the sea, and it is clear that the Franks rated their
chances of survival more by sheltering here than in a
building which offered no obvious means of escape. In
theory, the Temple could therefore have been used to
organize a seaborne withdrawal, if the Latins had not
already been so utterly defeated that its garrison was
finally overwhelmed after a blockade lasting a further ten
days.204
At Tripoli, a similar set of circumstances also led to a
203 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 122.
204 Gestes, pp.814, 816; Annales de Terre Sairite, p.461
(text A); Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, pp.231-32, and
see aboV e , p.15.
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high number of Christian casualties. It has been mentioned
that Tripoli's citadel was located on a hill opposite the
actual city, making it impossible for anyone to reach it
once the Muslims had begun their assault. As a result, the
Franks had nowhere to hide after their urban defences had
been breached, and hundreds of citizens who sought refuge
on a small island in the harbour were ruthlessly
massacred. If this island had been fortified, these people
could have been evacuated in the same way that the
defenders of Sidon were two years later. This suggests
that sites which had a powerful inner fortress with direct
access to the sea were strategically superior to
settlements protected by strong curtain walls and a
relatively weak citadel.205
Having looked at the defensive role of castles, citadels
and urban fortifications, it is possible to discuss the
various attacking functions of such sites in more detail.
In doing so, it quickly becomes apparent that whenever
they went on the offensive, the Franks again relied on
their strongholds to make up for their lack of troops, and
to compensate for their inadequate field armies. Indeed,
by constructing new fortifications in areas which had been
abandoned by the Muslims or acquired by treaty, the
Christians could maintain, or even expand, their borders
without ever having to face their opponents in open
battle.
In the short term, this tactic was relied on to re-
establish Latin control over territories which had been
lost temporarily. Thus we have seen that Coliath, a small
castrum-type fortress in the county of Tripoli, probably
fell to Saladin in 1188, was demolished by al-Adil twenty
205 Abu'l-Fida, Annales, pp.162-63; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 11(a), 102-3; Annales de Terre
Sainte, p.460 (text B).
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years later, and was again overrun by Baybars during a
Mamluk raid carried out in 1266. There is no evidence that
the Franks tried to prevent these attacks by confronting
the Muslims, and in 1266 at least Coliath's garrison quite
simply fled without even attempting to hold such a small
and low lying site against a far larger Mamluk army.
However, as long as more powerful strongholds like Chastel
Blanc, Crac des Chevaliers and Tripoli held out, it became
equally pointless for the Muslims to install their own
troops at Coliath, for these forces would be terribly
exposed to a Christian counter-attack once their
colleagues had withdrawn from the area. Consequently,
successive Muslim aggressors thought it wiser to demolish
Coliath, but none of them could actually prevent the
Franks from reoccupying the site, and rebuilding it on at
least two occasions. This suggests that Coliath was not in
fact lost for good until Baybars conquered the entire
plain of Akkar in 1271.26
Further south it has also been noted that the tower of
Qaqun remained in Christian hands for as long as the much
larger Frankish strongpoint of Caesarea did.2U? Parallel
observations can be made about the fortified mills of Doc
and Recordane, which were situated on the plain of Acre,
and were owned by the Templars and the Hospitallers
respectively. Both these structures were destroyed during
the Muslim raid on the area in 1253, and subsequently
suffered further damage in 1263, when Doc was demolished,
and again in 1267, when the same fate befell neighbouring
Recordane. 208 These events, as well as the substantial
206 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 150, and see above,
pp.70-71.
207 See above, p.72.
208 1253: Eracles, II, 440-41; Matthew Paris, Chronica
Maiora, V, 398; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.220;
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.44 (text B). 1263: ibid, p.450
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remains of Recordane which still survive today, suggest
that the Military Orders were able to reconstruct both
mills again and again during the thirteenth century,
because of their close proximity to Acre.209
Thus larger Frankish cities and strongholds were not only
capable of withstanding major incursions, but also acted
as focal points for Christian reconquests and rebuilding
programmes once temporary invasions had come to an end. So
far this strategy has been discussed in fairly localized
terms, but it was also used to regain territories which
lay further afield. Montfort, for example, was established
as soon as, If not slightly before, Christian possession
of the site had been confirmed in the treaty of Jaffa.210
The key strongholds erected or reoccupied in the early
1240s, most notably Beaufort and Saphet, also ensured that
many of the inland areas gained at this time remained
under Christian rule until the reign of Baybars. It has
also been shown that initial efforts to recolonize
numerous urban sites lost or destroyed after the battle of
Hattin centred around the construction of new castles,
especially at Caesarea, Sidon, Ascalon, Tiberias and
Jerusalem. Further north, the tower which Bartholomew de
Ravendel constructed at Maraclea after 1277 represented
another, unusually late, attempt to reestablish a Frankish
(text A); Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 57, 57n4, 59.
1267: ibid, II, 103n2.
209 Recordane was defended by a two storey tower
similar to that at Qaqun. See Benvenisti, The Crusaders in
the Holy Land, p.251; Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de
Jerusalem, p.124; D. Pringle, 'Survey of Castles in the
Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1989: Preliminary Report',
Levant, XXIII, (1991), 87-91, at 89.
210 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 175. The site
of the castle was acquired in 1228. See Tabulae ordinis
Theutonici, no.63, pp.5l-53; RRH, no.1002, p.263. This was
confirmed by Frederick II in 1229. See Tabulae ordinis
Theutonici, no.67, pp.54-55; RRH, no.1011, p.265.
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lordship previously overrun by the Muslims. 211 Around 1261
Bohemond VI also 'took Latakia and built a strong new
tower' , so that the town, which had belonged to the
Muslims since 1188, returned to Christian control for the
next twenty six years. 212 Clearly, therefore, the Franks
depended on fortifications far more than troops to secure
any new territories which they occupied, and it is
interesting to note that out of all the sites mentioned
above, Latakia appears to have been the only settlement
acquired after a direct confrontation with Muslim
defenders. This merely confirms that the Latins were
normally too outnumbered to make conquests by force, and
actually achieved most of their territorial gains through
diplomacy.
Once they had been occupied or reconstructed, Latin
defences could therefore be used to protect both people
and territory, making them an ideal way of safeguarding
and repopulating newly secured land. In the short term,
however, many such structures had also been built to
defend Christian field armies operating against the
Muslims. As soon as they had captured Acre, for example,
the various contingents of the Third Crusade set about
repairing the city's defences in order to protect
themselves against Saladin. 213 Later on Richard I used
Acre as a springboard for his campaign into southern
Palestine, but the further he moved away from the city,
the more exposed he became to potential Muslim counter-
attacks. In a sense, therefore, self-preservation had as
much to do with Richard's hasty refortification of Jaffa
211 See above, pp.74-75.
211 1188: Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 356, 359-63.
c.1261: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 115.
213 Itinerarium, p.240; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
II, 376.
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and Ascalon as the desire to reconquer these cities.
Likewise, we have seen that Richard's decision not to
attack Jerusalem resulted from a concern about the
harshness of the terrain, the inadequacy of the water
supply, and the lack of friendly castles along the way
where his army could find shelter. 214
 It should be added
that a quarter of a century later, members of the Fifth
Crusade were motivated by similar worries when they
constructed Pilgrims' Castle, for, according to Oliver of
Paderborn, 'the primary advantage of this building is that
the assembly of Templars...will remain in the garrison of
this fort up until the restoration of the walls of
Jerusalem'. Hence both Richard I's followers and Oliver of
Paderborn's companions hoped to secure the holy city, and
indeed the entire route between it and Acre, by building
fortifications rather than driving the Muslims back
through sheer weight of numbers.215
The new citadels which Frederick II's troops constructed
at Jaffa, Caesarea and Sidon can be cited as further
examples of castles being built to expand Latin power, and
at the same time protect crusaders in the field. 216 In the
middle years of the thirteenth century, Joinville also
wrote that during construction work at Jaffa, Louis IX's
army remained camped right next to Frederick's older
fortress, and as close to the shore as possible, so that
it would be sheltered while new town walls were being
built. 217 Similarly, the remains of a contemporary hail
214 Itinerarium, pp.380, 394, and see above, p.86.
215 Quote: Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina,
p .171. The construction of Pilgrims' Castle also enabled
the Templars to continue their traditional role as
guardians of pilgrims travelling to or from Jerusalem. See
below, pp.159-60.
216 See above, pp.50, 54.
217 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p.284.
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along the north face of Sidon's sea castle suggests that
Louis IX used this stronghold as his headquarters until
the town's urban defences had been completed. 218 Thus the
policy first adopted by Richard I was later carried
forward by both Frederick II and Louis IX, and the latter
crusader in particular clearly relied on much older
fortifications in order to accomplish his own extensive
building programme successfully.
By building or repairing strongholds, these men were again
attempting to augment and consolidate Frankish rule
without having to expose their soldiers to a potentially
disastrous encounter like the battle of Hattin. At other
times, however, the Franks were in fact prepared to attack
their opponents more directly, and on such occasions the
role of castles and cities changed from that of refuge
sites to that of starting points for offensive campaigns
against Muslim territories.
Attacks of this kind can be divided into two groups
depending on what they were intended to achieve. Firstly,
the Latins organized several expeditions which were
designed La capture Muslim castles or make other permanent
territorial gains. Indeed, Acre itself would not have
fallen in July 1191 if the massive defences of
neighbouring lyre had not provided a safe landing point
for Italian ships bringing essential reinforcements and
provisions to the Christians. 219 In addition, the siege of
Acre was conducted from a fortified camp, which was
defended by successive lines of wooden pallisades and
218 Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de Jerusalem,
p.232. This hall may also have been built by the Templars
between 1260 and 1291. See Kennedy, Crusader Castles,
p.122.
219 See, for example, Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.196; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, II, 366.
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ditches, and stood on a hill to the east of the city. By
the beginning of 1190, this camp was so large that it had
virtually become a walled town in its own right, and
contained numerous churches and other residential or
functional buildings.220 Although this camp initially found
itself besieged by Saladin's forces stationed further
inland, months of fighting and the constant arrival of
more crusaders eventual l Y obliged Saladin to retreat,
enabling the Franks to encircle Acre and bring about its
ultimate downfall.221
Once the crusaders had re-established themselves at Acre,
they could use this city to organize campaigns against
other Muslim targets which also needed to be taken by
force. To some extent Richard I's expedition along the
coast can be included in this category, for although
Caesarea, Arsuf, Jaffa and Ascalon had all been sleighted
and abandoned by the Muslims, and did not therefore need
to be besieged before they could be occupied, Richard
still had to defeat Saladin at the famous battle of Arsuf
before he could establish himself at these sites more
2"securely.
Itinerarium, pp.62, 73; Ambroise, L'Estoire de la
guerre sainte, lines 3060-76, cols..82-83; Histoire des
patriarches d'Alexandrie, extract cited in J.F. Michaud,
Bibliothègue des Croisades, IV (Paris 1829), 257.
221 Itinerarium, pp.61-140, 211-32; Ambroise, L'Estoire
de la guerre sainte, lines 4,557-5,224, cols.122-40;
Eracles, II, 125-31, 149-51, 155-57, 171-74; Matthew
Paris, Chronica Maiora, II, 334-36, 353-61, 369-70, 373-
75; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 406-522, V, 3-26; Ibn al-
Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 3-44; Baha'-al-Din,
Anecdo., pp.l32238.
222 Battle of Arsuf: Itinerarium, pp.262-80; Ambroise,
L'Estoife de la uerre sainte, lines 6,090-6,630,
cols.16377; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 38-40; Ibn al-
Athir, amel Altevarykh, II, 49-50; Baha'-al-Din,
Anecdot, 258-61. Richard's conquests: see above, pp.51-
52.
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Five years later, German troops belonging to Henry Vi's
crusade also arrived at Acre before marching north and
capturing Beirut, whose Muslim garrison fled in panic
after attempting to make a stand in front of their
castle. 223
 Other, less successful, expeditions launched
from Acre included the failed siege of Mt Tabor undertaken
by members of the Fifth Crusade in 1217,224 and the lord
Edward's somewhat confused attack on Qaqun in 1271, which
may in fact have been an extensive raid rather than an
actual siege. 25
 Shortly after their triumph at Beirut,
the Germans had also organized another campaign from Tyre,
which was aimed against the isolated inland stronghold of
Toron, but had to he abandoned in the face of a Muslim
relieving force.226
Further north, Frankish efforts to regain Muslim held
territories had equally mixed results. In 1191, Bohemond
III failed to reconquer Latakia and the neighbouring port
of Jabala, in an offensive which was presumably launched
from Tripoli itself. Sixteen years later Raymond Roupen,
an Armenian claimant to the throne of Antioch, granted
Jabala to the Flospitallers in order to gain their support
223 Eracles, II, 224-26; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V,
116-17; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 86-87; Arnold
of LUbeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp.205-6.
224 See above, p.60.
225 Eracles, II, 461; Gestes, pp.778-79; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 101; Ibn al-Furat, Selections,
II, 155; al-'Ayni, Le Collier de Perles, p.246. See also
Pringle, The Red Tower, pp.60, 62; Marshall, Warfare in
the Latin East, p.206.
226 Arnold of LLibeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp.207-10;
Eracles, II, 227; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, p.74; Ibn al-Athir,
Kamel Altevar ykh, II, 87-88. For a description of Toron,
see Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de Jerusalem, pp.117-
18.
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against his political opponents. 227
 As a result, the
Hospitallers eventually occupied half of Jabala, but there
is no evidence that they ever recaptured Bikisrail, a
mountain fortress to the north east of Margat which
Raymond Roupen promised to them in 1210. Although
Raymond's strategy therefore only had limited success, it
provides us with an interesting example of a Military
Order being encouraged to reconquer old Christian
territories in exchange for assurances that they could
keep any strongholds which they managed to capture.228
Their great importance in Syria also meant that the
Military Orders were at the forefront of many subsequent
campaigns against the Muslims, such as the failed siege of
Horns which the Hospitallers of Crac des Chevaliers
undertook in 1207.229 To the north of Antloch, the
Ternplars spent much of the thirteenth century trying to
reconquer the vast estates which they had held there
before 1188, and in particular the strategic fortresses of
Baghras and Darbsak. These castles guarded two of the most
important mountain passes connecting Antioch with the
Cilician plain, but the former was occupied by the
Armenians between 1190 and 1216, whilst the latter had
been garrisoned by Aleppine forces in the wake of
Saladin's invasion. As a result, the Templars only
retained the neighbouring stronghold of Hadjar Shoghian
227 1191: Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes, p.274. 1207: Le
Trésor des Chartes d'Arrnénie ou Cartulaire de la
Chancellerie royale des Roupéniens, ed. V. Langlois,
(Venice 1863), no.11, pp.130-31; Cartulaire, II, nos.1262,
1263, pp.70-71.
228 be Trésor, no.12, pp.l32-33; Cartulaire, II,
no.1355, pp.l22-23. Bikisrail had been lost to the Muslims
during the twelfth century. For more details, see Cahen,
pp.515, 612-13, 629-30, and see below,
pp.157-SS.
229 Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, II, 105-6.
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(Chilvan Kale) during the early years of the thirteenth
century, and it was from here that they made an
unsuccessful attack on Darbsak in 1237. This offensive,
along with the history of other Templar fortifications
north of Antioch, will be discussed in more detail
below 230
The last phase of Christian expansion in Syria occured
after the Mongol destruction of Aleppo in 1260, which
enabled Bohemond VI to commit 'many acts of aggression
against the lands of Islam', so that 'he took a number of
villages in Muslim territory', as well as the town of
Latakia itself. All these conquests appear to have been
made from the city of Tripoli. 231 It was also at this time
that Bohemond acquired Darkoush, Kafr Dubbin and several
other castles situated to the east of Antioch, which had
been captured by the Muslims in 1188, but became an easy
target for the Franks after the Mongol invasion.232
Unfortunately for the Templars, a similar set of
circumstances apparently enabled the Armenians to occupy
the fortress of Darbsak. In 1268, however, all these
strongholds were lost to the Mamluks along with
230 1237: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 404-6;
Abu'l-Fida, Annales, 112-13, and see below, pp.277-84.
231 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 115. Bohemond VI, or
the Templars and the Hospitallers, or indeed all three,
probably also captured Jabala at this time. See ibid, II,
128, 128n1. For the Mongol invasion of Syria, see above,
pp . 15-16.
232 1188: Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes, pp.112-15; Abu
Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 368-74. 1261: Ibn al-Furat,
Selections, II, 115, 126. See also Jackson, ('The Crisis',
494-96), who argues that Bohemond made these conquests
through sheer force rather than the assistance of the
Mongols.
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Ant ioch 233
These events again illustrate the Franks' chronic lack of
manpower, for it is clear that Bohemond's successes during
the early 1260s began and ended with the Mongol invasion
of eastern Syria. Moreover, many of the attempted sieges
which have already been mentioned, including those of
Horns, Qaqun and Toron, failed because the Franks were too
outnumbered to face the Muslim relieving forces sent to
assist these places, and were consequently obliged to
retreat. Such setbacks probably explain why sustained,
large scale sieges undertaken by the Latins were extremely
rare during the thirteenth century, and were often
rejected in favour of more manageable raiding expeditions
which could be called off as soon as the Muslims tried to
retaliate.
Offensives which belonged to this category were
consequently much smaller in scope, for they were carried
out in order to gain booty rather than permanent
territorial conquests. However, many campaigns of this
kind still involved relatively large numbers of men, and
were therefore launched from castles and fortified cities
as well. In 1271, for example, the lord Edward's troops
joined forces with Templars, Hospitallers and other
soldiers from Acre in a raid against St.George, situated
just a few miles inland. The expedition, undertaken by
1,500 horsemen, succeeded in causing widespread
destruction of Muslim crops and property, and at the same
time bringing its participants substantial booty in the
form of grain and cattle. 234
 Other raids were also
233 Darbsak: Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, p.7O5. Darbsak
is listed as one of the castles Baybars acquired from the
Armenians. See Abu'l-Fida, Annales, p.152; Ibn al-Furat,
Selections, II, 166. 1268: ibid, II, 126.
234 Gestes, p.778; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 155.
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launched from the coast against Sidon, Beaufort and
central Galilee during the Fifth Crusade, 235 and in 1253
some of Louis IX's followers carried out an attack on the
Muslim town of Banyas while they were based at Sidon.236
It has already been noted that Julian of Sidon also raided
Mongol territories to the east of Beaufort in 1260, and
that the arrival of Aragonese crusaders at Acre nine years
later enabled the Franks to attack several Muslim villages
near Montfort with a force of around 130 knights.237
In the county of Tripoli, several similar offensives were
carried out from Margat and Crac des Chevaliers during the
earliest years of the thirteenth century. Thus in 1203 an
army of 400 knights, 1,400 footsoldiers, and numerous
Turcopoles and archers drawn from the garrisons of these
strongholds suffered a crushing defeat near Montferrand,
only a month after another Hospitaller force had been
routed while trying to attack Harna. 238
 Nevertheless, the
very next year the Order made more successful incursions
against both Horns and Hama, and may well have participated
in another expedition toward Jabala. 239 In 1265, the
Templars and Hospitallers also joined forces with the
bellico se Bohemond VI on a raid which was eventually
235 Sidon and Beaufort: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
iii, ii; Eracles, II, 324-25; James of Vitry, Lettres,
p.99; 0jiver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.167-68.
Galileeib, pp.164-65; Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora,
III, 10; Eracles, II, 323-24.
236 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p310-18.
237 1260: see above, p.103-4. 1269: see above, p.41.
238 al-Makrizi, Histojre d'Egypte, pp.126-28, 126n3,4,
128n1; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, p.81.
239 Horns and Harna: al-Makrizi, 1-listoire d'gypte,
p.135; Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevayj1, II, 105; Kamal-ad-
Din, L'Histoire d'Alep, ed. E. Blochet, ROL, V, (Paris
1897), 44-45. Jabala: al-Makrizi, Histoire d'Egypte,
pp.135, 127n1; Eracles, II, 247-48.
118
repulsed by Muslim troops from Horns. Fourteen years later,
the garrison of Margat organized its last expedition
against former 1-lospitaller estates around Crac des
Chevaliers and Chastel Blanc, and clearly maintained an
aggressive stance toward the Muslims right up until the
very end.240
Having looked at both the relatively minor raids and the
more ambitious siege campaigns undertaken by the Franks,
it is possible to make a few general conclusions about the
offensive strategies which they adopted during the
thirteenth century. Firstly, it is clear that large
fortified sites such as Margat, Crac des Chevaliers, Acre
and Tyre were ideal starting points for all Christian
expeditions, because they could provide adequate food,
water and shelter for substantial numbers of men and
horses. As we have seen, Tyre was particularly important
in this respect, because if it had fallen to Saladin in
1187, the Franks may not have been able to recapture Acre,
or indeed return to the Holy Land ever again.
These events are also a reminder of the immense importance
of west European crusaders to the Latins, particularly in
the kingdom of Jerusalem, where virtually every Frankish
offensive both during and after the Third Crusade was only
made possible by the arrival of external reinforcements.
This in turn explains why coastal strongholds, and most
commonly Acre itself, were normally used as springboards
for campaigns into Muslim territory. Thus the walls of
Acre, Tyre and neighbouring settlements along the coast
246 1265: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 83-84. 1279:
Gestes, p.784; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.228;
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.457 (text A). Hospitallers and
Templars from Margat and surrounding strongholds may also
have participated in an attack on Horns and Hama,
undertaken by Frankish, Armenian, Mongol and Georgian
troops in 1282. See Hethoum the Historian, Table
Chronologjgue, p.487.
119
protected the vital sea links with western Europe, and
provided visiting crusaders with safe and reliable
anchorages where troops could be mustered and supplies
brought ashore. These observations do not, however, apply
as much to the Frankish states of northern Syria, partly
because these areas were less popular with foreign
crusaders, and partly because their borders were more
permanently established further inland. Indeed, Crac des
Chevaliers's successful resistance against Saladin in 1188
ensured that the county of Tripoli's frontiers during the
thirteenth century were not that different from what they
had been immediately before the battle of Hattin. As we
shall see, this region also relied less on external
assistance because of the sheer might of the Military
Orders 241
Although it is clear that the vast majority of offensive
campaigns organized by the Franks during the thirteenth
century either failed to make any major territorial gains,
or were not in fact designed to do so, the sheer amount of
destruction which these expeditions inflicted on exposed
towns and villages was such that they could also be used
to keep large areas of the countryside in thrall. Indeed,
sometimes the mere threat of punitive raids enabled the
garrison of a single Latin fortress to extend its
authority over many estates and settlements previously
held by the Muslims. It has already been mentioned, for
example, that the security provided by Saphet encouraged
more than 10,000 peasants to recolonize neighbouring
territories, while the castle's strategic location above
the river Jordan also made it possible for its defenders
to launch raids on Muslim lands as far as Damascus. As a
241 See below, pp.128-29, 154-55. The county of
Tripoli's eastern border had remained relatively stable
since the 1140s. See Deschamps, La Defense du comté de
Tripoli, pp.21-34, particularly at p.25.
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result, the rulers of this city were forced to relinquish
many of their properties in this area.242
Once it had been completed, Pilgrims' Castle served a very
similar purpose, for 'between Acre and Jerusalem there is
no fortification which the Saracens hold, and therefore
the unbelievers are harmed greatly by that new fortress;
and with the fear of God pursuing them, they are forced to
abandon these cultivated regions'. Moreover, Oliver of
Paderborn added that 'the construction of this castle is
presumed to have been the cause of the destruction of [Mt
Tabor], because in the long wide plain, which lies between
the mountainous districts of this camp and of Mt Tabor, no
one could safely plough or sow or reap because of fear of
those who lived in it'. 243
 Thus the crusaders finally got
rid of Mt Tabor not by launching a direct military
assault, but by building their own stronghold, whose
Templar garrison could harass the Muslims and deprive them
of their food supplies. Almost half a century later,
Baybars was obliged to repair the neighbouring tower of
Qaqun, because 'his subjects living in those parts needed
a place of protection' , suggesting that the Templars were
still using their fortress to dominate large parts of
central Galilee.244
The Templars and the Hospitallers relied on similar
strategies to maintain their power in the county of
Tripoli, and to keep their Muslim neighbours in check. One
such neighbour was the tribe of the Assassins, schismatic
242 De constructione castri Saphet, line 251, P.385.
243 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.171-72.
244 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 101. By the 1280s,
the situation had reversed, and Qaqun was used by the
Muslims to intimidate Pilgrims' Castle; a clear
indicitaion of declining Frankish power. See Burchard of
Mount Sion, Descriptio, pp.83-84.
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Muslims who controlled the extremely mountainous district
to the east of Latakia. The rough terrain in this area
enabled the Assassins to retain their independence for
much of the thirteenth century, but their close proximity
to Margat, whose garrison could easily launch a punitive
raid against them, forced them to pay the Hospitallers an
annual tribute of 1,200 gold pieces and 100 bushels of
wheat and barley.
The threat posed by Crac des Chevaliers toward the emir of
llama and the ruler of Bokebais (or Abu Qubais, a Muslim
castle between Hama and the territory of the Assassins)
meant that they too had to make similar annual payments to
the Order worth 4,000 and 800 gold pieces respectively.245
Moreover, if they did not pay, there could be grave
consequences, for in 1229 the Hospitallers carried out an
extensive raid around Montferrand, a castle they
themselves had held during the twelfth century, because
the emir of Hama had not paid up. The following year a
force of 500 horsemen and 2,700 footsoldiers, composed of
both Hospitallers and Templars, launched another attack
toward Hama, but this time the expedition ended in defeat
at the hands of the emir's army.246
However, the Hospitallers were not deterred, and angered
by the emir's persistent refusal to pay, they organized a
third offensive in 1233. This expediton was far larger
than those of 1229 and 1230, and involved 100 knights, 400
mounted sergeants and 1,500 footsoldiers led by the
Hospitaller Grand Master, as well as 25 Tempiar knights,
245 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 98; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 32; Wilibrand of Oldenburg,
Itinerarium, p.210.
246 1229: Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 180.
1230: al-'Ayni, Le Collier de Perles, p.194; Deschamps, k
Crac des Chevaliers, p.128.
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80 knights from the kingdom of Jerusalem, 30 knights led
by Bohemond V's brother Henry, and 100 knights from
Cyprus. This impressive force marched overnight toward
Montferrand, enabling the Franks to make a surprise attack
on its bourn the following morning. Having sacked this
settlement, they continued to ravage the surrounding
countryside, before returning toward the coast, without
having encountered any Muslim resistance. Consequently,
the sultan of Damascus advised the emir of Hama to pay the
money he owed, and peace was reestablished with the
Hospitallers. 247
 Indeed, the Order appears to have
collected Muslim tribute for a further thirty years, until
Baybars finally obliged it to renounce these payments as
part of a peace treaty established in 1266.248
Thus larger castles like Saphet and Crac des Chevaliers
allowed the Franks to intimidate, or even control,
extensive areas without actually having to occupy them in
their entirety. In Syria, this policy also enabled the
Military Orders to reep huge financial rewards from their
neighbours, and in a later chapter it will be shown that
castles in general were likewise used to impose smaller,
more regular taxes on Greek and Muslim peasants.249
However, it should again be noted that the raids needed to
maintain this military and financial dominance were
usually carried out by Christian armies which were heavily
outnumbered by their Muslim opponents. Consequently,
Frankish strongholds were not just relied on to protect
troops during the initial stages of an offensive, but were
also required to shelter vulnerable field armies once a
campaign got under way. Hence in 1197, German crusaders
247 Eracles, II, 403-5; Abu'l-Fida, Annales, 115.
248 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 98; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 32.
249 See below, pp.408-9.
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marching from Acre to Beirut stopped off at Tyre, so that
they could rest and feed, and at the same time minimize
the amount of time which they spent in the open, exposed
to enemy counter-attacks.25°
The need to find shelter became even more urgent if a
Latin field army came under direct threat from a Muslim
force operating close by. In 1253, for example, French
companions of Louis IX who were participating ma raid on
Banyas narrowly avoided a potentially disastrous
confrontation with the Muslims by withdrawing to Sidon at
the first sign of trouble. 25 ' It is also interesting to
note that the first major raids which the Hospitallers
carried out from Crac des Chevaliers and Margat occured in
1203 and 1204, almost twenty years after the Order had
acquired the latter castle. This raises the possibility
that the Hospitallers completed their rebuilding programme
at about the same time, and deliberately chose not to go
on the offensive until both fortresses were strong enough
to resist possible counter-attacks. 252 Similarly, Templar
forces carrying out raids around Mt Tabor and the river
Jordan must have had relatively little to fear, because
they knew that even if the Muslims attempted to pursue
them, they could easily retreat to Saphet or Pilgrims'
Castle, both of which were virtually impregnable. In 1271
Baybars is also reported to have besieged Akkar because
'brigands could come down from it and they would fortify
themselves there'. According to Ibn al-Furat, these men
could attack the surrounding countryside with impunity,
for Akkar itself lay 'in difficult hill country, far from
supplies of water', and was therefore almost totally
250 Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica Slavorum, p.205.
251 See above, p.117.
252 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.283
84.
124
immune to Muslim counter offensives.253
However, on other occasions the Franks were persuaded to
stop and fight rather than run away, particularly if they
were close enough to a castle to disengage from a battle
if the need arose. In 1279 200 horsemen from the garrison
of Margat used this tactic against the 5,000 Muslims who
were trying to prevent them from ravaging the
neighbourhood of Crac des Chevaliers. The Hospitallers
knew that it could be suicidal for them to confront this
force in the open, and they therefore allowed themselves
to be chased until they had almost reached Margat itself
before turning on the Muslims and routing them with the
loss of only one mounted sergeant. As we have seen, the
defenders of Margat also thwarted another Muslim attack
two years later, when 600 Hospitallers rode out of the
castle and drove off 6,000 startled Muslim besiegers.254
Similarly, one contemporary reported that during the siege
of Acre in 1291, the Franks deliberately kept their city
gates open so that they could launch surprise attacks
against their opponents, either by day or by night.255
Clearly, therefore, it was sometimes worth risking a
direct encounter with the Muslims, provided that the
Franks had some means of protecting themselves should the
battle start to turn against them. Hence the Rule of the
Templars advised members of this Order that if they were
defeated in the field, they had to try to reach the
nearest fortress in order to keep their casualties to a
153 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 148.
254 1279: see above, p.118n24O. 1281: see above,
p. 49n17
255 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono graPhY, pp.492-93.
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minimum. 256
 Likewise, the castle of Ascalon, which had
been used as a collection point for Frankish troops on the
eve of the battle of La Forbie, became a refuge site for
those few Christians fortunate enough to escape the
subsequent carnage •251
The terrible losses suffered at La Forbie also remind us
of what could happen if the Latins did not have the time
or the means to find shelter in the wake of a defeat. This
point can be illustrated further by returning to the
failed Templar attack on Darbsak, which turned out to be
one of the worst military disasters in the Order's
history, because most of its participants were cut down by
an Allepine counter-offensive long before they could reach
the safety of Hadjar Shoghlan. 258 In 1266, Hospitallers,
Templars, Teutonic Knights and other secular troops
campaigning near Tiberias also found themselves trapped in
a Muslim ambush which resulted in the death of around 500
troops; a total which subsequently appears to have
increased because the Franks were then forced to march all
the way back to Acre, a journey of approximately 50
kilometres, while being constantly harrased by local
Muslim peasants. This costly and humiliating defeat could
surely have been avoided if the Franks had been able to
take refuge in a nearby castle.259
However, at other times the Latins did not just rely on
their strongholds for protection, but used the garrisons
256 La Rè g le du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon, (Paris 1886),
no.168.
251 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 342.
258 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 404-6; Abu'l-
Fida, Annales, pp.112-i3.
259 Eracles, II, 455; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorUm,
p.222.
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of such sites to raise additional troops for their own
field armies. This strategy had backfired disastrously in
the months after the battle of Hattin, when Saladin
overran several Latin castles which were virtually empty,
and the fact that the Franks were prepared to use it again
after 1187 is a further indication of their chronic lack
of manpower. 260
 Thus the Templars, Hospitallers and
Teutonic Knights, who may have contributed as many as 600
knights to the battle of La Forbie, nust have found it
difficult to defend their local castles properly after
they suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the
Egyptians and Khwarizmians. This point probably applies
most to the Teutonic Knights, who are reputed to have lost
all but three of their contingent at La Forbie, presumably
putting severe strain on their garrisons at Montfort, Acre
and elsewhere. 261
 Perhaps losses sustained by the
Hospitallers also contributed to the fall of Ascalon in
1247 262
Sixteen years after the battle of La Forbie, a somewhat
smaller Christian army suffered another crushing defeat in
southern Galilee. This expedition, which was led by the
lord of Beirut, was partly made up of Templars sent from
Acre, Pilgrims' Castle, Saphet and Beaufort. 263 As a
result, all these sites may well have been seriously
undermanned after the battle, although it is extremely
260 In 1188, for example, Saladin captured the Syrian
castle of Saone in three days, because it was so poorly
defended. See below, p.163.
261 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 301; Marshall,
Warfare in the Latin East, p.1.49; Riley-Smith in Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 173n2.
262 See above, p.53.
263 Eracles, II, 445; Gestes, pp.752-53; Marino Sanudo,
Liber secretorum, p.221; Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, V, 204.
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difficult to estimate exactly how many troops had been
drawn from each individual fortress. However, it has been
calculated that Saphet alone had a peace time garrison of
1,650 men, fifty of whom were mounted knights, 264
 and if
similar numbers applied to their other major castles, the
Templars could have represented a fairly substantIal
percentage of the 900 knights and additional Turcopoles
who are said to have taken part in the battle.
Contemporary sources also suggest that the Order had
suffered particularly heavy casualties, and had to pay a
considerable ransom for the release of their captured
commander.265
By contrast, it was probably less risky for the Latins to
take troops from strongholds which were not particularly
important strategically. It has been noted, for example,
that the citadel of Acre contributed very little to the
overall strength of this city, and it could probably be
left virtually empty provided that surrounding ramparts
were still being guarded. From 1254 onwards, this
structure was occupied by the French regiment, a standing
force which had been established by Louis IX, and normally
contained about 100 knights, plus additional crossbowmen
and infantry. During the 1250s and 60s, this regiment
participated in several large scale raids against the
Muslims, 266 including a successful expedition against
inland territories south of Ascalon, which 200 knights
264 De costructione castri Saphet, lines 204-9, p.384;
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp.11820.
265 The estimate of 900 knights comes from Abu Shama,
Deux Jardins, V, 204. See also Eracles, II, 445; Annales
de Terre Sainte, p.449 (text A).
266 Eracles, II, 441; Rothelin, p629; Marshall,
Warfare in the LatinEast, pp.77-83.
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assembled at Jaffa carried out in 1256.261
However, although the French regiment clearly boosted
Latin troop numbers in the east, its contribution was not
as significant as that of the Military Orders, who
participated in virtually every Christian campaign of the
thirteenth century, including the crusades of men like
Theobald of Champagne268
 and the lord Edward. 269
 The
dominance of these Orders became even more apparent in
northern Syria, where the Templars and the Hospitallers
were not just contributing to a wider Frankish war effort,
but were pursuing their own aggressive policy towards the
Assassins and the Muslims of Horns, Hama and Aleppo. As we
have seen, this policy was maintained through a series of
punitive raids, most of which were launched from the
Hospitaller castles of Margat and Crac des Chevaliers. To
a large extent, these fortresses were used for such
campaigns because of their strength and strategic
location, but they may also have been chosen because of
their sizeable garrisons. Thus in 1212 Wilibrand of
Oldenburg wrote that 1,000 men were stationed at Margat,
whilst a further 2,000 soldiers defended neighbouring Crac
des Chevaliers. These totals would have enabled the
Hospitallers to use garrison troops for their expeditions
against the Muslims. Moreover, the Templars may well have
raised their own contingents from Tortosa and Chastel
Blanc, their largest castles in the county of Tripoli, for
joint campaigns such as the raid on Montferrand in
267 Rothelin, pp.630-31. Troop figures are based on
numbers defending Jaffa after the raiders had retreated
there following a Muslim counter-attack. See ibid, p.632.
268 See above, pp.13-14.
269 See above, pp.113, 116.
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1233•27U Although Wilibrand of Oldenburg does not give any
figures for these castles, Baybars is reported to have
found 700 men at Chastel Blanc in 1271, and the total for
Tortosa must have been at least as high. 27' in 1266, the
castellan of Chastel Blanc also sent 'fifty crossbowmen
and arbalasters' to reinforce Crac des Chevaliers against
the Mamluks, suggesting that garrison troops could be used
to bolster other castles as well as Latin armies in the
field
Frarikish soldiers cere therefore expected to participate
in a hole variety of defensive and attacking operations,
but trying 10 stab1ish which troops were used for which
campaigns again raises several difficult questions.
Firstly, it is far from clear whether all of the 700 men
inside Chastel Blanc were members of the fighting
garrison, or were just taking shelter there from Baybars.
Similarly, Wilibrand of Oldenburg's figures for Crac des
Chevaliers and Margat sound suspiciously like vague
approximations, and do not indicate what percentage of
each castle's garrison was made up of infantry, archers,
mounted troops and actual brothers of the Hospital. It
also seems unlikely that even if Wilibrand's totals were
accurate in 1212, they still applied during the second
half of the thirteenth century, for in 1268 the Master of
the Order wrote that there were only 300 knights left to
defend all Hospitaller properties in Syria. This suggests
that archers had to be sent from Chastel Blanc to Crac des
Chevaliers because the latter stronghold was severly
270 Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, pp.208-10.
1233: see above, p.121.
271 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 143; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 84.
272 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 86.
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undermanned during the final years of Frankish rule.273
However, by using more detailed thirteenth century figures
given for Saphet's garrison, and relying on a papal, and
therefore	 hopefully accurate,
	 reference	 to	 sixty
Hospitaller knights being stationed at Crac des
Chevaliers, the military historian Christopher Marshall
has estimated that Cr'çhad a total mounted force of 160,
and that Margat had an equivalent contingent of 80
horsemen. 274
 If these calculations are correct, the 600
cavalry troops who defeated Muslim besiegers outside
Margat in 1282, as well as the 200 horsemen from the same
castle who ravaged the plain of Akkar three years earlier,
cannot all have come from this castle's garrison. Their
numbers must therefore have been boosted by mercenaries or
troops collected from other strongholds and properties.
However, even though the detailed planning which preceded
their campaigns remains uncertain, it is clear that the
Templars and the Hospitallers were so powerful in the
county of Tripoli, that they remained on the offensive
there for many years, even without the assistance of
European crusaders. It has been suggested that they
frequently relied on troops drawn from their garrisons in
order to do so.
For much of the time, Latin strongholds were consequently
intended to provide troops, supplies and shelter for
Christian field armies, without becoming directly involved
in any fighting. But occasionally the Franks also
constructed fortifications which were specifically
designed to blockade enemy castles. The imperialist siege
273 Cartulaire, IV, no.3308, pp.291-93; Marshall,
Warfare in the latin East, pp.l17-18.
De constructione castri Saphet, lines 204-9, p.384.
Cartulaire, II, no.2727, pp.777-78; Marshall, Warfare in
the Latin East, pp.117-20.
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of Beirut, for example, was largely conducted from a small
fort, which the bombards erected on a hill opposite the
citadel in the autumn of 1231. This fort, which had been
built out of 'stones with wood above', was used by Richard
Filangeri and his men to bombard the Ibelin castle with
catapults. 275 As we have seen, the fortified camp
established near Acre during the Third Crusade also
enabled the Franks to blockade this city, whilst at the
same time providing them with a place of shelter from
Saladin's counter-attacks. Another interesting aspect of
the siege of Acre was Richard I's use of a 'portable'
castle during the campaign. This large, wooden structure
had initially been erected by Richard in Sicily during his
journey to the Holy band, and was subsequently taken to
Acre, where it was used to attack the city walls.276
Moreover, the Franks' lack of troops sometimes enabled
Baybars to use similar tactics against Christian
strongholds. Hence in 1265, the Latins realized that they
could not hold Acre's outer defences against Baybars's
army, and so they demolished these fortifications to
prevent the Muslims from using them to attack the city
itself. 277
 In the same year Baybars also occupied the
cathedral of Caesarea, so that he could use its towers to
bombard those Christian forces still holding out in the
nearby citadel.278
Finally, it is important to remeber that many Frankish
strongpoints along the coast were used for naval as well
275 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.121,
129; Gestes, pp.701, 704; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.149, 153;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.81, 85.
276 Sicily: Itinerarium, p.168. Acre: Richard of
Devizes, Cronicon, p.42.
277 Annales de Terre Sainte, p.452 (text B).
278 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 70; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 7.
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as land based offensives. Attacks of this kind were most
common during the frequent clashes between the Italian
city states, which tried to dominate local trade by
deploying enormous war fleets against each other. In 1264,
for example, the Venetians attacked the pro-Genoese city
of Tyre with no less than fifty galleys, which were
equipped with special boarding towers designed to
overwhelm defenders positioned along the sea walls.279
This assault proved less successful, however, than an
earlier, more discreet raid carried out in 1242, when
Venetian galleys were allowed to slip into the harbour
after their Ibelin allies had secretly lowered the chain
across its entrance.280
Both these offensives were planned and carried out from
Acre, but in 1232 Tyre itself became the 5 tarting point
for another naval raid, this time undertaken by 22
imperialist galleys, which attacked Ibelin forces camped
a few miles to the south at Casal Imbert. 281 The previous
year Lombard troops had also arrived by sea at Beirut,
enabling them to bring with them many of the building
materials needed for their fort, 282 while in 1278 Bohemond
VII sent a fleet of fifteen galleys from Tripoli to attack
Sidon. The provocation for this latter incursion had been
the Templars' involvement with the lord of Gibelet, who
was plotting to seize Tripoli from Bohemond.283
279 Gestes, pp.756-57.
280 Gestes, pp.732-35; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, pp.178-84.
281 Philip of Novara, The Wars of FrederijII, p.139;
Gestes, pp.708-9; Chronigue d'Amadi, P.160; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, p.89.
282 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.121;
Gestes, p.701; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.81; Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.149.
283 Gestes, p.784, and see below, p.146.
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Numerous seaborne attacks were also organized against the
Muslims during the thirteenth century. In the build up to
the Fifth Crusade, for example, the Christian fleet
gathered in the harbour at Pilgrims' Castle during
preparations for the forthcoming expedition to Egypt.184
Although it is not recorded where they set out from, a
number of Frankish ships launched another damaging attack
on Alexandria in 1270, and made off with two Muslim
vessels. 285
 These incidents, as well as references to
Christian naval installations such as a Templar shipyard
at Acre, make it clear that coastal fortifications
provided secure bases for the maintenance and construction
of ships and galleys, which were essential if the Latins
were to retain their dominance over the sea.286
It is possible to conclude, therefore, that virtually all
military activities which the Franks were involved with,
regardless of whether they were defensive or aggressive,
land based or carried out at sea, relied on castles and
urban fortifications in some way or another. So far these
activities have been discussed almost exclusively in terms
of larger cities and fortresses, but it should be noted
that many smaller strongholds, which were no more powerful
than Coliath or Chastel Rouge, also had their part to
play.
One of the lesser castles rebuilt by Richard I, for
example, was Casal des Plains (Azor), which was situated
along the road between Jaffa and Lydda, and had been
284 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.176.
285 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 141.
286 La Rèle du Temple, no.119.
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demolished by Saladin early in 1191.287 This fort appears
to have been similar in design to Qaqun, indicating that
it was not intended to withstand major sieges, but rather
to provide Richard I's forces with a reasonably safe
supply point and watering hole, which they could
potentially use during a campaign against Jerusalem.288
Likewise, in 1285 Kalavun insisted on the demolition of
Bartholomew's tower at Maraclea, for even though it was
relatively small, he may have feared that the Franks would
use it to try to recapture the recently fallen castle of
Margat. 289 Almost a century earlier the lord of Nephin had
also carried out a raid against Christian refugees fleeing
from Palestine in the wake of Saladin's victory at Hattin;
another rather depressing reminder that smaller
strongholds could often fulfil the same attacking
functions as their larger counterparts.298
Defensively, however, the repeated destruction of sites
like Coliath and the bour of Pilgrims' Castle indicates
that these places could not possibly hope to resist
Mamluk, Ayubid and Khwarizmian invasions in the same way
that Acre, Tortosa or Margat did. The real reasons behind
the construction of many smaller castles and urban
fortifications must consequently be sought elsewhere,
including the Rule of the Templars, in an interesting
clause concerning the dangers of travelling unescorted
within the kingdom of Jerusalem. It relates how two
brothers in the vicinity of Acre 'found Saracens who
attacked them and killed one of the brothers and led away
287 Itinerarium, pp.280, 289-90; Ambroise, L'Estoire
gperre sainte, line 6,854, col.183, lines 7,207-214,
col .193.
288 Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, p.313.
289 See above, pp.74-75.
290 Eracles, II, 100-1.
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his horse; the other was badly wounded'. 291
 Similarly,
when Joinville was given the task of escorting the French
queen from Acre to Tyre during Louis IX's crusade, it was
considered safer to travel by night in order to avoid such
attacks. Joinville observed that this mission was
particularly dangerous because they had to stop twice
along the way to feed the royal children. 292
 Numerous
other incidents recorded by contemporaries, such as the
need for an armed guard to accompany James of Vitry while
he was preaching the Fifth Crusade, 293
 and the
construction of a tower near Pilgrims' Castle 'because of
bandits who threatened strangers ascending to Jerusalem',
also suggest that even near the coast internal security
within Christian territories was very poor.294
Moreover, the Franks were not just concerned about robbers
and highwaymen, they also feared the outbreak of more
serious and widespread rebellions by the local Muslim
population. In the past, this aspect of Frankish rule has
been played down by historians anxious to stress that the
Latins were generous landlords, who allowed the natives to
practise their Muslim faith. 295 On the whole this appears
to have been true, largely because the Franks were so
outnumbered, 296
 but some evidence can still be produced to
291 La
	 gj du Temp le, no.616.
292 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p.336.
293 James of Vitry, Lettres, pp.91-92.
294 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.l69.
295 Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de Jerusalem,
p.123. This view is criticised by Smail, Crusading
Warfare, pp.62-63, and B.Z. Kedar, 'The Subjected Muslims
of the Frankish Levant', in Muslims under Latin Rul
1100-1300, ed. J.M. Powell, (Princeton 1990), pp.135-174,
at p.167.
296 Kedar, 'The Subjected Muslims', pp.l60-74.
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show that there was deep local resentment toward the Latin
presence in the Holy Land. Most notably, the Muslim
uprising against the Frankish population of Jerusalem
reflected a widespread feeling that this city should not
have been handed over to the Christians by al-Kamil. 297
 At
other times local peasants turned against the Franks as
soon as they had been defeated in battle or were forced to
retreat into their castles. This occured In 1187 and 1188,
after the battle of Hattin, 298
 and again in 1266, when
Latin forces defeated near Tiberias were attacked by
Muslim peasants as they retreated back to Acre.299
By studying these incidents of local unrest, it is
possible to build up a picture cc a 1ranüsh society which
was more or less 'under siege' all the time. This helps
explain why, for example, the citizens of Arsuf lived in
constant fear of being robbed or murdered , at a time when
their town still had no wall around it. 300 it also
confirms that the Castle of Roger the Lombard, Qaqun,
Coliath and all the other towers and fortified enclosures
dotted across the countryside were primarily designed to
protect people against the dual threat of Muslim rebels
and common criminals. Both these aggressors normally
lacked the means and the will to attack Latin
fortifications, and were certainly incapable of
undertaking protracted sieges involving catapults or other
297 Eracles, II, 384-85, and see above, p.65. On Muslim
resentment to the agreement of 1229, see al-'Ayni, Le
Collier de Perles, pp.187-94.
298 Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 301-2; R.C. Smail,
'Crusade rs ' Castles of the Twelfth Century', Cambridge
jCal Journal, X, (1951), 133-49, at 142; Kedar, 'The
Subjected Muslims', p.155.
299 See above, p.l25.
300 Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.232.
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specialized equipment. As a result, outnumbered Frankish
troops and settlers could survive periods of civil unrest
by sheltering behind their defences until help arrived, or
their rebellious opponents ran out of steam. In 1229 this
strategy worked well at Jerusalem, whose inhabitants
retreated inside the Tower of David until the 15,000
Muslim peasants ransacking the city had been driven back
by knights from Acre. 301 Moreover, the infrequency of
local uprisings in general suggests that the sheer
proliferation of crusader fortifications in the east
usually deterred the native population from even
contemplating an armed insurrection. In a later chapter it
will also be shown that apart from people, cattle, produce
and precious belongings could equally well be sheltered
inside strongholds, which therefore safeguarded the entire
economic and political infrastructure of the crusader
states in the Holy Land.302
Another important defensive function fulfilled by smaller
Latin defences was their use as look out posts and
observation points. Thus the Red Tower, a crusader fort in
southern Galilee whose appearance was virtually identical
to that of Qaqun, had deliberately been placed on a hill,
so that its defenders could immediately spot a hostile
force moving across the surrounding low lying plain. This
would enable them to warn people living nearby of an
imminent attack, giving locals a chance to take shelter
inside the tower or make a hasty retreat toward the coast.
Indeed, this tower was so useful as a look out post that
the Israeli army still used it for this purpose during the
late 1940.°
301 Eracles, II, 384-85.
302 See below, pp.409-14.
303 Pringle, The Red Tower, p.87. For more details on
this tower, see ibid, pp.85-194.
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Many other minor fortifications were not oniy designed to
keep an eye on their immediate locality, but also formed
part of more extensive intervisible networks incorporating
major strongholds and cities. It has already been
mentioned, for example, that Cave de Tyron was situated in
an elevated position opposite Sidon, so that its defenders
could warn Christians living in and around this town of a
Muslim incursion from Damascus. 304 It should also be noted
that the much larger fortress of Beaufort performed a
similar role just a few miles to the south, because its
garrison could observe Damascene troops moving toward the
coast along the Beqa valley. In addition, Beaufort was
intervisible with numerous other fortresses in the area,
including Subeibe, located 21 kilometres to the south
east, Toron (Tibnin), which lay to the west along the main
route to Tyre, and Chãteauneuf (Hunin), situated 18
kilometres to the south. Toron and Chãteauneuf were both
in Christian hands at this time, and the former castle
could also communicate with the Templar stronghold of
Saphet. 305 Along with Beaufort and Cave de Tyron, these
castles therefore acted as an early warning system for
Tyre, Sidon and neighbouring Frankish settlements along
the coast. Even more importantly, Beaufort enabled the
Franks to keep watch over Subeibe, the Damascene fortress
to the kingdom of Jerusalem. This stronghold was regarded
as a major threat by the Franks, who may even have tried
to recapture the neighbouring town of Banyas during the
304 See above, p.73.
305 Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem,
p.178. R. Fedden and J. Thomson, Crusader Castles, (London
1957), p.12 (map showing intervisible castles). For more
details on Toron, see Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de
Jerusalem, pp.117-18. For Châteauneuf, see Benvenisti, The
Crusader in the Hol y Land, pp.300, 303. Toron and
Châteauneuf were restored to the Franks in 1241 (Matthew
Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, pp.141-42) and lost to Baybars
in 1266 (Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 97).
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1250s, in an attempt to re-establish their authority east
of the river Jordan. 306
 Hence Beaufort held great strategic
importance, and was one of the few castles in the region
not demolished by Saladin or Baybars.307
Further north, a similar network covered the plain of
Akkar and the principal route connecting Tripoli with
Horns. This network incorporated Tortosa, Crac des
Chevaliers and Chastel Blanc, as well as many smaller
structure such as Akkar, Chastel Rouge and Arima, a fort
situated near the coast which appears to have been held by
the Templars until the late thirteenth century. 308 All
these strongholds were intervisible, so that it would have
been impossible for a Muslim army to enter the area
without being spotted almost immediately. Indeed, some
Frankish look out posts may have enjoyed such good
visibility that they actually had an aggressive as well as
a defensive role to play. The tower of Tukhlah, for
example, could warn the Templars of Chastel Blanc of an
imminent attack from the north, but was also perfectly
located to observe and intimidate its immediate
surroundings
Other towers and observation posts were situated very
close to urban sites along the coast. One such building
306 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.310-18. For
more details on Banyas and Subeibe, see A. Grabols, 'La
Cite de Baniyas et le château de Subeibeh pendant les
croisades', Cahiers de Civilisation Médievales, XIII
(1970), 43-62.
307 This is confirmed by achaeological evidence at the
site, including an inscription from the reign of Baybars.
See DeschamP s , La Defense du rovaume de Jerusalem, p.2O8.
338 Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.105-7; Fedden
and Thomson, Crusader Castles, p.12. For more details on
Arima, see Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp.68-73.
309 See above, pp.72-73.
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known as La Tor de l'Opital stood on the outskirts of
Tyre, and may have been the tower captured by Baybars
during a Muslim attack on the area in 1266.310 Whilst
carrying out a Similar raid against Tripoli two years
later, Baybars also 'took a tower in which a number of
Franks had held out against him and these were
beheaded' . At Acre there may have been a similar
outpost on the small hill opposite the city known as Tel
al-Fukhar, which formed the nucleus of the Christian camp
during the Third Crusade. This hill was certainly
fortified in some way when Baybars attacked it in 1263,
before being repelled by Frankish troops who had dug
trenches around the summit.312
Thus Acre, Tyre and Tripoli all had towers located
relatively close to their walls, which could act as the
eyes and ears of' these cities even if they themselves
ultimately failed to withstand a Muslim invasion force.
Early warning could also be provided by many other
neighbouring castles within a five or ten miles radius.
Hence in 1266 the inhabitants of Tripoli would have found
out that Baybars was on his way long before he actually
reached the city, for as he advanced from the north the
sultan encountered the much smaller strongholds of
Coliath, Albe and Archas. These sites were systematically
overrun by Baybars and their occupants forced to flee, but
they may have held him up long enough for the defenders of
Tripoli itself to prepare themselves and evacuate the
310 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 87; Deschamps, j
Défensedu ro yaume de Jerusalem, p.119; Riley-Smith, Th
gjof St.John, p.135.
311 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 116.
312 Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie', 117, and see
above, p.111.
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surrounding plain.313 Similarly, we have seen that the
mills of Dcc and Recordane were fortified in their own
right, but freque1 came under attack whenever the
Muslims launched a raid against Acre, so that they too
acted as a 'shield' for a much larger and more important
Frankish settlement.314
South of Acre, the fortifications of Pilgrims' Castle were
also strengthened by the presence of two outlying towers.
One of these, which lay to the north of the fortress and
was known as Destroit, had already existed in the twelfth
century, when its principal function had been to prevent
local highwaymen from robbing travellers on their way to
Jerusalem. However, after the construction of Pilgrims'
Castle it was retained by the Templars as an advance look
out post, while a similar tower was also built about a
kilometre to the south, which boosted the defences of the
adjacent town, and could warn the main garrison of an
enemy force approaching from Egypt. 315 Moreover, both
these forts were designed in such a way that they could,
if necessary, be defended independently. 316
 Early in the
thirteenth century Willbrand of Oldenburg also referred to
yet another tower built near Tortosa by Philip Augustus
during the Third Crusade, and it is interesting to
speculate whether this structure resembled the kind of
round, isolated towers which Philip erected in France to
313 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 85-86; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 27.
314 See above, p.107.
315 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.169;
Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle: The faubourg and
its defences', 112-13.
316 Destroit: Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, pp.94-98.
Southern tower: Johns, 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle:
The faubourg and its defences', 116-17.
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guard his territories against the English.317
Many large fortresses, towns and cities were therefore
surrounded by towers and other minor defences which
provided an early warning system both for garrison troops
and for people living nearby. In order to do this
efficiently they had to be able to communicate with each
other over long distances, and apart from sending
messengers on horseback, this could be done in a variety
of ways. The most common methods were to use fire or smoke
signals, or to reflect the sun's rays using some kind of
shiny surface. Both the Hospitallers and the Templars also
kept carrier pigeons at Acre, 318
 and in 1217 the
Hospitallers used this form of communication to inform the
garrison at Crac des Chevaliers that the preacher James of
Vitry wanted to pay a visit. An armed guard could
therefore be arranged which escorted this important guest
to the fortress from Tripoli. 319
 This example in
particular highlights the need for castles to be in close
contact with each other at all times, if they were to
fulfil their defensive role properly.
However, whilst the enormous number of castles, towers and
fortified houses built by the Latins guaranteed a certain
level of security against both internal and external
warfare, it also diminished the amount of control which
Frankish rulers had over their own vassals. Most European
monarchs were able to keep localized warfare to a minimum
by enforcing a strict royal monopoly on castle building,
and maintaining a far larger field army than any of their
subjects. But in the Latin east, the unique combination of
317 illbrand of Oldenburg,
	 inerarium, p.210.
31B La Ré g le du Temple, no.591; Rey, 'Etude sur la
Topographie', 143.
319 James of Vitry, Lettres, p.93.
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very few troops and extremely powerful castles meant that
overlords rarely had enough men at their disposal to
besiege fortresses held by disloyal vassals.
In the south, these problems can be illustrated by taking
a closer look at Frederick II's largely unsuccessful
attempts to impose his authority over the kingdom of
Jerusalem during the late 1220s. In 1229 Frederick marched
south from Acre to Pilgrims' Castle and ordered the
garrison to hand it over, but when the Templars refused,
the emperor saw that he did not have enough troops to take
it by force, and was obliged to retreat. Later Frederick
also tried to capture the Templars' headquarters at Acre,
but could not do so, and eventually abandoned the city
altogether. Hence even the most powerful ruler in
Europe could not assert his authority over the whole of
Acre, let alone the entire kingdom of Jerusalem. Indeed,
Frederick's construction of a new citadel at Jaffa not
long afterwards may reflect a realization that he could
only secure a strong base in the region by building his
own castle, rather than trying to occupy somebody
else's. 21
Another claimant to the throne of Jerusalem whose
ambitions were thwarted by the sheer strength of the
kingdom's castles was Hugh Ill of Cyprus. Hugh had in fact
been declared king in 1269, but he faced a powerful rival
in Charles of Anjou, who had bought his claim to the crown
from Maria of Antioch in the early 1270s. In 1276 Hugh III
had to admit defeat in this dispute, because the French
regiment, which occupied the citadel of Acre, came out in
favour of Charles. Hugh had no hope of controlling the
2' Eracles, II, 373-74.
Eracles, II, 373; Mari.no Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
p.213.
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city as long as this Angevin stronghold held out in the
heart of his supposed capital, and he therefore withdrew
to Cyprus. Moreover, even if Hugh had had the resources to
besiege this castle, he was also opposed by the Templars,
whose bases at Acre, Sidon and Pilgrims' Castle were
extremely well defended. As a result, Lusignan power was
not restored in Acre until ten years later, when Hugh
III's son Henry arranged a carefully negotiated truce with
the French regiment. Only then could he regain control
over the citadel and have himself crowned king.322
In northern Syria, Bohemond III's successors encountered
similar problems trying to impose their rule over both
Tripoli and Antioch. After Bohemond's death in 1201, the
latter city became the focal point of a lengthy succession
dispute between Bohemond IV and Raymond Roupen. Raymond
Roupen was the son of Bohemond III's son Raymond and Leon
II's niece Alice, but far from encouraging friendly
relations between the Franks and the Armenians, he firmly
allied himself with Leon II, who ultimately hoped to
extend his authority over the entire principality of
Antioch. As we have seen, Raymond Roupen also gained the
support of the Hospitallers in exchange for territorial
grants, whilst Bohemond IV allied himself with the
Templars and the sultan of Aleppo; an interesting example
of a Franco-Muslim alliance against a fellow Christian.
These two factions became embroiled in a long period of
sporadic warfare which lasted until 1219, and which was
largely centred around the impregnable mountain citadel of
322 Gestes, pp.783-84, 789-9; Annales de Terre Sainte,
p.456. For more details on the background to this dispute,
see Edhury, The Kingdom of C yprus, pp.90-97; Riley-Smith,
Feudal Nobility, pp.224-27. For the truce of 1286, see
RRH, no.1465, p.382, no.1466, pp.382-83.
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Antioch itself. 323 Thus in 1203 Leon II failed to take the
city because this stronghold was garrisoned by supporters
of Bohemond IV, while the Templars also defended their own
Antiochene headquarters vigorously. 324
 Thirteen years
later Raymond Roupen did in fact succeed in establishing
his control over Antioch, but this was largely achieved
with the aid of the Hospitallers, who were given the task
of defending its walls and citadel. This enabled Raymond
Roupen to suppress any local opposition until 1219, when
he was ousted by anti-Armenian elements inside Antioch who
had joined forces with Bohemond IV. Bohemond was now
reinstated as prince of Antioch, although his position
remained insecure for a while, because Raymond Roupen
still held out in the citadel briefly before finally
escaping back to Cilicia. These events are reminiscent of
Hugh III's problems at Acre, because anyone wishing to
control Antioch clearly also had to control its
citadel 325
Some years before these events the unfortunate Bohemond IV
had to deal with further internal problems involving his
vassal Renaud III, lord of Nephin. In 1203 Renaud married
the heiress to the lordship of Akkar without Bohemond's
permission. Bohemond therefore ordered Renaud to come to
Tripoli and explain himself, but when the latter failed to
appear Bohemond declared war on him and attacked the
323 For more details on this dispute, see Cahen, j
Syrie du Nord, pp.596-631. Grants to Hospitallers: see
above, pp.113-14, and below, p.276.
324 Gestes, p.663; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.435 (text
B). See also Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.203;
Hethoum the Historian, Table Chronolo g i gue, p.48O;
Eracles, II, 257; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, p.604.
325 Eracles, II, 318; Annales de Terre Sainte, pp.436-
37; Hethoum the Historian, Table Chronologigue, pp.483-84;
Gestes, p.664; Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan,
pp.89-90; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.621-22, 630-31.
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castle of Nephin. Renaud responded by launching a raid on
Tripoli, but this did not deter Bohemond, who subsequently
captured Nephin and Akkar with the help of the Genoese and
the lord of Gibelet. As a result, Renaud's insurrection
represents one of the few occasions in the later history
of the Latin east when a ruler actually managed to
confiscate the stronghold of a disloyal vassal.326
However, during the second half of the thirteenth century
the castles of Nephin and Giblet both became involved in
a far more serious baronial rebellion, although this time
the lords of Nephin were allied with the counts of Tripoli
against the Embriaco rulers of Gibelet. In the course of
this conflict, the Embriacos and their Templar allies
attacked Tripoli no less than three times (1258, 1276,
1282), and were only kept at bay by the city's massive
defences. In 1276 the Templars also made a failed assault
against Nephin, and it was not until 1282 that Bohemond
VII finally captured Bertrand II of Gibelet, executed him
and occupied his castle. Thus the defences at Gibelet,
which were still relatively small compared with larger
Frankish strongholds such as Tortosa or Pilgrims' Castle,
enabled the Embriacos to defy both Bohemond VI and
Bohemond VII for a period of almost 25 years.27
While the rulers of Antioch/Tripoli and the kin g s of
Jerusalem were often powerless to impose their authority
over their vassals and rivals, other factions were free to
fight it out amongst themselves. Hence the Templars did
° Eracles, II, 314-15; \nnales de Terre Sainte, p.435
(although text \ confuses Gibelcar (ie Akkar) with
Gibelet); larino Senudo, Liber scretorum, p.205; Cahen,
S ync du Nord, pp.608-9.
1258: Gestes, pp.748 - 50. 1276: ibid, pp.781-83.
1282: ibid, pp.787-88. See also Deschamps, La Defense du
comté de Tri poli, pp.206-8, 299-300; Irwin, 'The Mamluk
Conquest of the County of Tripoli', p.247.
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not necessarily support Bohemond IV against Raymond Roupen
out of personal loyalty, but were probably hoping that he
could help them regain the fortress of Baghras, which the
Armenians had occupied since the 1190s. 328
 Similarly, the
Hospitallers had no qualms about opposing their fellow
Franks if this meant that they could acquire new
properties from Raymond Roupen. Meanwhile, the sultan of
Aleppo was probably only too happy to ally himself with
Bohemond IV in order to halt Armenian expansion and
generally fuel arguments between his Christian neighbours.
Consequently, just about all the participants in the
Antiochene succession dispute were pursuing their own
goals, and some may not even have cared who actually won
the overall conflict!
Clashes between rival groups were even more common at
Acre, where the Military Orders and the Italian city
states had all constructed heavily fortified compounds in
order to intimidate their enemies and to protect their own
supporters. It has already been noted that the Templars'
headquarters, an imposing quadrilateral citadel with four
corner towers, may have been the strongest such
structure, 329 but contemporary sources make it clear that
other fortifications within the city were almost as
impressive. Both the Hospitallers and the Teutonic
Knights, for example, built strongholds which were
probably very similar in design to that of the Templars.
These would have had very few windows facing the
surrounding streets, and would have been defended by the
kind 0f large, isolated towers still visible in some
328 5ee below, pp.278-82.
329 See above, p.105.
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Italian towns. 330
 Such towers were also erected by the
Genoese, the Pisans and the Venetians, whose quarters were
all located in the vicinity of the harbour.331
These fortifications divided medieval Acre into numerous
walled enclosures and ghetto-like quarters, which did
little to creat a sense of central authority, and
encouraged frequent outbreaks of violence and civil
unrest. This type of warfare can best be illustrated by
giving a brief description of the war of St.Sabas, fought
between the Genoese and the Venetians tn tkxe late.
Having begun as an insLgnificant property dispute
involving a small church, this conflict quickly spread to
engulf the whole city, leading to widespread street
fighting between the Venetians and their Pisan allies, and
the Genoese, who were supported by the Hospitallers. The
two sides also bombarded each other with enormous
crossbows and catapults mounted on top of towers and other
tall buildings. Some of these weapons were so large that
they could hurl rocks weighing 200 kilos over long
distances. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising
that many houses were destroyed and countless lives lost
in the space of just a few months. It is equally
understandable that the first action taken by the
Venetians after they finally emerged victorious was to
raze the Genoese quarter to the ground, including its
330 Gestes, p.815; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the
Hol y Land, pp.105-9; Riley-Smith, The Kni ghts of St.John,
pp.248-49; Rey, 'Etude sur la Topographie', 135-36, 140.
331 Gestes, p.815. Genoa: Rey, 'Etude sur la
Topographie', 137-38; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the
Holy Land, pp.100-2; Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the
thirteenth century', pp.26-30. Venice: ibid, pp.30-36;
Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.102-4; Rey,
'Etude sur la Topographie', 137. Pisa: ibid, 138-39;
Jacoby, 'Crusader Acre in the thirteenth century', pp.19-
26; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.98-100.
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powerful citadel.332
Like Bohemond IV's struggle with Leon II and Raymond
Roupen, the war of St.Sabas also had wider implications
which went beyond the city of Acre. Most notably, it is
important to remember that the Embriaco lords of Gibelet
were Genoese, and that their first attack on Tripoli
occured in 1258, when the fighting at Acre was at its
height. These struggles may therefore have represented a
much wider campaign to augment Genoa's power in the east,
and even turn Tripoli into a fortified trading post
controlled solely by the Genoese. They later established
such a base at Famagusta, and after the death of Bohemond
VII in 1287, they also managed to set up an Embriaco-led
commune at Tripoli in the final years before the fall of
the city. 333
 They also continued to clash with the
Venetians from time to time, particularly during the mid-
1260s, by which time they were based at Tyre rather than
Acre. 334
 Thus the Italian city states, like the Military
Orders, were often prepared to pursue their own aggressive
policies, even if this meant that large amounts of troops
and resources were diverted away from the continuing
struggle with the Muslims.
These observations apply equally well to the highly
damaging clashes between Frederick II's supporters and
their Ibelin rivals during the 1220s, 30s, and 40s.
Several incidents during this conflict have already been
332 Gestes, pp.742-48. See also Eracles, II, 443;
Rothelin, pp.633-35; Annales de Terre Sainte, pp.44'7-48;
Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, pp.220-21. For the
background to this dispute, see also Riley-Smith, Feudal
Nobility , pp. 215-17.
1258: Gestes, pp.742-50. 1287-89: ibid, pp.800-2;
Annales de Terre Sainte, pp459-60.
Gestes, pp.756-57, 768-69.
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referred to, including Richard Filangeri's failed siege of
Beirut and the combined Venetian and Ibelin attack on Tyre
in 1242, which in fact ended imperialist control over this
city and brought the dispute to a close. Alongside
Frederick's unsuccessful attacks on Pilgrims' Castle and
the Temple at Acre, these events provide further evidence
that above all, it was the strength of the Franks' castles
which caused the collapse of Hohenstaufen power in the
east .
Frederick II's final humiliation also reflects the
military and political dilemma confronting all Franksih
settlers in the Holy Land. Clearly, strongholds like
Gibelet and Pilgrims' Castle undermined royal power and
encouraged warfare amongst the nobility, the Military
Orders and the Italian city states. There were two obvious
solutions to this problem. Firstly, fortifications could
be demolished in the same way that the Genoese quarter at
Acre had been in the late 1250s, bringing peace to the
city for the first time in years. This tactic also worked
well on Cyprus, where barons were strictly forbidden from
building their own castles, and localized warfare was very
unusual. 336 Secondly, the creation of a large, permanent
and well disciplined field army which a ruler could call
upon at any time would have made it impossible for even
the strongest fortress to resist the royal will. However,
the constant lack of troops experienced by the Latins made
this latter solution unworkable, while the former would
have exposed Christian territories to a swift and decisive
Muslim invasion. As a result, the Franks had to put up
with periods of anarchy rather than risk being wiped out
by their common enemy.
335 See above, pp.34, 51, 143.
336 See below, pp.214-19.
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The famous military historian R.C. Small has also noted
that central authority in the Holy Land 'was progressively
weakened.. .because lands, castles, powers and rights over
men had continually to be conceded to Orders, which were
not wholly part of the feudal structure' 337 . Although this
statement was made with reference to the twelfth century,
it applies even more to the period after 1187, when
constant Muslim incursions and a chronic lack of resources
forced many barons to hand their castles over to the
Hospitallers, Templars or Teutonic Knights. In 1257, for
example, Julian of Sidon sold numerous estates between
Sidon and Beirut to the Teutonic Knights for 23,500
Saracen bezants, suggesting that he was in serious
financial difficulties and needed to raise some cash
fast. 338 In the same year the German Order also purchased
Cave de Tyron, 339 and three years later Julian even sold
Beaufort and Sidon to the Templars. This last transaction
was necessitated by the Mongol incursion of 1260, which
appears to have bankrupted Julian and left him unable to
pay for the reconstruction of Sidon.340
Similar financial pressures explain why the Military
Orders acquired many other territories and fortresses
during the thirteenth century. The Teutonic Knights in
particular profited from baronial poverty by buying up
many estates in the vicinity of Acre. These acquisitions
included the site of the Order's headquarters at Montfort,
Small, 'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth Century',
147.
338 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.109, p.89.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.110, pp.89-90.
Eracles, II, 445; Gestes, p.752; Annales de Terre
Sainte, p.449; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.221.
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purchased in 1228,341 as well as other lands nearer the
coast which were protected by the smaller castles of
Mhalia (Castrum Regis) and Judin (Jiddin). 342
 This latter
stronghold is also architecturally significant, in that it
appears to have been constructed by the Teutonic Knights
at some point after the mid-1220s, yet its defences
incorporated no less than two approximately square
donjons; further evidence that such structures were still
being constructed well into the thirteenth century,
despite their supposed strategic inferiority to purely
concentric castles like Belvoir. Indeed, the close
parallels between Judin and Montfort, as well as the
presence of another square keep at a Teutonic fortress in
Cilicia, have even led to the suggestion that these
castles were built according to a more general German
design, although it has already been noted that
architectural distinctions between the various Military
Orders should not be taken too far.343
To the north of Judin, Frederick II also helped the
Teutonic Knights to gain control over several manors near
Toron, 44 whilst Julian of Sidon continued to sell parts
of his lordship to the Order until as late as 1261. These
included the village of Gezin, located near Cave de Tyron,
341 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.63, pp.51-53; RER,
no.1002, p.263.
342 These lands were acquired in 1220: Tabulae ordinishni ci , no.53, pp.43-44, no.54, pp.44-45.
343 D. Pringle, A. Petersen, M. Dow and C. Singer,
'Qal'at Jiddin; a Castle of the Crusader and Ottoman
periods in Galilee', Levant, XXVI, (1994), 135-66,
particularlY at 135-54, 159-62. For Mhalia, see also
Pringle, 'Survey of Castles in the Crusader Kingdom of
Jerusalem ', 90.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.66, p.54.
153
which Deschamps believed to have been fortified. 345
 In
1209 Bohemond IV also entrusted three towers along the
curtain walls of Tripoli to the Teutonic Knights, but
these appear to have been the only fortifications guarded
by the Order in all of northern Syria. This grant is
particularly surprising considering Bohemond's appaling
relations with Leon II, a staunch ally of both the German
emperor and the Teutonic Knights. In general, however, the
close links between the Armenians and the Germans probably
explain why the Order never expanded any further in the
northern crusader states.348
Although the Teutonic Knights rapidly became powerful
landholders in the first half of the thirteenth century,
their properties did not have the same military importance
as those of the Templars. Saphet and Beaufort were
particularly significant in this respect, because they
guarded the Franks' frontier with Damascus. Both these
castles were granted to the Order by individual lords (in
1168 and 1260 respectively347 ), reflecting the steady
erosion of baronial power in the east. The other most
important Templar fortresses in the kingdom of Jerusalem
were Sidon and Pilgrims' Castle, the latter having been
built on a site which already belonged to the Order before
1187 348
345 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.111, pp.90-91,
no.114, pp.96-97, no.115, pp.97-98, no.117, pp.103-4,
no.118, pp.lO-; Deschamps, La Defense du royaume de
p.223.
346 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.44, pp.35-36; Cahen,jjN2r.c pp.667-68, and see below, pp.269-73.
34 1168: Pringle, 'Review Article' , 145. 1260: see
above, p.15ln340.
348 The tower of Destroit dated from the twelfth
century. See Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina,
p.i9; Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, p.94.
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In the county of Tripoli, the Templars had also acquired
the castles of Tortosa and Chastel Blanc in the middle
years of the twelfth century, and had immediately set
about rebuilding their defences. Tortosa in particular had
probably been handed over by the local bishop because,
like Julian of Sidon in 1260, he could not afford to
repair the terrible damage inflicted on the site by Nur
ad-Din. It seems that many neighbouring estates and
properties, including the castle of Arima, were also sold
to the Templars at about the same time. 349
 In addition,
the Templars held another large territorial block to the
north of Antioch, which may have come into their
possession as early as the 1130s.350
As far as the Hospitallers were concerned, the most
important fortresses in the kingdom of Jerusalem were
Arsuf, Ascalon and Mt. Tabor. Arsuf was rented out to them
by Balian of Ibelin in 1261, whilst Ascalon was entrusted
to the Order soon after its completion in 1241. Mt.Tabor,
on the other hand, was granted to the Hospitallers by
Alexander III, acting on behalf of the monks who lived
there. This transaction is an interesting example of
growing papal involvement in the military affairs of the
Latin east, and suggests that the Church as well as the
nobility had problems defending its territories.351
Further north, however, the key Hospitaller strongholds of
Crac des Chevaliers and Margat had both been sold to the
Order by laymen rather than the Church. These purchases
had occured in 1144 and 1186 respectively, so that like
the TemPlarS,	 the Hospitallers were already well
349 See above, p.46.
350 See below, pp.277-84.
351 Arsuf: Cartulaire, III, no.2972, p.1, no.2985, p.6.
ibid, II, no.2320, p.615. Mt Tabor: ibid, II,Ascalofl
no.2726' p.777, no.2811, pp.815-17.
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established in the county of Tripoli before the battle of
Hattin 352
In addition to these major fortresses, the Hospitallers
held countless smaller strongholds whose size and overall
design varied considerably. On and around the plain of
Akkar they possessed Coliath, Chastel Rouge and numerous
other sites which were not permanently lost until 1271.
Thus after the fall of Chastel Blanc, Baybars occupied
'its territory, together with the forts and towers in the
neighnourhood of Hisn al-Akrad (Crac des Chevaliers)'.354
Once he had conquered this latter castle, the Hospitallers
abandoned several further towers, 'burning all their
property that they could not remove') 55
 Most of these
structures had probably been built or acquired in the
twelfth century, and many had been sold along with Margat
and Crac des Chevaliers. Indeed, when they purchased the
former stronghold, the Hospitallers even received the
entire town of Banyas (Valania), which lay below the
slopes of Margat.356
In the kingdom of Jerusalem, however, it appears that many
twelfth century Hospitaller castles were either lost for
good after 1187, or were left in ruins even if they had
been regained by treaty. Recent excavations at the castle
of Belmont, for example, confirm that this site was never
351 Crac des Chevaliers: Cartulaire, I, no.144, pp.116-
18, no.391, pp.266-68. Margat: ibid, I, no.783, pp.491-96,
no.809, p.505.
Coliath: Cartulaire, I, no.82, pp.76-78. Chastel
Rouge: ibid, I, no.519, pp.353-54, no.549, pp.371-72.
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 143.
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 147.
356 Banyas: Cartulaire, I, no.783, pp.49l-96, and see
Riley-Smith, The Knights of St.John, pp.93-95 for more
details on all Hospitaller properties in the area.
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rebuilt after Saladin demolished it in 1191, and was
subsequently occupied by a Muslim village) 57 This
suggests that Belveer and Castellum Emmaus, two
neighbouring Hospitaller strongholds which also guarded
the pilgrim route between Jaffa and Jerusalem, were
similarly abandoned in the thirteenth century, and no
attempts were made to reoccupy them even after Frederick
II negotiated the return of Jerusalem itself) 58 In
addition, doubts have been cast on the traditional
assumption that the Hospitallers regarrisoned Belvoir
during the 1240s, and returned to Bethgibelin, an
important twelfth century settlement in Judea. 359
 It is
equally unclear whether the Hospitallers ever held the
castles of La Fève and Caymont, located in central
Galilee, although they certainly laid claim to them.36
However, the Hospitallers clearly did possess a number of
smaller forts and towers in the kingdom of Jerusalem,
which were similar in design to the tower of Tukhlah and
other such structures in the vicinity of Crac des
Chevaliers. These included La Tor de l'Opital, Chola and
Turns Salinarum, all of which were either designed as
look-out posts, or as fortified administrative centres
where local inhabitants could be sheltered along with
1191: Ambroise, L'Estoire de la g uerre sainte, line
6,859, col.183. R.P. Harper and D. Pningle, 'Belmont
Castle: A Historical Notice and Preliminary Report of
Excavations in 1986', Levant, XX (1988), 101-18, at 102.
358 Harper and Pringle, 'Belmont Castle', 102.
359 Riley-Smith (The Knights of St.John, pp.415-16,
436-37) believes these sites were reoccupied; Marshall
(Warfare in the Latin East, PP2021) does not. It also
that the Hospitallers reoccupied
Forbelet, a twelfth century castle near Belvoir. See
Pningle, 'Survey of Castles in the Crusader Kingdom of
Jerusalem', 90.
36 Cartulaire, III, no.3028, pp.30-31; Riley-Smith,
.jçnihts of St.John, p.136n2.
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livestock and farm produce.361
Bearing in mind that reconstructing smaller Hospitaller
properties can sometimes be difficult, it is hardly
surprising that trying to do the same for the Templars,
whose records did not survive the dissolution of the
Order, becomes virtually impossible. Some information can
be gleaned, however, from contemporary descriptions of
property disputes between the Templars and the
Hospitallers, which appear to have occured with alarming
regularity. It is in this way, for example, that we know
the two Orders agreed to divide the town of Jabala between
them, after the Templars disputed the way in which it had
been granted to the Hospitallers by Raymond Roupen. 362 At
the time of this agreement, Jabala was still in Muslim
hands, but Bohemond VI must later have recaptured it along
with Latakia, for in 1266 we find the Templars
relinquishing their half of the town to Baybars in
exchange for a peace treaty covering Tortosa and Chastel
Blanc. Ibn al-Furat's account of this arrangement is also
interesting in that it mentions the presence of a tower at
Jabala, which could either have been a similar structure
to that erected by Bohemond at Latakia, or could have been
built by the Templars and the Hospitallers.363
Alternatively, it may have been Jabala's fortified Roman
theatre, which was presumably the 'strong castle'
Wjllbrand of Oldenburg referred to when he passed by more
361 La Tor de l'Opital: see above, p.l38. Chola:
benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.221, 228,
276. Turns Salinarum: Tibble, Monarchy and Lordship,
p.150.
362 Cartu1a ji, II, no.1725, p.292, no.1739, p.207,
no.2000, pp.427-28, no.2058, pp.455-5'?; Riley-Smith, The
Kni ghts of St.John, pp.445-46, and see above, pp.113-14.
363 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 115, 128, and see
above, p.115n231.
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than half a century earlier.364
In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the fortified mill at Doc
represents another site whose Templar ownership can be
confirmed by studying Hospitaller documents. Doc was
located along the same river as Recordane, and as a result
both mills became the object of a fierce argument between
the two Orders, when it was proposed to build a new dam
across this vital waterway. This dispute lasted for
several years until it was finally settled in l235.
Hospitaller records also suggest that the Templars
occupied the Red Tower for many decades, even though the
Abbey of St.Mary of the Latins (the actual owner of the
site) had originally rented this small look-out post and
agricultural centre to the Hospitallers, in an agreement
dating from 1189.366 This situation had probably come
about at the time of the Third Crusade, when Templars
accompanying Richard I may have garrisoned the tower
without even consulting its official tenants. Moreover,
subsequent references to this stronghold indicate that it
may not have been handed over to the Hospitallers until as
late as 1248. Hence without these scraps of evidence e
would not have known about a Templar presence on the
Sharon plain lasting more than half a centurv
Similar fragments of information make it possible at least
Willbrand of oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.212; Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 128n5; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord,
p.171.
' 65 Cartulaire, II, no.2117, pp.486-87, no.2120, p.89;
Rile y-Smith , The Knights of St.John, pp.446, 450. The
Hospital1erS had held Recordane since at least 1154. See
I, no.225, p.173.
Cartulaire, I, no.879, p.559; Pringle, The R
Tower, P.59.
367 Cartulaire, II, no.2141, p.501, no.2482, pp.673-75.
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to speculate about other Templar castles in the kingdom of
Jerusalem. Casal des Plains, for example, was rebuilt by
the Templars during Richard I's unsuccessful campaign
against Jerusalem, and was presumably therefore garrisoned
by them after the Third Crusade came to an end 368
 Another
stronghold situated between Jaffa and the interior was
Latrun (Toron des Chevaliers), a fairly sizeable castle
constructed by the Order in the twelfth century.
Consequently, the Templars may have returned to the site
after it was included in the treaty of Jaffa, although the
archaeological evidence suggests that the damage inflicted
on it by Saladin in 1191 was never subsequently
re paired. 369 It is even unlikelier that the Order ever
tried to reoccupy Gaza, which had belonged to it before
the battle of Hattin, but had also been demolished by
Saladin. 370 Admittedly, areas near Gaza were granted to
the Franks in 1241, but these were quickly lost during the
Egyptian and Khwarizmian invasion of 1244,371 and eight
years later the site was formally recognized as a
permanent Muslim possession. 372 Finally, it should be
noted that the Templars, like the Hospitallers, probably
owned numerous forts and towers on their estates and near
their larger strongholds. The towers of Tukhlah and
Destroit have already been mentioned in this context,
whilst the remains of a similar twelfth century structure
to the north east of Jerusalem implies that the Order
368 Ambroise, L'Estoire de la guerre sainte, lines
7,2O7-1	 col.193; Itinerarium, p.290.
369 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 174; Pringle,
'Survey of Castles in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem',
89-90.
370 Ambroise, L'Estoire de la guerre sainte, line
6,843, col.183; Forey, The Militar y Orders, pp.59, 74-75.
371 1241: Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 141-43.
1244: 1bid, IV, 339; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 3-4.
RRli, no.1199, p.315
'I.
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originally guarded a long chain of towers which could
protect pilgrims travelling between the coast and holy
sites near the river Jordan. Perhaps some attempts were
made to repair this network after 1229, although if this
were the case, one would expect to find more evidence of
thirteenth century rebuilding work at Latrun.373
The vast majority of crusader castles were consequently
held by the Templars, Hospitallers or Teutonic Knights,
but these three Orders also helped to guard other Frankish
sites in the Holy Land, including the Christian cities
along the coast. At Acre, the Teutonic Knights were
expected to maintain and garrison a section of the
ramparts near the Accursed Tower, including the gate of
St.Nicholas. These defences had been granted to the Order
in 1193. A very similar arrangement was also made with
the Hospitallers soon after the Third Crusade, and in 1291
all three Orders fought valiantly in defence of the
city.375
Outside Acre, it has already been noted that the Teutonic
Knights also helped garrison Tripoli, whilst another
section of this city's ramparts which was badly damaged
during the siege of 1289 was held by the Hospitallers.376
Elsewhere along the coast, the Hospitallers shared the
burden of defending Sidon long before this lordship had
373 Pringle, 'Survey of Castles in the Crusader
Kingdom of Jerusalem', 88, 90. Tukhlah: see above, p.73.
Destroit see above, p.141.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.28, pp.24-25, no.29,
p.25.
375 Cartulaire, I, no.938, p.594, no.972, pp.616-17.
1291 sjege Gestes, pp.808, 812-13.
376 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.44, Pp.35-36. This
document also refers to sections of the wall being guarded
by the Templars. 1289: Gestes, p.8O3.
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passed out of baronial control, and guarded another tower
at Jaffa, which was likewise held by an individual
lord. 377
 In addition, the Teutonic Knights held two towers
flanking Caesarea's town wall, and from 1229 onwards
Frederick II relied on this Order to contribute to the
defence of Jerusalem. 378 Similarly, all three Military
Orders carried out repairs on Tyre's and Acre's
fortifications during the Mongol crisis of 1260, even
though these were royal cities. 379 Such incidents are a
clear indication of the importance of the Military Orders,
and the extent to which even the most powerful secular
rulers relied on their help.
Unlike most nobles, the Orders also had the resources
needed to build and maintain massive fortifications. At
Beaufort, for example, the Templars constructed a whole
new citadel opposite the older castle in the space of just
eight years, and at Arsuf, urban fortifications erected by
the Hospitallers soon after they took over the site were
said to have enraged Baybars. 380 Even after they had
completed Saphet, the Templars spent 40,000 bezants each
year maintaining this fortress, whilst the vast new
defences erected at Tortosa and Chastel Blanc in the mid-
twelfth century, and at Margat and Crac des Chevaliers up
to c.1204, could hardly have come cheap. 381 The money
Sidon: Cartulaire, II, no.2160, p.310. Jaffa: ibid,
I, no.954, p.603.
Caesarea: Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.40, pp.32-
33. Jerusalem: see above, p.65.
Rothelin, p.636.
Beaufort: Rey, Etude, pp.127-28; Deschamps, La
DéfendU royaume de Jerusalem, pp.198, 208. Arsuf: Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 54; Benvenisti, The Crusaders in
pp.134-35.
381 De constructione castri Saphet, lines 203-4, p.384.
Tortosa etc: see above, pp.44-48.
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required for such projects was largely drawn from the
Orders' extensive estates in Europe and the Holy Land, and
clauses in the Rule of the Templars suggest that it was
then channelled into vast central funds specifically set
aside for castles. 382 Many strongholds, including Saphet,
were also paid for by pilgrims and crusaders.383
Although it has been shown that Crac des Chevaliers and
other strongholds may have been increasingly undermanned
from the 1260s onwards, it is also clear that the Military
Orders generally had more troops at their disposal than
the nobility, particularly in early thirteenth century
Syria. Furthermore, the remains of vast cisterns,
undercrofts and storerooms at sites like Crac, as well as
Wi.11brand of Oldenburg's claim that Margat contained
enough supplies to withstand a five year blockade, suggest
that the Orders had the resources to prepare their castles
for almost any emergency that might arise. 384 Both the
Templars and the Hospitallers also enforced strict rules
regarding the use and defence of castle entrances, to
prevent spies and traitors from gaining access. 385
 Such
precautions, along with the obstinate and heroic refusal
of the Orders to give up the fight even as they were being
driven out of Acre, suggest that the Hospitallers,
Templars and Teutonic Knights were more disciplined,
skilled and better equipped than any other Latin troops in
the east.
382 La Règle du Tem ple, nos.126, 127. For more details
on the income of the Military Orders, see Forey, The
jjQii s pp.98-l32.
383 See below, pp.425-26.
384 Wilibrand of Oldenburg,	 Itinerarium, p.210;
DeschamP s , Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.203-4.
385 La Rè g le du Temple, no.228; Cartulaire, III,
no.3844, p.453, article 12.
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The preparedness and sheer commitment of the Military
Orders can be contrasted with the inefficiency and poverty
of the nobility. In 1268, for example, troops and citizens
from Antioch sheltering in the citadel were quickly forced
to surrender to Baybars because unlike Margat, this
stronghold was badly stocked with provisions, and 'had
neither enough water nor enough mills' to feed
everybody. 386
 Eighty years earlier, Saladin had also been
able to capture the fortress of Saone, situated along the
land route between Latakia and Antioch, in a matter of
three days, even though Margat, Tortosa, Chastel Blanc and
Crac des Chevaliers all held out. The principal reason for
this was that Saone was owned by an individual lord, so
that even though its defences were no less impressive than
any of its neighbours, its garrison was far weaker and far
more demoralized than those of the Hospitallers and
Templars. 387 This also explains why these two Orders
became so immensely powerful in the county of Tripoli, for
their already extensive twelfth century properties were
almost the only inland territories which still belonged to
the Franks after the battle of Hattin. Indeed, it would
not be an exaggeration to say that from 1188 onwards this
crusader state owed its very existence to the Templars and
the Hospitallers.
In the kingdom of Jerusalem, the situation did not become
quite so extreme unt.il the mid-thirteenth century, when
entire lordships like S don were regularly handed over to
the Orders. However, it would be misleading to assume that
barons here were in H stronger position than their
neighbours further north. The lords of Jaffa, for example,
Ibu al-Furat, Selections, II, 122.
Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 364-67; Ibn al-Athir,
Kamel Altevarykh, I, 721-22; Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes, 111-
12. For a brief description and history of Saone, see
Kennedy, Crusader Castles, pp.83-96.
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were only able to hold on to their castle by making
regular appeals to the papacy for more money, and, as we
have seen, could never have afforded to refortify their
town without the intervention of Louis IX and Odo of
Chãteauroux during the early 1250s. 388
 Similarly, it has
been argued recently that by the time Caesarea fell to the
Muslims in 1265, this barony 'had disintegrated so far
that the lord's influence in many parts of his own
lordship must have been minimal'. Again, this was because
many lands and properties had been sold off to the
Military Orders and other institutions, in order to raise
revenues and pay off ever increasing bills.389
The pattern of baronial ownership in the east aso
confirms that the further inland castles lay, the more
exposed they became to Muslim incursions. As a result,
they were costlier to defend and more likely to get sold
off to one of the Military Orders. Thus Jaffa, Beirut and
Caesarea were the only major strongholds in the kingdom of
Jerusalem which remained in secular hands right to the
end. Likewise, Gibelet, Nephin and Maraclea were all
baronial castles throughout the thirteenth century, whilst
Bohemond VI kept Latakia for himself after he had
recaptured it in 1261. On the other hand, the only inland
stronghold held by the counts of Tripoli during this
period was Akkar. 390
 It is also important to remember that
with the notable exception of Odo of Montbéliard's citadel
at Tiberias, any new defences built by individual lords
during the thirteenth century were again situated along
388 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.284, 306-8;
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, pp.141-42.
Tibble, Monarchy and Lordships, p.152, and see
ibid, pp.99-152, particularly pp.120-52.
390 This is confirmed by the mocking letter Baybars
sent to Bohemond VI after Akkar's capture in 1271. See Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 148.
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the coast 39l These included Bartholomew's tower at
Maraclea, and Bohemond Vi's towers at Latakia and
(possibly) Jabala. Early j the thirteenth century, John
of Ibelin had also been granted Beirut, and subsequently
carried out extensive improvements there. These probably
concentrated on the construction of a new outer wall, for
although the castle itself no doubt needed major repairs,
there is no evidence that it had been demolished by
Saladin in its entirety.2
As the thirteenth century progressed, the Frankish
nobility was therefore pushed further and further toward
the coast, whilst the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic
Knights gradually came to dominate virtually all military
activities in Syria and the kingdom of Jerusalem. As a
result, any discussion of castles in the area must
inevitably include these three powerful organizations.
However, the gradual erosion of secular lordships, the
rise of the Military Orders, and the constant threat of
both internal and external warfare, also made it difficult
for the Franks to pursue a common military strategy toward
their Muslim enemies. Indeed, the castle of Beirut largely
remained in Christian hands for as long as it did because
its lords negotiated a series of treaties with the
Muslims, irrespective of what their Frankish neighbours
were up to. 393 Similarly, the treaty arranged between
Baybars and the Templars, whereby the Order gave up half
of Jabala to protect Chastel Blanc and Tortosa, was
391	
c1es, II, 432-33; Joinville, Histoire de Saint
Louis, pp.288, 290, and see above, p.65.
Beirut: Gestes, pp.678-79, and see above, p.51.
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 50, 103, 104-5, 113,
135, 164; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 28, 42,
51, 70. Attempts to maintain this truce even after the
fall of Acre failed. See ibid, 11(a), 131; Gestes, p.817.
See also p . Holt, 'Baybars's treaty with the Lady of
Beirut in 667/1269', in Crusade and Settlement, PP.24248•
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bitterly opposed by the Hospitallers, whose troops at
Jabala even ended up fighting Muslim forces sent there to
act on behalf of the sultan.394
This situation has often been contrasted with that of the
twelfth century, when both the monarchy and the nobility
were much stronger. Indeed, Deschamps, Rey and others
believed that once the First Crusade had come to an end
'the Franks proceeded to organize the various parts of the
countryside' 395 as though they were all of one accord, and
constructed their strongholds as part of a national scheme
of defence. In his work on crusader castles, Rey in
particular spoke of successive 'lines' of fortifications,
starting with coastal sites like Acre and Tripoli, which
protected the kingdom from external enemies.396
This theory of a vast network of defences specifically
built to block all entry points into the kingdom of
Jerusalem, the county of Tripoli and the principlaity of
Antioch was largely demolished by Smail. Smail pointed out
that Frankish territories had been conquered in a series
of campaigns usually undertaken by individual barons like
Tancred, who were largely driven by personal greed. As a
result, castles built or captured by the crusaders were
intended for local rather than national defence, and had
little strategic value beyond their immediate
surroundings. Moreover, the regular incursions made by
Saladin, Nur ad-Din and others into Christian territories
showed that frontier castles stood little chance of
preventing Muslim attacks anyway.397
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 128.
Rey, Etude, p.2.
396 Rey, Etude, p.4.
Smail,	 Crusading Warfare,	 pp.2O4-15;	 idem,
'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth Century', 135-45, 149.
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Other scholars have made similar conclusions for the
period after 1187. Marshall in particular has written that
'few of the Latin strongpoints were of any genuine
strategic value' apart from Margat, Crac des Chevaliers,
Saphet and to some extent Pilgrims' Castle. 398 Likewise,
Prawer noted that the fortress of Montfort was basically
intended to serve as the Teutonic Knights' headquarters,
and had little military importance. 399 It has also been
shown that many crusader fortifications, such as the
Castle of Roger the Lombard and Qaqun, were far too small
to withstand Muslim invasion forces, and were primarily
designed to improve internal rather than external
security. These factors had hardly even been looked at by
historians before Smail's time.
However, it would be an oversimplification to say that
during the thirteenth century the Franks consistently
failed to implement some kind of overall strategy. It
would also be rash to dismiss Rey's theory of castle
networks entirely, for some strongholds clearly were built
and designed to interact with others. Pilgrims' Castle,
for example, was referred to as 'the breastwork of the
city of Acre' by one contemporary, implying that it had
deliberately been constructed to defend Acre from the
south. 4 Likewise, Ascalon became the focus of so much
crusader activity because of its proximity to Egypt,
rather than a pressing desire to re-establish a former
Christian city. By building new defences here Richard I,
Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall all hoped to
Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.129, and see
ibid, pp.l29-31.
Prawer, The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, p.308. See
also Pringle, 'A thirteenth century hall', 52.
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.256.
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deter the Muslims from attacking Galilee, whilst at the
same time creating a potential starting point for
Christian incursions toward Gaza and Jerusalem. These
factors caused Matthew Paris to describe it as the 'key'
to the kingdom of Jerusalem, and help explain why both
Saladin and Baybars were so keen to demolish it.401
As we have seen, several other castles built or
extensively repaired during the thirteenth century,
including Beaufort, Saphet and Crac des Chevaliers,
belonged to intervisible networks specifically designed to
guard national frontiers. Furthermore, Margat, Pilgrims'
Castle, Crac des Chevaliers and Saphet clearly intimidated
the Muslims over a wide area, and consequently extended
Frankish authority many miles inland. In the county of
Tripoli, Akkar, Chastel Blanc and Tortosa also made a
significant contribution to the aggressive policies which
the Hospitallers pursued in this area, whilst further
south one scholar has suggested that the garrison of
Montfort 'represented a continuing threat to Saphet' after
1266.402 Bearing in mind that Montfort was probably also
included in the select list of fortresses thought strong
enough to resist the Mongols, this implies that both the
castle's strength and strategic importance have been
underestimated in the past. Similarly, Mt Tabor may well
have been occupied by the Hospitallers because its summit
was difficult to attack, yet afforded extensive views over
Muslim territories to the east. It may therefore have been
used to attack areas around the river Jordan in the same
way that Saphet was,	 and certainly enabled the
401 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, IV, 144, and see
above, pp.52, 53.
402 Thorau, The Lion of E gypt, p.206. Gregory IX also
considered Montfort very important because of its
proximity to Muslim territories. See Tabulae ordinis
Theutonici, no.72, pp.56-57.
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Hospitallers to cultivate large parts of central
Galilee. 43
 Thus there may have been more Christian
strongholds than Marshall suggests which were intended to
provide national, not just local, defence, whilst some of
these sites could also be used to make significant
territorial gains at the expense of the Muslims.
Yet Rey's argument that virtually all Latin fortifications
ever constructed formed part of a huge, carefully planned
defensive system should still be rejected, for this would
also suggest that the Franks hoped to guard a static
frontier which hardly altered from year to year. In
reality, however, borders were constantly changing, and
individual strongholds were often destroyed or constructed
with staggering speed. Pilgrims' Castle, for example, was
begun in 1218, but was already strong enough to resist a
major siege within two years. 44 On another occasion,
Richard I was 1n such a hurry to repair the citadel of
Jaffa that he did not use any mortar, but simply built dry
stone walls which could be strengthened later.4U5 During
the spring of 1192 Richard also spent a mere four months
rebuilding Ascalon's walls, only for them to be demolished
again soon after as part of the peace treaty with
Saladin.4 6 Indeed, both Saladin and Baybars
systematically dismantled many strongholds to prevent
Lheir recapture, and even as late as 1270 the latter
sultan flattened the last remaining defences at Ascalon.
This was presumably done to deter Louis IX or the lord
Edward from devoting their crusades to fortifying these
403 Mt Tabor formed the centre of a vast territorial
block belonging to the Hospitallers. See Riley-Smith, The
Knights of St.John, pp.413-17.
404 See above, p.55-56.
Itinerarium, p.412.
406 See above, pp.51-52.
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sites and attacking Jerusalem.4
These incidents help to create an image of a region which
was almost constantly at war, with border regions changing
hands regularly, and castles being seen as far more
temporary structures than they are today. The shifting
nature of warfare in the Holy Land also makes it doubtful
whether natural barriers such as mountain ranges were as
important to the defence of Frankish territories as one
might think. Such features could be bypassed relatively
quickly, and there seems little difference between the
ease with which Saladin invaded the coastal plain in the.
twelfth century, and Baybars overran the same area eighty
years later.
This conclusion brings us back to the observations made at
the end of the previous chapter. Crusader tactics did not
in fact change that much during the two centuries of Latin
rule in the Holy Land, for the Franks hardly ever tried to
defend their borders by challenging their opponents in a
direct confrontation. The battles of Hattin and La Forbie
showed that to do so against a numerically superior enemy
could be suicidal. Instead, Ayubids, Mamluks and Seijuks
were regularly allowed to penetrate Christian territories
unhindered, until a lack of food, supplies or morale,
combined with a realization that it would take many years
to reduce the larger Fankish strongholds, forced them to
retreat. This strategy often worked successfully during
both the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, and did not
ultimately fail because crusader castles were
architecturally inferior, but rather because external
political factors changed dramatically from around 1260
onwards. Most notably, Baybars united the Muslim world
under a strong Egyptian sultanate, and eventually overcame
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 142; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 84.
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many of the political and military problems which had
prevented Saladin from wiping out the Franks during the
late 1180s. This enabled the Muslims to conduct sustained,
all year round campaigns with armies numbering tens of
thousands of men, at about the same time that west
European crusades were getting smaller, and internal
disputes between fellow Latins were getting more frequent.
As a result, the outnumbered, ill- disciplined and divided
Franks were powerless to stop a succession of Mamluk
sultans from capturing crusader strongpoints almost at
will. However, the ability of the Latins to survive for
another thirty years after the accession of Baybars,
without ever meeting their opponents in a major pitched
battle, can also be seen as a remarkable achievement,
which was only made possible by the sheer strength of
their greatest castles and urban fortifications.
Fig. 7. Cyprus. Fran Edbury, The Kingdan of Cyprus, np 1.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF FORTIFICATIONS IN THE KINGDOM
OF CYPRUS, 1191-1374.
Thanks to its isolated location and relatively strong
monarchy, the kingdom of Cyprus was by far the most
successful Latin state in the eastern Mediterranean during
the crusader period. However, despite the island's
unusually tranquil history, it has been shown that there
were two principal factors which were most likely to
threaten or undermine its Lusignan rulers. Firstly, there
was always a danger that an internal conflict would break
out between the Greeks and their Frankish overlords, which
is what happened in 1192, or between rival Latin factions,
as was the case in 1228, 1306 and 1369. Secondly, the
Lusignans constantly had to be on the lookout for an
external attack on Cyprus, either by pirates and Muslim
raiders, or much more seriously, by a Genoese or Mamluk
invasion force. Consequently, virtually all fortifications
constructed there during this period were designed to deal
with at least one of these dangers.
However, whereas the threat of internal warfare does not
appear to have increased significantly between 1191 and
1373, it is clear that the possibility of an actual
invasion grew considerably after 1291. As we shall see,
this explains why the Franks did not construct any major
new fortifications on Cyprus before the fall of Acre, and
continued to rely on the Byzantine defensive strategy of
having smaller castles at Famagusta, Limassol, Paphos and
Nicosia, and larger strongholds at Kyrenia, St.Hilarion,
Buffavento and Kantara. Indeed, the relative tranquility
on Cyprus during the thirteenth century shows that this
network of defences proved more than adequate in dealing
with minor raids and rebellions. It also helped Henry I
and the Ibelins defeat Frederick II's supporters during
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the war of 1228_33.1
The relatively small number of troops involved in this
conflict provides us with another reason why castles on
Cyprus were not dramatically strengthened or enlarged
before 1291. At the battle of Agridi, for example, the
Ibelins only had 223 mounted troops and the Lombards
2,000,2 whilst during the subsequent siege of Kyrenia John
of Ibelin bitterly regretted attempting a general assault
on the castle, because he had so few men at his disposal.3
From 1291 onwards, however, the Cypriots knew that they
were likely to be attacked by a Genoese or Mamluk invasion
force numbering at least 12,000 men. In addition, it has
been shown that piracy, which could still have a
devastating effect on certain areas even if it did not
threaten the kingdom as a whole, probably increased
dramatically in the course of the fourteenth century. 4 In
these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the
Lusignans erected vast new coastal defences during this
period, so that Cyprus increasingly relied on castles and
town walls for its survival, in the same way that crusader
states on the mainland had done before the fall of Acre.
These efforts clearly indicate that as far as the
strategic importance of castles on Cyprus was concerned,
1291 was in fact a far more significant date than 1191.
This statement can be backed up by looking at the history
and archaeological remains of individual strongpoints on
Cyprus.	 At	 Limassol,	 for example,	 investigations
1 See above, pp.16-22.
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.92; Gestes, p.712;
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.146.
Gestes, p.721; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, p.156.
See above, pp.33, 37-38.
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undertaken at the turn of the century failed to uncover
any medieval walls or urban defences around the city, but
did reach some interesting conclusions about the ruined
castle located near the harbour. The oldest part of this
citadel consisted of a large, square, two storey keep,
which originally had a small chapel or hall attached to
its east wall. The architectural historian C. Enlart dated
this keep to the thirteenth century, suggesting that it
was constructed from 1192 onwards, but probably stands on
the site of its Byzantine predecessor.5
However, Enlart also noted that at some later date the
building to the east of the keep had been almost
completely demolished, and replaced by a larger structure.
In addition, a second tower had been added parallel to the
old keep, which was itself extensively altered in its
internal layout. The vaulting and masonry used during this
second building phase proved that it dated from the
fourteenth century. Finally, it was clear that further
improvements had been made during the sixteenth century,
when the entire structure was encased with massively thick
ramparts, which blocked up many of the original medieval
arrow slits. These alterations dated from the Venetian
domination of Cyprus between 1489 and the Turkish invasion
of 1570, when numerous attempts were made to upgrade older
strongholds in order to make them strong enough to resist
artillery bombardment.7
These three distinct building phases can be compared with
Enlart, L'art othigue, II, 678-82.
Enlart, L'art gothigue, II, 680-82.
Enlart, L'art othigue, II, 682-83. See also A.H.S.
Megaw, 'The Arts in Cyprus, B: Military Architecture', Q,
IV, (1977), pp.198-206, at pp.198-99. For more details of
the Venetian domination of Cyprus, 1489-1570, see Hill,
History of Cyprus, III, 765-877.
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the known history of Limassol castle. This stronghold is
said to have been founded by Guy of Lusignan in 1193,
although it has already been noted that when Richard I
landed here two years previously some sort of Byzantine
fortification already existed, which was easily captured
by the crusaders. 8 In 1212 the travelling pilgrim
Willbrand of Oldenburg noted that Limassol was 'not a well
defended city', although he stressed that it had a good
port. Further evidence of the relatively small scale of
the defences erected in 1193 dates from 1220, when the
Muslims carried out a raid on Limassol in order to stop
supplies reaching members of the Fifth Crusade in Egypt.
This raid caused major casualties in the city, suggesting
that Limassol's castle was far too small to shelter the
entire Christian population, but could perhaps at least
protect the Frankish minority
The attack of 1220 is the last recorded raid made on
Limassol until i303, when pirates from Rhodes looted the
city. In 1271 Baybars also sent an Egyptian fleet of
eleven to fourteen galleys against Limassol, but it was
shipwrecked off the coast and some Muslim troops were
taken prisoner.' 1 Over the next few decades, it is clear
that the number of piratical incursions made against
Cyprus increased steadily, and some of these may have been
8 Etienne de Lusignan, Description de toute l'isle de
Cypre, (Paris 1580), folio 123; Itinerarium, pp.181-91;
Richard of Devizes, Cronicon, pp.35-36; Ambroise,
L'estoire de la guerre sainte, pp.38-42; Eracles, II, 161-
64; Roger of Howden, Chronica, III, 105-7; Gesta Regis,
II, 162-64.
1212: Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.230.
1220: Eracles, II, 345-46.
18	 Chroni g ue	 d'Amadi,	 p.239;	 Florio	 Bustron,
Chronigue, p.134.
Annales de Terre Sainte, p.455 (text B); Gestes,
p.778; Eracles, II, 460; al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans,
1(b), 87; Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 152-54; Marino
Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.224.
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aimed at Limassol. However, the only specific reference to
the city being attacked again dates from 1373, when
Genoese raiders targeted Limassol because 'the garrison
was fewer and weak: and they landed and burned the houses;
and the inhabitants took flight; and they did much
damage' .
These events tally perfectly with the archaeological
evidence at Limassol. Clearly, the original castle begun
during the 1190s replaced a Byzantine citadel, which may
well have been in a state of disrepair. The modest scale
of the new Frankish stronghold suggests that its principal
function was to maintain law and order on a local scale
and prevent the kind of rebellion which broke out against
the Templars at Nicosia in 1192. If such an uprising did
occur, the tower could provide shelter for Frankish
settlers, who were still massively outnumbered by the
native Greek population at this point. This is confirmed
by the events of 1220, which, as we have seen, clearly
indicate that Limassol's thirteenth century castle was
never intended to accomodate local Cypriot people as well.
The absence of any town walls at Limassol during thIs
period provides us with further proof that initially the
greatest threat to crusader rule was internal rather than
external.
The second building phase at Limassol can be explained in
terms of the growing threat of seaborne incursions during
the fourteenth century. Enlart compared the style of the
fourteenth century remains at LIimassol to those of
Famagusta cathedral, begun in 1311. This suggests that the
castle was enlarged before 135, and perhaps in response
Leontios Makhairas, ecital, c.377, pp.7-. ee
also Chronigue d'Amadi, p.444; florio ustron, Chronie,
pp.300-1; Strambaldi, Chroniue, p.l3.
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to the Genoese raid on nearby Paphos in 1316.13 However,
judging by one contemporary source, it is likelier that
the new building works date from the reign of James I
(1382-98), who no doubt feared a repeat of the Genoese
attack of 1373.14 Nevertheless, even James I's
improvements could not possibly have made the castle
strong enough to resist the kind of invasion forces which
the Genoese used at Famagusta, or which the Franks feared
the Mamluks would send against Cyprus after 1291. Clearly,
therefore, Latin defences at Limassol were never intended
to withstand anything more than local rebellions or minor
seaborne raids.
The early history of Limassol's fortifications is very
similar to those of Famagusta, the principal harbour on
the east coast of Cyprus. Famagusta's castle was already
mentioned during Richard I's conquest, when the emperor
Isaac Comnenus fled there briefly in mid-May ii9i.5
Twenty years later Wilibrand of Oldenburg wrote that like
Limassol it was not particularly well defended, 16 although
Frederick II's supporters still deemed it important enough
to station imperialist troops there during the spring of
1232 . 1?
 However, events some months later again suggest
that it can have been little more than a large tower. In
August 1232, the Ibelins sailed towards Cyprus in order to
reconquer the island and relieve the besieged castle of
St.Hilarion. Under cover of darkness they arrived on a
small island just outside Famagusta, and from there
managed to sneak into the city itself. Realizing this, the
13 Enlart, L'art othiqj, II, 681-82, and see below,
p.184.
14 Strambaldi, Chroniq, p.277.
15 Itinerarium, p.199.
16 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.232.
17 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.141;
Gestes, p.710; Eracles, II, 399.
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imperialist troops in the city retreated to Nicosia,
leaving only the 'sea tower' still holding out against the
Ibelins. The garrison of this tower subsequently
surrendered, but only after it had been promised several
fiefs by king Henry himself. These statements are
interesting because they suggest that Famagusta's castle
was intended to guard its harbour, and also confirm that
the Ibelin army of 1232 was extremely small.18
Famagusta probably continued to be protected solely by
this sea tower until the reign of Henry II (1285-1324),
who began a programme of enlarging the castle itself and
adding a town wall around the city. 19
 The fact that
Famagusta's cathedral and numerous other churches also
date from this period indicate that the city was
undergoing a period of rapid expansion during the early
fourteenth century, which presumably made it even more
urgent to defend such an important centre in response to
the events of 1291.20
During Amaury of Tyre's brief rule on Cyprus, when his
brother the king was exiled in Armenia for a while, the
construction programme started by Henry II was hastily
continued, no doubt to try to strengthen Amaury's grip on
Famagusta as much as to defend it from possible Mamluk
invasions. Amaury also had the wooden balconies of houses
facing the city streets removed, because they hampered the
movement of his cavalry troops, again indicating that he
18 Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.165-66; Gestes, pp.712-13;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.93; Philip of Novara, The
Wars of Frederick II, pp.147-48.
19 Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 143.
20 For more details on Famagusta's churches, see
Enlart, L'art gothigue, I, 250-394. For the growing wealth
of Famagusta, see D. Jacoby, 'The rise of a new emporium
in the eastern Mediterranean: Famagusta in the late
thirteenth century', in Studies on the Crusader States and
on Venetian Ex pansion, c.8, pp.145-79.
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feared an imminent royalist attack on the city. By 1310,
when Amaury was murdered and the political situation on
Cyprus began to change in favour of the king, these
fortifications must have been largely completed, because
in that year Famagusta declared itself staunchly on Henry
II's side and its citizens walled up the town gates and
demolished their drawbridges to prevent Amaury's
supporters from regaining control of the city.21
However, these defences, which had been constructed in
considerable haste by Greek peasants ferried in from the
countryside, may still have been considered inadequate
against the Mamluks, and it is doubtful whether they could
have been as strong as the kind of urban fortifications
built by the Franks at Acre and Tyre. It seems likely,
therefore, that improvements continued to be made during
the fourteenth century, so that by the mid-1340s an
anonymous English traveller could write that Famagusta 'is
a city strongly built.., on the rock. It is surrounded by
deep and broad moats cut out of the rock, and has high
walls and towers subtly constructed of squared and cut
stone' 22
By the 1360s, however, it must have been apparent to the
Cypriots that these defences were likelier to be put to
the test by a Genoese rather than a Muslim army. But when
the Genoese invasion finally came in 1373, Genoa's admiral
Peter of Campofregoso preferred to use stealth rather than
brute force to get into Famagusta. Having clashed with
Cypriot troops in a number of small encounters outside the
21 Florio Bustron,
	 Chronigue,	 p.194; Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.335.
22 'Manuscript recording the journey of an anonymous
Englishman', in Supplementary excerpts on Cyprus, or
further materials for a history of C yprus, trans. and ed.
T.A.II. Mogabgab, (Nicosia 1941), p.58. For Acre and Tyre,
see above, pp.62-64, 66.
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city, the Genoese suggested that Famagusta's castle should
be completely evacuated, and that seventeen men from each
side should meet inside to discuss a truce. Peter II and
his representatives agreed to this arrangement, but as
soon as the Genoese negotiators entered the citadel, they
overpowered their Cypriot counterparts, let more Genoese
troops inside, and thereby managed to occupy the whole
city.23
The stratagem used by the Genoese to capture Famagusta
suggests that by 1373 its defences were extremely strong,
but this impression may be misleading. Soon after the city
had been taken, the Genoese expressed concern that Peter
II's forces would storm the castle walls because they were
so low. As a result, Peter of Campofregoso 'gave orders
that they should raise the height of the walls wherever
they were low, and he tried to bring the sea all around
the place (ie the citadel) so as to make it an island'.
Another reference to wooden towers being added to
Famagusta's sea wall in 1380, during an encounter between
Genoa and Venice, also implies that the city's defences
were dangerously low. 24 It seems, therefore, that after an
initial building phase between c.1291 and 1340,
Famagusta's defences were either left incomplete or fell
into disrepair, because the threat of a Mamluk attack
appeared to be fading. Although Famagusta's walls no doubt
formed a complete circuit in 1373, this problem had
clearly not been rectified in the years preceding the
Genoese invasion. From 1373 onwards, therefore, the
Genoese must have carried out substantial repairs to the
walls, which subsequently withstood several Cypriot
23 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.386-88, p.365-67,
c.410-20, pp.389-403; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.446-48, 450-
51; Strambaldi, c i-ue, pp.156-60, 166-73; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, pp.302-11.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.450, p.435 (quote),
c.586, p.585. See also Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.186.
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attacks, including one involving cannons in 1402.25
During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, this process
was continued by the Venetians, who replaced most of the
old walls with ramparts more suited to artillery warfare,
and encased the castle itself with thick exterior earth
embankments, just as they had done at Limassol.26
Nevertheless, enough thirteenth and fourteenth century
remains have survived to confirm that there were two basic
phases of construction at Famagusta between 1191 and 1373.
Henry's citadel, which, as we have seen, probably dates
from the period 1291-1310, is located on a small
promontary at the north end of the harbour. It is
rectangular in shape, with four square corner towers. At
its centre is a small courtyard around which are located
the remains of various vaulted buildings. Although they
are all now blocked off by later Venetian defences, the
remains of numerous arrow slits facing the sea to the
north, as well as a postern gate to the west, confirm that
this is a classic example of the kind of simple
rectangular (or castrum) fortresses erected by the Latins
throughout the crusader states in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. 27
 Extending to the north east of
this citadel, the Venetians later added a fortified jetty,
from which a chain was connected to a 'chain tower' on the
other side of the harbour entrance. This structure may
have been built on the site of an earlier fourteenth
century tower.
25 1402: Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.355. Other
attacks occured in 1375, 1380 and 1382 (ibid, pp.342-51),
and in 1441 (ibid, p.371). Famagusta finally fell in 1464
(ibid, p.411).
26 Enlart, L'art
	 othi gue, II, 618-19; Etienne de
Lusignan, Descri ption, folio 24.
27 Other examples of castrum-type castles have
survived in the Holy Land. See above, pp.70-71.
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Even more significantly, Enlart believed the remains of
the thirteenth century citadel's north east corner tower,
which was largely demolished by the Venetians when they
built the jetty, are those of the original keep or sea
tower mentioned in 1191 and 1232.28 This confirms that a
Lower had existed here since Byzantine times, ;hose
location shows that it was intended to guard the port arid
perhaps even help approaching ships to find he harbour
entrance, although its small scale indicates that IL could
not ha e been much of a defence rgatIlE t anything more than
smalj pi.1'aLicai L'aio. 	 loE-\er,	 }:C ippeorance of the
actual FemaLns ol	 his ower has led the archaeologist
Ie'.4.ts tu or.Llude that it was probably built by Guy
of Lusinan in the 119Os. If this is the case, then its
primary role may in fact have been to suppress the local
population and protect Frankish newcomers. This would make
its function almost identical to that of the early
thirteenth century castle at Limassol. At both these sites
it also appears that any Byzantine fortifications still
standing in 1191 were demolished, presumably because they
could not be relied on to provide enough shelter either
against pirates or Greek rebels.
However, the construction of Famagusta's town walls and
the considerable rebuilding of its citadel after 1291
reflect a total shift in policy by Henry II and his
successors. These defences were built from scratch and
were clearly intended to protect the city from full scale
invasion forces rather than mere raids. Almost nothing
survives of these fortifications, which were
systematically replaced by the Vnetians. However, they
probably followed the same line as the present town wall,
28 Enlart, L'art othigue, II, 615-18; Leontios
Makhairas (1ecital, c.221, p.203) refers to the chain
tower as early as 1368.
29 Megaw, 'Military Architecture', p.197.
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which forms an app roximate rectangle around the city. Only
one tower along this wall predates the Venetian period,
but even this is Probably a Genoese structure built after
1373, rather than a relic from the original Lusignan
construction period .
The wealth of historical and archaeological evidence at
both Limassol and Famagusta makes it relatively easy to
assess the role of crusader fortifications there, but at
Paphos the situation is far more confusing. In 1191
Richard I occupied 'the castle which is called Paphos'
once Isaac Comnenus had been defeated, indicating that
some sort of fortification already existed there before
the crusader period. 3 ' However, this is the last specific
reference to there being any kind of stronghold at Paphos
until 1373. In that year, a small fleet sent against
Cyprus ahead of the main Genoese invasion force landed
nearby with an army of 2,000 mercenaries, and 'took the
castles of Paphos'. Having captured these fortifications,
the Genoese 'set to work and heightened them, and cut a
trench, so that the sea flowed in and surrounded them with
water... ' As a result, 'when the Cypriots brought up
fighting-towers and soldiers in them, they resisted the
attack without anxiety for the result'. It is unclear how
long the Genoese subsequently stayed at Paphos, although
they probably held it during most, if not all, of the
Genoese campaign against Kyrenia, which ended in the
spring of 1374.32
We are therefore left with the problem of trying to work
out how and at what stage Paphos progressed from being
Enlart, L'art g othi g ue, II 618-19.
Roger of Howden, Chronica, III, 111.
32 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.377, p.359 (quote).
See also Chroniciue d'Amadi, pp.444-45; Florio Bustron,
Chronigue, pp.301-2; Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.l54-55.
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defended by a single Byzantine stronghold, which was
quickly overrun by Richard I's troops, to two separate
castles, which were strong enough to resist a concerted
Cypriot attack using siege towers! Moreover, the only
recorded attack on Paphos between 1191 and 1373, carried
out by Genoese raiders in 1316, makes no reference to any
of these fortifications) Over the centuries, historians
and archaeologists have interpreted these facts in
different ways. In the sixteenth century, Etienne of
Lusignan referred to the two towers occupied by the
Genoese, stating that 'there were two very strong castles
by the shore, whose walls were constantly lapped by the
sea, which the kings descended from the Lusignans had
equipped with all necessary defences', but he went on to
say that they were later destroyed by the Venetians.34
Both the Chronique d'Amadi and Florio Bustron went further
by claiming that these structures, as well as a nearby
'citadel', had been built by James I in 1391, but this, of
course, does not tally with the events of 1373.
These statements leave us with two possibilities. Firstly,
it may be that Florio Bustron and the Chronique d'Amadi
are quite simply incorrect, and that Paphos's twin castles
were built at some point during the early fourteenth
century. The second and more likely possibility is that
James I was indeed responsible for building work at
Paphos, but that this amounted to repairs necessitated by
the attack of 1373, rather than the construction of brand
Chroni g ue	 d'Amadi,	 p.398;	 Florio	 Bustron,
Chronigue, pp.249-50.
Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 16.
Chronigue d'Amadi, p.495; Florio Bustron,
Chronigue, p.352. All traces of James I's 'citadel' must
have disappeared long before Enlart's day, as he makes no
reference to it. It may also be that this refers to the
two towers, rather than a separate building which has now
vanished.
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new defences. This would suggest that these castles had
originally been built at some point between 1191 and 1373,
and possibly in response to the Genoese raid of 1316.
These observations are to some extent confirmed by the
archaeological evidence. Around a century ago Enlart saw
the remains of two towers guarding the harbour of Paphos,
one of which, despite Etienne of Lusignan's statement,
showed traces of Venetian occupation, before later being
incorporated into a Turkish fort. 36
 More recently, Sir
George Hill also concluded that at least one of these
towers had been built on the ruins of the Byzantine castle
captured by Richard I, adding that the Venetian and
Turkish remains at Paphos incorporated a 'Lusignan tower'.
This implies that the site was in fact occupied almost
continuosly from the Byzantine period onwards, and may
even have been refortified soon after Richard I's
invasion, in the same way that Limassol and Famagusta
were.
However, the difficulties with Paphos do not end there. In
1957, and after both Hill and Enlart had reached their own
conclusions, the archaeologist 'fegaw discovered the
remains of a sizeable castle on a site located slightly
inland, which had previously been connected with a
classical temple dedicated to Venus. It consisted of an
almost square inner castle, built around a central
courtyard and defended by four corner towers, which were
themselves surrounded by an outer curtain wall flanked by
a further eight towers. Although this castle was still
small compared with many strongholds constructed on the
° Enlart, L'art othigue, II, 696.
Hill, Histor y of Cyprus, II, 18-19.
A.H.S. Megaw, 'Supplementary Excavations on a
Castle Site at Paphos, Cyprus, 1970-71', Dumbarton Oaks
Papers, XXVI, (1972), 322-45.
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mainland at this time, it nevertheless contrasted
dramatically with the isolated towers already described at
Limassol and Famagusta. Not only was it planned as a true
concentric fortification with two lines of defence and no
obvious central keep, but its inner castle probably also
contained substantial residential apartments.39
During a series of excavations between 1957 and 1971,
Megaw investigated this site extensively in order to
ascertain who had built it and when it had been occupied.
This enabled him to draw a number of conclusions about the
castle's history. Firstly, it seemed that the original
Roman or Byzantine fortifications had been destroyed
during a devastating Arab attack in 654 A.D. Secondly,
very little evidence of further occupation between 654 and
1191 was unearthed above this layer, whilst no less than
25 coins were found dating from between 1191 and c.1220,
as well as numerous other items that could be associated
with every day life in the early thirteenth century.40
However, despite these finds Megaw believed that a small
number of twelfth century Byzantine coins on the site,
plus a number of architectural peculiarities and
readjustments within the inner castle, proved that it was
basically a Byzantine construction later repaired by the
Franks, and that it was finally destroyed during the
massive earthquake recorded by Oliver of Paderborn in
1222. 41
 But by drawing this conclusion Megaw appears to
contradict himself, when he first states that the drainage
system below the inner bailey must have been constructed
at the same time as the castle itself, and then concludes
that the upper parts of the castle were a late addition by
Megaw, 'Supplementary Excavations', 323-25.
40 Megaw, 'Supplementary Excavations', 328-43.
41 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatiria, p.279; See
also Annales de Terre Sainte, p.437 (text 13).
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the Franks, even though the subterranean drains and the
latrines of the upper storey are clearly part of one
integral design. 42 Moreover, it seems odd that if this was
the castle occupied by Richard I in 1191, it was not
referred to at all by Willbrand of Oldenburg. Willbrand
visited Paphos in 1212, and his faithful recording of the
state of the defences of numerous other places in Cyprus,
as well as his obvious interest in fortifications
throughout the Latin East, make it very surprising that he
should fail even to mention a castle with double walls and
several flanking towers.43
Hence the possibility emerges that this site may have been
occupied at least to some degree between the seventh and
thirteenth centuries, but that the castle itself was not
begun until after 1212, and was basically built from
scratch. This may also explain why the rock-cut ditch
around the castle was never completed. Megaw believes this
ditch was hastily begun against renewed Arab aggression in
the 680s, but it could also have been left unfinished
because of the earthquake of 1222, after which the castle
was definitely never rebuilt. 44 Moreover, the incomplete
state of the castle ditch, which rendered several
unfinished pastern gates in the outer curtain useless,
raises the possibility that the castle was built in an
even shorter time span just before 1222, perhaps in
response to the Mamluk raid on Limassol in 122O. If this
is so, then this stronghold may represent a brief attempt
to defend Cyprus more systematically against an external
invasion seventy years before the loss of Acre; an attempt
which was abandoned after the earthquake of 1222, and the
42 Megaw, 'Supplementary Excavations', 335, 343.
3 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.230.
4 Megaw, 'Supplementary Excavations', 343.
See above, p.l75.
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gradual realization that the raid of 1220 had been an
isolated incident.
Thus the picture at Paphos is a little more confused than
elsewhere, although the basic functions of all the
fortifications constructed there between 1191 and 1373
were roughly the same as those at both Famagusta and
Limassol. The castle guarding the city in 1191 must have
been too small and dilapidated to have been preserved by
the Franks. It could either have been a predecessor to one
of the two towers near the shore, or a small fortification
cleared away when the Franks built their larger castle at
some point between 1212 and 1222. Whether the Franks also
built a new tower to protect the harbour after 1191, as
they did at Limassol and Famagusta, is uncertain, but the
possibility cannot be ruled out, and Hill appears to have
thought that they did. However, the role of all these
early thirteenth century defences must have been more
substantial than the mere suppression of the local
population, which seems to have been achieved perfectly
adequately by the smaller towers at Limassol and
Famagusta. Presumably, therefore, Paphos's closer
proximity to Egypt, and the raid of 1220, convinced the
Franks that this stretch of coastline was particularly
vulnerable to seaborne offensives. However, if this was
the case, it seems odd that the inland castle was not
rebuilt after 1222. As far as the two towers attacked in
1373 are concerned, it has been suggested that these were
constructed after 1316, when it became apparent that the
Genoese were prepared to use force against Cyprus.
Clearly, both these defences and those later built by
James I were erected in response to the ever increasing
threat posed by the Genoese, and the possibility that they
would try to capture western Cyprus by using Paphos as a
bridgehead.
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Whereas the history of Paphos is relatively obscure, the
situation at Nicosia seems to have been far more
straightforward. Nicosia differed from Paphos and the
other centres looked at so far, because (like Jerusalem)
it owed its importance to its political and religious
status, as the capital of Cyprus and the seat of its
archbishop, rather than its economic wealth or seaborne
trading activities. Consequently it was the only major
urban centre on the island which did not lie on the coast,
and was therefore not as exposed to potential external
aggression as other settlements, even after 1291. Thus
when looking at the role of fortifications at Nicosia
during this period, it is first of all important to
remember its unique geographical location.
As we have already seen, two incidents during the very
earliest days of crusader domination on Cyprus suggest
that Nicosia was yet another place which had a small
castle in Byzantine times. Firstly, Isaac Comnenus found
refuge here briefly whilst fleeing from Richard I, before
the entire city was subsequently occupied by English
troops.° Secondly, after Richard had sold the island to
the Templars, they placed a force of Italian mercenaries
in the casUe of Nocosia, which came under siege during
the Cypriot rebellion of 1192. Although it lacked adequate
supplies, this garrison, which consisted of 14 knights, 74
footsoldiers and another 29 mounted troops, managed to
hold out for a while and subsequently made a successful
sortie against the Greeks. However, this incident
nevertheless convinced the Templars that they lacked the
troops and resources to maintain and garrison the island's
castles properly, and they therefore handed it back to
Itinerarium, pp.194, 200-1; Roger of Howden,
Chronica, III, 111; Vinsauf, 'Itinerary of Richard I',
p.10.
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Richard I.47
The siege of 1192 may also have inflicted considerable
damage on the castle of Nicosia, which had been described
as 'a very strong fort' only a year previously. 48 It was
perhaps for this reason that the crusaders decided to
reconstruct it not long afterwards. This is confirmed by
Wilibrand of Oldenburg's statement that in 1212 he saw a
strong citadel at Nicosia which had been completed
recently. It seems that this structure was built on the
site of the old castle, which had been located 'by the
small market', suggesting that it stood right in the
middle of the cIty.4
Thus it seems likeliest that the events of 1192 caused Guy
of Lusignan, or one of his successors, to demolish the
Byzantine castle (or what remained of it) fairly soon
after Lusignan control was established on Cyprus, and
replace it with a citadel deliberately placed at the
centre of Nicosia to act as a symbol of the new regime,
and to prevent a recurrence of the kind of rebellion which
had ousted the Templars. A pattern is therefore starting
to emerge, suggesting that during the 1190s and the very
earliest years of the thirteenth century, the Lusignans
built a series of small but strong castles at Famagusta,
Limasso]. and Nicosia. (As we have seen, a similar tower
may also have been built near the harbour of Paphos, which
was later complemented by the larger stronghold built
between 1212 and 1222, and eventually replaced by two new
Eracles, II, 189-91; Chronigue d'madi, pp.83-85;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.50-52; Leontios Makhairas,
Recital, c.12, p.11.
Vinsauf, 'Itinerary of Richard I', p.10.
Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerariurn, p.228; Etienne
de Lusignari, Description, folio 30-31.
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towers in the fourteenth century.
These early Frankish castles were little more than large,
square towers, whose principal functions were to suppress
the Greeks and strengthen the crusaders' grip on Cyprus,
and their role can be compared with that of the Norman
castles built in England after 1066, as well as the
numerous isolated towers built by the Latins in Greece
from 1204 onwards. 5° Their small size, as well as
incidents such as the devastating Muslim raid on Limassol
in 1220, show that they could not hope to prevent larger
external attacks, let alone full scale invasions. However,
they were no doubt intended to discourage smaller raids,
and an attack against Cyprus by Greek pirates in 1192 may
be significant in this respect. The construction of towers
at Limassol and Famagusta suggests that the Lusignans
feared similar incursions in the future, and were
particularly concerned about Greek aggressors, who could
potentially seek both political and military aid from
Constantinople •51
Returning to Nicosia itself, it appears that the tower
erected before 1212 continued to act as the only defence
for the city until the fourteenth century, and may even
have been allowed to fall into a state of disrepair. The
kings of Cyprus themselves did not live in this castle,
but resided in the royal palace nearby, which was probably
slightly fortified in its own right. This is implied by
the fact that in 1307, when Henry II managed to slip away
from his brother Amaury's guards, he took refuge in the
palace and defended it successfully against Amaury's
troops for four days, before eventually having to
50 See below, pp.3l92l.
51 Eracles, II, 205-6.
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surrender •52
As far as urban defences were concerned, it seems that
none were constructed at Nicosia until the second half of
the fourteenth century, presumably because of the city's
inland location. Nicosia's original Byzantine town walls
had probably disappeared completely by the time Richard I
occupied the city in 1191, although when they were
eventually reconstructed, the remains of 'ancient walls
which had been built by the first rulers at the time of
Constantine the Great' were unearthed. 53 It seems unlikely
that "the castle of Lefkosia", which Henry II began to
construct in the late thirteenth century, amounted to a
complete circuit around the city. 54 Henry probably thought
that his resources were best spent fortifying more exposed
coastal settlements such as Famagusta first. But if the
kings of Cyprus felt that the defence of Nicosia was not
particularly urgent after the fall of Acre, the subsequent
threat of a Genoese invasion seems to have changed their
minds.
It was not until the reign of Peter I (1359-69),
therefore, that new town walls were erected. Peter may not
only have been motivated by a fear of the Genoese; his
aggressive policies towards the Muslims had already led to
a number of retaliatory raids on Cyprus by the Turks,
whilst his attack on Alexandria in 1365 must have renewed
fear of a Mamluk invasion. 55 Some indication of what these
fortifications looked like and how far they had progressed
52 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.148-49; Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.259. For more details on the royal palace, see
Enlart, L'art gothigue, pp.525-38.
Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 30.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.41, p.43.
Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, p.26. Turkish raids:
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.139, p.121, c.151, p.133.
Attack on Alexandria: see below, p.221.
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before Peter I's death can be gauged from events during
the reign of his son, Peter II. In October 1373, Peter II
made an inspection of the walls, because he feared that
Nicosia would soon be attacked by the Genoese, who were
busy preparing to besiege Famagusta. The king found that
'the walls were very strong; but they were low, and he
sent word to the country round, and men came together and
built them up with earth and stones; and they dug out the
ditch and constructed one hundred and thirty three
platforms to fight from in addition to the towers'.56
Peter II had been right to fear for the safety of his
capital. Toward the end of November 1373, the Genoese, who
had by now occupied Famagusta and captured king Peter
himself, marched against Nicosia. Peter's uncle James of
Lusignan, the constable of Cyprus, had already left the
city in order to guard Kyrenia to the north, perhaps
implying that despite recent improvements, Nicosia's walls
were deemed too weak to bother defending. At any rate, the
departure of James, (whom the inhabitants of Nicosia had
tried to prevent from leaving because of their fear of the
Genoese), as well as the apparent inadequacy of the city's
fortifications, enabled the enemy to enter the city
virtually unchallenged.
Once they had arrived at Nicosia, The Genoese troops
quickly realized that there were not enough of them to
occupy the entire city and its walls. They therefore
restricted themselves to garrisoning a section of the
ramparts 'from the Market Gate to the Tower of St.Andrew,
and they made the walls higher and held the place in great
force. And the tower which stands near the Market Gate
they filled with earth and stones and made it like a
56 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.384, p.363. See also
Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.156; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.439-
40; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.294.
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castle'. 57 These fortifications ensured that the Genoese
could keep an eye on the entire city and intimidate its
population into submission. They also protected the
Genoese against James of Lusignan, who subsequently
arrived from Kyrenia and tried to recapture Nicosia.
Despite being massively outnumbered, the Genoese were now
so well entrenched at Nicosia that they managed to hold on
to the capital until a peace treaty was agreed in April
1374. During this time Nicosia's inhabitants, who had been
abandoned and left leaderless, indulged tn idsread
looting and street fighting, both against the Genoese and
each other. To some extent, the Genoese actually
encouraged such violence, because it helped them track
down their own enemies and systematically sack the entire
city. Their defences also enabled the Genoese to beat
off another Cypriot attack from Kyrenia in March 1374. The
tower near the Market Gate may have been particularly
significant in this respect, because by filling it in with
earth the Genoese had created their own 'citadel' capable
of withstanding catapult bombardment.
The events of 1373-74 had shown that Nicosia was almost
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.424, p.405. See also
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.312; Chronigue d'Amadi,
p.454; Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.173. James's departure to
Kyrenia: ibid, pp.159-66.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.434-35, pp.417-21;
Chroni g ue d'Amadi, p.456; Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.179-
80; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.314.
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.312-16; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.455-57, 458; Strambaldi, Chroni g ue, pp.178-83,
186-87; Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.433, p.417, c.436-
43, pp.421-29, c.453-54, pp.437-39.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.510, pp.499-501;
Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.211-12; Chronigue d'Amadi,
pp.468-69; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.326-27. For more
details on the fall of Nicosia, see Hill, Histor y of
Cyprus, II, 393-402, 406-10.
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worse off with weak defences than no defences at all. By
being able to occupy the city's walls so easily, and
thereafter fortifying one particular section of their
circuit, the Genoese used Nicosia's fortifications against
its own inhabitants, and prevented the Cypriots from
liberating the city. Consequently, the city walls
were considerably improved and repaired during the next
two decades, to deter the Genoese at Famagusta from making
a new attack. James I in particular carried out much of
this work during the 1390s.61
So far we have mainly looked at the town walls of Nicosia,
but its citadel also underwent many changes from the mid-
fourteenth century onwards. During this period the sources
make no reference to the original castle built between
1192 and 1212, which, if it still existed, must have been
considered totally inadequate for the defence of the city.
During the reign of Peter I, therefore, a new citadel was
constructed on a hill on the outskirts of Nicosia. This
site dominated the entire city, and was used by the Turks
to bombard the capital in 1570; an indication of the
strategic value of this hill, as well as the problems the
Cypriots later had in defending such a low lying city
against artillery attack. 2 The castle itself basically
consisted of a 'strong and impressive' tower, whose
different floors, including a dungeon in the cellar, were
connected by ladders. This tower was also surrounded by a
large moat, which had been excavated by slaves who 'dug
the earth all day, and carried it out on their backs'.3
Florio l3ustron, Chronigue, pp.26, 352; Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.495.
62 Enlart, L'art othigue, II, 523.
William of Machaut, La prise, pp.258-59. See also
Chroni g ue d'Amadi, p.422; Florio Bustron, Chronigue,
p.271; Strambaldi, Chroni g ue, p.102; Leontios Makhairas,
Recital, c.260, p.241, c.265, p.247; Enlart, L'art
othi g ue, II, 520-21.
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Although it had not been completed by the time Peter I was
murdered in 1369, the Margarita Tower, as this stronghold
was known, clearly had more to do with defending Nicosia
from external aggressors than the original thirteenth
century castle. Whereas the old citadel stood at the heart
of the city, so that it would intimidate the Greeks, the
Margarita Tower had deliberately been placed in a spot
which could otherwise have been used by anyone besieging
Nicosia. Moreover, its construction coincided with the
first attempts by the Cypriots to provide the city with
proper town walls. The Margarita Tower had therefore been
built to protect Nicosia against the Genoese and the
Muslims, but as we shall see it was later used more as a
prison, and eventually became a hated symbol of Peter I's
regime .
From 1373 onwards, however, even the Margarita Tower was
not thought to suffice against the Genoese threat. In 1376
Peter II ordered that it should be demolished, along with
numerous other buildings which were in the way, and a new,
stronger castle was begun. This fortress lay near the
Paphos gate, in the west of the city, and must have been
far larger than the Margarita Tower, because it even
incorporated royal apartments. It was built by Genoese
prisoners of war in the space of just ten months, using
recycled masonry from the Margarita Tower and 'walls in
the town which were of no use' . Its defences were
subsequently strengthened by both James I and Janus (1398-
1432), who 'made it a famous work'.65
It is clear that the extensive fortifications built at
See below, pp.405-6.
65 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.594-97, pp.591-93
(quotes: c.594, p.591, c.597, p.593). See also Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.490; Strambaldi, Chroniq, pp.250-51; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, p.349; Enlart, L'art gothigue, II,
519-20.
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Nicosia between the 1360s and the beginning of the
fifteenth century were intended to protect the city
against the Genoese. These defences can therefore be
compared with the late fourteenth century improvements
made at Limassol and Paphos, which, as we have seen,
served a very similar purpose. However, Nicosia is unusual
in that it was the only major settlement on Cyprus whose
defences were not upgraded immediately after 1291. The
same could not be said for Kyrenia, Nicosia's principal
port to the north, and one of the most important coastal
settlements in Cyprus after Famagusta.
Kyrenia's role as the main lifeline between Nicosia and
the outside world gave it great strategic importance, and
it was defended by a 'very strong castle' even in
Byzantine times. In 1191 this fortress was occupied by Guy
of Lusignan, who assisted Richard I in the conquest of
Cyprus, and its loss was such a blow to Isaac Comnenus
that he surrendered to Richard soon afterwards. 66 During
the next four centuries Kyrenia continued to be modified
and strengthened by successive rulers of Cyprus, making it
so strong that, 'despite having been attacked in so many
wars, it was never breached or taken by storm' 67 The
castle, which is approximately rectangular in shape,
stands on a large promontary, so that its four corner
towers dominate the harbour and town to the west, another
large bay to the east, the shore line to the north, and
the coastal plain to the south. Beneath or inside the
66 Itinerarium, pp.202-3; Roger of Howden, Chronica,
III, 111; Ambroise, L'estoire de la guerre sainte, p.53;
Gesta Regis, p.167. Guy of Lusignan allied himself with
Richard I (overlord of the Lusignans in France) and took
part in the conquest of Cyprus in order to strengthen his
position against Conrad of Montferrat, his rival in the
Holy Land. This explains why Richard later allowed Guy to
buy Cyprus from the Templars. See Itinerarium, pp.195,
235-36, 317-51.
67 Etienne de Lusignan, Descri ption, folio 27.
10. Plan of Kyrenia castle
Hatched 5Ik = Byzantine castle	 17— To Sou(h-West Bastion (lower level)
If lack walls	 Frankish	 18— To South Fighting Gallery.
ctions and addittions	 19— Venetian Gallery.20— South-East Tower.
Dotted walls = Venetian reconstru- 	 21— Gate to East Outwork.
ctions and addittions	 22— Gun .Cbnmber (site of Frankish
tower).
I— Entrance passage.	 23— Horseshoe Tower.
2— Guardroom.	 24— Water Tank.
3— Byzantine Chapel. 	 25— East Fighting Gallery.
4— North-West Tower. 	 26— North Range (foundations).
5— West Ward (north end). 	 27— North-East Tower.
6— West Ward (centre).	 28— North-East Staircase.
7— Gate-House (chapel over) - 	 29— Chamber with reconstructed flooi.
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Fig.8. Kyrenia castle. Fran Megaw, 'Military Architecture'
HC, IV, 198.
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later medieval and Venetian defences are preserved the
remains of the original Byzantine castle first occupied by
Guy of Lusignan. This fortress seems to have had four
relatively small, round and hollow corner towers attached
to the main curtain walls, with an additional horse shoe
tower half-way along the south curtain wall. Beyond this
latter rampart, there stood another massively thick wall
flanked by several pentagonal towers, which defended the
castle's weak southern side.68
This was probably the fortress Wilibrand of Oldenburg saw
in 1212, when he described Kyrenia as small but well
fortified with a strong castle, and having a good
harbour. 69 The archaeological evidence suggests that some
crusader modifications may already have been carried out
on the castle by this date, although as at Famagusta, the
most important period of reconstruction and enlargement
dates from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries. During this period the original Byzantine north
and east curtain walls were replaced by new defences built
with ashlar masonry similar to that used in thirteenth
century Syria. These structures incorporated two floors of
shooting galleries, with a rampart above, whose
crenellated parapet was still perfectly preserved when
Enlart saw it around a century ago. 7° To the south, the
Franks retained some of the Byzantine fortifications, but
encased them with a further curtain wall and shooting
gallery now destroyed by later Venetian constructions.
There are further traces of Frankish structures along the
west curtain of the castle, including the original 'L'
shaped gateway, which was built using massive blocks of
masonry and was shielded by the castle's enormous north
68 Megaw, 'Military Architecture', pp.199-203.
69 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.228.
70 Megaw, 'Military Architecture', pp.200-203; Enlart,
L'art othi g ue, II, 573, and fig.357.
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west corner tower. This tower also had a postern gate
facing the sea, and originally had a barbican attached to
it which defended the main gate against potential attacks
from the town.7'
These alterations represent the last major building phase
at Kyrenia before the sixteenth century, although minor
repairs were no doubt carried out from time to time,
especially around the time of the Genoese invasion in
1373. However, during the Venetian domination of Cyprus,
Kyrenia's defences were altered and brought up to date. As
a result, most of the Frankish structures along the
castle's south and west sides were destroyed, and new
ramparts were added, including a vast bastion at the south
west corner of the site.
This brief description of the ccstle 's defences makes it
clear that Kyrenia uiffered from the other strongholds
mentioned su far, in that it was exceptionally strong even
'it the beginning of the crusader period. Consequently, it
could resist major invasion forces as well as smaller
piratical raids. This strength was first highlighted
during the civil war between Frederick II and the Ibelins.
In 1229, the Ibelin faction managed to defeat the
emperor's five baillis near Nicosia and then besieged the
imperialists at Kantara, St.Hilarion and Kyrenia. However,
rather than trying to storm Kyrenia, John of Ibelin asked
Philip of Novara to negotiate a deal whereby the Lombard
garrison would surrender if they had not been relieved by
a specified date. This was in fact what happened,
illustrating that sieges could sometimes be terminated
71 Enlart,	 L'art gothi g ue,	 II,	 573-75;	 Megaw,
'Military Architecture', pp.202-3.
Megaw, 'Military Architecture', p.202; Enlart,
L'art gothi gue, II, 574-75, 577.
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through negotiations rather than warfare.73
Almost three years 'ater, however, when John of Ibelin's
preoccupation with the siege of Beirut enabled the
Lombards to regain control on Cyprus, Kyrenia was again
garrisoned by imperialist troops. 74 Consequently, after
the Lombard defeat at the battle of Agridi, those
imperialists not already killed or captured sought their
way to Kyrenia, and although they only numbered fifty
knights and 1,000 other troops, they managed to hold out
there for an entire year. During this period the Ibelins
and their Genoese allies blockaded Kyrenia by land and
sea, and attacked it with numerous catapults and siege
engines, many of which were set alight in the bitter hand
to hand fighting.
The siege of 1232-33 was the last major attack on Kyrenia
before the Genoese invasion of Cyprus. As we have seen,
the constable of the kingdom, James of Lusignan, had gone
to Kyrenia shortly before the fall of Nicosia in November
1373. Thereafter James's troops, who were mainly composed
of Bulgarian mercenaries, managed to prevent their enemies
from advancing north until January 1374, when the Genoese
finally broke through the mountain passes connecting
Nicosia with the coast. As a result, Kyrenia itself came
under siege, and its 'bridges were raised and the gates
13 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.78; Chronigue d'Amadi,
p.143; Gestes, p.690; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, p.103.
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.136,
141; Gestes, p.707; Chronigue d'Amadi, p.158; Eracles, II,
399; Florio I3ustron, Chroni gue, p.91.
Floria Bustron, Chronigue, pp.98-105; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.173-82; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, pp.156-68; Gestes, pp.718-24. See also
Eracles, II, 401-2.
201
nailed up'.76
There now followed several weeks of intense fighting,
which, on the whole, proved more costly for the Genoese.
This was because the constable's men were able to bombard
or set fire to the attackers' catapults and siege engines,
in the same way that the Lombards had done in 1232. At one
point they also let down one of the drawbridges, which was
counterpoised in such a way that when it was released
anyone standing on it would fall into the castle ditch.
This fooled several Genoese soldiers, who ended up in the
moat and were killed.77
These setbacks forced the Genoese to call off the attack,
but subsequent negotiations led to nothing, and the siege
was soon resumed. However, once again the defenders were
able to repel even the most elaborate Genoese siege
engines, including a vast wooden platform lashed between
two galleys, which was so tall that it could be used to
fire into the castle from off shore. As a result, most of
the Genoese withdrew to Nicosia, and the two sides agreed
to a ceasefire which effectively ended the siege in mid-
March.
Hence Ryrenia was extremely important in terms of national
as well as local defence, and there can be little doubt
that their failure to capture it in 1374 prevented the
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.464-70, pp.449-55
(quote: c.470, p.453); Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.317;
Chroni g ue d'Amadi, p.460; Strambaldi, Chroni gue, pp.192-
94.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.470-81, pp.453-65;
Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.194-99; Chronigue d'Amadi,
pp.460-62; Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.317-19.
8 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.317-25; Leontios
Makhairas, Recital, c.481-503, pp.465-91; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.462-67; Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.199-209,
217.
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Genoese from conquering all of Cyprus. Moreover, Kyrenia
differed from neighbouring castles in that the town and
harbour next to it may already have been fortified as
early as 1212. Enlart agreed with this theory, quoting
Wilibrand of Oldenburg's statement that Kyrenia was a
'small but fortified town' as proof that its walls were
built between 1192 and 12l2. However, Hill rejected
this, and believed that these defences were erected from
the early fourteenth century onwards, even though his
conclusion ignores Wilibrand of Oldenburg's description,
as well as further evidence that during the siege of 1232
John of Ibelin's men had to storm the town, and
encountered a lot of resistance thereY
The archaeological evidence at Kyrenia is slim, because
much of the town wall was later rebuilt by the Venetians,
but two towers in particular may contain some fourteenth
or even thirteenth century masonry. One placed roughly
half way along the town's west curtain is similar in style
to Hospitaller fortifications on Rhodes (constructed from
1309 onwards), whilst the other, located where the south
and west curtains meet, may originally have been built in
the thirteenth century . It is therefore possible to
conclude that both Hill and Enlart were correct, for the
Byzantine town walls at Kyrenia may have been well
preserved enough to make it worth the Franks' while to
repair and maintain them from an early date, whereas the
events of 1291 inspired a brand new construction phase
continuing into the fourteenth century. Beyond defending
the town of Kyrenia, the events of 1232 also imply that
such fortifications acted as an outer line of defence for
Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.228; Enlart,
L'art othi g ue, II, p.559.
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.101; Hill, Histor y of
C yprus, II, 20.
Enlart, L'art gothigue, II, 571-72.
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the castle itself. This is confirmed by references to an
attack on the harbour chain during the spring of 1374,
which suggests that the Genoese failed to capture the town
during their siege of Kyrenia.82
At any rate, it is clear that Kyrenia's importance
throughout this period meant that it was fortified in a
manner more akin to castles on the mainland than the rest
of Cyprus. It is therefore perhaps more logical to place
Kyrenia in the same category as Buffavento, St.Hilarion
and Kantara, for although it was not a mountain castle,
its strength and strategic value meant that the Lusignan
kings relied on it to protect the entire kingdom of
Cyprus. St.Hilarion in particular played a very similar
role to that of Kyrenia, because anyone hoping to control
Cyprus permanently needed to control this extremely strong
fortress as well.
St.Hilarion derived almost all its strength from its
location. It is situated on a mountain peak isolated from
the rest of the Kyrenja mountain range by deep valleys,
one of which carries the road between Kyrenia and Nicosia.
The strategic value of the castle therefore lay in the
ability of its garrison to observe any enemy ships at sea,
or hostile forces moving south from the coastal plain
around Kyrertia towards Nicosia inland. Its defences were
divided into three baileys along the east slope of the
site, while the north, west and south sides were all so
steep that they required very few man made fortifications.
The lower and middle baileys contained various service
buildings and residential quarters, most of which in fact
date from the Byzantine period. Beyond these structures a
steep path gave access to the upper bailey, which housed
further royal apartments, including a thirteenth century
82 Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.205; Leontios Makhairas,
Recital, c.495, p.483.
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hail whose appearance and function will be discussed in
more detail below. 83 To the east of and even higher than
the upper bailey, two towers also occupied the actual
ridge of the mountain top itself, and one of these in
particular probably acted as a final refuge for the castle
garrison.84
This brief description of St.Hilarion's location and
defences show that like Kyrenia, it was intended to be
strong enough to withstand even the most determined
attackers. Both the archaeological and historical evidence
suggests that this was already the case in Byzantine
times. The curtain wall of the lower bailey, the gateway
to the middle ward and numerous other structures in the
castle are all Byzantine, or at least have Byzantine
foundations, proving that from 1191 onwards the Franks
only modified and repaired an already very old fortress.
(Etienne de Lusignan says it was built at the time of 'the
gods and the pagans'85).
This is also confirmed by the events of 1191, during
Richard I's conquest of Cyprus. As the emperor Isaac
Comnenus fled in the face of Richard's army, the latter
besieged St.Hilarion for several days, bombarding the
castle with rocks until its garrison surrendered. Soon
after he also occupied the nearby castle of Buffavento,
and the loss of these two strongholds contributed to
Isaac's subsequent surrender. It is, however, significant
that Richard did not actually capture St.Hilarion by
storm, and that its defenders probably gave up because
83 See below, pp.403-4.
84 Fiorio Bustron, Chroni gue, p.24; Enlart, L'art
gothi g ue, II, 583-95; Megaw, 'Military Architecture',
p.204; Rey, Etude, pp.239-48.
85 Etienne de Lusignan, Descri ption, folio 36; Megaw,
'Military Architecture', p.204.
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their loyalty
86place.
to the emperor was suspect in the first
St.Hilarion is next mentioned by the historical sources in
1228, when, as we have seen, John of Ibelin fled to the
castle and had it well stocked with supplies in
expectation of an imminent attack by Frederick II.
However, the emperor's conciliatory stance during this
crisis, which persuaded John to abandon St.Hilarion, may
imply that Frederick was reluctant to commit himself to a
lengthy siege of such a powerful castle. 87
 The kind of
siege which Frederick II had feared actually occured in
1229, although this time his supporters were inside, not
outside, St.Hilarion, following their defeat near Nicosia.
Three of Frederick's five baillis (Aimery Barlais, Amaury
de Bethsan and Hugh de Gibelet) retreated to the castle,
where they subsequently held out for about ten months.
During most of that time John of Ibelin personally took
charge of the siege, launched several unsuccessful attacks
against the castle gates, and suffered heavy casualties in
the process. But despite these setbacks, the Ibelins were
still able to prevent any supplies from reaching the
besieged garrison, whose lack of food got so bad that in
the spring of 1229 they even had to eat a donkey for their
Easter feast! Later this problem was temporarily solved by
a surprise raid on the Ibelins' camp and food supplies,
although this attack also had the effect of strengthening
the Ibelins' resolve to capture the castle and to improve
their blockade around it, eventually causing the garrison
86 Itinerarium, p.202; Ambroise, L'estoire de la
uerre sainte, pp.54-55; Vinsauf, 'Itinerary of Richard
I', p.14, and see above, pp.16-18.
87 Gestes, pp.682-83; Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.l3l-32;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.68-'7O; Philip of Novara, The
Wars of Frederick II, pp.82-85.
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to surrender.88
Two years later, when the Lombards had managed to regain
control over Cyprus, St.Hilarion was again besieged,
although this time it provided shelter for a small number
of Ibelin supporters, including king Henry's sisters. But
luckily for the garrison, which was short of troops and
provisions, the castle was relieved relatively quickly
this time, following the Lombard defeat at Agridi on the
fifteenth of June, 1232.89
The final siege of 1232 also turned out to be the last
attack on St.Hilarion before it was demolished by the
Venetians early in the sixteenth century. During the
Genoese invasion, the fortress was held by Peter II's
uncle, John of Antioch. John's garrison, composed
primarily of Bulgarian mercenaries, probably shared the
responsibility of guarding the pass of St.Hilarion with
other Bulgarian troops from Kyrenia. This is implied by
the fact that when the Genoese eventually broke through
the pass in January 1374, many of the defeated Bulgarians
retreated back to St.Hilarion. 9 The fact that the
previous autumn ,James of Lusignan had provided supplies
for both Kyrenia and St.Hilarion also suggests that these
two fortresses were putting up a co- ordinated defence
against the Genoese.2
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.102-
10; Gestes, pp.684-94; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.143-46;
Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.78-79.
89 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.91; Philip of ovara,
The Wars of Frederick II, p.142.
Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 36.
91	 Leontios	 Makhairas,	 Recital,	 c.469,	 p.453;
Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.193.
92 Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.184. See also Leontios
Makhairas, Recital, c.447, p.431.
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However, the Genoese never actually made a direct assault
on St.Hilarion, and like Frederick II before them, they
were probably reluctant to do so because of the castle's
strength and inaccessible location. Indeed, the last
mention of St.Hilarion during this period records a rather
curious incident. In the spring of 1374, John of Antioch
became convinced that his Bulgarian mercenaries were
plotting to kill him, because they had been instructed to
do so by queen Eleanor, Peter I's widow, who suspected
that John had been responsible for her husband's murder.
As a result, John had the Bulgarians thrown frotu tbe
highest point of the castle, and only one of them is said
to have survived this vicious punishment. This macabre
incident may well be fictitious, but it does at least
illustrate the sheer height and inaccessibility of
St. Hilarion !
St.Hilarion differed from Kyrenia in that it underwent
relatively few alterations during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, and its defences were merely
repaired from time to time. This suggests that the
Byzantine castle was still in good shape in 1191, and that
the fortifications erected by the Greeks were more than
adequate for the Franks, even after the events of 1291 and
1373-4. But in terms of function Kyrenia and St.Hilarion
were almost the same, because both these strongholds were
intended to stop invaders as well as mere raiders. Indeed,
St.Hilarion's isolated location, high up on a mountain
summit and far from any centres of population, clearly
illustrates that this fortress had little to do with the
defence of its immediate locality, in the way that the
castles of Paphos and Limassol did.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.552, pp.54'?-49;
Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.4'7'7-'78; Strambaldi, Chronigue,
pp.232-33; Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, p..338, and see
above, pp.20-22.
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Much the same can be said about the castles of Kantara and
Buffavento. Buffavento is situated to the east of
St.Hilarion, on the other side of the mountain pass
linking Kyrenia and Nicosia, and its defensive strength
again lay in its location on a mountain top. Indeed, some
of this mountain's slopes were so steep that it did not
even have complete curtain walls around its summit. The
castle consisted of a lower and an upper bailey, which
were originally linked by a narrow staircase later
destroyed by the Venetians when they dismantled Buffavento
in the sixteenth century. The lower bailey was composed of
a series of buildings constructed on a long, narrow
plateau overlooking the interior of the island to the
south. These structures were probably originally used as
store rooms and living quarters for the castle's garrison.
They were dominated by the walls of the upper bailey,
located roughly 25 metres higher up on the mountain summit
itself. The buildings of the upper bailey, like those at
St.Hilarion, provided a final refuge for the castle
garrison in case of trouble, although in peace time they
probably served as royal apartments. To the west of these
buildings a tower also stood on a remote outcrop, which
was separated from the rest of the site by a deep cleft in
the rock, and could only be reached via a wooden
drawbridge. This tower must have acted as a keep, and
would have been a good spot from which to observe the
surrounding countryside. 94 Despite later repairs during
the crusader period, all these structures were probably
Byzantine
Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 36; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, pp.23-24; Enlart, L'art gothigue, II,
600-5; Megaw, 'Military Architecture', pp.205-6; Rey,
Etude, p.249.
Rey, Etude, p.250.
Fig.9. The castle of Buffavento, showing the inaccessibility of
the site. From Rey, Etude, plate 24.
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The history of Buffavento is also similar to that of
St.Hilarion. In 1191 it was surrendered to Richard I, and
during the spring of 1232 it was besieged by Lombard
troops until the battle of Agridi. During this siege it
was commanded by Eschive de 1ontbé1iard, wife of John of
Ibelin's son Balian, who had fled to the castle from
Nicosia disguised as a minor brother of the Hospitaller
Order. 96 Like St.Hilarion, Buffavento also escaped the
worst of the fighting during the Genoese invasion.
However, as soon as a truce had been established in the
spring of 1374, its castellan immediately asked the king
for assistance, suggesting that although Buffavento had
not been attacked directly, its defenders ha stiH been
afraid to leave their stronghold and were consequently
running short of food.97
Kantara, the third of the great mountain fortresses, lies
considerably to the east of St.Hilarion and Buffavento. It
is also located on a less inaccessible site, and
consequently relied more on man made defences than either
of its neighbours. The castle was composed of a large,
irregularly shaped bailey, whose curtain wall followed the
edge of the summit. Some fortifications overlooked the
steep cliffs to the north and west, but the main defences
were located to the south and south-east, where it was
relatively easy to approach the castle. The main entrance
was also situated on this side, and consisted of two
successive gateways, each flanked by a pair of horse shoe
towers. Numerous buildings constructed against the inner
1191: Itinerarium, p.202; Richard of Devizes,
Cronicon, p.38. Vinsauf; 'Itinerary of Richard I', p.14;
Ambroise, L'estoire de la guerre sainte, col.54-55. 1232:
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.142; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, p.91; Chroni g ue d'Amadi, pp.162-63;
Gestes, p.710.
Strambaldi, Chronigue, p.217; Leontios Makhairas,
Recital, c.521, p.511.
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face of the castle's curtain wall, as well as the two
towers of the inner gateway, were all provided with arrow
slits, so that the entire south side of the castle could
be protected by flanking fire. Inside Kantara's ramparts
there also stood a small, rectangular tower equipped with
its own arrowslits and drawbridge. This building can be
compared with the towers already mentined at St.Hilarion
and Buffavento, both of which acted as lookout posts and
refuge sites.98
Although Kantara was not as inaccessible as St.Hilarion or
Buffavento, it too could hold out for months if necessary.
This was not the case in 1191, when Isaac Comnenus
surrendered the castle to Richard I as soon as St.Hilarion
and Buffavento had given up. 99
 But between 1229 and 1230
the castle held out for about ten months against a force
commanded by the pro-Ibelin knight, Anceau de Brie. During
this siege, Anceau de Brie constructed a large trebuchet,
which was used to bombard the Lombard garrison and
presumably stood on the more accessible south side of the
castle. According to Philip of Novara, however, it
'battered down nearly all the walls, but the rock was so
strong that it could not be scaled' . This clearly
indicates that even on its supposedly weak side, Kantara's
combined natural and man made defences made it virtually
impregnable. Consequently, starvation and the realization
that Frederick II would not send any reinforcements,
rather than Ibelin bombardment, finally caused Kantara to
surrender in the spring of 1230.
	 Three years later, the
98 Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 35; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, p.23; Enlart, L'art othiqj, II, 650-
54; Megaw, 'Military Architecture', p.205.
Itinerarium, p.262; Richard of Devizes, Cronicon,
p.38; Roger of Howden, Chronica, III, 111.
100 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, p.79; Gestes, pp.690-95;
Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.143-45; Philip of Novara, The Wars
of Frederick II, pp.l03-5, 107-10.
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Lombard garrison at Kantara surrendered to Henry ii
without a fight, and the castle witnessed no further
warfare during the rest of the crusader period..101
Like the other mountain strongholds, Kantara played a
relatively small role during the Genoese attempt to
conquer Cyprus. John of Antioch sheltered here briefly in
1373, after he had managed to escape from Famagusta, where
Peter II and several nobles were already being held
captive by the Genoese. As we have seen, John subsequently
moved to St.Hilarion, but Kantara still remained under
Cypriot control throughout the Genoese campaign.102
Moreover, during the ensuing decades, Kantara's eastern
location gave it great strategic importance, because its
garrison could observe the Genoese at Famagusta, and would
have early warning of any hostile forces moving inland
across the coastal plain towards Nicosia. As a result,
James I repaired and strengthened Kantara's walls during
the 1380s and 90s, so that the present remains of the
castle contain far more fourteenth century structures than
either Buffavento or St.Hilarion. Etienne of Lusignan
Proudly observed that these improvements ensured that the
Genoese never captured Kantara, perhaps implying that they
at least considered attacking the fortress between 1373
and 1464.
It has already been mentioned that James I was also
responsible for other repairs and alterations at Limassol,
Paphos and Nicosia. In addition, he constructed the castle
101 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.148;
Chronigue d'Amadi, p.166; Gestes, p.713; Florlo Bustron,
Chronigue, p.93.
Florio Bustron, Chroni g ue, pp.310-il; Chroniqi
d'Amadi, p.453; Strambaldi, Chroni gue, p.l71; Leontios
Makhairas, Recital, c.419, pp.399-4Ol, c.425, p.4O5.
103 Etierine de Lusignan, Description, folio 35; Enlart,
L'art g othi g ue, II, 649.
212
of Sigouri, on the coastal plain near Famagusta. Sigouri
was a classic example of a castrum, and consisted of an
almost square enclosure defended by a curtain wall and
four small corner towers. A deep, water filled moat
surrounded the whole structure, which could only be
reached via a drawbridge. 104 Further west, he also rebuilt
La Cava, a royal residence close to Nicosia, which
overlooked the main route to Larnaca, and thence to
Famagusta. All that remains of La Cava are the ruins of
two massive towers linked by a curtain wall; an
arrangement which is strongly reminiscent of the
thirteenth century sea castle at Sidon. 105 Clearly, the
principal function of both this stronghold and Sigouri was
to contain the Genoese at Famagusta, and deter them from
making a new attempt to conquer all of Cyprus. Moreover,
even if the Genoese did make an attack inland, Sigouri in
particular could shelter people living nearby, thereby
saving lives and protecting the local economy.
Offensively, these castles also provided good bases from
which to attack Famagusta, in the same way that Latin
troops blocked the citadel of Corinth off with temporary
forts during the Frankish conquest of Greece.' 06 Between
them, Kantara, Sigouri, La Cava and Nicosia therefore
formed a defensive barrier which protected the interior
and minimized the threat posed by Famagusta. Limassol and
Paphos, as well as Kyrenia to the north, to some extent
acted as a continuation of this barrier around the coast,
and by improving their defences James I ensured that these
places were also protected against future Genoese
104 Etienne de Lusignan, Descri ption, folio 35;
Chroni gue d'Amadi, p.495; Florio Bustron, Chroniqjj,
pp.24, 352.
105 Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, p.352; Etienne de
Lusignan, Description, folio 36; Chroni g ue d'Amadi, p.495;
Megaw, 'Military Architecture', p.204. For Sidon's sea
castle, see above, p.50.
106 Corinth: see below, p.354.
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incursions.
Having described the principal strongpoints on Cyprus
individually, it is now possible to make a few overall
conclusions about their design and function. As we have
seen, almost all castles on Cyprus either date from the
Byzantine era, the beginnings of the Lusignan dynasty, the
two decades following the fall of Acre, or the period of
growing Genoese hostility during the fourteenth century.
Architecturally, these four distinct phases are reflected
in the changing appearance of Cypriot fortifications.
Hence the remote Byzantine castles of St.Hilarion,
Buffavento and Kantara can be compared with similar
structures inherited by the Franks and Armenians in Greece
and Cilicia, including Arcadia and Servantikar.' 07 The
isolated towers subsequently constructed at Limassol,
Famagusta, Nicosia and (perhaps) Paphos are also very
similar to those built around the Aegean after the Fourth
Crusade, which provided shelter for the outnumbered Latin
conquerors of the Byzantine empire. 108 Finally, the
extensive new defences erected after 1291, particularly at
Famagusta, Kyrenia and Nicosia, are more comparable with
the far larger castles and city walls built in the Holy
Land before the fall of Acre.'° 9 However, the relatively
simple design of Sigouri, which was virtually identical to
some twelfth century crusader strongholds even though it
was completed after 1374, again confirms that Frankish
military architecture rarely rejected older designs as
soon as new innovations had been discovered. Sigouri also
dosproves Marshall's statement that 'the castrum form of
107 Arcadia: see below, pp304-5. Servantikar: see
below, pp.234-36.
108 See below, pp.319-22.
109 See above, pp.62-64.
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the castle was exclusive to the twelfth century.'1°
Militarily, the defensive functions of Cypriot
fortifications also changed relatively little between the
twelfth and fourteenth centuries, particularly with regard
to internal security. The need to keep the Greek
population in check, for example, does not appear to have
declined after the initial rebellion of 1192. In 1359, the
papal legate Peter Thomas attempted to convert Orthodox
Greeks at Nicosia to catholicism, but the meeting ended in
a riot, with many locals shouting 'death to the legate!
In the end, Peter Thomas's life was only saved by the
swift intervention of John of Antioch and his troops. 111
 At
about the same time the Venetians also warned Peter I that
Greeks rebelling on Crete could try to contact their co-
religionists and supporters on Cyprus.' 12
 Although it
falls outside the time limits of this chapter, reference
should also be made to a popular uprising which occured in
the wake of the Egyptian invasion of Cyprus in 1426. Once
the Egyptians had gone back to the mainland, taking king
Janus with them and leaving Cyprus in a state of anarchy,
'many of the poor folk in their dwellings rose in
rebellion and pillaged the Christians, and also killed
many of them...and at Lefkosia (Nicosia) they set up king
Alexis, and all the peasants submitted to his rule'.113
" Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.100, and see
above, pp.70-7l.
Philip of Mézières, The Life of St.Peter Thomas,
pp.92-93. See also Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.409-lO;
Strambaldi, Chroni gue, p.39; Florio Bustron, Chroniciue,
p.258; Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.101, pp.89-91. For
more details on the underlying tensions between the Greek
and Latin Churches, see J. Gill, 'The Tribulation of the
Greek Church in Cyprus, 1196-c.1280', BZ, V (1977), 73-93.
Mas Latrie, Histoire, III, 742.
113 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.696-97, pp.673-75
(quote: c.696, p.673). See also Florio Bustron, Chronigue,
p.369; Strambaldi, Chronigue, pp.284-85; Chronigue
d'Amadi, p.513.
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These events bear a remarkable resemblance to an incident
which occured a few months before the Nicosian uprising
against the Templars, when one of Isaac Comnenus's
relatives had been declared emperor by a Greek mob, and
had eventually been hanged by Richard I's representatives
on Cyprus. 114 They also show that the Franks still needed
castles to suppress the Greeks and protect themselves
against them, even 230 years after Richard I's invasion.
The role of castles during the various disputes between
fellow westerners also changed remarkably little. Both
Richard I and the Templars had relied on Cyprus's castles
to maintain control over the Greeks in the 1190s. In 1228
Frederick II used the same method to suppress the Ibelins.
As we have seen, before leaving the east in 1229 he also
made sure that all the strongholds on Cyprus were
garrisoned by his own troops and supporters, and were well
provided with supplies. 5 In 1306, Amaury of Tyre also
'sent castellans and bailies to all the towns and castles
of the kingdom of Cyprus' to prevent any of them falling
into the hands of Henry II's fo]1owers.
The subsequent downfall of Amaury's supporters further
illustrates how important it was for anyone wishing to
control Cyprus to hold its fortresses. Almost as soon as
Amaury had been murdered in 1310, the people of Paphos and
Limassol declared their support for Henry II. This may not
have been a disastrous blow for Amaury's camp, because
neither of these places was particularly well fortified.
114 Gesta Regis, pp.l72-'73; Roger of 1-Jowden, Chronica,
III, 116.
115 Eracles, II, 369, 376; Philip of Novara, The Wars
of Frederick II, pp.85, 88-94; Chroni g ue d'Amadi, pp.131-
34; Florio Bustron, Chroni g ue, pp.68-73.
J6 Chroni gue d'Amadi, p.25O. See also Leontios
Makharias, Recital, c.54, p.53; Florio Bustron, Chronigue,
p.139.
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However, at about the same time the garrisons of both
Kyrenia and Famagusta came out in favour of the king. At
Famagusta the recently constructed town walls were manned
by royalists, and all the city gates were walled up. As we
have seen, the Franks had recently also constructed
massive new defences at Kyrenia, and so Amaury's
supporters suddenly found themselves isolated at Nicosia,
with little chance of retaking either of these extremely
well defended strongholds. Consequently Henry II and many
of his followers, who had been exiled to Armenia by
Amaury, were able to return to Famagusta unhindered, and
the usurpers were forced to surrender soon afterwards.117
Similar circumstances brought about the downfall of
Frederick II's supporters almost a century earlier. The
Lombards had initially lost control over Cyprus in the
spring of 1230, not so much because they were defeated in
battle, but because they were forced to surrender both
Kantara and St.Hilarion to the Ibelins after lengthy
sieges. 118 Two years later, they were able to regain a
toe-hold on Cyprus by occupying Kyrenia and Kantara, but
the Lombards' position remained weak as long as they could
not secure Buffavento and St.Hilarion. To make matters
worse, by the time the Ibelins landed at Famagusta in the
spring of 1232, many Lombard troops were tied down at the
siege of St.Hilarion. Consequently, the Lombards were
already under strength when they faced the Ibelins at the
battle of Agridi. In the wake of the battle, the
imperialists had no choice but to retreat to Kyrenia,
leaving their garrison at Kantara completely cut off and
unable to do anything but surrender. Once it became
apparent that the bombards at Kyrenia were not going to
11? Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.199-201, 207;
Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.335-36, 343-44. Famagusta: see
above, p.l'79. Kyrenia: see above, pp.198-99.
118 See above, pp.205-6, 210.
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receive any more help from Frederick II, they were forced
to do the same.'19
Hence the Lombards' defeat resulted from their inability
to hold on to all the most powerful strongholds on Cyprus.
Had they defended the mountain castles successfully in
1230, or been able to reoccupy St.Hilarion and Buffavento
in 1232, their troops would not have been so
overstretched, nor would they have had to. fight the
Ibelins on several fronts. Moreover, the Ibelins
themselves would have been confronted with the daunting
task of dislodging the Lombards from several strongholds,
and not just Kyrenia. It should also be remembered that
their recapture of Kyrenia in 1233 was particularly
important to the Ibelins, because of its coastal location.
Unlike the mountain castles, Kyrenia could be reinforced
by sea, and could therefore act as a potential bridgehead
for anyone wishing to invade Cyprus. Hence it was
particularly important that this fortress remained in
royal hands.
This last point can also be illustrated by looking at the
events of 1373 and 1374. Once the Genoese had established
themselves at Famagusta, they occupied Nicosia relatively
easily. But Nicosia had very little strategic value,
because it was poorly defended and lay in a valley
surrounded by higher ground. Moreover, the Genoese knew
that 'if they did not have the castle of Kyrenia, they
would not be able to hold Nicosia, or the rest of the
island', and so they concentrated all their efforts on
trying to take this fortress during the spring of 1374.120
Had the Genoese captured Kyrenia, they would have had a
119 See above, pp.19-20, 200, 210.
120 Chroni gue d'Amadi, p.454. See also Florio Bustron,
Chroni gue, p.312; Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.425,
p.405.
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perfect new coastal base, which could be supplied by sea
and could be used to make further conquests inland. In
short, Kyrenia would have become a second Famagusta,
which, as we have seen, was so well defended that the
Cypriots spent almost a century trying to get it back. (It
is also interesting to note that by preventing the Genoese
from taking Kyrenia, James and John of Lusignan, who acted
as castellans of Kyrenia and St.Hilarion respectively,
thwarted the ambitions of their great rival Eleanor of
Aragon. Thus the events of 1373-74 provide us with further
evidence of the ways in which these castles could prevent
internal conflicts as well as external invasions.121)
Kyrenia's location in relation to the three mountain
castles also gave it great strategic importance. Kyrenia,
St.Hilarion, Buffavento and Kantara were all intervisible,
whilst Kantara could communicate with Famagusta, and
St.Hilarion with Nicosia. Buffavento lay at the heart of
this network, and here 'they kept a look out every night,
and as soon as they spotted ships at sea, they would
signal with fire or torches to the town of Nicosia and the
castle of Kyrenia'. 122 After 1291, this system could warn
the inhabitants of Cyprus against an approaching Muslim
fleet. From 1373 onwards, it was also used to keep an eye
on the Genoese at Famagusta. It could equally well be used
to warn people in the countryside and along the coast
about imminent pirate attacks. As we have seen, the
intervisibility between Kyrenia and St.Hilarion also
enabled their garrisons to organize a co-ordinated defence
against the Genoese in 1374.123
The three mountain castles, Kyrenia, and, once it had been
121 See above, pp.20-22.
122 Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 35.
123 See above, p.2O6.
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fortified, Famagusta, were therefore the most important
strongholds in Cyprus. Although they could not prevent
rebels or invaders from holding the countryside, these
places enabled the Lusignan kings to survive the conflicts
of 1228-33 and 1306-10, as well as the Genoese invasion of
1373-74. Consequently, they formed the corner stone of
Lusignan power, and it is hardly surprising that
successive rulers of Cyprus were so keen to keep them
under royal control. These strongholds must also have
acted as a further deterrent against any uprisings by the
Greeks, although the isolated location of the mountain
casLles in particular shows that they had far more to do
with national than local defence.
As has been mentioned, the final defensive role of castles
on Cyprus was to protect the island's inhabitants against
pirates and other seaborne raiders. Many references have
already been made to attacks of this kind, but one last
example can be given to illustrate the ways in which
coastal fortifications contributed to the overall security
of the island: in 1368, two pirate galleys from Morocco
were spotted approaching Famagusta. The garrison of the
chain tower was therefore informed, and the chain raised
across the harbour to stop the galleys from gaining
access. The garrison then told the admiral, who prepared
two ships for a counter-attack. These measures were
observed by the pirates, who quickly lost courage and
withdrew. 124
Offensively, it should also be noted that Cypriot
fortifications contributed toward the war against the
Muslims. Before Fainagusta became the most important
harbour on Cyprus, Limassol twice served as a temporary
base for western crusaders. In 1228 Frederick II landed
124 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.221, p.203.
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here, and probably resided in the castle for a while
before sailing to Acre.' 25 Two decades later Louis IX also
stayed at Limassol during the winter of 1248-49, and used
the town as a supply depot for his invasion of Egypt.
Indeed, Joinville was greatly impressed by the vast
storerooms, granaries and wine cellars which the king
relied on to feed his troops and their horses. 126 As we
have seen, Limassol also acted as a stopping off point for
merchants bringing supplies to Franks in Egypt during the
Fifth Crusade, and the Muslims tried to halt this process
by sacking the town. It may be that Baybars's failed
attack on Limassol in 1271 represented a similar attempt
to prevent troops and provisions from reaching the Lord
Edward's crusade at Acre. These incidents suggest that the
coastal strongholds built at Limassol, Famagusta and
Paphos during the late twelfth and early thirteenth
centuries were also designed to act as safe bases for
crusaders on their way to the Holy Land or Egypt.'27
However, from 1291 onwards Cyprus became the final
destination, rather than a mere stopping off point, for
crusaders from the west. At this time Famagusta also
rapidly superseded Limassol as the largest naval and
trading centre on Cyprus, and it therefore became the
starting point for numerous seaborne raids against the
mainland during the fourteenth century. 128 In 1300, for
example, the Hospitallers, Templars and Cypriots set off
from Famagusta on an expedition against Alexandria. They
subsequently sailed northwards along the Syrian coastline
125 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.73;
Florio Bustron, Chroni- g ue, pp.63-64; Gestes, p.676.
126 Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp.72-74.
127 See above, p.175.
128 For more details on the rise of Famagusta and the
decline of Limassol, see Jacoby, 'The rise of a new
emporium in the eastern Mediterranean', pp.147-54.
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until they reached Maraclea, which they sacked before
heading back to Cyprus. Until 1302 the Templars also
garrisoned a small castle on the island of Rouad, just
opposite Tortosa, and this stronghold must have relied on
Cyprus almost entirely for its food supply. In 1300 troops
from Cyprus and the Military Orders landed here and even
went ashore at Tortosa for a while, in a failed attempt to
meet up with Mongol forces attacking Syria from the
east. 129
Reference has also been made to the period of renewed
aggression against the Muslims during the reign of Peter
I (1359-69). Peter launched several naval offensives
against the mainland, the most famous being his attack on
Alexandria in 1365. This expedition succeeded in capturing
the city, but the crusaders were too outnumbered to hold
Alexandria and had to retreat with their booty relatively
quickly. Indeed, one source even noted that for every ten
Christians there were 100 Muslims defending the place.30
These figures, as well as European apathy towards new
crusades and the reluctance of the Italians to break off
their lucrative trade with the east, explain why Cyprus
never became the focus of any major new campaigns after
1291 . 1
 Nevertheless, undeterred Peter I continued with
129 For more details on this and other attempts to link
up with the Mongols and Armenians after 1291, see Gestes,
pp.848-50, 852-53; Florio Bustron, Chroni g ue, pp.129-33;
Chroni g ue d'Amadi,	 pp.234-38;	 Marino Sanudo,	 Liber
secretorum,	 p.242;	 A.	 Luttrell,	 'The	 Flospitallers'
Interventions in Cilician	 rmenia: 1291-1375', in
Cilician Kin g dom of Armenia, ed. T.S.R. Boase, (Edinburgh
1978), pp.118-44, at pp.118-24.
130 William of Machaut, La Prise, pp.68-69. See also
Philip of Mézières, The Life of St.Peter Thomas, pp.125
35; Florio Bustron,	 Chroni g ue,	 pp.262-63;	 Chroniq
d'Amadi,	 pp.413-15;	 Strambaldi,	 Chronigue,	 pp.63-69;
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.159-73, pp.143-55.
European apathy: William of Machaut, La Prise,
pp.58-59; Edbury, The Kingdom of Cyprus, pp.168, 177-79.
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his crusading activities against the Muslims, which had
begun in 1360 with the Cypriot occupation of Corycos,
situated along the coast of Cilician Armenia.' 32 In 1361
Peter also captured neighbouring Satalia (Adalia), and he
subsequently carried out several naval attacks against
adjoining Turkish settlements such as Anamur, forcing
local rulers to pay him tribute. 133 These aggressive
strategies would not have been possible if Cyprus itself,
and in particular Famagusta, had not been so well defended
against potential Muslim counter-attacks.
However, whilst Peter I probably saw himself as a
crusading hero in the mould of Louis IX or Baldwin of
Flanders, most fourteenth century rulers of Cyprus were
happy to be at peace with the Muslims, rather than
provoking them into invading the island. As a result,
castles on Cyprus were always more important in terms of
defence than attack. In addition, the Lusignan kings'
tight grip on all major Cypriot strongholds meant that the
monarchy had far more to do with national security than in
other crusader states. This situation contrasted
dramatically with Frankish territories on the mainland,
where the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights were
increasingly relied on to protect Latin states during the
thirteenth century.
In Syria, the Military Orders' defensive strategy was
132 William of Machaut, La Prise, p.20; Florio Bustron,
p.259;	 Strainbaldi,	 Chronigue,	 pp.42-44;
pp.410-41; Leontios Makhairas, Recital,
c.112-14' pp.99-101, and see below, p.288.
133 William of Machaut, La Prise, pp.'20, 121-22; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, pp.259-60, 263; Leontios Makhairas,
Recii, c.116-28, pp.lO3-13, c.132-33, pp.117-19, c.143,
p.125, C.150, pp.l31-33 Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.411, 415;
Strambal di , Chronigue, pp.46-47, 71; Philip of Mézières,
The Life of St.Peter Thomas, pp.96-97. On the payment of
tribute to Peter, see ibid, p.l27; Leontios Makhairas,
Recital, c.124, p.109.
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based around the construction of massive castles such as
Saphet, Crac des Chevaliers and Montfort, but the nature
of warfare on Cyprus meant that similar fortifications
were not necessary there. 134 Moreover, the Lusignan kings
probably actively discouraged such castles, because they
would only have undermined royal authority on the island
by weakening the strategic value of Kyrenia and the
mountain fortresses. This fear is most apparent during the
reign of Henry II. After the loss of Acre, the king at
times seems to have been almost as scared of the Templars
and Hospitallers as the Mamluks, and did his best to tax
both Orders and prevent them from gaining more estates on
Cyprus. The tension which this policy must have caused was
not eased until 1307-8, when the Templars were dissolved
and the Hospitallers began to concentrate their efforts on
the conquest of Rhodes.'35
The Teutonic Knights, however, never appear to have had
many properties on Cyprus beyond a couple of houses at
Nicosia, and a few estates in the vicinity of Limassol.
These had been granted to the Order either during the
reign of king Aimery (1196-1205), or during the late
1220s, when German influence in Cyprus was at its
greatest. Although the Teutonic Knights held on to these
properties even after the defeat of the Lombards in 1233,
their strong imperialist links, as well as their later
involvement in the Baltic, meant that they never had much
134 See above, pp.84-86.
135 Henry II's attempts to stop the Orders from gaining
new estates even led to protests from the pope. See
Boniface VIII, Reistres, ed. G. Digard et al, (4 vols.,
Paris 1884-1939), II, nos.3060, 3061, 3062, p.411. See
also Hill, Histor y of Cyprus, II, 198-99; Mas Latrie,
Histoiri., I, 189. For more details on the dissolution of
the Templars in Cyprus, see Chroni gue d'Amadi, pp.280-91;
Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.163-71. For more details on
the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes, see Luttrell, 'The
Hospitallers at Rhodes', pp.283-86.
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influence in Cyprus, even after 1291. Moreover, there
seems to be no evidence in the contemporary sources to
confirm Professor Richard's claim that the Order held a
castle at St.George (near Limassol), and it is unlikely
that it possessed any fortifications on the island at
all 136
Consequently, the military and political climate on
thirteenth century Cyprus meant that the Orders played a
relatively insignificant role there, and it was only the
Templars and Hospitallers who constructed a few small
strongholds intended purely for local defence and
administration. The Templars' occupation of Cyprus between
1191 and 1192 was probably too brief for them to have
completed any new fortifications on the island, although
Guy of Lusignan was later buried in a church established
by them at Nicosia. 137 In 1198, however, both the Templars
and the Hospitallers were asked by Innocent III to help
defend Cyprus against any possible attacks, and in 1210
the principal Templar castle at Gastria was already
mentioned by one of the sources, suggesting that the Order
was quick to re-establish itself on the island during the
11 90s 138
136 For a detailed discussion of the Teutonic Knights'
properties in Cyprus, see W. Hubatsch, 'Der Deutsche Orden
und die Reichslehnschaft über Cypern' , Nachrichten der
Akademie der Wissenschaft im Gdttingen. Philologisch-
Historische Kiasse, (1955), 245-306. The main grants to
the Order were made in 1197 and 1229. See Tabulae ordinis
Theutonici, no.34, pp.27-28, no.71, p.56. For Richard's
claim that the Order held a castle on Cyprus, see Chypre
sous les Lusinans: documents chypriotes des archives du
Vatican (XIVe et XVe siècles), (Paris 1962), p.120.
137 Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 123.
1198: Innocent III, Die Register Innocenz III, ed.
0. Hagender and A. Haidacher, (2 vols. so far,
Graz\Cologne 1964-), I, no.438, pp.661-62. 1210: Eracles,
II, 315-16.
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However, one sixteenth century source claims that Gastria
was built by the Egyptian invasion force of 1426, and this
statement reflects the general confusion about Templar
estates and fortifications on Cyprus between 1191 and
1307 . 1 3 9
 This was perhaps to some extent caused by the
confiscation and destruction of Templar property by Hugh
III in 1279, because of the Order's support for Charles of
Anjou, Hugh's rival for the throne of Jerusalem.14°
However, it was mainly due to the Templars' dissolution in
1307, when almost all of their properties were granted to
the Hospitallers. Consequently, archaeological remains of
original Templar fortifications are very rare on Cyprus,
whilst the records of which Order held which estates prior
to 1307 had already become blurred by the sixteenth
century. Hence, Florjo Bustron's list of Templar estates
gained by the Hospitallers contains numerous properties
that probably already belonged to them before 1307.141
Tevertheless, enough archaeological and historical
evidence does exist to draw some conclusions about the
functions of Templar fortifications on Cyprus. The site of
the castle of Gastria, for example, still shows some
traces of a medieval castle. It was situated on a small
promontory at the northern end of the Bay of Famagusta, so
that to the east it was protected by the sea. On the
landward side it was defended by a rock cut ditch c.8
metres wide, originally crossed by a wooden bridge or
drawbridge, while to the north a small inlet probably
139 Etienne de Lusignan, Descri ption, folio 36.
140 Hugh III held these properties until 1282. See
Annaide Terre Sainte, p.457 (text A); Gestes, p.784;
çjue d'Amadi, p.214; Florio Bustron, Chronigue,
p.116. For more details on this dispute, see Edbury, The
Kingdom of Cyprus, pp.93-96; Hill, Histor y of Cyprus, II,
170-74, and see above, pp.143-44.
141 Florio Bustron, Chroni gue, pp.246-47; Etienne de
Lusignan, descri ption, folio 36.
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served as a harbour for the castle.'42
These meagre remains are enough to conclude that Gastria
was a surprisingly small castle, considering that it was
the main Templar stronghold on Cyprus, and that it could
only have been suitable for local defence. But the closest
it ever got to being involved in any warfare was in 1232
following the battle of Agridi, when a small number of
Lombard troops fled to the castle and tried to gain entry
to it. But the Templars, whose Temple at Acre had been
besieged by Frederick II three years previously, did not
let them in, and they were left sheltering in the castle
ditch, where they were soon rounded up by the Ibelins and
brought to Nicosia to join the other Lombard prisoners.143
The Templars also seem to have had minor fortifications at
Khirokitia and Yermasoia, two of their estates near
Limassol. At Khirokitia, below the fifteenth century ruins
of a Hospitaller building, the remains of what appears to
have been an older tower were still visible in Enlart's
day, and this may have been the Templar tower which the
Marshal of the Order was imprisoned in, in 1307. There are
no such remains at nearby Yermasoia, although Florio
Bustron describes how the Templar Commander was also
imprisoned here in 1307, presumably in another small tower
or fortified building. 144 Descriptions of 3-lugh III's
destruction and confiscation of Templar property in 1279
also suggest that the Order had towers or houses at Paphos
and Limassol. These must have acted as administrative
centres and safe places to store the Order's financial
142 Enlart, L'art gothigue, Il, 656.
143 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.91,
155; chronigue d'Amadi, p.173; Gestes, pp.718-19; Florio
Bustron, Chronigue, p.98. For Frederick II's attack on the
Temple at Acre, see above, p.143.
144 Florio Bustron, Chroni g ue, pp.161-71; Enlart, L'art
gothjcni, II, 671-73.
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assets, in the same way that they did in Acre and
elsewhere on the mainland. Moreover, it was probably a
similar Templar building which the Lombards occupied in
Nicosia in the spring of 1232.145 A document dating from
1264 records that the Order subsequently sold this place
to two secular knights for 2,000 bezants blanc.'46
In 1307 the Hospitallers were granted many of these
Templar properties, particularly their rural estates.
These included the castl.e of Gastria, as as XasLa
and Khirokitia, where a fifteenth century Hospitaller
tower replaced the earlier Templar one.47 The
Hospitallers also had their own towers at Limassol and
Nicosia, which played a small role in the war between the
Lombards and Ibelins. In 1228 Frederick II had John of
Ibelin's Sons imprisoned in the Hospitallers' tower at
Limassol, because it 'was strong and nearer his ships',
implying that it may have been larger and more reliable as
a prison than the royal castle itself. 48
 The following
year Philip of Novara described how he managed to avoid
being captured by the five baillis and slipped away to the
Hospital at Nicosia along with 150 troops, and numerous
women and children of the Ibe].in faction. However, this
building cannot have been very strong, because Philip
hastily had to equip it with a cistern and a wooden
145 Florio Bustron, Chroni g ue, p.116; Gestes, p.784;
Chronigue d'Amadi, p.214; Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick IT, p.143; Annales de Terre Sainte, p.457 (text
A).
146 'A Register of the cartulary of the vathedral of
Santa Sophia of Nicosia', ed. J. L. LaMonte, Byzantion, V,
(1930), 439-522, no.99, 476-77.
147 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.170-71. The fifteenth
century tower at Khirokitia is referred to by Etienne de
Lusignan, Description, folio 35. See also Hill, Histor y of
Cyprus, II, 23; Enlart, L'art othi gue, II, 671-73.
148 Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, p.82.
See also Gestes, p.680.
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pallisade, and make sure it was well stocked with biscuits
and other food which would be suitable for a long siege.
In the end this did not happen, however, because John of
Ibelin arrived from Syria soon after and defeated the
Lombards, at which point Philip was able to make a sortie
from the Hospital and help drive the enemy out of Nicosia.
These events imply that although the tower at Limassol may
have been strong enough to provide shelter against local
uprisings or small raids, the Hospital at Nicosia can have
been little more than a large, residential building, which
Philip of Novara was presumably forced to shelter in
because the city's royal castle was still in Lombard
hands 149
However, the principal Hospitaller castle on Cyprus was
located at Kolossi, to the west of Limassol. This estate
had been granted to the Hospitallers by Hugh I in 1210,
and subsequently became the Order's Grand Commandery and
headquarters on Cyprus, but the impressive tower which
stands there now was constructed in the mid-fifteenth
century, although it was probably built on the site of a
similar older structure. Moreover, Florio Bustron's claim
that a Templar tower at Kolossi was also granted to the
Hospitallers in 1307 suggests that there may have been
another castle nearby which has now completely vanished,
although Enlart believed that this statement was incorrect
in the first place)50
Finally, Etienne of Lusignan described how an estate at
Episkopi, just to the west of Kolossi, 'was given by the
king of Lusignan (Hugh I, 1205-18) to the Knights of
Gestes, pp.686-89; Chronigue d'Amadi, pp.l39-'IO;
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II, pp.96-100,
103.
150 cartulaire, II, no.1354, pp.121-22; Florio Bustron,
Chroni qj, p.171; Enlart, L'art gothi g ue, II, 683-94.
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St.John of Jerusalem, who built and fortified the castle,
before the island fell into the hands of the Turks. .
indicating that here too there was some sort of
fortification which has now vanished. Reference should
also be made to a proposal that Buffavento be held by the
Hospitallers during peace talks between the Genoese and
the Cypriots in 1374. This suggestion was probably never
carried out, although it does at least shed further light
on the strategic importance of Buffavento, which the
Genoese presumably hoped would be removed from royal
control. 151
Therefore the limited and often confused historical and
archaeological evidence does at least prove that both
Templar and Hospitaller fortifications on Cyprus were
extremely small. Gastria, for example, can have been
little more than a walled enclosure, whilst most of the
other so-called castles we have looked at were probably
only towers or fortified houses. Hence these structures
must have been of limited military value, and could only
have been intended to withstand minor attacks by rebels,
raiders or pirates. Instead, they were normally used for
purely agricultural and administrative activities.
Kolossi, for example, lay at the heart of a large
agricultural complex and sugar plantation belonging to the
Hospitallers, and had a fortified barn and several other
farm building situated close to it. No doubt the towers at
Khirokitia and Yermasoia fulfilled a similar role in the
rich sugar and cotton producing area around Limassol.152
Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 18.
Buffavento: Edhury, The Kingdom of C yprus, p.208n39. For
details of Hospitaller properties around Limassol, see
also Richard, Documents chypriotes, pp.111-20.
152 Enlart, L'art gothigue, II, 684, 694-95. For more
details on the sugar industry, see M-L. von Wattburg, 'The
medieval cane sugar industry in Cyprus: the results of
recent excavations', Antiquaries Journal, (1983), 298-314.
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A late fourteenth century reference to salt still being
kept in 'the warehouses of the Templars' suggests that
this Order had also relied on small fortified structures
to protect its agricultural produce before 1307.153
The insignificance of Cypriot fortifications belonging to
the Military Orders also reflects the internal stability
achieved by the Lusignan kings, and their ability to
prevent the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights,
as well as the Latin nobility in general, from undermining
central authority. Returning to the observations made at
the beginning of this chapter, it has al-so been argued
that strongpoints on the island were additionally expected
to deal with three other dangers, namely potential
rebellions by the Greeks, minor raids by Turks and
pirates, and full scale invasions by the Mamluks or the
Genoese. It is clear that on the whole Cypriot castles
were extremely successful in dealing with all four of
these. Between 1192 and 1373 the Lusignan dynasty survived
several outbreaks of violence involving both internal and
external aggressors. In 1373 the impregnability of Kyrenia
and the mountain castles also ensured that the Genoese
were prevented from making any conquests beyond Famagusta,
which itself only fell because of their treachery.
Moreover, once the mainland had been lost to the Mamluks,
heavily fortified coastal settlements such as Kyrenia and
Famagusta ensured that Cyprus prospered economically, and
could even be used for new seaborne attacks against the
Muslims. Hence the island's fortifications, as well as its
location, ensured that Cyprus outlived all neighbouring
Frankish territories, and became one of the most tranquil
and prosperous Latin states in the eastern Mediterranean.
153 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.618, p.609. For more
details on the agricultural and administrative uses of
structures like Kolossi, see below, pp.408-14.
Fig.1O. Cilician Armenia. Frctn Boase, ed., The Cilician Kingdart
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF FORTIFICATIONS IN CILICIAN ARMENIA,
c. 1187-1375.
Cilician Armenia differed from the other Christian states
of the eastern Mediterranean in several important ways.
Unlike the Latins, who were foreign colonizers trying to
impose their will on a far larger Muslim population, the
Armenians had made Cilicia their homeland; a place where
all members of society shared certain cultural, political
and religious characteristics. From the second half of the
twelfth century onwards, these characteristics were
gradually changing, as Byzantine power in southern Asia
Minor collapsed, and Leon II (ruled as king, 1198-1219)
and his successors created an independent Armenian kingdom
loosely based on the Latin monarchies of western Europe.1
This process was fiercely opposed by some members of the
local nobility, who resented giving up freely held land in
exchange for fiefs, and did not want the Armenian Church
to accept the supremacy of the papacy. In addition,
Cilicia itself formed a sharp contrast with the relatively
exposed coastal regions occupied by the Franks, for its
lush central plain was surrounded by high mountain ranges,
which could only be penetrated through a relatively small
number of valleys and defiles. Thus the Armenians were
both culturally and geographically removed from their
Latin neighbours, and these factors meant that their
castles often performed very different functions from
those which have been discussed far.
Armenian fortifications also present the historian with
many different problems of dating, attribution and
interpretation, for the history of Cilicia, particularly
during the fourteenth century, is extremely badly recorded
1 See above, pp.22-24.
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in the contemporary sources. Indeed, it is not even
possible to establish when most Armenian strongholds were
lost to the Muslims, let alone try to construct the kind
of accurate chronological descriptions already given for
larger Frankish castles like Sidon or Crac des Chevaliers.
As a result, the following outline of fortifications in
Cilician Armenia only includes those sites where there is
enough historical and archaeological evidence left to make
some definite conclusions about design, age and function.
These structures can be divided into two categories,
depending on whether they were located on the Cilician
plain, or along one of the mountain passes giving access
to it. One of the most important castles belonging to this
latter group was Baghras (Gaston), which guarded the Belem
Pass. This was the quickest and easiest route across the
Amanus mountain range, and connected Antioch with several
minor ports and settlements along the southern coast of
the Gulf of Alexandretta, including La Portelle, Bayas,
Canamella and the toll station known as the 'Pillar of
Jonah'. However, travellers journeying between Cilicia,
Aleppo or Edessa, who did not need to pass Antioch, were
likelier to take another route just to the north of the
Belem Pass, which bisected the Amanus mountains between
the castles of Darbsak (Trapesac) to the east and Hadjar
Shoghian (Calan) to the west. Baghras, Darbsak and Hadjar
Shoghian had all belonged to the Templars before 1188,
although it remains uncertain whether the latter castle
should be identified with Roche de Roussel or Roche
Guillaume, two fortresses which the Latin sources tell us
the Order held in the region. This problem will be
discussed in more detail below, as will the architectural
remains of these strongholds, which were inevitably far
more Frankish in design than their Armenian neighbours
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further north.2
The next major route into Cilicia ran through the Amanus
Gates, which lay about 100 kilometres to the north of
Antioch. This pass was guarded by the tower of Hasanbeyli
in the east and the castle of Servantikar in the west, and
was frequently used by invading Muslim armies during the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 3
 It also formed the
last major point of entry into Cilicia before the Amanus
range gradually gives way to the Anti-Taurus and Taurus
mountains, which protected the Cilician plain from the
north and west. The few routes an invasion force could
realistically have used to penetrate these mountains were
also overlooked by strategic fortresses, most notably
Vagha, which guarded an important road heading due north
from Sis across the Anti-Taurus mountains, and Lampron,
one of the strongest castles in the vicinity of the
Cilician Gates. The Cilician Gates were by far the most
important route between Lesser Armenia, Constantinople and
western Asia Minor, although another coastal road also
existed further south, where the Taurus mountains met the
Mediterranean sea. Here the Armenians held the town and
castle of Silifke, which Leon II granted to the
Hospitallers during the early years of the thirteenth
century. Beyond Silifke, Armenian control gradually gave
way to that of the Seijuk Turks.4
Apart from Silifke, all the castles which have just been
mentioned were typical Armenian mountain strongholds.
Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.139-45, 148-50; Edwards,
The Fortifications, pp.39-40, and see below, pp.CA 111-133
Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.145-48; Edwards, j'j
Fortifications, pp.39-40.
Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p.152; Edwards, Th
Fortifications, p.40; Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom',
p.2.
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Servantikar, for example, was built on a roughly
triangular plateau approximately 500 metres above sea
level. Today it is extremely ruined, but the description
of one contemporary makes it clear that even during the
medieval period its natural strength was such that it
needed few man made defences: '[Servantikar] is a strong
citadel on an outcrop in a valley. Several of its sides do
not have walls, as they are naturally defended by the
cliff's edge...it commands the route through the defile of
Man' (ie the Amanus Gates).5
These steep cliffs meant that man made fortifications were
only really necessary along the castle's gently sloping
east side, which was defended by a long, sinuous curtain
wall flanked by numerous round or horse shoe towers. The
only entrance to the castle lay in the north-east corner
of the site, and was composed of an arched gatehouse
flanked by two solid round towers. Moreover, this entrance
could only be approached along a path exposed to fire from
the east curtain. The actual gatehouse was therefore
extremely difficult to reach, let alone attack, but even
if an enemy should breach the outer gate itself, he then
had to turn through ninety degrees whilst under fire
through machicolation in the ceiling, before entering the
lower bailey.
However, even having got this far, a potential attacker
then had to try to penetrate the upper bailey, built on
the highest southern point of the site. This bailey was
again defended by a curtain wall with flanking towers and
an 'L' shaped gateway (F on plan), and contained numerous
residential buildings including four immensely powerful
Abu'l-Fida, cited in P. Deschamps, 'Le Château de
Servantikar en Cilicie, le defile de Marris et la
frontière du comté d'Edesse', S yria, XVIII (1937), 379-88,
at 382.
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towers at its southern end. These towers contributed to
the general defensive scheme of the curtain wall, but
could also act as a kind of keep or final refuge. In
addition to these defences, the castle was equipped with
several cisterns, as well as an Armenian chapel
incorporated into tower C.
Although this castle was probably originally Byzantine,
and also shows some crusader influence from t^i t1tk.
century (particularly the talus which tower K rests on at
the southern tip of the upper bailey), it is primarily an
Armenian construction. As such it shares a number of
characteristic features with other fortifications of this
type. Firstly, the castle's strength is basically derived
from its location on a plateau almost completely
surrounded by steep cliffs. Hence, curtain walls were not
always deemed necessary, and where they were built they
consistently follow the cliff's edge, so that they
enhanced the natural strength of the site. The shape of
the castle is therefore entirely dictated by that of the
plateau, but the Armenian builders turned this to their
advantage by creating angles to provide flanking fire
almost everywhere along the curtain wall, so that
relatively few real towers were actually needed. Moreover,
wherever these were added, particularly on the more
exposed east side of the fortress, they were invariably
round or horse shoe shaped, because the Armenians believed
that this made them better able to withstand battering
rams and earthquakes. Consequently, it is very unusual to
see sharp corners or right angles in Armenian
fortifications.
Other features at Servantikar are also typically Armenian.
The masonry used on the exterior of the fortress is
largely composed of small, square blocks of bossed stone,
which were also considered to be more resilient against
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battering rams. The walls were only really constructed
with care where this was necessary, and rely on their
thickness for strength, rather than revetments or deep
foundations. There is only one gateway, which is difficult
to reach, is flanked by two towers, and is placed at a
right angle to the curtain wall, so that it cannot be
attacked head on. It is also defended from above by slot
machicolation, enabling troops in the upper chamber of the
gatehouse to shoot down on attackers through holes
carefully incorporated into the vauiting.
Like many other Armenian castles, Servantikar also has two
baileys providing successive lines of defence, and has few
free standing buildings within its walls. Consequently,
residential quarters and other service buildings have
mostly been positioned along the inside of the curtain
wall or incorporated into the towers. The chapel, for
example, doubles as a salient defending the entrance,
whilst the strongest point of the castle is defended by a
series of rounded towers (J,K,L,M) attached to the curtain
wall, rather than an isolated keep.6
The general layout of both Lampron and Vagha is virtually
identical to that of Servantikar. Both these strongholds
are situated on remote mountain spurs hundreds of metres
above sea level, and were defended by successive baileys
rising toward impregnable inner citadels. Indeed, the
upper parts of Lampron could only be reached via a
circuitous ramp, which had been cut out of the solid rock
and was barely two metres wide, making it impossible for
6 Deschamps, 'Le Château de Servantikar', 381-84;
Edwards, The Fortifications, pp.217-20; Cahen, La Syrie du
Nord, pp.145-46; Hellenkemper, Bur gen, pp.111-15.
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more than one attacker to use it at a time. 7 The lower
approaches to Vagha were almost as inaccessible, and were
additionally protected by several gateways, at least one
of which incorporated the same kind of Armenian slot
machicolation already mentioned at Servantikar. 8 It is
hardly any wonder, therefore, that in 1275 the Catholicos,
or head of the Armenian Church, sought shelter there from
the Mamluks, and that for much of the medieval period the
Armenians deemed Vagha the safest place in Cilicia to
store their most precious iconìs anìci re1igios arteacts.9
The second group of castles held by the Armenians, which
were situated on or near the edges of the Cilician plain,
were far more complex architecturally, and often
incorporated many different Roman, Byzantine, Frankish,
Muslim and Armenian features. This point can be
illustrated by looking at Toprak (Ti! Hamdoun), the first
major stronghold to the west of Servantikar and the Amanus
Gates. Toprak is set on a large and partially man made
hill measuring approximately 100 metres by 70 metres, and
is defended by a double curtain to the east and south, and
a huge talus topped by a powerful wall to the west and
north. The presence of this talus, the type of masonry
used, and the very ordered arrangement of the walls and
towers, all suggest that the castle is mostly a Mamluk
construction dating from the fourteenth century, with only
certain parts attributable to the Armenians, or earlier
F.C.R. Robinson and P.C. Hughes, 'Lampron, Castle of
Armenian Cilicia', Anatolian Studies, XIX (1969), 183-207,
particularly at 194-95. See also Edwards, Th
Fortifications, pp.176-83.
8 J.G. Dunbar and W.W.M. Boal, 'The Castle of Vagha',
Anatolian Studies, XIV (1964), 175-84 (machicolation at
178); Edwards, The Fortifications, pp.259-65.
Bar Hebraeus, Chronography, p.453; L.M. Alishan,
Sissouan ou l'Arméno-Cilicie, (Venice 1899), pp.172-73.
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twelfth century Byzantine and crusader occupants.'°
Consequently, Toprak was probably largely rebuilt after
1337, when, according to the Armenian chronicler Nerses
Balientz, the Muslims acquired much of eastern Cilicia by
treaty. 1 ' This in turn suggests that the site had been
severely damaged during previous Mamluk attacks on the
area, particularly those of 1266 and 1298.12 However,
Willbrand of Oldenburg's description of Toprak in 1212 as
a 'good strong castle held by a nobleman' proves that it
must have been a well fortified and important stronghold
even before the Mamluk period.13
To the north and east of Toprak, numerous outcrops rising
up above the Cilician plain were occupied by other castles
whose architectural heritage varied considerably. Between
Toprak and Sis, for example, the Armenians garrisoned and
repaired the classical acropolis of Anavarza (Anazarbus),
a Roman settlement which also showed traces of early
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.244-50; Hellenkemper,
Burg, pp.140-53; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, p.l4'T; Muller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp.75-77; J. Gottwald,
'Die Burg Til im Sudöstlichen Kilikien', BZ, XL, (1940),
82-103.
Nerses Balientz, extract reproduced in Alishan,
Sissouan, p.469.
1266: Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 99; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 31, 33-34. Hethoum the
Historian, Table Chronolo g i gue, p.487; Bar Hebraeus,
Chrono graphy , p.446; Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed.
Dédéyan, pp.117-18, Vahram of Edessa, Chroni gue Rimée,
pp.521-22; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.223; Samuel
of Ani, Chronoraphie, p.261. 1298: al-Makrizi, Histoire
des Sultans, 11(b), 60-65; Samuel of Ani, Chronographie,
p.463; Gestes, pp.839-40; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum,
pp.233-34. The sources for 1298 mention Toprak
specifically, those for 1266 do not. See also T.S.R.
Boase, 'Gazetteer', in The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia,
pp.145-85, at pp.183-84.
13 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.226.
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twelfth century Frankish occupation. 14 Other Roman or
Byzantine acropolis sites reoccupied by the Armenians
included Bodrum, 15 which lay a few miles to the north of
Toprak, and Sis, the capital of the Armenian kingdom. 16 In
addition, several hilltops were given entirely new
fortifications, which invariably incorporated all the
various defensive techniques adopted at Vagha, Lampron and
Servantikar. The best preserved such sites are
Gökvelioglu, 17 Tumlu' 8 and Yuan, all of which lay to the
east and south east of Toprak. The ttost fatuous csf these
was probably Yjlan (han Kale/The Castle of the Snakes),
whose complex inner gateway and stout horse shoe towers
represent some of the most impressive Armenian structures
of the period.'9
14 'Anazarbus (Anavarza)' , M. Gough, Anatolian
Studies, II (1952), 85-150, particularly at 91, 119-25;
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.65-70; Hellenkemper, Burgen,
pp.191-201; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, p.152; Boase,
'Gazetteer', p.153, and see below, pp.255-56.
15 F. Frech, 'Die armenischen Burgen' , Zeitschrift der
Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, IX (1915), 576-80, at
578; Hellenkemper, Bur gen, pp.137-39; Alishan, Sissouan,
pp.229-31; Boase, 'Gazetteer', p.157; Edwards,
Fortifications, p.92.
16 Hellenkemper, Burgen, pp.202-13; Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.233-36; Alishan, Sissouan, pp.241-48;
Fedden and Thomson, Crusader Castles, pp.97-100; Muller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p.'77.
17 G.R. Youngs, 'Three Cilician Castles', Anatolian
Studies, xv (1965), 113-34, at 118-25; Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.133-35; Hellenkemper, Burgen, pp.165-
68; Boase, 'Gazetteer' , p.165.
18 Youngs, 'Three Cilician Castles', 113-18; Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.255-59; Hellenkemper, Burgen, pp.188-
91; Boase, 'Gazetteer', p.184.
19 Youngs, 'Three Cilician Castles', 125-33,
particularly at 128-30; Edwards, Fortifications, pp.269-
75; Hellenkemper, Bur gen, pp.169-87; Fedden and Thomson,
Crusader Castles, pp.100-3; Muller-Wiener, Castles of the
Crusaders, pp.77-'79; Boase, 'Gazetteer', p.185.
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Thus the Armenians either improved or repaired much older
sites, or erected new defences according to their own
distinct building style. This style was largely imported
from Armenia proper, but may also have been influenced by
Byzantine military architecture. Hence Servantikar can be
compared with Kantara, St.Hilarion and Buffavento, the
three great mountain fortresses built by the Greeks on
Cyprus, which were defended by a similar combination of
sheer cliffs and successive curtain walls. 20 It is also
interesting to speculate whether the 20 metre wide moat
dividing the castle of Lampron from neighbouring mountains
to the north was either copied from the Greeks, or perhaps
even excavated by them, for it bears a close resemblance
to the famous rock hewn ditch at Saone, which most
archaeologists now agree is originally Byzantine.21
Indeed, Lampron was probably only one of many Armenian
fortresses built directly on top of older Byzantine
structures dating back many centuries. The difficulties in
trying to distinguish between the two is clearly apparent
at Azgit, a remote mountain castle between Servantikar and
Vagha, which different scholars have attributed to both
the Greeks and the Armenians.22
Certain Armenian defensive strategies were also very
similar to those adopted by the Franks. In terms of
location at least, Montfort, Akkar and Beaufort belong to
the same group as Yilan and Vagha, for they all relied on
their remoteness and inaccessibility to protect them. The
20 See above, pp.203-4, 208-10.
21 Lampron: 'Lampron, Castle of Armenian Cilicia',
191. Saone: Pringle in Lawrence, Crusader Castles,
pp. XXjX-XXX.
J.G. Dunbar and W.W.M. Boal, 'The Castle of Azgit',
in Boase, The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, pp.85-91, at
p.91; Fedden and Thomson, Crusader Castles, pp.46-47.
241
'semi-concentric' layout of Montfort also appeared at many
Armenian strongholds, which, as we have seen, were
provided with two or three lines of defence in exposed
areas, but none at all in those parts which nature had
already rendered impregnable.23 In addition, by
reoccupying Byzantine or classical fortifications, the
Armenians were merely continuing a policy already used by
the crusaders when they first reached Cilicia and Antioch.
Later, it will also be shown that from 1204 onwards the
Latin conquerors of the Byzantine empire either took over
former Greek strongholds, or built their own castles on
isolated hilltops which required relatively few major
defences 24
It also seems likely that some architectural features
which gradually appeared in Frankish castles were in fact
copied from the Armenians. The Hospitaller castles of Crac
des Chevaliers, Margat and Silifke may be particularly
significant in this respect, for all three incorporated
the kind of complex gateways and horse shoe towers built
by the Armenians at Yilan and elsewhere. Silifke was
granted to the Hospitallers in 1210, and subsequently
remained under their control for the next sixteen years,
suggesting that the castle was being reconstructed at
almost exactly the same time that the Order was carrying
out its improvements at Crac and Margat. 25 This link
appears to have been limited to these three castles,
however, for in general horse shoe towers were not at all
23 Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, p.111;
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.13-14. For Montfort, Akkar and
Beaufort, see above, pp.5'?, 59, 74.
24 See below, pp.296-312.
25 Cartulaire, II, no.1351, p.119; Langlois, k
Trésor, no.3, pp.112-14; Edwards, Fortifications, pp.221-
28, particularly at 228, and see below, p.273. For Margat
and Crac des Chevaliers, see above, pp.44-46.
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popular with the Franks. Nevertheless, this need not rule
out a wider Armenian influence, as 'L' shaped entrances
were used at many crusader sites, and a more concentric
layout, where several flanking towers rather than a
central keep acted as the inner citadel, was adopted at
Crac, Margat, Pilgrims' Castle, Belvoir and possibly
Saphet. 26
 The architectural historian R.W. Edwards has
also noted that slot machicolation, a defensive element
incorporated into the inner gate at Crac des Chevaliers,
'appears to be an Armenian invention', 27
 whilst other
scholars have pointed out that during the twelfth century
at least, the crusaders sometimes relied on Armenian
engineers to help them capture Muslim strongholds. If the
Armenians were experts on siege engines, it therefore
follows that they must have known how to build
fortifications which were most capable of withstanding
such weapons.28
However, in other cases the Franks rejected Armenian
precedents in favour of their own designs. Hence most
castles built by the crusaders tended to be less irregular
and rely more on square or rectangular towers,
incorporating several gateways and posterns. Moreover,
many Frankish strongholds were centred around a large,
free standing keep, which derived its strength from
extremely thick walls rather than more sophisticated
concepts of interconnecting flanking fire. During the
thirteenth century the Latins also tended to use smooth
rather than bossed masonry, and often built their walls on
26 See above, pp.77-80.
27 Edwards, Fortifications, p.15; Deschamps, Le Crac
des Chevaliers, p.182.
28 Fedden and Thomson, Crusader Castles, pp.55-56;
Edwards, Fortifications, p.11.
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large revetments to give them extra strength. 29 These
differences between Armenian and Frankish military
architecture can partly be explained in terms of local
terrain. The somewhat less rocky and mountainous landscape
of coastal Syria and Palestine meant that man made
features such as revetments were needed to compensate for
the absence of sheer cliff faces and deep ravines.
However, castles like Servantikar also reveal a difference
in mentality between the Armenians, who had been a
mountain people long before they migrated to Cilicia, and
the Franks, who always needed to have access to the sea in
order to maintain their links with western Europe. In
addition, it should be noted that many of the defensive
elements adopted by the Latins, and in particular 'L'
shaped gateways, could equally well have been inspired by
Muslim or Byzantine precedents, or could quite simply have
been reinvented by the crusaders themselves.
The links which have been made between Armenian and Latin
fortifications should therefore be regarded as suggestions
rather than statements of fact. So far, these links have
been analysed in purely architectural terms, but they can
also be used to illustrate the various military functions
of Armenian strongholds. Most notably, it is clear that
the Armenians tended to reoccupy or fortify sites which
were located along routes leading onto and across the
Cilician plain. Hence anyone entering Cilicia via the
Amanus Gates would first pass Hasanbeyli, a watch tower
which probably belonged to the Teutonic Knights, 3° and
then reach Servantikar, situated near the eastern mouth of
the valley. From here the traveller could continue to the
west, past Toprak and Yuan toward the classical cities of
29 See above, pp.77-80. For more details on the
difference between Armenian and crusader masonry, see
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.20-24.
See below, p.271.
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Misis (Mamistra), Adana and Tarsus, all of which were
inhabited during the thirteenth century. At Tarsus, the
road linking these places carried on along the coast
toward Silifke, whilst at Adana and Misis other routes led
north to Lampron and the Cilician Gates, or south, past
Gökvelioglu toward the famous port of Ayas (Lajazzo).
Alternatively, it was possible to travel in a north
easterly direction from Servantikar, via Bodrum and Amuda
(another castle held by the German Order) to Sis, or to
turn south at Toprak, along a road which led to Baghras,
Hadjar Choghlan and Antioch. Another important route
crossed the Cilician plain from north to south, so that
anyone travelling across the Anti-Taurus mountains toward
Ayas would pass Vagha, Sis, Tumlu, Yilan and Misis.31
These routes reveal the extent to which the Armenians
planned the design and location of their fortifications,
for many of them formed part of a wider intervisible
network. Hence Gökvelioglu could communicate with Yuan
via Misis, whilst to the north Yilan itself could send
smoke or fire signals to Tumlu, Anavarza and Amouda. In
addition, Anavarza was intervisible with Ak Kale, another
castle situated to the north east of Sis, whose
inhabitants were themselves able to see Tumlu. Further
south, the garrison of Toprak could also observe Amouda,
Anavarza and Tumlu, even though this latter castle lay
over 40 kilometres to the west. Consequently, all the
major strongholds and settlements of the Cilician plain
could communicate with each other either directly or via
other castles. This in turn suggests that the Armenians
did not just fortify remote and elevated sites because of
their obvious defensive potential, but also because such
places enjoyed good all round visibility. Clearly, this
must have been a primary concern at Tumlu, whose strategic
31 Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.145-48, 150-52; Boase,
'The History of the Kingdom', p.2.
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location enabled the rulers of Sis to keep in touch with
the furthest corners of their kingdom. 32 Similarly, it
will later be shown that the Armenians primarily
reoccupied the acropolis of Anavarza because of its high
altitude rather than a desire to recolonize an old Roman
city. 33 Furthermore, other mountain fortresses such as
Servantikar, whose visibility was usually limited to the
valley they occupied, no doubt communicated with their
neighbours by means of messengers on horseback, or perhaps
even carrier pigeons, so that they too could be
incorporated into a network which effectively covered much
of Cilician Armenia.34
The principal function of this network was to warn both
civilians and troops of an imminent hostile invasion. In
the north and west such an attack was most likely to be
launched by the Seljuk Turks of Anatolia, whilst in the
east and south the Mamluk sultans of Egypt posed the
greatest threat. Consequently the castles of Silifke,
Lampron and Vagha came under less pressure after the
1240s, when the Seijuks were subjugated by the Mongols,
whereas Servantikar and the area to the south of Toprak
gradually witnessed more and more fighting after the
accession of Baybars in 126O. Hence Baybars sent a
raiding expedition onto the Cilician plain in 1266, and
subsequent large scale Mamluk incursions occurred in
32	 Hellenkemper,	 Burgen,	 pp.262-63;	 Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.41-42.
Hellenkemper, Burgen, p.262, and see below, p.256.
Carrier pigeons were also used between castles in
the Holy Land. See above, p.142.
See above, p.23.
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1275, 1298, 1322, 1337 and 1375.36 Although they were
supposedly allied with the Armenians, the Mongols also
invaded Cilicia from time to time, particularly in 1266,
1307 and 1320.
Whenever attacks of this kind were looming, the Armenians
relied on their furthest castles to warn them in plenty of
time. Thus in 1266 Baybars's troops used the Amanus Gates
to enter Cilicia, only to find their path blocked by an
Armenian army led by Hethoum I (1226-69), who was waiting
near Servantikar in the forest of Mani. Hence the
garrisons of Servantikar and Hasanbeyli must have told
Hethoum in advance that the Muslims had decided to take
this route, enabling the Armenian king to raise an army,
prepare his men, and march across Cilicia from his capital
at Sis. Just under a decade later the Armenians presumably
used the same tactics, for in 1275 we again find them
confronting the Egyptians very close to Servantikar. On
this occasion, however, the famous chronicler Sempad died
in the ensuing struggle, 38
 whilst in 1266 Hethoum I was
also badly defeated by Baybars's men, who managed to kill
36 1266: See above, p.238n12. 1275: al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 123-25; Hethoum the Historian,
Table Chronologigue, p.487; Bar Hebraeus, Chronography,
pp.452-54; Constable Sempad, Chroniciue, RHCArm I., 653;
Gestes, p.780; Marino Sanudo, Liber secretorum, p.226.
1298: see above, p.238n12. 1322: Samuel of Ani,
Chronographie, p.467. 1337: ibid, p.468; Nerses Balientz,
extract in Alishan, Sissouan, p.469. 1375: Jean Dardel,
Chronigue, pp.70-84.
31 1266: Bar Hebraeus, Chronograp1y, pp.445-46. 1307:
Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, p.466; Hethoum the
Historian, Table Chronolog i gue, p.490; Jean Dardel,
Chronigue, pp.17-iS. 1320: Constable Sempad, Chronigue,
RHCArm I, 667-68.
38 Constable Sempad, Chronigue, RHCArm I., 653;
Hethoum the Historian, Table Chronologigue, p.487; Bar
Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , pp.452-54.
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one of his Sons and capture the other. 39 Indeed, in 1298
yet another Muslim army passing through the Amanus Gates
even managed to sack Servantikar itself, and in 1337 the
Armenians found themselves under so much pressure that
Leon V (1320-41) probably surrendered the castle to the
Egyptians permanently. 40 These terrible setbacks were
primarily caused by the Armenians' inadequate troop
numbers, as is indicated by the Mamluk invasion of 1275,
when a royal force of 5,000 horsemen actually managed to
defeat the first wave of Egyptians, before being swept
aside by another section of the Muslim army which alone
numbered eight thousand men. 4 ' In 1298 the Mamluks are
also said to have attacked the area with a staggering
20,000 troops drawn from Egypt, Aleppo and other parts of
Syria 42
Nevertheless, despite these problems, the history of the
Amanus Gates during the thirteenth century can still be
used to highlight the defensive strategies which the
Armenians hoped would keep their opponents at bay.
Clearly, Hethoum I and his successors realized that it
would be suicidal to meet numerically superior invasion
forces in the open, and so they tried to even the odds by
confronting their enemies in narrow and wooded mountain
passes, where a surprise ambush could potentially prevent
attackers from reaching the Cilician plain. For this
Vahram of Edessa, Chroni g ue Rimée, p.522; Constable
Sempad, Chroni g ue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.117-18; Hethoum the
Historian, Table Chronologigue, p.487; Samuel of Ani,
Chrono g raphie, p.461; Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , p.446.
40 1298: Gest, pp .839- 40. 1337: Nerses Balientz,
extract in Alishan, Sissouan, p.469. See also Deschamps,
'Le Château de Servantikar', 387.
41 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , pp.452-53.
42 al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(b), 60-61. For
more details on troop numbers, see above, pp.37-38.
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tactic to work, the Armenians needed to gather their
troops and deploy them quickly, which again made it
imperative for castle garrisons to be on the alert
constantly, and send warning signals as soon as they
spotted an approaching enemy. No doubt these concerns
account for al-Makrizi's claim that Hethoum I built
numerous towers to guard the mountains around Cilicia, as
well as Constable Sempad's report that Leon III (1270-89)
'ordered the construction of a strong castle at the foot
of Mount Taurus...to defend this district and the famous
route of Xoz Jor' . This route penetrated the Anti-Taurus
mountains a few miles to the west of Vagha. The need for
a quick response at the first sign of trouble may also
explain why many other intervisible strongholds were
situated on or near important roads, for these routes
could be used by troops who were normally stationed in
castles, but were expected to reach frontier areas at very
short notice. Servantikar must have been particularly
important in this respect, and may well have been used as
an assembly point for contingents hoping to stop the
Muslims, as well as a refuge for those who escaped the
disastrous encounters of 1266 and 1275. In 1265 Hethoum I
is also said to have deterred Baybars from attacking
Lesser Armenia by gathering his troops together in the
Belem pass as quickly as he could. Many of these forces
had clearly been brought from various baronial castles all
over Cilicia.44
In the long run, however, it is clear that the Armenians
were quite simply too outnumbered for all these elaborate
precautions to make any difference. But even though they
proved incapable of halting repeated enemy incursions,
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 	 33;
Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, p.125.
Constable Sempad, Chroni g ue, ed. Dédéyan, p.115.
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they still managed to survive such attacks by sheltering
inside their most powerful castles. In 1266, for example,
Baybars's forces ravaged the Cilician countryside
unhindered, 'but in front of the fortresses which they
attacked, they failed miserably'. 45
 Similarly, when the
Muslims returned some years later, Leon III found himself
so outnumbered that he did not even attempt to confront
them, and consequently 'only those who occupied the
fortified places, or had retreated to the fortresses,
escaped the carnage'.
Moreover, whenever they did manage to capture any Armenian
castles, Mamluk besiegers frequently discovered large
numbers of civilians sheltering inside them. Hence in 1298
one stronghold taken in the vicinity of Toprak was found
to contain 'a large throng, composed of peasants, farmers'
wives and children'. After this site had surrendered, al-
Makrizi wrote that a further 'eleven places in the
territory of the Armenians similarly fell under the
control of the victors'. Although these sites were later
reoccupied with the help of the Mongols, this disaster
must have inflicted untold suffering on the local
population. 47 It should also be noted that according to
the Muslim sources, not all Armenian castles escaped the
Mamluk raid of 1266 unscathed, for the Teutonic Knights
defending Amuda were obliged to surrender, along with 'two
thousand two hundred people, both fighting men and others,
of whom the men were killed and the captives distributed
amongst the troops'. 48 Wilibrand of Oldenburg's remarks
that Amuda provided a place of shelter for local people,
Vahram of Edessa, Chroni g ue Rimée, p.522.
Vahram of Edessa, Chroni g ue Rimée, p.528.
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(b), 64-65.
48 Ibri al-Furat, Selections, II, 99; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 34.
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and that the nearby river yielded good fish supplies, give
further weight to the impression that the castle acted as
a refuge point for many neighbouring communities.49
Thus the Armenians depended on their strongest
fortifications to protect them in much the same way that
the Franks relied Pilgrims' Castle or Saphet to see them
through crises such as the Khwarizmian invasion of 1244.50
As a result, if any castles failed to withstand an enemy
attack, their surrender invariably led to the death or
enslavement of large numbers of unarmed civilians. Hence
the fate of Amuda's occupants can be compared with that of
the 5,000 Christians slaughtered by the Khwarizmians at
Jerusalem, whose defences were too dilapidated and poorly
garrisoned to provide adequate protection.5'
However, once they had retreated inside their castles, the
majority of Armenians could at least feel confident that
their lives would be saved, for most external invaders
seem to have been more concerned with gathering booty than
making permanent territorial conquests. In 1266, for
example, Baybars's troops devastated much of the Cilician
plain, prompting the Armenians to ask the Mongols for
assistance. By the time they had arrived, however, the
Muslims had already taken their loot and gone home, and so
the Mongols themselves turned to ravaging the area! 52 In
1298 the Mamluks conducted their campaign in an equally
opportunist manner, for they do not appear to have pressed
home their siege of Sis, which had been their original
Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.224. For
more details on this castle, see below, pp.269-70.
50 See above, p.85. See also Hellenkemper, Burgen,
p.264.
See above, p.102.
52 Bar Hebraeus, Chronography, pp.445-46.
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target, because some sections of the Muslim army found it
more profitable to go on an extensive looting spree
instead. This spree undoubtedly inflicted considerable
damage on the surrounding countryside, but its impact was
still far more temporary than a systematic destruction of
the citadel at Sis would have been.53
The nature of Muslim and Mongol attacks on Cilician
Armenia did not just enable most of its inhabitants to
emerge unscathed, but also gave its rulers the chance to
recoup their losses at the end of each incursion. Hence we
have seen that in 1298 no less than eleven Armenian sites
were overrun, whilst in 1266 both Toprak and Amouda were
probably captured, but none of these places were
subsequently held by the Muslims, who either abandoned
them deliberately, or gave them up in the face of Mongol
pressure. A peace treaty between Leon III and Kalavun
dating from 1285 also indicates that for much of this
period the sultans of Egypt merely used the threat of
punitive raids in order to extract large amounts of
tribute from the Armenians. 54
 Indeed, the Mamluks do not
seem to have started capturing castles for the sake of
territorial gain rather than short term booty until the
fourteenth century, when more systematic attempts were
made to occupy the Cilician plain. It is clear that 1337
was a turning point in this respect, for in that year 'the
troops of the sultan of Egypt, and the tyrant emir called
Melik-Omar, entered Cilicia with 60,000 cavalry troops and
besieged Ayas...they would not leave until the town had
been delivered to them, along with all the land between
the Ceyhan river and the territory of the Arabs, land
where there lay forty castles and fortresses, each with
its own lord. These were abandoned to the Arabs
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(b), 60-61.
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(a), 203-12.
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voluntarily and by treaty'. 55
 The Ceyhan river ran through
the heart of Cilicia, from the mountainous interior around
Marash to the Mediterranean coast near Ayas, and
consequently, if this treaty was carried out to the
letter, it would mean that the Armenians lost Servantikar,
Toprak, Yuan, fisis and Gökvelioglu at this time.
However, until the 1330s at least, Armenian kings still
had the option of waiting until their opponents had taken
all the loot they wanted, and then emerging from their
castles and reoccupying the Cilician plain with relative
ease. Consequently, the strength of their fortresses,
combined with the very temporary nature of most enemy
offensives, ensured that the Armenians maintained their
borders for much of the thirteenth and early fourteenth
centuries. It has been noted that this was largely
achieved without confronting numerically superior enemies
in the open, and that on some occasions the Armenians even
survived large scale invasions despite being heavily
defeated.
At times, however, the Armenians clearly were prepared to
risk a pitched battle in the hope of minimizing the amount
of damage which raiders inflicted on their land. In 1307
Oschin, brother of Leon IV (1301-7), adopted this tactic
against the Mongol general Poularghou, soon after the
latter had murdered Leon and several leading Armenian
barons at a supposedly friendly meeting below the castle
of Anavarza. As soon as Oschin realized that his brother
had been betrayed in this way, he fled to the citadel at
Sis, and used this stronghold as a collection point for a
new army with which he chased the Mongols out of Cilicia.
These events provide us with a rare example of a castle
being used in an attacking rather than a defensive role,
Nerses Balientz, extract in Alishan, Sissouan,
p. 469.
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and give further credence to the suggestion made earlier
that Armenian troops were either stationed permanently
inside fortresses, or were gathered together inside such
structures at the first sign of trouble.56
The remarkable resilience of the Armenians in the face of
ever larger incursions also reflects the immense
importance of the remote and rugged terrain of northen
Cilicia, and the virtually impregnable mountain fortresses
which were constructed there. Vagha, for example,
continued to act as the residence of the catholicos well
into the fifteenth century, 57 whilst the lords of Gaban,
an unidentified castle situated somewhere near Sis, seem
to have retained a certain amount of independence until
the same period. 58 Indeed, Sis itself was not permanently
conquered by the Mamluks until 1375, when the citadel was
captured and the surrounding city destroyed. 59 Hence the
isolated Armenian strongholds along the northern fringes
of the Cilician plain were the backbone of the kingdom,
and it must have been from here that 1-lethoum I and his
successors swept down to reoccupy any sites which had been
destroyed each time the Mamluks or the Mongols departed.
The fate of Sis and Vagha can be contrasted with that of
Toprak, which, as we have seen, probably failed to resist
the Mamluk raid of 1266, was sacked in 1298, and was
finally handed over to the Muslims almost forty years
later. Indeed, the fact that the present remains of the
castle date almost exclusively from the fourteenth century
suggests that Toprak lay in ruins between 1298 and 1337,
56 Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, p.466.
Alishan, Sissouan, pp.172-73.
58 Boase, 'Gazetteer', pp.163-64.
Jean Dardel, Chronigue, pp.7O-84; Fedden and
Thomson, Crusader Castles, pp.99-100.
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and was then rebuilt once the Mamluks had decided to
incorporate Cilicia into their empire permanently. These
events also imply that although its defences were hardly
weak, Toprak lacked the strength of its neighbours further
north, for it was situated on an artificial hill rather
than a mountain, and lay directly in the path of anyone
attacking the area via the Belem pass or the Ainanus Gates.
Furthermore, if the Armenians did indeed abandon Toprak as
early as 1298, and therefore lost this link in their
network of intervisible castles, it merely confirms that
the mountain fortresses to the north and east were so
strong that they could survive independently, and could
withstand besieging armies even without any prior
warning 60
Similar circumstances may also explain why the Armenians
lost control over strongholds which lay beyond the Taurus,
Anti-Taurus and Amanus ranges relatively quickly. Darbsak,
which had been regained after 1260 courtesy of the
Mongols, fell to Baybars in 1268, because it simply became
too exposed to Mamluk aggression after the fall of
Antioch. 61
 Indeed, according to Ibn al-Furat, Baybars also
captured several castles to the east of Antioch from
Hethoum I, implying that these had been garrisoned by
Armenian rather than Frankish troops after 1260. This
suggests that Hethoum took advantage of Bohemond Vi's
almost permanent absence in Tripoli to exert considerable
influence over Antioch itself. 62 Many years earlier,
Byzantine weakness had also enabled the Armenians to
o.,'d -Jr j&e	 of (Jke	 /	 affte j'fteXSeS
60 See above, p.238.
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 54-55; Ibn
al-Furat, Selections, II, 166.
62 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 166; Boase, 'The
History of the Kingdom', pp.25-26. The castles to the east
of Antioch had been taken by Bohemond VI around 1261. See
Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 115, 124, 126.
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they held here were coastal sites, which were gradually
picked off by the Seijuks during the reign of Leon II.
Once again, therefore, the Armenians were far more
successful at holding on to those castles which were
remote and were situated in the mountains.63
The design, history and location of sites like Vagha
therefore reflects the Armenians' preference for mountain
castles, but it also illustrates their total lack of
interest in urban fortifications. This is prcbably zziost
evident on the Cilician plain, where they recolonized a
number of sites which had been important urban centres
under the Byzantine Greeks and Romans. When Wilibrand of
Oldenburg travelled across Cilicia in 1212, he wrote that
some of these places, most notably Alexandretta, Misis and
Tarsus, still had the remains of ancient walls around
them, but that these had since fallen into decay, and it
seems that only Adana had any real urban defences left at
all. On the other hand, Tarsus apparently did have a
strong citadel, suggesting that the Armenians had
maintained this structure at the expense of any other
surrounding fortifications. Clearly, therefore, the
inhabitants of Tarsus relied on a compact castle rather
than sprawling curtain walls to protect them.64
Further north, the same defensive strategy was adopted at
Anavarza, a Greek and Roman city later held by the
crusaders and the Armenians. This site is dominated by a
large rocky plateau which gradually thins out into a
63 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, RHCArm I.,644-46;
Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom', pp.23-25; Cahen, j
Syrie du Nord, p.632.
64 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, pp.218-20.See
also Edwards, Fortifications, pp.37-SO, particularly,
pp.43-46.
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narrow spur to the north, whose steep sides and easily
defended access point made it ideal for fortification.
However, whereas the Greeks and Romans used this spur as
a means of refuge in case of trouble, and built their city
in the valley below, the Armenians concentrated all their
building efforts on the plateau itself. Consequently,
while leaving the town walls in the valley to decay, the
archaeological evidence shows that they carried out major
repairs and modifications to the walls of the southern
plateau and the defences of the northern spur. The thin
neck of land connecting these two elements was also
defended by a huge square keep which stands isolated
between two deep ditches to the north and south. This keep
has an inscription on it dated 1188, commemorating the
Armenian repairs carried out on the castle by Leon II,
which the archaeologist Michael Gough has taken to mean
that the keep itself is also Armenian. However, this has
been challenged recently by R.W. Edwards, who has shown
that the masonry and design of the keep is typical of the
kind of towers erected by the Franks throughout the
crusader period, and in particular during the early years
of the twelfth century. The history of Anavarza therefore
illustrates some very interesting aspects of Armenian
military architecture: whilst the urban fortifications of
the site were abandoned and the city itself appears to
have gone into decline, the Armenians concentrated on the
citadel, and only incorporated older structures where this
fitted their needs. Hence the crusader keep was not only
retained because of its strength, but also because its
height gave it intervisibility with Yilan, Tumlu and other
fortresses
Gough, 'Anazarbus', 119-25 (keep: 122-23); R.W.
Edwards, 'The Crusader Donjon at Anavarza in Cilicia',
Abstracts of the Tenth Annual Byzantine Studies
Conference, (Cincinnati 1984), 53-55. See also
Hellenkemper, Bur gen, pp.191-201; Edwards, Fortifications,
pp.65-70; Boase, 'Gazetteer', p.153; Cahen, La S yrie du
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A similar disregard for urban defences is also evident at
Sis, which stood on the lower slopes of a precipitous
ridge above the Cilician plain. The importance of Sis as
the residence of the Armenian kings, and very often also
the catholicos, meant that it appears to have been one of
the few relatively large urban centres in the region, but
Wilibrand of Oldenburg still reported that it had no town
walls whatsoever, only a strong citadel at its summit.66
Although the present remains of the site indicate that
more outer defences must have been added after Willbrand's
visit, the historical evidence confirms that the
inhabitants of Sis primarily relied on this powerful
stronghold, which was essentially yet another mountain
fortress, to protect them against external aggressors. In
1275, for example, the Muslims 'made their way as far as
Sis, but they found no man therein, for they had all
sought protection for themselves in the citadel, and piece
by piece [the Muslims] burnt [the city]'.67 A century
later, during the final siege of Sis, numerous early
Muslim attacks on the citadel also failed 'because the
castle was very strong, and well manned, and well equipped
with stones and trebuchets on the walls, which the king
(Leon VI,1374-75) had placed there, and so there was
nowhere the castle could be attacked except in front of
the gate'. 68 In addition, Sis withstood another less
sustained siege in 1298, whilst it has already been noted
t.h4-in-4-3O7 heo IV' L1th1 sheltered there from t-h.-
Nord, p.152.
66 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.222.
67 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , p.453. For descriptions
of Sis, see Hellenkemper, Burgen, pp.202-13; Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.233-36; Fedden and Thomson, Crusader
Castles, pp.9'7-99; Alishan, Sissouan, pp.241-48; Muller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, p.77.
68 Jean Dardel, Chroni gue, p.73.
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that in 1307 Leon IV's brother sheltered there from the
Mongols 69
It is clear, therefore, that the Armenians only regarded
strongholds like the citadel at Sis as safe havens during
an emergency, and did not live permanently inside
fortresses or behind town walls in the way that the vast
majority of the Franks did during the thirteenth century.
Indeed, few people in Cilicia probably lived in urban
settlements at all, but inhabited much smaller farms and
villages scattered across the plains and the valleys of
the interior. In a sense, this also applied to the higher
levels of society, for at Sis both the cathedral and the
residence of the catholicos, as well as the royal palace
itself, were all located outside the citadel. This is a
far cry from Frankish royal residences such as Kyrenia,
Chiemoutsi and St.Hilarion, all of which were incorporated
into immensely powerful castles.7°
These profound differences between the Armenians and the
Franks also meant that the two peoples were affected by
enemy attacks in sharply contrasting ways. Whereas the
economy of the Latin states was based more on mercantile
trade, that of Cilician Armenia was largely agricultural,
and hence Armenian castles were not so closely linked with
the economic welfare of the region. This meant that the
Armenians did not need to compromise between building
fortifications in strong defensive positions, and at the
same time making them accessible enough for traders and
merchants to use. Cilician castles did not necessarily
have a walled town, or bour, attached to them in the same
way that Frankish strongholds usually did, and so they
Coto	 yfi/	 cebC
69 1298: al-Makrizi, 1-listoire des Sultans, 11(b), 61.
1307: Samuel of Ani, Chrono g raphie, p.466.
70 Alishan,	 Sissouan,	 pp.246-47.	 For Kyrenia,
Chlemoutsi and St.Hilarion, see below, pp.401-2.
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available. Consequently, such castles could be positioned
and designed with little regard to where the civilian
population actually lived, whereas Latin fortifications
often had to be adapted to suit the needs of an already
existing Christian settlement, even if this meant that
they were not located in very good defensive positions.
Hence Armenian castles were usually much stronger than
Frankish ones, but at the same time less significant to
the overall survival of the kingdom. Thus the capture of
a place like Tripoli, whose walls and citadel guarded a
large urban settlement and safeguarded an important centre
of trade, had a far more damaging impact on Syria than the
loss of a single castle like Yuan or even Sis could ever
have on Lesser Armenia.
These observations are perhaps most applicable to areas
near the Mediterranean coast. Whereas the Latins relied on
the sea as a vital economic, political and military
lifeline to the west, the only major coastal centres
consistently occupied by the Armenians were Ayas (Lajazzo)
and Corycos (although the inland ports of Tarsus and Misis
were also connected with the sea via rivers). Both these
ports rose greatly in influence during the thirteenth
century, and became very popular with Latin traders after
the fall of Acre. Hence the Armenians retained and even
augmented many of the ancient defences guarding these two
sites, which had originally been constructed by the
Romans, Greeks and Arabs. At Corycos these defences
consisted of two fortresses, one situated on a headland
just to the east of the harbour, and the other on a small
island a couple of hundred metres off shore. The design
and layout of both these castles owe far more to Roman
military architecture than Armenian defensive strategy.
The land castle, for example, is approximately square in
plan and defended by two concentric curtain walls. These
walls are flanked by numerous square and polygonal towers,
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and include various elements from classical times,
including a Roman triumphal arch incorporated into the
inner rampart. A similar description can be applied to
Corycos's sea castle, as well as the fortifications at
Ayas; pre-Armenian structures which were also situated on
land and an island in the mouth of the harbour. In
addition, both Ayas and Corycos were surrounded by ancient
urban defences, which, like the walls of Tarsus and
Anavarza, were probably abandoned during the thirteenth
century.
However, the decision to maintain the castles of Ayas and
Corycos appears to have been taken by Leon II, who
recognized that closer links with Italian merchants could
bring greater financial prosperity to his kingdom. Hence
Leon granted trading privileges to the Genoese in 1201,
1215 and 1216, the Venetians in 1201, and also the Pisans
in 1216. Leon's successors confirmed and augmented these
grants, 72 and made others to the merchants of Sicily
(1331), Montpelier (1314, 1321), and Catalonia (1293), as
well as the Florentine banking company, the Bardi
(1335). These privileges allowed western merchants to
trade along the coast of Cilicia, in return for paying
certain tolls and taxes which were collected by royal
officials. Consequently, the defences of Ayas and Corycos
were expected to protect a lucrative source of income for
Corycos: Aljshan, Sissouan, pp.397-402; Muller-
Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp.79-80; Edwards,
Fortifications, pp.161-66. Ayas: ibid, pp.77-81; Alishan,
Sissouan, pp.432-34.
Genoa: Langlois, Le Trésor, no.1, pp.105-8, no.10,
pp.126-28, no.15, pp.136-37, no.26, pp.154-61, no.27,
p.162. Venice: ibid, no.2, pp.109-12, no.19, pp.l43-45,
no.25, pp.151-54, no.3i, pp.166-68, no.36, pp.l82-85,
no.40, pp.193-94. Pisa: ibid, no.16, pp.138-39.
Sicily: Langlois, Le Trésor, no.38, pp.186-89.
Montpellier: ibid, no.34, p.l78, no.37, p.185. Catalonia:
ibid, no.28, p.163. Florence: ibid, no.41, p.195.
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the rulers of Cilician Armenia.74
On numerous occasions the fortifications of these sites,
and in particular their sea castles, also sheltered local
people during Muslim incursions. In 1275, for example,
8,000 Egyptians entered Ayas 'and they killed those whom
they found inside', but did not attack those citizens who
had fled to the sea castle. As a result, these people
narrowly escaped certain death, although they were
subsequently set upon by pirates, who 'even carried off
their cloaks' Nevertheless, this incident is a clear
indication that the Armenians used the same tactics to
defend Ayas and Corycos as they did at Sis and Anavarza,
for both harbours were protected by citadels rather than
ramparts, so that their inhabitants could take shelter
temporarily, and then repair any damage inflicted by the
Muslims once they had departed. Indeed, the fact that some
of the trading privileges which have just been mentioned
date from the period after 1275 suggests that Ayas
recovered relatively quickly from this particular
incursion.
However, even if this was not in fact the case, it may be
that the destruction of Ayas and Corycos had a far smaller
impact on the Armenians than the loss of Acre or Tripoli
did on the Franks. Hence Ayas suffered terrible damage in
1322, when the Muslims flattened the city and even managed
to capture the sea castle, whilst in 1337 it was handed
over as part of a wider peace treaty which covered most of
eastern Cilicia. 76
 After these terrible setbacks, both
14 For more details on West European traders in
Cilicia, see Langlois, Le Trésor, pp.35-40; Cahen, La
S yrie du Nord, pp.689-90.
Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy, p.453.
76 1322: Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, RHCArm I., 667-
68. 1337: Nerses Balientz, extract in Alishan, Sissouan,
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Ayas and Corycos, along with the entire Cilician
coastline, were frequently in Muslim hands, but although
this meant that the Armenians were largely cut off from
the west, they still held out against their enemies for
another forty years. This situation was only made possible
by the harshness of the Cilician interior, and the
strength of the Armenians' mountain fortresses, and would
have been unthinkable in Palestine or Syria during the
thirteenth century. The close economic and military ties
between the Franks and western Europe would have made it
impossible for crusader strongholds like Antioch or Crac
des Chevaliers to have survived inland without the
existence of coastal centres such as Tripoli or Antioch's
port at St.Simeon.77
To some extent, the Armenians may also have fared better
against the Muslims because they were united under one
monarch, who could organize a more disciplined defence
than the weak and politically divided rulers of the Latin
states to the south. This unity had largely been achieved
during the middle years of the twelfth century, when
Armenian leaders had captured many Cilician sites from the
Turks, the Franks and the Greeks. As a result, from the
reign of Leon II onwards, the kings of Armenia probably
possessed most of the castles and settlements which have
already been discussed, including Adana, Anavarza, Yuan,
Vagha, Ayas, Sis, Tumlu, Tarsus and Misis.78
Such extensive royal ownership probably also explains how
the Armenians were able to create the kind of intervisible
See above, pp.92-98.
78 The extent of the royal domain can be calculated by
studying Leon II's coronation list, in 1198. See below,
pp.264-65. See also Hellenkemper, Bur gen, p.258, and
above, pp.22-23.
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network of castles which protected the entrances to and
routes across the Cilician plain. The existence of this
network clearly reflects the presence of a strong central
authority, and this has led many historians to argue that
it was primarily the work of Leon II himself. This theory
can be backed up by looking at the historical evidence,
which shows Leon to have been a vigorous ruler whose
reign, along with that of his son-in-law Hethoum I (1226-
70), marked the zenith of Armenian power. Not only did
Leon pursue an aggressive policy toward the Seljuks and
have ambitious plans of incorporating Antioch into his
kingdom, but numerous sources also mention his castle
building activities. Michael the Syrian, for example,
stated that 'the valorous Leon extended his domination
over 72 fortresses', and Vahram of Edessa wrote that 'he
built a number of castles and fortresses, with which he
surrounded Cilicia'
This is to some extent confirmed by the archaeological
evidence. As we have seen, the crusader keep at Anavarza
has an inscription on it commemorating Leon's repair work
there, whilst at Yuan a carved relief above the inner
gateway is often thought to represent Leon seated on his
throne, dating it to the period after 1198. A similar
inscription to that at Anavarza has also been found on the
walls of the sea castle at Corycos, and dates from 1206.
In addition, the close similarities in masonry, vaulting
and building techniques between Yuan and several other
mountain castles implies that many of these structures
were erected by Leon
Michael the Syrian, Chroni qj, p.405; Vahram of
Edessa, Chronigue Rimée, p.511. See also Hellenkemper,
Burgen, p.262.
80 Anavarza: see above, p.256. Yuan: Youngs, 'Three
Cilician Castles', 130. Corycos: Alishan, Sissouan, p.400.
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However, R.W. Edwards has sounded a note of caution about
dating so many castles to such a brief period of time. He
has pointed out that the inscription at Anavarza dates
from 1188, ten years before Leon became king, and that
both this inscription and that at Corycos only commemorate
repair work rather than new foundations. Similarly, there
is no irrefutable proof that the relief at Yuan actually
represents Leon, whilst the building style used in this
and other castles is fairly common to all Armenian
military architecture between the tenth and fourteenth
centuries. 81
 Therefore, it may be an oversimplification to
credit so many Cilician fortresses to Leon, although it
nevertheless seems a fair assumption that such a large and
complex system of castles could only have been created in
the period between c.1190 and c.1260, after the Armenians
had broken away from the Byzantine empire, but before the
Mongols and the Muslims began to tear the kingdom apart.
These time limits also seem logical when one considers the
internal history of Cilician Armenia, for the fourteenth
century in particular witnessed a series of palace coups
and baronial rebellions which severely weakened the
monarchy, and must surely have ruled out extensive and
centrally organized building projects. During most of the
thirteenth century, such clashes were kept to a minimum,
simply because the Armenian kings were by far the most
powerful landholders in Cilicia, and held so many
impregnable fortresses that the nobility lacked the
resources to seize them by force. Indeed, most Armenian
barons probably only held one major castle each, which
would have been traditional hereditary possessions passed
on from generation to generation. By far the most useful,
and in many cases the only way of establishing which
castle belonged to which lord is to consult Leon II's
81 Edwards, Fortifications, pp.33-37.
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coronation list of 1198. This vital document records the
forty five barons who were present that day along with
each family seat, and therefore confirms that Servantikar,
Corycos, Toprak, Silifke, Amouda and Lampron were all
owned by individual nobles at this stage. Of the remaining
thirty nine place names, ten are a complete mystery,
whilst the rest cannot all be identified with any exact
location. It is also by noting significant omissions from
this list, such as Sis, that we can estimate the extent of
the royal domain, although this rather unsatisfactory
method makes it perfectly possible that omitted places
like Tumlu were in fact baronial strongholds which had not
yet been built. This problem casts further doubt on the
theory that Leon II alone constructed most of the Armenian
strongholds in Cilicia.82
However, although it will probably never be possible to
link every medieval ruin in the area with one particular
king or lord, the reign of Leon II still reveals some
interesting information about the methods Armenian rulers
used to keep their followers in check. As we have seen,
this was partly done by ensuring that the royal domain was
far greater than that of any one baron, but it was also
achieved by confiscating the property of those nobles who
were regarded as a risk. Perhaps the best example of' this
aggressive policy is provided by the castle of Lampron,
whose impressive defences and strategic location near the
Cilician Gates have already been referred to. Lampron was
also the seat of the Hethoumids, who were involved in
several damaging internal disputes with their arch-rivals,
Leon II's own Roupenid dynasty. During the twelfth
century, the Hethoumids had frequently allied themselves
with Constantinople against the Roupenids, and over the
next two hundred years they often appear to have exploited
82 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.73-81;
Boase, 'Gazetteer', pp.146-48.
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baronial discontent toward pro-western rulers -very
effectively. However, the principal reason for their
success lay in the sheer strength of Lampron itself, which
was so powerful that 'all the lords of this castle
rebelled because they knew it was impregnable'.83
Many of Leon II's predecessors had tried and failed to
bring this disloyalty to an end by organizing futile
sieges of Lampron. In 1201 Leon therefore came up with a
more subtle plan to gain possession of the castle. 'With
this aim in mind, he sent to Hethoum, son of Oschin, a
message to trick him: "I want to establish a bond of
friendship with you", he told him, "and give Philippa,
daughter of my brother Roupen, in marriage to your oldest
son Oschin". Hethoum accepted this suggestion. The
celebrations for the marriage were to take place at
Tarsus. When the Hethoumids had arrived in this city with
all their relatives and children, the king Leon seized
them and occupied Lampron without any bloodshed. After
having imprisoned Hethoum for a while, he released him,
gave him a number of villages, and treated him with good
will form then on. As for Hethoum, he showed himself to be
a loyal vassal'. 84 Although Lampron eventually returned to
Hethoumid power later in the thirteenth century, these
events illustrate how the seizure of ,just one fortress
could dramatically enhance the strength of an Armenian
king. It is interesting to speculate whether Frederick II
had been as successful in the Holy Land if he had managed
to acquire Beirut and the castles of the Templars in the
same way.85
83 Leon the Great of Cilician Armenia, cited in
Robinson and Hughes, 'Lampron, Castle of Armenian
Cilicia', 183. For a brief history of Lampron and its
bellicose owners, see ibid, 183-88.
84 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.81-82.
85 See above, pp.51, 143.
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Leon's treatment of Hethoum after Lampron had been taken
is also extremely significant, for it reflects a conscious
policy to break away from the more traditional Armenian
custom of outright hereditary ownership, and move toward
a more feudal system of fiefs granted by the king in
return for loyalty and military service. Although it still
remains unclear what these services were, and how, for
example, royal castles were garrisoned, other evidence can
still be produced to show that Leon was indeed trying to
'westernize' the nature of castle ownership. Hence in 1198
the constable Sempad recorded that the 45 barons who came
to Leon's coronation were encouraged to attend because the
new king 'attracted them with his promises, and made them
his men with his grants' . Clearly, Leon wanted these lords
to realize that they did not just hold their castles by
conquest or birthright, but because he allowed them to do
so. 8 Similarly, when Vasil of Vaner, one of the nobles
included in the 1198 list, died heirless in 1214, Leon
took possession of his properties rather than allowing
them to remain under the control of Vasil's extended
family. Hence we find Leon acquiring and handing out fiefs
in the manner of a west European king.87
Thus the rulers of Cilician Armenia relied on a
combination of force and generosity to maintain their grip
on power; a combination which Leon II and his successors
86 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, p.73. See
also Edwards, Fortifications, pp.46-47.
87 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, p.77. The
land was subsequently transferred to the Hospitallers. See
Langlois, Le Trésor, no.8, pp.122-23; Cartulaire, II,
no.1426, pp.464-65, and below, pp. CA1O3. Vaner has been
identified with the castle of Gdkvelioglu, although this
cannot be verified, and Leon II's grant to the
Hospitallers mentions no fortifications at all. See
Hellenkemper, Burgen, pp.165-68; Boase, 	 'Gazetteer'
p.165; Youngs, 'Three Cilician Castles', 118, 125.
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later used to transform their status from that of mere
warlords to that of kings with certain inalienable rights.
This process was not as smooth as one might expect,
however, because it was not always possible to predict
rebellions in advance, or to seize castles pre-emptively
in the way that Leon had done at Lampron. Indeed, it has
already been shown that Leon's successful occupation of
this stronghold was the exception rather than the norm,
and was achieved through stealth rather than military
strength. In a sense, therefore, the Armenians were
victims of their own success, for their mountain castles
were so strong that they encouraged nobles to rebel, and
therefore contributed to the erosion of royal authority.
Hence in 1271 a baronial insurrection sparked off by the
death of Hethoum I was only put down once Leon III managed
to capture the rebels' castles, and their ring leader had
been killed in 'the fortress of the city of Anavarza'.88
Similarly, in 1221 Raymond Roupen used the fortress of
Corycos as his headquarters during a failed attempt to
seize the Armenian throne, in the anarchic period
following the death of Leon II. This crisis came to an end
when Raymond Roupen was defeated and killed by Constantine
of Lampron whilst trying to capture Tarsus.89
In order to understand the underlying causes of these and
many other internal conflicts, it is also important to
take a closer look at the dramatic changes which Leon II
and his successors introduced in the course of the
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some aspects of these
changes, such as the granting of privileges to the Italian
88 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono graphy , p.449, and see pp.449-
50; Vahram of Edessa, Chroni gue Rimée, p.52'?; Constable
Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, p.125.
89 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , pp.379-8O; Hethoum the
Historian, Table Chronolo g i g ue, p.485; Vahram of Edessa,
Chronigue Rimée, p.514; Boase, 'The History of the
Kingdom', pp.22-23; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.631-32.
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city states and the introduction of fiefs, have a1ready
been discussed. Other reforms, most notably the transfer
of numerous castles and estates to the Military Orders and
the forging of closer links with the papacy, were also
intended to strengthen the monarchy, and to bring much
needed financial and military assistance against the
Seijuks, Mongols and Mamluks. However, these policies were
bitterly resented by traditionalists amongst the nobility,
who did not wish to change the Armenian church, give up
free land in exchange for fiefs, or indeed make way for
alien Frankish newcomers.
Perhaps the most important such newcomers were the
Teutonic Knights. They were often favoured by Armenian
rulers because of their close links with the German
emperors, who had supported the idea of an Armenian
kingdom since Frederick Barbarossa's crusade in 1190. This
support ultimately helped bring about Leon II's
coronation, which was attended by the papal legate Conrad
of Mainz and the imperial chancellor Conrad of Hildesheim,
the latter having brought with him a crown from the
emperor Henry VI. 90 Consequently, Leon owed much of his
status to the Holy Roman Empire, and was keen to
strengthen this link by endowing the Teutonic Knights with
various Cilician properties. One of the most significant
of these was the fortress of Amuda (Adamodana), which lay
on the Cilician plain and was granted to the Order in
1212. 91
 In the same year Willbrand of Oldenburg saw it and
90 Constable Sempad, Chroni g ue, ed. Dédéyan, p.73;
Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica Slavorum, p.210; Cahen, La
Syrie du Nord, pp.588-90; Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden,
p.59; Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom', p.19; J.S.C.
Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic Knights in
Cilician Armenia', in The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia,
pp.92-117, at p.111.
91 Langlois, Le Trésor, no.6, pp.117-20; Tabulae
ordinis Theutionici, no.46, pp.37-39; Riley-Smith, 'The
Templars and the Teutonic Knights', p.113.
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remarked on its strength, whilst in 1266 the Muslims
captured it and killed or enslaved the 2,200 people
sheltering there. 92 After this , Amuda's history is
somewhat obscure, and it may in fact have been abandoned,
for in 1298 the Mamluks used it as a meeting point during
their invasion campaign.93
These few recorded events nevertheless give us some ideas
about the functions which Amuda was expected to fulfil.
Further clues are also provided by the archaeological
evidence: Amuda was built on an outcrop approxiate1'j 93
metres above the Cilician plain, at a point where an
important trade route between the Amanus Gates and Sis
crossed the Ceyhan river. The castle's position on high
ground made it intervisible with Yilan, Anavarza, Tumlu
and Toprak, and also gave it great defensive strength, for
steep cliffs rendered it totally inaccessible from the
east, north and west. Consequently much of the site was
defended by a simple curtain wall, which only had one
entrance in the south west corner, and appears to have
been repaired and altered by successive Byzantine,
Armenian and Frankish owners.The most interesting feature
of the castle, however, was the large, square keep, a
three storey structure with immensely thick walls and a
solitary doorway several metres above ground level. This
structure was erected by the Teutonic Knights with little
regard to local building techniques, and its isolated
location at the highest and strongest point of the castle
92 Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.224; Ibn al-
Furat, Selections, II, 99; al-Makrizi, Histoire des
Sultans, 1(b), 34.
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 11(b), 61; Riley-
Smith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic Knights', p.115.
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can be compared with the central keep at Montfort. 94 Its
size and strength also suggests that the Order invested a
lot of time and money in Amuda, which was clearly intended
to act as its headquarters in Cilicia. In addition, the
fortress formed an important link in the network of
intervisible strongholds guarding the Cilician plain and
its inhabitants, and its location near the Amanus Gates
meant that it often bore the brunt of Muslim attackers
using this particular route. Amuda's close proximity to a
popular river crossing also raises the possibility that it
was used to collect tolls from merchants and travellers,
and if this is the case, it can be compared with
Hasanbeyli, a tower and observation post near the eastern
approaches to the Amanus Gates. A document dating from
1271 implies that this structure was the Black Tower, a
toll station which the Teutonic Knights held in the
vicinity of Servantikar.95
To the north of this strategic valley, the Teutonic
Knights also possessed Haruniye (Haroun), which had
belonged to an individual baron in 1198, but was given to
the Order by Hethourn I and queen Isabella in 1236.96 Like
Amuda, Haruniye is situated on high ground, and overlooks
the road between Servantikar and the northern fringes of
the Cilician plain. Its design owes little to Armenian
military architecture and reflects the varied building
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.59-61; Hellenkemper,
Burg en, pp.123-31; Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, p.61.
Montfort: see above, pp.57, 152.
Document translated and reproduced in Alishan,
Sissouan, p.239. See also Edwards, Fortifications, pp.147-
49; Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, p.65, and see below,
p.421.
95 Constable Sempad, Chronigue, ed. Dédéyan, p.'76;
Langlois, Le Trésor, no.18, pp.141-43; Tabulae ordinis
Theutonici, no.83, pp.65-66; Riley-Smith, 'The Templars
and the Teutonic Knights', pp.113-i4.
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work carried out on it over the centuries by Greeks,
crusaders and Muslims. Hence Haruniye has fewer distinct
remains dating from the Teutonic Knights' occupation than
Amuda. The fortress itself was so compact that it amounted
to little more than an elongated keep, with a small
central courtyard, two floors of shooting galleries and a
large rounded tower in the north- west corner. This tower
is significant in that the masonry used in its
construction suggests that it may have been extensively
repaired by the Teutonic Knights, and was possibly even
used by the Order as a chapel.97
Furthermore, Amuda and Haruniye were only the most
important centres at the heart of an extensive territorial
block belonging to the Teutonic Knights between the Amanus
mountains and the Ceyhan river. This region appears to
have been well populated with many villages, as well as
several smaller towers or fortified houses held by the
Order, such as Cumbethefort, which probably lay half way
between Amuda and Haruniye and was visited by Wilibrand of
Oldenburg in 1212. These places presumably fulfilled a
similar role to that of Hasanbeyli, in that they
controlled trade in the region and generally helped the
Teutonic Knights to administer their properties. 98 It is
also extremely significant that the Order had been given
so many lands and castles both to the east and to the west
of the Amanus Gates, for this suggests that Leon II,
Hethoum I and their successors hoped that the German
knights would help them to defend a vulnerable frontier
region against external aggressors, in much the same way
that the Templars and Hospitallers protected the county of
Edwards, Fortifications, pp.143-46; Hellenkemper,
Burgen, pp.116-19.
98 Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.220;
Langlois, Le Trésor, no.6, p.119; Hellenkemper, Burgen,
p.263.
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Tripoli from the Muslims of Horns and Hama. 99
 Initially
this was done to guard the Amanus Gates against the Seijuk
Turks, who had indeed been defeated in a pitched battle
near Servantikar in 1187, but from the 1260s onwards the
Mamluks clearly posed the greatest threat to the Teutonic
Knights, and must ultimately have been responsible for the
destruction of the Order's properties in Cilicia.100
Although they did not share the same significance in terms
of nationality as the Teutonic Knights, the Templars and
the Hospitallers also held castles and estates in Cilicia
during the thirteenth century, but these two Orders we're
often treated in very different ways. During his dispute
with the Templars over the castle of Baghras, and his
attempts to exert more influence over Antioch itself, Leon
II confiscated many Templar properties in or on the
fringes of Cilicia, and at the same time tried to secure
support elsewhere by being very generous to the
Flospitallers. One of the most important grants that Leon
subsequently made to this Order was the castle of Silifke
(Seleucia), which lay near Ayas on the coastal route
leading westwards out of Cilicia. 101
 This stronghold was
composed of an inner curtain wall flanked by several horse
shoe towers, and a wide outer moat whose inner revetment
was so large that it effectively formed a second rampart.
There was no central keep, and all the service buildings
and residential quarters of the castle were therefore
incorporated into several undercrofts and other structures
Riley-Smith,	 'The Templars and the Teutonic
Knights', p.l14, and see above, pp.44-49.
100 Constable Sempad, Chroni g ue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.63-64.
The document of 1271 shows that Haruniye and Hasanbeyli
were still occupied at this time. See Alishan, Sissouan,
p.239; Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic
Knights', pp.114-17.
101 Langlois, Le Trésor, no.3, pp.112-14; Cartulaire,
II, no.1351, p.119.
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Fig.13. Silifke; a concentric castle similar to Crac des Chevaliers.
Fran Edwards, Fortifications, p.221.
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built along the inner faces of the central bailey. As we
have seen, these defences are architecturally significant,
for although the masonry and building techniques used in
their construction are unmistakably Frankish, their
overall design is strongly reminiscent of many Armenian
fortresses. Consequently, Silifke may represent a direct
architectural link between sites like Servantikar and the
castles of Margat and Crac des Chevaliers.02
The way in which Leon II transferred Silifke to the
Hospitallers is also interesting. In the early years of
the thirteenth century a nobleman called Henry and his
three sons, Constantine, Joscelin and Baldwin held Silifke
along with numerous smaller castles, including Goumardias
(Camardias) and Norpert (Castellum Novum). Henry was also
married to the sister of the Armenian catholicos John,
with whom Leon had numerous disputes during this period,
which were probably caused by resentment toward the
latter's pro-Frankish policies. In addition, it has
already been noted that Armenian control to the west of
Silifke gradually receded at this time in the face of
Seijuk expansion. Hence Leon may have killed two birds
with one stone by first having Henry and his sons arrested
for conspiring against him in 1207, and then granting
Silifke and its adjoining territories to the Hospitallers,
so that they could guard this frontier against the Seijuk
Turks. 103 This policy came to fruition ten years later,
when the Hospitallers and the Armenians together defended
102 Edwards, Fortifications, pp.221-27; Hellenkemper,
Burgen, pp.249-54; Fedden and Thomson, Crusader Castles,
pp.103-5; MUller-Wiener, Castles of the Crusaders, pp.80-
81.
103 Constable Sempad, Chronigue, ed. Dédéyan, p.85;
Hethoum the Historian, Table Chronologigue, p.481; Boase,
'The History of the Kingdom', pp.'2l, 23-25, and see above,
pp.254-55.
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Silifke successfully against the Seljuks. 104
 In addition,
Leon's policy toward the Armenian lord of Silifke can be
compared with his treatment of Hethoum of Lampron in 1201,
and his transfer of Amuda to the Teutonic Knights in 1212.
Perhaps similar circumstances explain why Haruniye was
held by an individual lord in 1198, but belonged to a
Military Order from 1236 onwards. It should also be noted
that the lands which Leon occupied following the death of
Vasil of Vaner in 1218 were subsequently granted to the
Hospitallers. Hence Leon's policy of rewarding the
Military Orders, but at the same time confiscating the
castles of potential troublemakers, often overlapped, and
formed part of a wider campaign to strengthen Cilicia
against both external and internal aggression.105
These observations also seem to be confirmed by what
happened after Leon's death in 1219. It was Leon's
intention that he should be succeeded by his daughter
Isabelle and her husband Philip, who, being the son of
Bohemond III, would hopefully fulfil the old king's dream
of uniting Antioch and Cilician Armenia. However, the
Frankish and catholic Philip was quickly murdered in a
baronial coup led by Constantine of Lampron, who then
installed his own son Hethoum I as king, and forced the
unfortunate Isabelle to marry him. But before she did so,
Isabelle sought shelter briefly at Silifke until the
Hospitallers, under immense political and military
pressure from Constantine, were eventually forced to hand
both their guest and their castle over to the Armenians in
1226. Thus once the powerful figure of Leon had been
removed, there was a Hethoumid-led backlash against
anything Frankish, which resulted in the death of Philip
104 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, RHCArm I., 645.
105 Lampron: see above, p.266. Haruniye: see above,
p.271. Vaner: see above, p.267.
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and the return of Silifkei°6
Ironically enough, however, the Hethoumids must ultimately
have understood the wisdom of gaining the support of the
powerful Military Orders, for as early as 1233 we find the
lord of Lampron giving new land to the Hospitallers from
his private domain. 107 Similarly, many of the properties
which the Order acquired during the reign of Leon II were
not just intended to prevent rebellions or halt the
Seijuks, but were also granted in exchange for troops and
money to pay for the war with Bohemond IV and the
Templars, who stood in the way of Leon's ambitious plans
to rule Antioch. Hence the Hospitallers only held Silifke
as long as they made an annual contribution of 400
horsemen to the royal army, 108 whilst Vasil of Vaner's old
estates were sold to the Order for a sizeable amount of
cash. 109 In 1214 the Hospitallers also provided the king
with 20,000 Saracen bezants in return for several other
large estates, including the castle of Canamella, which
lay along the coast between Alexandretta and Misis. These
estates were to be handed back to Leon provided he could
repay his loan within two years, otherwise the Order could
keep them.' 10
 During this period Raymond Roupen, Bohemond
IV's rival for the throne of Antioch, also issued a spate
of charters granting or confirming numerous privileges and
properties to the Hospitallers in order to secure their
106 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.93-94,
95-96; idem, Chronigue, RHCArm I., 647-48; Hethoum the
Historian, Table Chronologigue, p.485; Samuel of Ani,
Chrono g raphie, p.460; Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom',
pp.23-25.
107 Langlois, Le Trésor, no.17, p.14O.
108 Constable Sempad, Chronigue, RHCArm I., 646.
109 Langlois, Le Trésor, no.8, p.122.
'	 Cartulaire, II, no.1427, pp.165-66; Langlois, j
Trésor, no.9, pp.124-25.
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assistance h11
Hence the primary functions of Hospitaller castles in
Cilicia were to defend its western frontier, enhance royal
authority internally and bolster Armenian influence in the
principality of Antioch. As far as the Hospitallers
themselves were concerned, these strongholds must also
have been used to protect and administer the extensive
territories which they gained under Leon II, particularly
Silifke, which became the residence of the Order's
preceptor in the area) 12 However, the close ties which
Leon established with the Hospitallers were largely forged
at the expense of the Teuiplars, whom the Armenians clashed
with regularly during the early years f the thirteenth
century. These clashes, combined with the incomplete
nature of Templar records, makes it difficult to work out
the extent of the Order's properties in Cilician Armenia,
although contemporary sources do confirm that it had held
considerable territories in the vicinity of the Belem pass
since the twelfth century, and possibly as early as the
1130s. 113
 As we have seen, the key fortresses in this area
were Baghras, Hadjar Choghian and Darbsak, which had
therefore originally been entrusted to the Templars to
defend Antioch against Byzantine or Muslim incursions from
the north. However, with the decline of both Frankish and
Byzantine control over the Cilician plain, the Armenians
increasingly regarded these castles as a threat to their
independenc e , and a hindrance to their hopes of
trolling Antioch. These factors explain the intense
111 See above, pp.113-14.
Willbrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.224; Riley-
Smith, The Knights of St.John, p.157.
113 A.W. Lawrence, 'The Castle of Baghras', in
Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, pp..34-84, at pp.4l-43; Riley-
Smith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic Knights', pp.92-97;
Forey, The Militar y Orders, p.61.
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hostility between Leon II and the Templars.
Much of this hostility centred around the castle of
Baghras, which had been abandoned by its original Templar
garrison at the approach of Saladin, and was subsequently
occupied by the Armenians. 114 Architecturally, this site
is extremely complex, partly because of its location on a
steep and inaccessible outcrop, and partly because of the
immense difficulties involved in trying to disentangle the
Byzantine, Frankish, Muslim and Armenian elements within
it. 115
 Hence the lower bailey which guarded the eastern
approaches to the fortress, as well as the huge revetment
supporting the shooting galleries of the south-west
corner, have all been attributed to the Armenians by the
archaeologist A.W. Lawrence, who dates them to the period
between 1191 and c.1200. 116 Edwards, on the other hand,
has pointed out that the Armenians rarely, if ever,
constructed revetments, and has also drawn comparisons
between the masonry of the lower bailey and numerous other
Templar sites, including Darbsak. Similarly, the various
residential and defensive structures of the upper bailey
are arranged in a compact, typically Armenian fashion, but
a more detailed study of individual architectural elements
within these buildings reveal certain similarities with
the Templar citadel at Tortosa. 117 It would be wrong,
therefore, to argue that Baghras is largely Armenian
114 Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, I, 731-32; Abu
Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 378-79; Eracles, II, 136;
Lawrence, 'Baghras', pp.44, 45; Riley-Smith, 'The Templars
and the Teutonic Knights', pp.97-98.
115 For a full description of the site, see RW.
Edwards, 'Bagras and Armenian Cilicia: A Reassessment',
Revue des Etudes Arméniennes, XVII, (1983), 415-55, at
419-32; Lawrence, 'Baghras', pp.49-83.
116 Lawrence, 'Baghras', pp.55-56, 62-63.
117 Edwards, 'Bagras and Armenian Cilicia', 420-23,
426, 429.
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simply because it is a mountain castle situated in a
remote area. Indeed, Edwards has reached the conclusion
that 'the Armenian presence here is no more than a
flirtation', and that Lawrence has generally overestimated
the importance of the site to Leon II.
Consequently, the strategic role of Baghras, just like its
architectural and political history, remains unclear and
surrounded by doubt. Whereas Edwards's archaeological
survey appears to have been carried out with greater
knowledge of Armenian fortifications in genera],
Lawrence's conclusions seem to concur more with the
historical evidence. The krab historian lbn a1-Athir, for
example, wrote that 'the son of Leon, prince of the
Armenians, marched on this place which was near his
territory. He rebuilt Baghras carefully and stationed a
garrison there to carry out raids on the surroundings'
whilst Wilibrand of Oldenburg stated that Baghras was 'a
very powerful castle, with three strong walls and towers
around it, situated in the last mountains of Armenia. It
carefully guards the entrances to that land, whose ruler,
the king of Armenia, holds it'. These descriptions suggest
that Leon's presence at Baghras was more than a mere
'flirtation', and that contemporaries considered the
castle to be strategically very important.119
This is confirmed by Leon's own attempts to hold on to
Baghras for as long as possible, and not return it to its
original Templar owners. In 1199 Leon wrote to Innocent
iii, claiming that the castle was his by right of
118 Edwards, 'Bagras and Armenian Cilicia', 431-432.
119 Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevar ykh, I, 732; Wilibrand
of OeflbUrg, Itinerarium, p.216.
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conquest, but the pope quickly rejected this argument,'2°
and during the ensuing years his representatives were kept
almost constantly busy trying to solve the problem of
Baghras, as well as the Antiochene succession dispute
between Raymond Roupen and Bohemond IV. Moreover, in 1203
the situation worsened when Leon seized Roche de Roussel
and Roche Guillaume from the Templars, justifying his
actions by portraying the Order's efforts to retrieve
Baghras as unprovoked aggression against the Armenians.'21
Two years later, Leon also made a vigoro's attempt to
recapture the former Templar castle of Darbsak from the
Muslims. 122 Needless to say, such tactics did not please the
Templars very much, and in 1211 another period of failed
negotiations and sporadic warfare culminated in a major
Templar attack on the area, including perhaps Baghras
itself. 123
 However, by this point the immense pressure
placed on Leon by the papacy the Tetaplars aud Boemcxd
IV, combined with the Seijuk threat in the west, all
conspired to bring about a change in Armenian policy. In
1212 Leon agreed to restore all Templar properties, and in
1213 the excommunication imposed on him by Innocent III
was lifted, although even then he managed to stall things
for a further three years before finally handing back
Baghras' twenty eight years after Saladin's invasion.'24
120 Innocent III, PL, Ccxiv, Lib.II, no.259, cols.819-
20.
121 Innocent III, Bk, CCXV, Lib.VII, no.189, col.504,
Lib.VITI' no.119, cols.689-90.
122 Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 317-18.
123 Eracies, II, 317-18; Innocent III, PL, CCXVI,
Lib.XIV' no.64, cols.430-32.
124 Innocent III, PL, CCXVI, Lib.XVI, no.7, cols.792-
93; jleySmith, 'The Templars and the Teutonic Knights',
p.107. For more details on this conflict, as well as the
parallel Antiochene succession dispute between Raymond
Roupen and Bohemond IV, see ibid, pp.98-10'?; Cahen, La
Syrie du Nord, pp.596-623.
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Clearly, therefore, Baghras meant so much to Leon that he
was prepared to use any means to hold on to it. This
determination reveals much about the dual role of the
castle, for whilst Baghras guarded a key route into
Cilician Armenia, Wilibrand of Oldenburg also noted that
'it overlooks Antioch directly', and could therefore be
used to intimidate or even attack the city) 25
 Indeed, it
seems plausible that Leon utilized Baghras for this very
purpose during his failed assault on Antioch in 1203.126
On the other hand, in 1226 and 1237 the reinstalled
Templar garrison of the castle successfully withstood
Aleppine besieging forces attacking from the east,
confirming that Leon had been correct in thinking that
Baghras would help him defend the Cilician plain.'27
Consequently, Baghras was vital to the security of both
Antioch and Cilicia, and it seems reasonable to conclude
that whilst Lawrence may have overestimated the extent of
its Armenian structural remains, Edwards has
underestimated its strategic importance.
Leon's actions also help us to understand the extent and
military role of other Templar fortifications near
Baghras. In the same way that Baghras guarded the Belem
pass, so the Templar castle of Darbsak had controlled the
entrance to another more northerly defile through the
Amanus mountains during the twelfth century, but it was
never recaptured by the Order after 1188.128 Nevertheless,
125 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.216.
116 See above, p.145.
121 1226: Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, II, 168-70;
Constabl e Sempad, Chroni gue, RHCArm, I.,648. 1237: Abu'l-
Fida, Annales , ID.112.
128 Abu Shama, Deux Jardins, IV, 376-77; Ibn al-Athir,
ijA l xJ yJci, I, 730-31; Cahen, La Syrie du Nord,
pp. 144-45•
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Leon's attempt to retake the fortress in 1205, as well as
another failed crusader attack in 1237, both indicate that
Darbsak had once been a key Templar stronghold, whose loss
clearly undermined both Frankish and Armenian security in
the region. This also helps explain why Hethoum I
reoccupied it after the Mongol invasion of 1260.129
On the Cilician side of the valley guarded by Darbsak the
Templars also held the castle of Hadjar Shoghian, which
the Franks either called Roche de Roussel or Roche
Guillaume. Again, this castle was located on a high, steep
sided summit which required few man made defences,
although some of the remains there, most notably a square
keep and a chapel, could date from the Templar
occupation.' 3 ° It was from this castle that the Templars
launched their failed expedition against Darbsak in 1237,
illustrating that its role had changed dramatically since
1188. Before this date Darbsak and Hadjar Shoghian had
worked together with Baghras to create a defensive network
protecting Antioch from the north, whiJst in the
thirteenth century Hadjar Choghian found itself defending
the Cilician plain against Muslim attacks from the east.
Returning to the problem of Hadjar Shoghlan's Frankish
name, some information can be gleaned from contemporary
descriptions of military campaigns in the area, most
notably the Mamluk attack on Antioch in 1268.131 But
whereas Cahen used this evidence to show that Had.jar
Shoghian should be identified with Roche de Roussel,
Deschamps tried to prove that it is in fact Roche
129 1237 and 1260: see above, pp.115-16.
130 Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.142-43.
Gestes, p.772.
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Guillaume, and that the rival candidate is located on the
coast, to the south of Alexandretta. This latter theory
appears to be less plausible, however, for both castles
were clearly so closely linked with Darbsak and Baghras
that it seems odd for Roche de Roussel to be situated so
far to the west, along the Mediterranean sea. Thus Hadjar
Shoghian is most likely to have been known as Roche de
Roussel, although this conclusion means that the exact
location of Roche Guillaume remains a mystery.132
Beyond the Amanus mountain range, the Templars also held
Port Bonnel, which has generally been identified with the
small harbour of Arsouz, to the west of the Belem pass.
This site would have given the Order's surrounding castles
and territories direct access to the sea; an important
facility once Saladin had captured Saone and Latakia,
thereby making the land route to the south hazardous and
difficult to use. Port Bonnel remained under Templar
control until Baybars destroyed the principality of
Antioch in 1268.133 Moving further north, it seems
unlikely that the Order could have owned any properties on
the Cilician plain itself during the reign of Leon II, or
indeed his heir Hethoum I, who became embroiled in further
clashes with the Templars during the 1230s. 134 However,
some historians have argued that they did hold extensive
lands here during the thirteenth century, basing their
theory on Ibn al-Furat's claim that during the Mamluk raid
on Cilicia of 1266, 'a Templar fortress known as al-Tina,
or according to another version, al-Tinat (Canamella), was
132 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.363-
65; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord, pp.143-45.
133 Gestes, p.766. See also Boase, 'Gazetteer', p.l'77;
Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p.141. Saone and Latakia: see
above, p. JT82.
134 Eracles, II, 405-6; Cahen, La S yrie du Nord,
pp.651-52.
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destroyed, and a large number of fortresses and towns of
theirs were burned and destroyed' . But this source should
not be accepted at face value, for Canamella belonged to
the Hospitallers, whilst Amuda, which it also attributed
to the Templars, belonged to the Teutonic Knights. Thus
Ibn al-Furat appears to have confused the three Orders,
and there is no reliable evidence that the Templars
possessed any castles to the north of Roche de Roussel.135
Therefore the role of Templar fortifications in this area
differed dramatically from that of the castles belonging
to the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights. Whereas the
latter two Orders became close allies of Leon II, the
Templars found themselves trying to defend the remnants of
their twelfth century properties against an expansionist
Armenian monarchy. These properties, and in particular
Baghras, Darbsak and Roche de Roussel, remained
strategically important throughout the crusader period,
because they were located half way between Cilicia and
Aritioch, and could therefore be used to defend or attack
either region, depending on who happened to control them
at the time.
The changing fortunes of all three Military Orders in
Cilicia, including the virtual expulsion of the
Hospitallers from Silifke in 1226, also remind us of the
dramatic impact the reign of Leon II had on the area in
general, and the divisions which his reforms caused within
Armenian society. So far these divisions have generally
been looked at in political terms, but many of the
internal clashes which broke out during the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries also had a strong religious element
to them. Indeed, it has already been shown that Silifke's
135 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 99. See also al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 34. Canamella: see
above, p.276. Amuda: see above, p.269.
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original Armenian owners had strong links with the
catholicos John, who probably resented Leon II's attempts
to be on good terms with the papacy, and seek its approval
regarding the problem of Baghras. 136 Similarly, the
rebellion of 1271 against Leon III appears to have been
led by a faction of Greek Orthodox nobles, whose patriarch
at Antioch was forced to flee once the uprising had
failed.' 37 In 1307/08 the catholicos Constantine of
Caesarea and the Grand Baron Hethoum also headed a council
at Sis where it was finally decided to accept Roman
Catholicism and recognize papal supremacy In exchange for
more western aid. owever, t1nis decision sparked oil a
virtual riot in the city, and many citizens and members of
the Armenian Church had to be imprisoned, exiled or even
executed so that order could be restored. This incident is
particularly significant in that it illustrates the
feelings of the common people rather than the aristocracy,
and suggests that even though Armenian kings did not need
to suppress a totally alien Muslim or Greek population,
their castles may still have helped them to maintain
internal security whenever highly unpopular political or
religious changes were introduced.'38
However, despite the risk of rebellions, Armenian rulers
often continued to seek assistance from the west in return
for religious reform. This policy became most apparent
following Leon V's (1320-41) marriage to Constance, widow
of Henry II of Cyprus, which meant that when Leon died in
1341 without an heir, the Armenian throne passed to Henry
136 Constable Sempad, Chronigue, ed. Dédéyan, pp.85,
88.
137 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , pp.449-50. See also
Vahram of Edessa, Chroni gue Rimée, p.527; Constable
Sempad, Chronigue, ed. Dédéyan, p.125, and see above,
p.268.
138 Samuel of Ani, Chronora phie, pp.465-67.
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II's nephews, John and Guy of Lusignan. John ('Constantine
111') and Guy ('Constantine IV') ruled from 1341 until
1342 and from 1342 until 1344 respectively, but this
attempt to establish an alliance with Cyprus also failed
because of resistance to it from within Cilicia. Indeed,
both men were murdered, and 'had an ephemeral reign,
because the troops rebelled against them'. 139 Although
both Benedict XII and Clement VI continued to plan a new
expedition to Cilicia at this time, these events must also
have undermined their efforts, and may help explain why
the crusade of 1344 attacked Smyrna rather than the
Muslims threatening Sis.40
Earlier in the fourteenth century, further in-fighting
between Hethoum II (1289-1307) and his three brothers,14'
as well as the arrest and execution of the lord of Corycos
in 1329, suggest that struggles between pro- and anti-
western factions became almost commonplace during this
period, and that virtually anyone bearing a grudge or
hoping to seize the throne would Join one or the other
party. 142 The Armenian throne hardly seems to have been
worth having, however, for its occupants continued to make
desperate appeals to Rome until as late as 1372, when
Constantine TV's widow Mary asked for military aid and a
139 Mardiros of Crimea, Liste Rimée des Souverains de
la Petite Arménie, RHCArm I., lines 56-57, p.685; Jean
Dardel, Chroni g ue, pp.20-28, 21n5. John of Lusignan may
not have been crowned king, and may have died of natural
causes. See also Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom'
pp.30-31.
140 C. Kohler, Lettres pontificales concernant
l'histkre de la Petite Arménie au XIVe siècle, (Paris
1909), nos.6-8, pp.320-21; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers
Interventions', pp.12829. Smyrna: see below, pp.341-42.
141 Samuel of Ani, Chronographie, pp.464-65; Hethoum
the Historian, Table Chronolo g i gue, pp.489-90; Boase, 'The
History of the Kingdom', p.29.
142 Constable Sempad, Chroni gue, RHCArm, I., 670-71.
287
powerful new husband who could help her country.143
Another letter sent to the Armenian catholicos by John
XXII granting marriage dispensations to certain nobles,
despite their having too close links of consanguinity with
their intended brides, suggests that by this date
successive Muslim invasions were actually killing off the
Armenian aristocracy. 144
The fourteenth century correspondence between Rome and the
kingdom of Armenia also reveals some interesting details
about the fate of individual castles during the bleak and
badly documented final decades of Armenian independence.
In 1323, for example, John XXII wrote to Leon V confirming
the king's donation of Paperon, a fortress near Lampron in
the Taurus mountains, to Oschin, lord of Corycos. The fact
that Leon felt the need to seek papal approval in this way
shows how much more closely Rome had become involved with
the internal affairs of the Armenians; a far cry from the
days of Leon II, when the pope was only consulted on such
matters if the king thought that it could strengthen his
own hand.145
Whilst the gradual disappearance of various baronial names
from royal witness lists suggests that other fortresses
were irretrievably lost to the Muslims during this period,
papal records also give some clues about the later history
143 Kohier, Lettres pontificales, nos.15-17, pp.324-26,
no.18, pp.326-27.
144 Kohier, Lettres pontificales, no.2, pp.315-16. For
more details on fourteenth century plans to send a crusade
to Cilicia, see Boase, 'The History of the Kingdom',
pp.29-33 Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers' Interventions',
pp.123-31.
145 Kohler, Lettres pontificales, no.4, pp.318-19. For
more details on Paperon, see J. Gottwald, 'Die Kirche und
das Schloss Paperan in Kilikisch-Armenien', BZ, XXXVI,
(1936), 86-100; Hellenkemper, Buren, 237-40; Boase,
'Gazetteer', pp.155-56; Edwards, Fortifications, pp.102-9.
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of castles belonging to the Military Orders in Lesser
Armenia. The Teutonic Knights, for example, must have lost
their possessions on the exposed Cilician plain by 1375 at
the very latest, and may never in fact have returned to
Amuda after 1266.146 In 1299 the Templars probably lost
their last major castle on the mainland when Roche
Guillaume fell, and it is not even certain if any of their
remaining Cilician properties were taken over by the
Hospitallers following their dissolution in the early
fourteenth century.147 Moreover, the Hospitallers
themselves held no major castles there following the loss
of Silifke in 1226, even though they frequently
participated in expeditions to the area after 1291.
Indeed, when John XXII asked them to garrison two castles
along the Cilician coast in 1332 (Antiochetta and
Sigurium), the Order apparently refused, primarily because
of the expense involved, but perhaps also because the
Armenians were considered untrustworthy) 48 However, this
notwithstanding, the Hospitallers were involved in the
Cypriot occupation of Corycos and Adalia during the early
1360s, and helped Peter I recapture Ayas briefly in
1367. 149
 These campaigns indicate that some westerners, and
especially the papacy, still hoped that European crusaders
would be able to reconquer the Cilician coastline, and
thereafter perhaps the Holy Land itself.
However,	 the
death of Peter I in 1369, combined with greater
Hospitaller involvement in the Aegean rather than the
eastern Mediterranean, effectively brought an end to west
146 See above, p.270.
141 Gestes, p.839; Riley-Smith, 'The Templars and the
Teutonic Knights', p.125.
148 RHCArm I., p.xxxiv; Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers'
Interventions', pp.128-29.
149 See above, pp.221-22.
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west European efforts to reconquer the Cilician coastline.
But it is doubtful whether such expeditions contributed
significantly to the Armenians' ability to hold out
against the Muslims anyway. The answer to this problem lay
not on the coast, but in the mountains and on the northern
fringes of the Cilician plain. The fortresses which were
situated in this area had deliberately been constructed on
the most remote and inaccessible outcrops available, with
little regard to social, economic or political factors.
This enabled their occupants to retain their eendeDce
well into, and sometimes even beyond, the late fourteenth
century. Further south, however, the many non-military
uses which Frankish castles were put to meant that
isolated mountain strongholds were relatively rare, and
most fortified sites were located in very vulnerable low
lying areas along or near the coast. The few Latin sites
which truly were mountain castles, most notably Akkar and
Montfort, appear to have fared much better against the
Mamluks, suggesting that the defensive strategy adopted by
the Armenians was ultimately superior to that of the
crusaders, whose reliance on the sea prevented them from
straying too far inland.
But whilst the sheer Impregnability o Cilician castles
enabled the Armenian kingdom to outlive its Frankish
neighbours, such structures also tended to undermine royal
power, and became safe havens for those nobles and
churchmen who rebelled against the many reforms introduced
by Leon TI and his successors. This in turn weakened the
region's chances of withstanding external attackers, and
even as early as the 1220s we learn that because of the
internal disputes between queen Isabelle and Constantine
of Lampron, 'sultan Ala ad-Din, lord of Beth Rhomaye
(leader of the Seljuk Turks), was master of many of the
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fortresses of Cilicia'. 150
 Hence we are left with the
irony that the very same castles which had protected the
Armenians for so long also contributed to the
disintegration of royal authority, and the final
destruction of Sis in 1375.
150 Bar Hebraeus, Chrono g raphy , p.389.
Fig.14. The Aegean. Fran Joinville and Villehardouin: Cbronicles
of the Crusades, trans. M.R.13. Shaw, (London 1963).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE ROLE OF FORTIFICATIONS IN FRANKISH GREECE
AND THE AEGEAN, 1204-c.1380.
The sheer extent of the territories involved, combined
with the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Greeks,
Cumans, Bulgars and Turks, made the Latin conquest and
colonization of the former Byzantine empire the most
ambitious project undertaken by the crusaders. Indeed, it
has already been mentioned that even allowing for the
exaggeration of medieval chroniclers, some Frankish rulers
may have found themselves outnumbered by at least ten to
one in their struggles with the Bulgars and the Greeks of
Nicaea. During the Fourth Crusade itself, Villehardouin
also noted that for every crusader besieging
Constantinople, there were 200 citizens defending it.1
When one considers that the vast majority of the crusaders
subsequently returned home, it quickly becomes apparent
that the Latins were just as outnumbered by the local
population as they were by their external enemies. As a
result, the Latins turned to castles as a means of
compensating for their lack of troops, in the same way
that they had done in the Holy Land since the very
beginning of the crusader period.
The sheer quantity of medieval ruins still standing in
Greece and Turkey bears witness to this, particularly in
the Peloponnese, where virtually every hill top seems to
have been fortified at some time or another. However,
although one would think that this should make the task of
identifying and describing crusader fortifications
relatively simple, this is not the case. Indeed, there are
a number of problems which make the study of Frankish
castles around the Aegean fraught with difficulties, not
I Villehardouin, La Con guëte, p.92.
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least the lack of historical sources. Bearing in mind that
there are certain periods, particularly in the fourteenth
century, when 'we cannot reconstruct completely' 2 the
history of southern and central Greece in general, it is
hardly surprising that the fate of individual castles in
this area frequently remains obscure for decades at a
time.
To make matters worse, the Latin overlords of Greece and
north-west Asia Minor adopted the same tactic of recycling
older masonry as their Byzantine predecessors, when they
constructed their castles and urban fortifications. As a
result, it is often impossible to tell whether a wall
composed of classical masonry blocks robbed from a much
earlier building is the work of Greeks or Latins. Trying
to establish if a strongpoint is Frankish, Catalan,
Navarrese or attributable to another western dynasty such
as the Acciajuoli lords of Corinth is even harder.
Inevitably, these problems have led to arguments about
dating and origin amongst the few archaeologists and
historians who have studied the subject. Such arguments
can perhaps best be summed up by looking at the castle of
Androusa, located in the south western Peloponnese, the
heart of the principality of Achaea. The present remains
of Androusa include sections of a single curtain wall,
flanked by several rounded, square and polygonal salients,
as well as a large tower, whose design and unusually thick
walls suggest that it acted as a keep. The castle's
masonry is typical for medieval Greece: a mixture of
small, uncut stones quarried locally, shards of pottery
and other fragments found at the site, and larger,
presumably classical, masonry blocks used to strengthen
Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.267.
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corners, doorways and other weak spots.3
In his monumental work on castles of Morea, Antoine Bon
dates this stronghold to the mid-thirteenth century, with
possible additions in the fourteenth century. The
Aragonese version of the Chronicle of Morea appears to
confirm this when it states that Androusa was built by
William de Villehardouin, who reigned from 1245 until
1278. But there are problems with this conclusion. A
number of features at Androusa, and in particular the use
of decorative brickwork and the presence of a pentagonal
open gorge tower along the north curtain, are typically
Byzantine, but extremely rare in Frankish military
architecture. 5 Bon accounts for these anomalies by
suggesting that the crusaders used local craftsmen, which
may well be true, but he never seems to consider the
possibility that some of the defences at Androusa were
constructed either before 1205, or during the brief period
of Greek domination in the area between the 1420s and
1450s. 6
 Likewise, when discussing the date of the oldest
fortifications at Mistra, Bon again lets the historical
evidence take precedence, basing his conclusion that the
castle must have been constructed 'in its entirety' by
William II on a statement to that effect in the Chronicle
of Morea. 1
 In a clear reference to Bon's work, the
Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.637-39.
Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.638-39; L. de los f.,
c.216, p.49.
Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.63'7, 638; C. Foss and D.
Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications: An Introduction,
(Pretoria 1986), pp.3O-31, 162-64.
6 Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.645. For the later history
of Androusa, see ibid, pp.411-12; Miller, The Latins in
the Levant, pp.391-92, 448-49.
Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.639. The following scholars
all agree with Bon: Andrews, Castles, pp.161, 173;
Runciman, Mistra, pp.29-30, 95; W. Muller-Wiener, Castles
of the Crusaders, trans. J.M. Brownjohn, (London 1966),
pp.84-85. For a description and history of Mistra see
Andrews, Castles, pp.l61-82, and, in far greater detail,
Runciman, Mistra, pp.9-146. See also L. de la c., c.205D,
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Byzantine scholar David Winfield challenges these findings
on archaeological and architectural grounds, asserting
that at Mistra 'there is nothing in the hill top citadel
and not very much on the site as a whole to indicate that
Villehardouin did more than reoccupy a typical Byzantine
hill town'. Winfield then goes on to claim that in Greece
'a number of fortifications that are probably Byzantine
have been assigned without question to the Franks'.8
In making these claims both scholars take somewhat extreme
views. Bon prefers to believe the Chronicle of Morea even
when this clearly contradicts the archaeological evidence,
whereas Winfield's more Byzantine stance immediately
assumes that the written sources are wrong. Moreover,
attempts by other historians to reconcile apparently
contradictory sources of evidence have led to some very
odd conclusions indeed, such as Robert Traquair's argument
that the fortress of Chlemoutsi (Clermont), the famous
royal stronghold in western Achaea, dates from the 1430s,
even though the most cursory inspection of the castle's
remains suffices to show that it must have been built
before the introduction of gunpowder.9
The lack of historical evidence, and the use of classical
masonry or other stone bearing few distinguishing features
such as masons' marks, have therefore prevented
archaeologists and historians working in this field from
carrying out the kind of systematic excavation and
research being conducted in the former crusader states of
pp.73-74, translated from To Chronikon tou Moreos: the
Chronicle of Morea, ed. J. Schmitt, (London 1904), p.200;
L. de los f., c.215, p.49.
Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, pp.30,
34.
R. Traquair, Mediaeval Fortresses of the North-
Western Peloponnesus', ABSA, XIII, (1906-7), 268-81, at
277-79.
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the Holy Land. This in turn has led to the kind of doubts,
arguments and misinterpretations outlined above. As if
this were not enough, however, many of the most important
medieval sites in Greece were also repaired or even
totally rebuilt by the Venetians, who took over several
coastal strongholds from their original owners during the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These include Corinth,
Nauplia, Monemvasia and Patras. Between 1685 and 1715 all
these places (as well as the much older Venetian colonies
at Modon and Coron) were recaptured from the Turks, and
their original medieval defences were hidden under even
more elaborate ramparts and artillery bastions. 1° It
should also be noted that from around 1500 onwards the
Turks themselves either demolished older crusader
fortifications, as appears to have been the case at
Boudonitza in the former duchy of Athens, 11
 or carried out
their own alterations and improvements, as can be seen at
Modon.
These myriad difficulties make it pointless, and in most
cases virtually impossible, to try to describe the
appearance and history of individual strongholds in
Frankish Greece. It is more useful and realistic to give
a few examples of medieval fortifications, in order to
address some of the problems already discussed, and
ultimately shed more light on the various functions of
crusader castles in the area. In doing so, however, it
must be remembered that we are usually dealing with trends
and probabilities rather than exact dates and facts, and
10 For more details, see Andrews, Castles, pp.135,
137-38, 143-45 (Corinth); pp.90, 91-92, 94-105 (Nauplia);
pp.192-96, 198-99, 209-10 (Monemvasia); pp.116, 117-19,
129 (Patras).
A. Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales de la Grèce
centrale', Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénigue, LXI,
(1937), 136-208, at 163.
Andrews, Castles, pp.74-78, 81.
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that many questions will remain unanswered until more
sites are excavated in detail.
All crusader fortifications in Greece can be placed in
three general categories: those which the Latins built
from scratch, on sites showing very little, if any,
evidence of previous occupation; those which were
constructed incorporating older Byzantine or classical
structures; and finally those which were already in good
condition at the time of the Fourth Crusade, and were
simply reoccupied by the Franks. In Thrace, Macedonia,
Asia Minor and eastern Thessaly most strongholds fall into
this latter category, mainly because the crusaders were
too poor or in control too briefly to carry out their own
repairs and building programmes. Thus Appolonia, located
on the furthest outskirts of Frankish territory facing
Nicaea, was referred to as 'one of the strongest and most
imposing castles to be found' as early as 1204, and
clearly needed few improvements before the crusaders could
garrison it with their own troops.' 3 North of Apollonia,
a series of equally well defended coastal strongholds
formed the backbone of Frankish power in Asia Minor.
Perhaps the most important of these was Spiga (Pigae), one
of the last Latin outposts to fall to the Nicaean Greeks
in 1225. Located on a promontory forming a good natural
harbour, Spiga was protected by a powerful Byzantine
rampart flanked by a series of closely set pentagonal
towers, which must have been maintained by the Franks and
are still largely preserved to this day.'4
On the European side of the Bosphorus, the crusaders
inherited some even more spectacular Byzantine
fortifications, particularly at Constantinople itself.
13 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.190.
14 Foss and Winfield, B yzantine Fortifications,
pp.154-55. Fall of Spiga: see above, p.30.
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This city's landward side was protected by the famous
double walls of Theodosius II (408-50), as well as a
number of later structures, including the rampart of
Manuel Comnenus (1143-80), which was located near the
Blachernae palace and bore the brunt of the Frankish land
offensive in 1203.15 That these defences had been kept in
good condition is attested to by the events of the Fourth
Crusade, when the Latins failed to take Constantinople
from the west, and were forced to concede that 'never was
a city so well fortified'.' 6 Interestingly, the Venetians
had far more success when they launched a naval attack on
the seaward defences, and managed to capture twenty five
towers along the Golden Horn by lowering wooden tatw
from their ships onto the ramparts. 17 In preparation for
the second Frankish siege of Constantinople in April 1204,
the Greeks were forced to heighten these towers 'with two
or three wooden storeys', but were still unable to prevent
the Venetians from gaining access to the city in almost
exactly the same spot. This suggests that the single sea
wall may have been lower, weaker and possibly in a far
worse state of repair than the land defences. It also
ilJustrates the huge advantage which Venetian naval power
gave the crusaders over their Greek opponents.18
15 Foss and Winfield, B yzantine Fortifications, pp.41-
70; A. van Millingen, B yzantine Constantinople: the walls
of the cit y
 and adjoining sites, (London 1899), pp.51-58,
122-27, 164-74.
16 Villehardouin, La Con guëte, p.l34, and see ibid,
pp.90-102; Robert of Clan, La Con guête, c.44-49, pp.44-
51; Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols.923-27.
Ibid, col.926; Villehardouin, La Conguête, pp.96-
100; Robert of Clan, La Conguête, c.44, p.45, c.46, p.47,
c.49, p.51.
18 Quote: Villehardouin, La Con guête, p.134. See also
ibid, pp.138-42; Robert of Clan, La Conguête, c.63, p.62,
c.70-77, pp.69-'?'?; Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols.947,
951-54. For a description of Constantinople's sea walls,
see van Millingen, B yzantine Constantinople, pp.178-267;
Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, pp.70-73.
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Fig.16. The walls of Constantinople, showing the section which
bore the brunt of the Frankish land attack during the Fourth Crusade.
Frc*n Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, p.247.
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If the thirteenth century sea defences of Constantinople
were not in a particularly good state, the Franks were
fortunate that the Venetians could patrol the Bosphorus
for them, and that most of their opponents attacked the
city by land. Baldwin of Flanders and his successors were
all so lacking in troops and resources that 'no repairs
are attested for the period of the Latin Empire', and it
seems that the sheer size of the Theodosian walls alone
saved the city from imminent capture when it was besieged
by a combined force of Bulgars and Nicaean Greeks in 1235
and 1236.19 These observations are confirmed by the fact
that Michael VIII Palaeologus carried out extensive
repairs on the capital's ramparts during the 1260s, 70s
and 80s.20
Contemporary accounts of the Frankish conquest of
territories to the west of Constantinople suggest that
many Byzantine settlements in Thrace, acedonia an
Thessaly were similarly well protected at the beginning of
the thirteenth century. Demotika, for example, was
described as 'a very fine, strong and wealthy castle' at
this time, while the fortress of Christopoli (Kavala) was,
according to Villehardouin, 'one of the strongest in the
world'. 2 ' Descriptions of the Thracian rebellion of 1205
and Ioannitsa's subsequent campaigns in the area also
reveal that Arcadiopolis, Stenimaka, Philippopolis,
Rousion and Rodosto all had urban fortifications of some
kind, while Adrianople was so well defended that initial
Frankish attempts to capture the city failed despite a
19 Foss and Winfield, B yzantine Fortifications, p.42,
and see below, p.358.
20 George Pachymeres, De Michaele, I, 186, 187. The
Blachernae palace also had to be restored at this time,
because it had been left in such a bad state by the last
Latin emperor, Baldwin II. See ibid, I, 144, 161.
21 Villehardouin, La Con guëte, p.166.
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sustained siege	 involving	 ladders,	 catapults	 and
sapping 22
Special reference should also be made to Thessaloniki,
whose vast defences, begun in the fourth and fifth
centuries, formed a triangle around the city, with an
impregnable hill top citadel at its apex. 23
 The history of
these defences, which most closely resembled the
Justinianic ramparts at Antioch, is somewhat obscure
during the crusader period. 24 It sou1d seem, however, that
they kept Theodore Angelus, despot of Epirus, at bay for
several months when he besieged the city in 1224, whilst
in 1209 they proved an insurmountable obstacle for the
emperor Henry, who had to use cunning rather than force to
overpower Thessaloniki's rebellious Lombard garrison.25
Accounts of the Norman attack on Thessaloniki in 1185 also
suggest that even the sea wall had been kept in good
condition by the Greeks.26
Beyond Thessaloniki, it is likely that the citadel of
Larissa represented another stronghold which was perfectly
intact at the time of the Fourth Crusade. This is implied
by the events of 1209, when the emperor Henry arrived in
the city and was obliged to besiege its Lombard defenders,
22	 Villehardouin,	 La	 Con g uëte,	 pp.200,	 204-6
(Arcadiopolis,	 Stenimaka,	 Philipoppolis);	 pp.240-44
(Rousion); pp.246-48 (Rodosto); pp.206-16, 234-36
(Adrianople). For Adrianople, see also Nicetas Choniates,
Historia, col.1002; Robert of Clan, La Conguête, c.112,
pp. 105-6.
23 Miller, Essays on the Latin Orient, p..2'79; Foss and
Winfield, B yzantine Fortifications, pp.5, 8; M. Vickers,
'The Byzantine Sea Walls of Thessaloniki', Balkan Studies,
II (1970), 261-78.
24 For Antioch, see above, p.6?.
25 1224: see above, p.29. 1209: see above, p.34.
26 Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols.651-54; Miller,
Essays on the Latin Orient, pp.275-76; Vickers, 'The
Byzantine Sea Walls of Thessaloniki', 272-74.
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who only withdrew from the citade:L as a result of
protracted negotiations rather than a successful assault
by the Franks. It is interesting to speculate whether
Boniface of Montferrat's campaign of 1204, and indeed the
entire Frankish invasion of northern Greece, had succeeded
if the Greeks had put up as much resistance as the
Lombards later did. After the fall of Constantinople,
virtually all the strongholds between the capital and
Larissa simply surrendered to the Franks without a
struggle. Those places which did try to defend themselves,
most notably Adrianople, caused the Latins considerable
trouble. Hence the crusaders were lucky, firstly in that
they were spared a series of lengthy sieges as they moved
west through Thrace and Thessaly, and secondly in that
they were able to reoccupy a large number of strongholds
which were already well fortified. It is extrettely
doubtful whether the Franks, with their limited numbers
and resources, had ever succeeded if the circumstances had
not been so accommodating.27
Consequently, the brevity of Frankish rule, the poverty of
the Latin emptre and the good state o older Byzantine
fortifications either made it unnecessary or impossible
for the crusaders to improve the Greek strongholds they
occupied, or to erect new defences of their own.
Presumably vast structures such as the ramparts at
Thessaloniki needed minor repairs during the crusader
period, but the total lack of archaeological evidence for
this, even at Constantinople, merely reinforces the
impression that the Franks relied almost entirely on the
works of their Greek predecessors. In central and southern
Greece, where Latin rule was stronger and more permanent,
the only comparable site was Monemvasia, located on the
27 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.647-61, pp.97-1O4. For the initial invasion of northern
Greece, see above, pp.24-25.
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east coast of the Laconia peninsula. Its situation on a
vast, sheer sided rock separated from the mainland by a
narrow stretch of water, made it so impregnable that it
was not captured by the Franks until 1249, following a
bitter three year siege. By 1262, however, the castle had
already been handed back to the Greeks as part of William
II's ransom following the battle of Pelagonia. 28
 As a
result, the Franks barely had time to integrate Monemvasia
into the principality of Achaea, and it is extremely
unlikely that they ever built any new fortifications
there. This is confirmed by the archaeological evidence,
which suggests that the Byzantine citadel is the only pre-
Venetian structure on the site.29
The second category of castles and fortifications
mentioned earlier covers the vast number of strongpoints
which incorporated a combination of both Frankish and
older Byzantine or classical defences. Structures of this
type varied enormously. As one would expect, they occurred
most commonly in Achaea and the duchy of Athens, but there
were also a few such fortifications further east. At
Nicomedia, for example, the Franks fortified a large
Byzantine church and surrounded it with outer defences, in
a simple but effective arrangement which withstood at
least one Nicaean siege. 30 In 1206 the crusaders also
reached Cyzicus, a narrow headland not far from Spiga, and
found that 'there had been in ancient times a fortress
with walls, towers and ditches; and they were nearly in
ruins. And the army of the Franks entered it, and Peter of
28 1249: L. de la c. , c.189-90, pp.67-68, c.202-6,
pp.72-74; L. de los f., c.210-14, pp.48-49. 1259-62: see
above, pp.29-30.
29 Andrews, Castles, pp.206-7, 209-10. For a
description and history of the whole site, see ibid,
pp. 192-210.
30 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp.272, 288. See also
George Acropolites, Annales, col.995.
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Bracieux, to whom the land had been assigned, began to
rebuild it, and to construct two castles and two
entrances') 1 Other castles in Asia Minor which were built
or repaired using similar methods included Charax, Civetot
and Panormos, all of which lay along the coast)2
Within the European half of the Latin empire, the
chronicler Henry of Valenciennes also wrote that in 1208
the emperor Henry decided to reconstruct the ruined castle
of Pamphilon in Thrace. Having defeated a vast Bulgar and
Cuman invasion force, Henry therefore went to this spot,
where he and his marshal swore not to leave 'until the
walls had been rebuilt and repaired' . Local labourers were
subsequently recruited and the work was completed with
such speed and determination that a new Frankish garrison
had been installed before the onset of winter. Although
this castle must have been situated somewhere along the
main road between Constantinople and Philippopoli, its
exact location has unfortunately never been established.33
When reading about the construction of such places, one is
immediately struck by the impression of great haste, and
the lack of money, troops and resources. Clearly, the
ephemeral nature of Frankish rule within the Latin empire
itself meant that it was not only convenient, but
essential, to reoccupy older Byzantine or Hellenistic
ruins, where the immediate supply of ready cut stone
facilitated the construction of new defences in a matter
of weeks. Similarly, it seems that Boniface of
Montferrat's refortification of Serres, carried out in
31 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.272. The Catalans
reoccupied the same site over a century later, when
Andronicus II employed them to fight the Turks in Asia
Minor. See Ramon Muntaner, L'expedició, c.203, pp.4'748
George Pachymeres, De Michaele, II, 398-99.
32 Villehardouin, La Cong uête, pp.l88, 274-76.
Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.550, 551, pp.50-51, c.554, p.52.
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1206-07 in response to Toannitsa's attack on the town the
previous year, amounted to hasty repair work rather than
a brand new building programme. 34
 To some extent the
apparent ease with which Theodore Angelus overran this
area in 1221 may confirm this. 35
 At any rate, it is
certainly true that Frankish domination over Serres,
located on the northern outskirts of the kingdom of
Thessaly, was just as precarious as that over the coastal
regions of Asia Minor.
In central Greece and the Peloponnese, however, greater
political stability ensured that former Byzantine and
classical sites were repaired, improved and even rebuilt
on a far larger scale. But this did not necessarily mean
that crusader fortifications were constructed to a higher
standard. At Patras, for example, William Aleman, the
first Frankish lord of the city, considerably improved the
defences of the lower bailey of the Byzantine citadel, but
this was done using masonry robbed from the neighbouring
archbishop's residence! Admittedly William may have been
motivated by a desire to reduce the power of the local
clergy, but his ruthless and desperate actions also
reflect the poverty of most of the Frankish adventurers
who came to Greece, and their urgent need to maintain
their fortifications at a time when much of the
countryside still remained virtually unconquered.35
3 Villehardouin, La Congute, pp.232-34; Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, col.1006.
1221 siege: Re gesta Honorii papae III, II, no.3877,
p..56, and see above, pp.29-30, 29n62.
Innocent III, EJ, CCXVI, no.164, col.340; Miller,
The Latins in the Levant, p.64; E. Gerland, Neue Quellen
zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistmus Patras,
(Leipzig 1903), p.14. Rivalry between the barons and
archbishops of Patras came to an end when William Aleman's
successor sold the lordship to the Church and returned to
western Europe; L. de los f., c.398, p.88. During the
fourteenth century the city was allied to, and eventually
came under the protection of, Venice; F. Thiriet, Rgestes
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At other sites, the amount of alteration undertaken by the
crusaders varied considerably, depending on whether these
places were in ruins or were still occupied at the time of
the Frankish invasion. A good example of the latter type
of fortification is Kalamata, located on the coastal plain
of south-western Morea. In 1205, William of Champlitte
only obtained its surrender by promising the defenders
that he would respect their land and property. 37 This
suggests that the stout double baileys of the fortress,
which protected its more vulnerable eastern side, pre-date
the thirteenth century. Indeed, it seems that the only
structure at Kalamata built by the crusaders was the keep,
a huge, slightly rectangular building located at the
highest point of the inner bailey, and constructed using
the same combination of classical ashlar blocks and small,
uncut stones as that already described at Androusa 38
Another stronghold which was probably occupied almost
continuously from classical times up to the thirteenth
century and beyond was Arcadia, situated near the lonian
coast on the other side of the Messenian peninsula from
Kalamata. Like its neighbour, Arcadia also relied on its
isolated position at the top of a steep, narrow hill for
much of its defensive strength. This meant that the design
des d1ibrations du snat de Venise concernant la
Romanie, (3 vols., Paris 1958-61), I, no.520, p.130.
During the early fifteenth century Venice rented the
entire city from the Church for a while, until the Greeks
of Mistra captured it in 1430; Marino Sanudo, Vite de'
Duchi, cols.839, 917. See also Miller, The Latins in the
Levant, pp.363-64; Gerland, Neue Quellen, pp.55-6'?, 149-
73; Andrews, Castles, pp.116-19; Traquair, 'Mediaeval
Fortresses', 279-80, and see below, pp.334-35.
L. de la c. , c.112-13, pp.37-38. See also L. de los
f., c.113, p.28.
38 Andrews, Castles, p.34, and see pp .30-35; Bon, La
Morée frangue, pp.6O6-68; Traquair, 'Mediaeval
Fortresses', 271-72.
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of the castle was almost totally dictated by the shape of
the summit. It enabled the original builders to leave
particularly inaccessible areas, such as the sheer north
side of the hill, virtually devoid of man made defences,
and to concentrate their efforts on the weaker southern
and eastern approaches. Here two successive baileys and
curtain walls, flanked by numerous towers and salients,
defended the main access route to the summit itself.39
Small sections of classical masonry, some of it still in
situ, suggest that this defensive arrangement is extremely
old, and was merely improved upon by the Byzantines. When
the crusaders first arrived in 1205 they were immediately
impressed by the sheer strength of Arcadia's
fortifications, and in particular the large tower at the
summit of the castle, which they believed had been built
by 'giants'; a clear reference to the vast, antique blocks
used in its construction. Indeed, Arcadia did not finally
surrender to the Franks until they began to bombard this
tower with several catapults. 40
 Many of the upper levels
of Arcadia's walls, however, were built using far smaller,
uncut stones, whose appearance is so generic that it is
very difficult to date them accurately. It does
nevertheless seem that the large, round tower at the
eastern corner of the site was constructed by the Franks,
just like the keep at Kalamata.4'
Numerous other fortifications in southern and central
Greece can be placed in the same group as Arcadia and
Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.669-70; Andrews, Castles,
pp.85-89. Arcadia can be compared with the mountain
fortresses on Cyprus. See above, p.213.
L. de la c., c.115, p.39. See also L. de los f.,
c.114, p.28
41 Andrews, Castles, p.89; T.S.R. Boase, 'The Arts in
Frankish Greece and Rhodes', in HC, IV (1977), pp.208-28,
at p.219.
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Kalamata. These include Coron, Patras, Athens and Thebes,
taken by the crusaders in 1205,42 and Nauplia, Corinth and
Argos, captured in 1211-12, 1210 and 1212 respectively.43
At about the same time the crusaders also occupied
Neopatras, which they held until its recapture by Theodore
Angelus in 1219. Almost all these places had to be taken
by force, a clear indication that they were fully
functioning military strongholds at the time of the Fourth
41 Coron: Villehardouin, La Cong uéte, p.196; L. de la
p, c.111, p.37. Patras: ibid, c.91, p.30. Athens and
Thebes: Nicetas Choniates, Historia, col.995.
The exact date of the fall of Corinth, Argos and
Nauplia remains unclear. They were initially besieged by
Boniface of Montferrat in late 1204: Villehardouin, La
Conguête, p.196; Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols.991,
998. According to the Chronicle of Morea, Corinth and
Nauplia were not captured until the 1240s: L. de la c.,
c.190-200, pp.68-71; L. de los f., c.211-i2, p.48; To
Chronikon tou Moreos, pp.188-97. However, papal documents
from the reign of Innocent III alluding to the fall of
Corinth (PL, CCXVI, no.6, cols.201-2) and Argos (,
CCXVI, no.77, col.598) suggest that the much earlier dates
given above are correct. For argos, see also To Chronikon
tou Moreos, p.104; L.de los f., c.93, 95, p.24. L. de los
f., correctly attributes the capture of Corinth to
Geoffrey I of Villehardouin (c.188, p.43), but
subsequently appears to make the same mistake as the L. de
la c. by implying that Corinth fell much later in the
thirteenth century (c.212, p.48). See also Longnon,
'Problèmes de l'histoire de la principauté de Morée', 156-
57; Eon, La Morée frangue, p.68.
Neopatras and surrounding territories had been
granted to Boniface of Montferrat's followers in the
partition treaty of 1204; Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden, I,
486-88. It presumably fell to the crusaders during
Boniface's campaign in the area; Villehardouin, La
Congute, p.178; Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols. 986,
990-91; Nicol, The Despotate, pp.35-36, 57-58. In 1319 the
Catalans captured Neopatras, and it became an important
duchy under their rule until the Turkish invasion of 1390.
See Marino Sanudo, Epistulae, ed. J. Bongars, in Gesta Dei
per Francos, sive orientalium expeditionum et reni
Francorum Hierosolimitani historia a variis, sed illius
aevi scri ptoribus litteris commendata, (2 vols., Hannau
1611), II, Ep.III (1325), 291; A. Rubió y Lluch, 'Els
Castells catalans de la Grecia continental', Annuari de
l'Institut d'estudis catalans, II (1908), 364-425, at 399-
413.
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Crusade. In terms of design and location they also shared
a number of important characteristics. Like Arcadia,
Corinth, Argos, 'Jeopatras and Thebes were all mountain
castles, and were defended by successive baileys and
outworks arranged around an ancient acropolis. All four
sites had either been occupied continuously since
classical times, or had been refortified in the eighth and
ninth centuries, when the political stability of the early
Byzantine period was fast disappearing. 45 Although Patras,
Nauplia and Coron were located in less precipitous coastal
areas, they too were built on hilltops or promontories
which had already acted as refuge sites for many
centuries 46
As at Arcadia, the oldest parts of these places were also
represented by the kind of Cyclopean masonry which
characterized the fortifications of the classical world.47
Above these remains, the later Byzantine defences were
built using a combination of small, poor quality stones
quarried locally, recycled antique masonry and any other
materials (such as broken pottery, bricks or tiles) which
could be found nearby. This latter type of construction is
perhaps best preserved along the north wall of the outer
bailey at Patras, which probably already existed by the
ninth century, and incorporated a bewildering array of
ashlar blocks, column drums and marble slabs robbed from
For general descriptions of these sites, see,
Corinth: Andrews, Castles, pp.138-45. Argos: Bon, La Morée
frangue, pp.674-76; Andrews, Castles, pp.107-15.
Neopatras: Rubió y Liuch, 'Els Castells', 399-400. Thebes:
Bon, 'Forteresses medievales', 189-91.
46 For general descriptions of these sites, see,
Patras: Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.670-73; Andrews,
Castles, pp.119-29. Nauplia: ibid, pp.92-105. Coron: ibid,
pp.15-23.
Good examples of such masonry can still be seen at
Argos. See Andrews, Castles, p.113, and figs.125-27,
pp.112-13.
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much older structures.48
From the early years of the thirteenth century onwards,
the Latins carried out their own repairs and improvements
on these castles. It is remarkable how often these
alterations involved the addition of a strong, central
tower or keep. Such structures have already been mentioned
at Kalamata and Arcadia, and good examples have also
survived at Corinth and Neopatras. 49 Reference should also
be made to the famous medieval tower at Athens, probably
built by the Acciajuoli in the fourteenth cent&ry.. bcit
unfortunately demolished in 1874. It was situated on the
ancient acropolis, which was itself well fortified enough
to resist a major attack by Leon Sgouros, the Greek ruler
of Corinth, during the brief period of anarchy on the eve
of the Frankish invasion (1205).50 From photographs it
seems that this tower was extremely sturdy, having been
constructed almost entirely from smooth marble slabs,
without the usual filling of smaller stones or rubbled
mortar. Standing to a height of at least 85 feet, it must
have been one of the most impressive medieval structures
built from recycled masonry anywhere in Greece.51
48 Andrews, Castles, p.126, and see fig.144, p.126;
Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.673.
Kalamata: Andrews, Castles, pp.34-35. Arcadia:
ibid, p.89; Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish Greece', p.219.
Neopatras: Rubió y Liuch, Els Castells', 400. Corinth:
Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.6'74; Andrews, Castles, p.140.
Perhaps the Aragonese version of the Chronicle of Morea
was referring to this keep when it reported that William
II of Villehardouin repaired 'the castle of Corinth'. See
L. fe los f., c.216, p.49.
50 Nicetas Choniates, Historia, col.991; Miller, The
Latins in the Levant, pp.31-32. On the great strength of
the acropolis in general, see Setton, Catalan Domination,
pp.l88-89.
51 Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.401-2; P.
Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis, Athens. The
Photographs of William J. Stiliman', ABSA, LXXXII, (1987),
131-33; P. Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece',
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Other improvements carried out by the Latins normally
amounted to the restoration, or even rebuilding, of outer
defences and curtain walls. It has already been mentioned
that such work was carried out by William Aleman at
Patras, whilst at Corinth it is possible that the
Acciajuoli strengthened the ancient ramparts in the
fourteenth century. 52
 The poor quality of the masonry at
Argos makes it impossible to draw similar conclusions for
this site, 53
 while at Coron and Nauplia it is the
proliferation of later Venetian artillery forttficattons
which makes the task of identifying medieval alterations
difficult. The historical sources nevertheless tell us
that by the late thirteenth century the Venetians had
already expanded the Byzantine castle at Coron so much
that it was deemed impregnable. 54
 The Chronicle of Morea
also records that there were in fact two fortresses at
Nauplia in the thirteenth century, implying that the lower
slopes of the promontory as well as its summit were
fortified in some way. 55
 It is possible that a small
section of wall, a triangular bastion and two rounded
towers visible beneath a collapsed fifteenth century talus
represents a small section of these defences. Certainly a
postern gate incorporated into the wall and built using
recycled classical stone resembles later fourteenth
century Catalan work at Boudonitza and Salona (Amphissa),
where doorways were framed with vast, antique masonry
ABSA, LXXXI, (1986), 101-23, at 107, 111-12.
52 Patras:	 see above,	 p.303. Corinth: Andrews,
Castles, pp.140-41.
ibid, p.108.
Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.106.
L. de la c., c.199, p.71.
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slabs 56
The scarcity of medieval remains at Nauplia is also
comparable to Thebes, where a solitary tower, again built
using much older masonry, is all that survives from the
palatial castle constructed there by Nicholas II of Saint
Omer in the mid- to late thirteenth century. 57
 However,
the fact that Thebes withstood a major siege in 1209, when
the emperor Henry attacked the rebellious Lombard garrison
using an array of mines, catapults and battering rams,
proves that this was yet another site where the Latins
were merely repairing and extending fortifications rather
than building new ones.58
Many of these observations also apply to the numerous
ruined sites and acropolises in southern and central
Greece which the crusaders reoccupied. Unlike Arcadia,
Corinth and the other strongholds just mentioned, these
places had not been maintained and refortified during the
Byzantine period, although some may still have been
inhabited as open settlements. Their natural strength and
ready supply of high quality masonry made these sites
extremely attractive to the Latins, who exploited them in
the same way that the Frankish invaders of Asia Minor had
done at Cyzicus in 1207.
Inevitably, fortresses which belong to this group contain
56 Nauplia: Bon, La Morée frangue, p.6'7'7; Andrews,
Castles, pp.93-94. Boudonitza: Bon, 'Forteresses
Medievales', 161. Salona: ibid, 177.
This was destroyed by the Catalans to prevent its
recapture by the Franks. However, the Catalans probably
retained some urban defences at Thebes. See L. de la c.,
c.554, pp.220-21; To Chronikon tou Moreos, p.524; Bon,
'Forteresses Medievales', 187-91.
58 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.672-78, pp.111-13.
See above, pp.301-2.
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far more structures dating from the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries, although they were often just as
likely to incorporate the same kind of defences as more
Byzantine sites such as Arcadia. Hence at Boudonitza, an
important castle on the northern frontiers of the Athenian
duchy, we find the familiar arrangement of successive
baileys dominated by a hill top citadel, even though this
stronghold was probably built almost exclusively by the
Franks and the Catalans. The masonry at Boudonitza also
confirms that like their Byzantine predecessors, the
Latins tended to rely on uncut stones quarried locally, if
it was found that there were not sufficient classical
remains left which could be recycled. 60 Other interesting
examples of this type of fortification include Salona and
Zeitoun (Lamia) in central Greece, and Modon and Akova in
the principality of Achaea. 61 Thus at Modon the crusaders
came across an open settlement 'which had been without
walls for a long time' , even though this 'city' was
clearly still inhabited by a fairly large Greek population
living inside the ruins of much older urban defences. It
seems that these remains were subsequently used by the
Latins when they refortified the site in 1205.62
Although later Venetian structures have long since
60 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales' , 148-63; Boase, 'The
Arts in Frankish Greece', pp.214-15.
61 For general descriptions of these sites, see,
Modon: Andrews, Castles, pp.61-83. Salona (Amphissa): Bon,
'Forteresses Medievales', 164-86; Rubid y Liuch, 'Els
Castells', 413-25; Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish Greece',
p.215. Akova: Bon, La Morée fran g ue, pp.634-35. Zeitoun
(Lamia): Rubió y Liuch, 'Els Castells', 393-98; Boase,
'The Arts in Frankish Greece', p.216.
62 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.194. It seems that
these hastily built defences were demolished by the
Venetians when they subsequently occupied Modon. See
Martin da Canal, La Chroni gue des Veneciens, c.67, p.349,
and below, p.334.
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obscured	 these	 defences,	 the	 implication	 of
Villehardouin's statement is that the crusaders provided
Modon with some kind of urban fortifications. At many
other sites whose ancient ramparts had been abandoned by
1205, the Franks appear to have begun the process of
restoration by constructing large, isolated towers out of
the surrounding ruins. This was certainly the case at
Akova, situated in the mountainous interior of the
Peloponnese. Here it seems that a fairly robust
rectangular keep once dominated the castle, which
otherwise relied on a combination of sheer cliffs and
thin, poorly constructed curtain walls for its defence.63
Similarly, the central donjon at Boudonitza had walls two
metres thick and an entrance positioned 2.2 metres above
the ground, while the outer ramparts of the fortress were
often twice as thin and had flanking towers situated as
much as 80 metres apart. 54 At Salona, another medieval
stronghold built on an ancient acropolis, a large round
tower located at the summit of the inner ward may belong
to the same category, although the fact that this
structure is round, an almost unique feature in central
Greece, makes it unclear whether it is in fact Frankish,
Catalan or Turkish. 65
 What is clear, however, is that
castles like Salona were generally dominated by central
towers which were far stronger than any surrounding
fortifications. They therefore compare well with intact
strongholds such as Kalamata, whose defences were of
course also strengthened by the addition of donjons during
the Frankish period.
Having looked at castles which were either intact in 1204,
63 Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.634-35.
64 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 152-61, particularly
at 161.
65 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 179-83; Rubió y
Lluch, 'Els Castells', 415-17.
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or were constructed on the ruins of far older
fortifications, it is now time to discuss those
strongholds which the Latins built from scratch on
previously unoccupied sites. Such castles are extremely
rare, and it seems that none were ever erected outside
southern and central Greece. Within this area, one of the
most important fortifications of this kind was Glarentza
(Clarence), located on a headland toward the north-eastern
tip of the Peloponnese. Glarentza was built on a rocky
plateau overlooking a small harbour, which was once
protected by a number or reefs and jetties. The town
itself was defended by a single curtain wall roughly two
metres thick and built from irregular, uncut stones, which
were only replaced by proper courses of masonry along the
parapet and in other more exposed areas. Along the length
of the wall there were at least two gates, which gave
direct access to the town, and were not protected by any
additional measures such as machicolation or 'L' shaped
passageways. However, they were originally separated from
the surrounding plain by a 20 metre wide moat running the
length of the landward rampart, while a small rectangular
citadel located halfway along the west curtain also acted
as a final refuge for the town's population.66
Little is known about the history of these fortifications,
or the exact date of their construction, although the
architectural evidence suggests that they were built at
some point in the thirteenth century on a previously
unused site. 67 Similar conclusions can probably be made
about Karytaina, located in the mountainous interior of
the Peloponnese. Built on a rocky outcrop far above the
66 Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.602-7. See also Traquair,
'Mediaeval Fortresses', 272, 275-79, although this
description is less reliable, and the attached history of
the site appears to confuse it with Chlemoutsi.
67 Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.324, 607.
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Fig.l7. The castle of Karytaina is very similar to many other nountain
fortresses built or occupied by the Franks, including Mistra and Arcadia.
Note also the possible remains of an isolated square keep in the upper
courtyard. Fran Bon, La Moree franque, plate 66.
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surrounding valleys, Karytaina's north, south and west
sides are so steep that they required few defences and
were not even protected by complete circuit walls. On the
relatively gentle eastern slope, however, a large outer
bailey and a fairly elaborate barbican guarded the main
approach to the castle from the village below. 68 Within
the inner fortress itself, there were a number of
buildings ranged around a lower and an upper courtyard,
and two of these are worth mentioning individually.
Firstly, there was a great hall situated along the south
curtain, whose doorway, windows and fireplace are
unmistakably French in style. Secondly, there appears to
have been a tower, or keep, which stood in isolation
between the two courtyards. The presence of these
buildings, as well as a number of other features such as
the inferiority of the masonry, the low quantity of
flanking towers and the weakness of the walls (only 90
centimetres thick in the barbican), all point toward a
Frankish construction of the thirteenth century. 69
 This is
apparently confirmed by the Chronicle of Morea, which
states that the castle was built by Geoffrey of Briel,
nephew of the first lord of Karytaina, at about the same
time as the fall of Monemvasia (l249).°
Many of the defences described at Karytaina - an upper
citadel dominated by a central keep, a combination of
sheer cliffs and successive baileys to block access to the
summit, a poorly constructed but elaborate barbican - are
also present at the mountain fortress of Livadia in
southern Thessaly, largely attributed to the Catalans,
with some possible Frankish and Turkish elements.
Moreover, the only classical masonry to be found at
68 Bon, La Morée frangue, pp .629-30, 631.
69 Bon, La Morée fran gue, PP.630-33.
70 L. de la c., c.219, p.79. See also L. de los f.,
c.118, p.29.
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Livadia was taken from an ancient temple some distance
away, and there is nothing to indicate that this is
anything but a purely western construction, built on a
virgin site.71
By identifying features such as reused or low quality
masonry, inaccessible location, and the presence of keep
towers, Bon has placed a number of other medieval
fortifications in the same category, including Géraki and
Kalavryta. 72 Relying on statements to that effect in the
Chronicle of Morea, he has also concluded that Androusa,
Old Navarino, Mistra, Beaufort (Leutron) and Old Mania,
all of them in the Peloponnese, were founded by the Franks
in the course of the thirteenth century. 73 But in the case
of Androusa, it has already been pointed out that a number
of architectural discrepancies make it possible that this
castle existed in some form before 1204. Doubt has also
been cast on Bon's assertion regarding Mistra. The upper
castle of this site is dominated by a large, rectangular
keep, which, as we have seen, is an extremely common
feature in Frankish military architecture in Greece. Many
of the surrounding ramparts and gateways, however, show
71 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 194-206; Rubió y
Liuch, 'Els Castells', 383-87.
72 Kalavryta: Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.633-34.
Géraki: ibid, pp.642-45.
Androusa: L. de los f., c.216, p.49; Bon, La Morée
frangue, pp.637-39. Old Navarino (Port de Jonc): L. de la
c., c.554, p.221; L. de los f., c.471, p.103; Bon, j
Morée fran gue, pp.668-69. For a detailed description, see
also Andrews, Castles, pp.42-48. Mistra: L. de los f.,
c.215, p.49; L de la c., c.205D, p.73, translated from To
Chronikon tou Moreos, p.200; Bon, La Morée frangue,
pp.639-42, and see also Andrews, Castles, pp.168-74;
Runciman, Mistra, pp.29-30. Beaufort (Leutron): L. de los
f., c.216, p.49; L. de la c., c.205E, p.74 . , translated
from To Chronikon tou Moreos, p.202; Bon, La Morée
frangue, p.504. Old Mania: L de la c., c.207, pp.74-75; L.
de los f., c.215, p.49; Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.503-4;
R. Traquair, 'Laconia: I, Mediaeval Fortresses', ABSA, XII
(1905-6), 259-76, at 275-76.
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strong Byzantine influences, which explains why Winfield
has rejected Bon's claims. 74
 Moreover, the archaeological
remains at Glarentza, Livadia and Karytaina, three sites
which it has been suggested really are purely Latin
constructions, all contain many of the same features as
Byzantine castles such as Arcadia, Corinth and Patras.
Thus we have come full circle, and have returned to the
architectural and historical dilemmas outlined earlier,
for many medieval remains in Greece are so similar that
they can be attributed to the Greeks, as Winfield has
done, or to the Franks, as Bon preferred, with almost
equal validity.
But if we accept one of these interpretations
wholeheartedly, we dismiss the other completely. Instead,
it could be argued that the Chronicle of Morea is merely
referring to a major rebuilding programme rather than the
construction of entirely new fortresses, when It states
that Androusa, Mistra and several other castles were
erected by the Franks. More specifically, it could signify
the addition of new keep towers. Such structures could be
built quickly and relatively cheaply, and were the obvious
choice, for they could be garrisoned by a small number of
soldiers even if far older and more extensive outer
defences were left in ruins, or had to be abandoned in the
face of a numerically superior enemy. Again and again we
have seen how towers of this kind were hastily added to
existing fortifications, be they intact, as was the case
at Kalamata and Corinth, or ruined, as occurred at Akova
and Boudonitza. Moreover, Frankish Greece was not the only
area where such tactics were adopted, for in Cyprus a
series of large towers were constructed on the ruins of
earlier Byzantine fortifications between 1191 and c.1210,
Androusa: see above, pp.292-93. Mistra: see above,
pp.293-94, and Andrews, Castles, pp.168-74, who agrees
with Bon.
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at a time when crusader rule was still weak and the local
population remained actively hostile. 75 If this was also
the case in central and southern Greece, then Bon may have
interpreted the Chronicle of Morea's statements too
widely, and wrongly assumed that the written evidence
precluded the existence of any pre-thirteenth century
defences whatsoever at sites such as Mistra. But he was
also correct in the sense that the Franks did indeed build
a number of imposing new towers, which could protect the
outnumbered newcomers and keep the local Greeks in check.
The controversy surrounding Mistra merely confirms that
there are indeed very few strongholds (and perhaps fewer
than Bon would claim) which can be attributed to the
Franks, Catalans or other westerners in their entirety.
Their lack of classical remains implies that Glarentza,
Livadia and Karytaina are three such sites. Chiemoutsi
(Clermont), situated on a gently sloping hill roughly
half-way between Glarentza and Andreville, was another.
This can be proved beyond doubt, for the circumstances
surrounding Chiemoutsi's construction are well documented.
During the first two decades of crusader rule in Achaea,
relations between the Latin Church and the Frankish
nobility deteriorated steadily, partly because of the
scandalous behaviour of men like William Aleman, and
partly because the Church refused to provide military or
financial help for the defence and conquest of Morea.
These problems came to a head in the period between 1220
and 1223, when Geoffrey I of Villehardouin confiscated all
church land in Achaea, which amounted to a third of the
entire Peloponnese, and used the revenues from these
estates to build Chiemoutsi. These events are clearly
recorded in the Chronicle of Morea and the correspondence
Cyprus: see above, pp.190-91.
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of Honorius u i , ?6 and are borne out by the total absence
of pre-thirteenth century remains at the castle itself.
The considerable amounts of money which Geoffrey I raised
from the Church during the 1220s enabled him to build an
exceptionally strong fortress, which would be suitable as
a royal residence and have the defensive strength to
compensate for its relatively exposed situation. The
dominant feature of this stronghold was the inner citadel
itself, a hexagonal structure which was superior to all
other crusader fortifications in Achaea in terms of its
strength, size and the quality of its masonry. Similarly,
both the residential buildings inside the citadel and the
defences of the large outer bailey were unusual because of
the high standard of vaulting and stone work employed in
their construction. Other features ol the castle, such as
the styling of the fireplaces, also confirm that
Chiemoutsi does indeed date from the first half of the
thirteenth century.77
Chiemoutsi is therefore unique, both in terms of its
appearance and the circumstances surrounding its original
construction. No other stronghold in the area can be dated
so accurately, whilst many, such as the tower on the
acropolis in Athens, have been attributed to Franks,
Catalans or other westerners over a period lasting almost
76 To Chronikon tou Moreos, pp.l76-82; L. de los f.,
c.217, p.49, which incorrectly dates these events to
c.1256 and the reign of William II; Reesta Honorii papae
III, II, nos.3162, 3163, pp.516-17, no.4480, p.159. (Full
text of no.448O also in Innocent III, CCXVI, cols.968-
72). See also Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.94-97; R.L. Wolff,
'Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of Constantinople',
Dumbarton Oaks Papers, VIII, (1954), 225-303, at 274.
Bon, La Morée fran g ue, pp.608-29, (fireplaces,
pp.621-22); Andrews, Castles, pp.149-58; Traquair,
'Mediaeval Fortresses', 272-79, which should be used with
caution; see above, p.294. Traquair is also used by Boase,
'The Arts in Frankish Greece', pp.217-18.
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two centuries. 78 The contrast is even greater when one
compares Chiemoutsi with the countless smaller medieval
fortifications in Greece, whose entire history usually
remains a complete mystery. Again, it would be futile to
try to list such structures individually, but as with the
larger castles already mentioned, a few examples can be
cited to give some idea of their general appearance and
design.
Virtually all fortifications of this type were towers%
either standing in isolation or surrounded by one or more
curtain walls. More than twenty towers of the isolated
variety have been identified in mainland Greece, and
particularly in the former duchy of Athens. Most of these
structures are extremely ruinous and are fast
disappearing, but the tower of Markopoulo, located about
25 kilometres south east of Athens, still stands to its
original crenellated height of 18-20 metres. 79 This
tower's external measurements (5.4m by 8.2m) are slightly
smaller than those of three similar buildings at Moulki
(Haliartos), Dadi (Amphikleia) and Thurion, along the main
route between Athens and Lamia, although all four
structures were built using the familiar combination of
recycled masonry and smaller, uncut stones. 80 At Moulki in
particular it is still possible to see four arrow slits in
each wall of the tower, divided equally between the first
78 Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis,
Athens', 133; Longnon, 'Problèmes de l'histoire', 89-90;
Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 112.
Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 102;
P. Lock, 'The Medieval Towers in Greece: A Problem in
Chronolgy and Function', in Latins and Greeks in the
Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed. B. Arbel, B.
Hamilton, D. Jacoby, (London 1989), pp.129-45, at pp.132-
33.
80 Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', p.133; Bon,
'Forteresses Medievales', 146-48; Lock, 'The Frankish
Towers of Central Greece', 113, 114-15, 121, 122.
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Fig.18. Haliartos (Moulki) tower; a typical Latin tower of
the Eastern Mediterranean. Fran Lock, 'The Frankish Towers
of Central Greece', 114.
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and second floors. 8' The original entrance was also
located well above ground level; an arrangement which was
copied at Thurion and Dadi, but not at Markopoulo, where
there was direct access to the ground floor.82
Most of the towers in central Greece, including those
mentioned above, were situated in low lying areas. Others
which were located on more isolated outcrops or hilltops
occasionally had curtain walls around them, making them
less accessible to the enemy. At Aetos in Messenia, for
example, there are traces of a square keep at the summit,
surrounded by an outer curtain wall enclosing an area
measuring c.45 metres by 90 metres. To the north and east
in particular, a further wall also protected the main
approaches to the keep, but all these outer defences were
weak and very badly constructed. 83
 A more robust example
of such a fortification is the acropolis at Athens.
Although this stronghold has already been discussed in the
context of far larger and more important castles, it is
nevertheless worth mentioning here because its medieval
tower shared certain similarities with Markopoulo,
including some kind of ground floor entrance. This raises
the possibility that the towers at Athens and Markopoulo
provided a precedent for many other such structures in
central Greece.84
Moreover, if we assume that these two strongpoints were
81 Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 113,
114; Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 146.
82 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales' , 147-48; Lock, 'The
Medieval Towers of Greece', pp.132-33; Lock, 'The Frankish
Towers of Central Greece', 113, 121, 122.
83 Bon, La Morée frangue, p.650.
84 Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis,
Athens', 133; Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece',
Pp.132-33; Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece',
111-12, and see above, p.308.
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built by the same lord, it may help us to date the
medieval towers of Greece, for it is most commonly claimed
that the tower at Athens was erected by the Acciajuoli
during the late fourteenth or early fifteenth centuries.85
However, this may be a dangerous generalization, because
the first floor entrances at Moulki, Thurion and Dadi can
be compared with a similar doorway in the central keep at
Boudonitza, which appears to be a Catalan rather than an
Acciajuoli construction. 86
 To complicate matters further,
the tower at Athens had a first floor entrance as well as
a ground floor one, and it was framed with reused
classical blocks, just like the inner gate at
Boudonitza. 8'
 It has also been noted that a similar
technique was used in the construction of a postern at
Nauplia, normally attributed to the Franks. 88
 These
problems illustrate the many difficulties involved in
trying to date the smaller fortifications of medieval
Greece. Indeed, the constant recycling of masonry and
building techniques has meant that even the Macedonian
tower of Mara Brankowicz, the only such site to be
properly excavated, cannot be dated more precisely than
the medieval period in general.69
Similar conclusions can also be made about the medieval
fortifications on the various Greek islands occupied by
the crusaders. The majority of such structures were also
isolated towers, most notably on Euboea, where they were
presumably constructed by the Venetians. On Chios the
85 Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', pp.132-33,
but this is by no means certain; see above, pp.318-19.
86 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 147-48, 161.
8? Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis,
Athens', 131; Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales' , 161.
88 See above, pp.309-10.
89 Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', p.136; Lock,
'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece' , 106-8.
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Genoese also built towers well into the sixteenth century,
some of which were of a more sophisticated round design
and strengthened by a talus. 9° During the earliest years
of the thirteenth century they relied on similar defences
on Crete in an attempt to hold the island against the
Venetians. Many of these fortifications were erected by
the Genoese, but it seems that others were merely
repaired, suggesting that older sites were often
reoccupied on islands in the same way that they were on
the mainland.91
Another example of such a tactic dates from the invasion
of Naxos by Marco Sanudo in 1207. In order to subjugate
this island Sanudo first had to capture the remote
stronghold of Apalire, situated on a steep inland mountain
whose slopes were defended by two, and in places even
three, successive curtain walls dattng from atut'ç.
Moreover, the fact that tt took U V etians. or than
five weeks to take the castle suggests that Apalire was an
ancient acropolis whose fortifications had been maintained
and improved by the islanders over the centuries. After
Sanudo had conquered the rest of Naxos, he quickly made
sure that this important stronghold was repaired and
garrisoned by his own men. 92 It is also interesting to
90 Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece' , 102,
104; Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', pp.137, 139-
41; Balard, La Romanie génoise, I, 445-46.
91 Marino Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, cols.543-45. See
also Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia, col.987; Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, col.1030; Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum
Venetum, pp.283-84; Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.51, 82-
83.
92 Daniele Barbaro, Cronica del Trivisano della Citta
di Venezia, extract cited in Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo,
p.106; Cronica Antica di Venetia, extract cited in
Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, p.110; Sauger, Histoire
nouvelle, extract cited in Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo,
p.115; Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish Greece', p.222;
Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.41-44.
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note that the only new fortification constructed by Sanudo
appears to have been yet another tower, situated in the
coastal town of Naxos and surrounded by its own curtain
wall. Although the exact appearance of this structure
remains unclear, it may well have resembled the kind of
towers already referred to at Markopoulo and Moulki, as
well as those erected by Sanudo's fellow countrymen on
Euboea.93
Marco Sanudo's castle at Naxos therefore represents yet
another Latin fortification in Greece which raises more
questions than it answers. To some extent a more
systematic archaeological investigation of medieval sites
would overcome these difficulties, but the excavation of
Mara Brankowicz has shown that this is not always the
case. Although they must consequently be regarded as
suggestions rather than statements of fact, one can
nevertheless draw a number of conclusions about the design
and architectural characteristics of the numerous castles
which we have looked at so far. Firstly, it is clear that
apart from Chiemoutsi, and perhaps also the great hail at
Karytaina, Latin fortifications in Greece were constructed
by relatively unskilled local builders, rather than well
trained west European masons and craftsmen. This explains
why the same type of stone work appears again and again in
strongholds built for different overlords several decades,
or even centuries, apart.
However, it has also been suggested that at sites where
there is an overwhelming number of typically Byzantine
features, such as decorative brickwork and pentagonal or
other polygonal towers, this may indicate the presence of
Greek employers as well as employees. If this is the case,
Sauger, Histoire nouvelle, in Fotheringham, Marco
Sanudo, p.115; Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish Greece',
p.222; Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.70-71.
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then castles such as Androusa may contain far more
structures from the pre-crusader period, or indeed the
early fifteenth century, than has previously been
recognized. Moreover, the presence of typically Frankish
donjons at Kalamata and elsewhere confirms that local
Greeks were fully capable of building more 'western'
structures when asked to do so, and would not therefore
have erected polygonal towers when working under the
supervision of a west European lord. 94 As we have seen,
this raises the possibility that Bon, along with other
scholars such as Kevin Andrews, have interpreted too
literally the Chronicle of Morea, written over a century
after the Fourth Crusade, when it states that many castles
in Greece were built by the Franks, apparently from
scratch, in the first half of the thirteenth century.95
At present, this conclusion cannot be confirmed or denied
but if we accept that the Latins at least repaired many
castles in Greece, and frequently added central towers to
them, then these sites can tell us a lot about the nature
of west European settlement around the Aegean sea. Akova,
Géraki, Karytaina, Patras and Kalavryta, for example, were
some of the most important lordships in Achaea, containing
as many as 24 fiels (Patras and Akova), and In certain
cases possessing special rights of jurisdiction. 97 Most of
Androusa: see above, pp.292-93. Kalamata: see
above, p304. Unlike castles, it seems that Frankish
churches in Greece were built by west European craftsmen.
See Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 104.
See above, p.G72-74. For the probable dates of the
various versions of the Chronicle of Morea, see Longnon's
introduction to the L. de la c., pp.lxviii-lxxxiv.
L. de la c., c.128, p.43-44; L. de los f., c.117,
p.28.
The lords of Patras, Karytaina and Kalavryta could
exercise high justice, or cases involving crimes
punishable by loss of life or limb. See P. Topping, Feudal
Institutions as revealed in the 'Assizes of Romania' ; the
Law Code of Frankish Greece, in Studies on Latin Greece,
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these castles were held by the same Frankish families
until the late thirteenth or early fourteenth centuries,
when they were either lost to the Greeks, or returned to
the royal domain once the original settlers of the Morea
began to die out. 98 Others, such as the archbishopric of
Patras, were sold to or sought protection from Venice,
which increasingly became the only western power strong
enough to defend Latin territories against the Greeks and
the Turks. 99 Yet even before this decline in Latin power,
which did not set in properly until the last third of the
thirteenth century, it is remarkable how poorly
constructed and unsophisticated these castles were. Hence
we have seen how at Karytaina, the third largest barony in
the whole principality, some of the curtain walls were
less than one metre thick and so badly constructed that
they have long since collapsed, even though they
apparently date from the 1240s, when Frankish power in the
area was at its greatest.10°
(London 1977), (henceforth Assizes), articles 43, 94.
98 The history of Karytaina can be used to illustrate
these problems. In 1275 Geoffrey de Briel, only the third
lord of the dynasty, died childless, and his lordship was
divided between the prince of Achaea and Geoffrey's widow.
Karytaina was subsequently granted to a succession of
different vassals before being lost to the Greeks of
Mistra early in the fourteenth century. See L. de la c.,
c.496, pp.194-95, and p.405; L. de los f., c.642, p.141;
Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.366-69. Emigration back to
Europe, the harsh living conditions, and in particular
military setbacks such as the battle of Cephissus
accounted for the disappearance of many Frankish families
early in the fourteenth century. See Bon, La Morée
frangue, pp.195-97'; Miller, The Latins in the Levant,
pp.146-48; Topping, 'The Morea, 1311-1364', pp.120-21;
Longnon, L'empire latin, pp.314-16.
H See above, p.303n36.
100 See above, pp.313-14. Karytaina owed twenty two
knights' fees, and was therefore only smaller than Patras
and Akova (twenty four fees each). See L. de la c., c.128,
pp.43-44; L. de los f., c.117-18, pp.28-29.
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The same contradictions can also be found in central and
northern Greece. For many years during both the Frankish
and the Catalan periods, the castle of Boudonitza retained
its virtual independence as a frontier lordship on the
northern outskirts of the duchy of Athens. It appears to
have successfully withstood the Epirote conquerors of
Thessaly in the 1220s, 101 resisted the aggressive Catalan
conquerors of' Athens, 102 and even held up the Turks for a
while in the fifteenth century, yet its defences were
relatively simple in design, and so little money seems to
have been spent on them that good, or even mediocre1
masonry was only used in the most vulnerable parts of the
castle 103
These observations also apply to other baronial castles in
central Greece, such as Salona, which became an important
Frankish lordship between 1205 and 1311.104 Even more
surprising, however, is the fact that many royal
strongholds were just as badly constructed. Androusa for
example, belonged to the princes of Achaea throughout the
medieval period, until it was finally lost to the Greeks
101 Honorius III appealed for help in defending
BoudonitZa and neighbouring Salona against the Greeks in
the 1220s. See Regesta Honorii papae III, II, no.4758,
p.20'?, no.5464, p.333; Miller, The Latins in the Levant,
pp.84-85; Nicol, The Des potate, pp.62-64.
102 The Pallavicini lord of Boudonitza was killed at
the battle of Cephissus (1311), but his widow married a
Venetian called Andrea Cornaro. Thereafter Boudonitza
increasingly came under the control of Venice, whose
military and political power safeguarded its virtual
independence from the Catalans. See Marino Sanudo,
Istoria, p.125; L. de los f., c.551, p.120; Setton,
Catalan Domination, pp.33, 105-6; Miller, The Latins in
the Levant, p.248.
103 Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.373-75. For
a general history of the site, see Bon, 'Forteresses
Medievales', 148-51. For variations in masonry, see ibid,
160-61.
104 Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales', 164-86; Rubió y
Liuch, 'Els Castells', 413-25.
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in the 1420s, yet we have already seen how its walls were
built using a slapdash mixture of broken pottery, bricks
and uncut stones) 05 Likewise, the castle of Livadia in the
duchy of Athens first belonged to the de la Roche family
in the thirteenth century, and then rose further in
importance under the Catalans, who made it the chief
residence and administrative headquarters of the vicar-
general, the official representative of the Aragonese
dukes. As a result Livadia outshone Thebes, and often
rivalled both Athens and Neopatras, but one would hardly
think so by looking at the actual remains of the
fortress. 106 The most striking example of this irony,
however, must surely be that of Constantinople itself,
whose rulers bore the imperial title yet lacked the money
to repair the walls of their own capital.101
Needless to say there were some exceptions, most notably
the luxurious thirteenth century castle of Saint Omer at
Thebes, and Chlemoutsi, which had been constructed with
the help of a fortuitous windfall.' 08 But on the whole, it
is clear that many of the medieval castles of Frankish
Greece owed their appearance to the relative lack of money
and resources of their owners. In the case of Baldwin of
Flanders and his successors, this can be explained in
terms of the sheer number of castles and amount of
105 See above, pp.292-93.
106 Othon de la Roche's ownership of Livadia is
confirmed by documents dating from 1214, issued during his
dispute with the papacy. See L.A. Muratori, ed.,
Antiguitates Italicae Medii aevi, (6 vols., Rome 1738-42),
V, cols.833-36; Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.69-
70. Othon's arguments with the Church were similar to, and
linked with, those of Geoffrey of Villehardouin; see
above, pp.317-18. For the subsequent history of Livadia,
see Bon, 'Forteresses Medievales' , 191-206; Rubió y Liuch,
'Els Castells', 374-87.
101 See above, pp.297-98.
Thebes: see above, p.310. Chiemoutsi: see above,
pp. 317-18.
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territory they were expected to govern. As far as the
nobility was concerned, it reflected the relative poverty
of the settlers who came to Greece in the first place.
Hence it has already been suggested that William Aleman
demolished Church properties at Patras in order to repair
his castle out of necessity as much as ruthlessness, even
though 'on paper' the lordship of Patras was one of the
most important in Greece, owing the service of 24 knights.
Even more significantly, William's ancestry in Europe
remains a mystery, and it seems that he was only one of
many crusaders who came to the east with little to lose
and much to gain.109
This situation can be contrasted with that of the other
crusader states, and in particular the Holy Land itself.
In a previous chapter it has already been shown that here
the majority of castles, and certainly those which were in
royal hands or were held by the greatest landholders, were
constructed on a far grander scale, by skilled craftsmen
who usually employed weil dressed stone and highly
sophisticated building techniques. This difference in
quality reflected the contrast in wealth between men like
William Aleman, and powerful European crusaders such as
Louis IX, who rebuilt the town walls of Caesarea, Jaffa
and Sidon. Most of the other great thirteenth century
fortifications in the Holy Land, such as Crac des
Chevaliers and Pilgrims' Castle, were built by the
Hospitallers and the Templars, who could also rely on
almost limitless resources from the west110
Economic limitations therefore had much to do with the
See above, p.303. Gerland,	 Quellen, p.14; Bon,
p.106n3.
110 Caesarea, Jaffa, Sidon: see above, pp.50, 54. Crac
des Chevaliers see above, pp.45-46. Pilgrims' Castle: see
above, P.55.
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design of Frankish castles in Greece. Added to this,
geographical factors such as the sheer inaccessibility of
many sites reduced the need for elaborate man made
defences considerably. As a result, strongholds such as
Karytaina had more in common with the remote Byzantine
defences of St.Hilarion and Buffavento, or the isolated
Armenian mountain castles of Servantikar and Lampron, than
they did with crusader castles in the Holy Land, which
were usually situated in coastal areas where huge
ramparts were needed to compensate for the openness of the
terrain.111
To some extent, therefore, the geography of southern and
central Greece made it logical for Latin settlers there to
adopt a more 'Armenian' or 'Byzantine' approach to
military architecture. But in other ways, the conquerors
of the Fourth Crusade relied on exactly the same tactics
as their twelfth century predecessors in Syria and
Palestine, and this is reflected in the design and
location of their castles. It is interesting to note, for
example, that initially at least the crusaders were most
anxious to occupy or construct strongholds which were near
the coast. This is an important reminder of the crusaders'
almost total reliance on the west for military assistance,
particularly during the very earliest years of the
conquest, when any lost troops, horses or equipment had to
be replaced from Europe. 112 These concerns explain why
Cyzicus, Nicomedia and other places on or near the coast
were the first sites to be conquered by the crusaders in
111 St.Hilarion and Buffavento: see above, pp.203-4,
208. Servantikar and Lampron: see above, pp.234-37.
Hence, for example, the loss of over 200 war horses
during fighting in 1203 and the departure of 7,000 Latins
in 1205 was seen as threatening the very existence of' the
Latin empire, for such losses could only be replaced from
the west over a period of many months. See Villehardouin,
La Conguête, pp.100, 222.
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Asia Minor. Similarly, it has already been noted that the
Franks hastily fortified Modon in 1205, so that they could
leave 'their baggage and their servants there', and could,
if necessary, receive supplies and reinforcements from
Constantinople or the west quickly and in relative
safety. 113
Once bridgeheads of this kind had been established, they
could act as starting points for further raids or
conquests inland. Again, reference can be made to Modon in
this context, as the safety provided by its new defences
enabled the Frankish knights to leave behind the slow and
unarmed sections of their army and push on. into the
interior unhindered. In Asia Minor, the Franks used the
fortified peninsula of Cyzicus in the same way, 'and from
there they began to ravage the lands of Lascarjs, and took
much booty and many head of cattle, and took the booty and
the cattle to their island' (ie Cyzicus)) 14
 Similarly,
during the autumn of 1205 the emperor Henry was able to
launch a campaign against loannitsa in the vicinity of
Demotika because he was receiving a constant supply of
food and reinforcements from the port of Rodosto.' 15 Three
years later Henry had to march west along the Thracian
coast in order to deal with the Lombard rebellion in
Thessaly, and again relied on a fleet sailing parallel to
him to feed his army during the bitterly cold winter.
Indeed, it seems that a surprise attack on his fleet by
pirates, combined with the fact that the Lombards still
held Christopoli (the most important harbour along the
route), explain why this expedition ran into so much
trouble and almost had to be abandoned through starvation
113 Villehardouin, La Congute, p.194.
114 Ibid, p.272.
115 Ibid, p.236.
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outside the walls of Thessaloniki.116
Well defended harbours and anchorages were therefore
essential to any aggressive campaigns conducted by the
Franks, and particularly during the first five years of
Latin rule. Once the crusader states around the Aegean had
been established, however, such places still acted as
important supply points whenever the newcomers were
threatened in any way. Hence after the loss of
Constantinople in l26l wh&ci 1ci o	 c
replacing the Latin emperor as suzerain of Achaea,
Glarentza became the obvious destination for ships sailing
from Brindisi. In 1270, for example, Charles sent a fleet
to Achaea to counter the growing threat posed by Michael
VIII Palaeologus, and during the next twenty years
countless troops and supplies from Italy flowed through
Glarentza in response to the increasingly pugnacious
activities of the Greeks at Mistra.' 17 According to the
Chronicle of Morea, it was also during this period that
Nicholas II, co-ruler of Thebes, built the castle of Old
Navarino (Port de Jonc) just north of Modon. 118 Even
though this area of Morea had been in Frankish hands for
many decades, Nicholas chose to construct his fortress on
an inaccessible outcrop overlooking a large, natural
Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.568-70, pp.59-61, c.662-65, pp.104-6, and see p.34.
J.A.C. Buchon, Nouvelles recherches histori g ues sur
la principauté francaise de Morée et ses hautes baronies
a la suite de la Quatrième Croisade, (2 vols., Paris
1843)11, no.19, pp.326-27, and see no.24, pp.330-31,
no.25, p.331, no.27, Pp.332-33. See also L. de la c.,
c.461, p.178, c.492, pp.192-93. For details on Charles of
Anjou's new status as suzerain, see above p.34n81.
118 L.de la c., c.554, p.221; L. de los f., c.471,
p.103. Judging by the absence of recycled masonry on the
site, this may have been another of the few castles built
by the Franks from scratch. See Bon, La Morée frangue,
pp.668-69; Andrews, Castles, pp.40-49.
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harbour. Presumably this was done so that Old Navarino
could be reinforced by sea quickly and conveniently,
particularly if it ever came under attack from the Greeks,
or indeed became the starting point for an incursion
against Mistra.
The castle of Old Navarino can also be compared with that
of Naxos, which, as we have seen, Marco Sanudo is said to
have built on a hill top situated very near the coast.
Here Sanudo could easily receive help froti other
states and colonies, or indeed Venice itself, making it an
ideal centre from which to rule both Naxos and the entire
Archipelago. Likewise, the Greeks were only able to
establish, and eventually expand, the despotate of Mistra
because of the invincibility of Monemvasia, whose natural
strength made it almost impossible to capture, but
relatively easy to reinforce by sea.119
Coastal strongholds were therefore needed to establish,
and subsequently maintain, Latin rule over the interior.
But if and when the political situation deteriorated for
the Franks, access to the sea was just as essential,
either to get help or to escape. Thus the Latin empire
narrowly avoided almost certain destruction in 1236,
because a Venetian fleet was able to break through the
Greek and Bulgar blockade which had been established
around Constantinople. 120 Similarly, when the Frankish
garrison of Cyzicus came under siege in 1207, the emperor
Henry organized a relieving fleet which sailed across the
Sea of Marmara, forcing Theodore Lascaris's ships and land
forces to retreat. If Cyzicus had been located inland, it
is extremely unlikely that Henry would have reached it in
time, or had enough troops at his disposal to face
119 Naxos: see above, p.323. Monemvasia: see above,
pp.300-1.
120 See below, p.358.
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Lascaris in a pitched battle. 121 These factors explain why
heavily fortified coastal strongholds, such as Spiga in
Asia Minor, or Modon and Coron in the Peloponnese, were
invariably the last western outposts to fall, sometimes
outliving neighbouring inland castles by many decades.122
However, when it was no longer possible to defend even the
most powerful fortifications, Latin garrisons could still
escape by sea in the same way that the defenders of Sidon
did after the fall of Acre. Thus many westerners,
including the Latin emperor Baldwin II, were able to flee
from Constantinople in 1261, whilst several decades
earlier Frankish troops had also managed to make an
orderly retreat from Kibotos in the vicinity of Nicomedia,
by sailing away across the Sea of Marmara to
Constantinople (1207). Interestingly, this latter castle
had in fact already withstood a Nicaean attack
successfully, but it was still decided to abandon it
because the Franks knew its garrison was too weak to hold
out for much longer. Hence it was a lack of troops and
resources rather than military skill which again prevented
the Latins from holding on to their territories4
The fate of Kibotos merely confirms that the Latins could
only hope to sustain their fragile position in the former
Byzantine empire by protecting their seaborne links with
each other and the west. In practice this meant that they
were heavily dependent upon the Venetians. It was Venice
which saved Constantinople in 1236, and it was their
121 Villehardouin, La Conguët, pp.284-88; George
Acropolites, Annales, col.1042.
122 Spiga: see above, p.G14. Modon and Coron did not
fall until 1500; see Miller, The Latmns in the Levant,
pp.495-98; Andrews, Castles, pp.15, 60.
123 Constantinople: see above, p.29. Sidon: see
pp.50-51.
124 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp-82.
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desperate need for Venetian assistance that forced the
Franks to give up their claims to Modon and Coron in 1209,
even though these cities had originally been captured by
French rather than Italian crusaders. 125 Moreover, other
coastal fortresses would never have surrendered in the
first place if it had not been for the Venetians. Both
Nauplia and Monemvasia, for example, were finally captured
because Venetian ships enabled the Latins to blockade
these strongholds by sea as well as by land. In order to
obtain Venetian support for his campaign against
Monemvasia and Nauplia, William II of Villehardouin also
confirmed the republic's possession of Coron and granted
it certain privileges. In return, Venice provided the
Franks with four galleys for the campaign, and undertook
to maintain a further two galleys for the permanent
defence of Achaea126 . This agreement again illustrates how
Venice dominated all naval activities in Frankish Greece,
in the same way that she had dominated the Fourth Crusade
itself. This situation can be contrasted with that of
Cyprus and the Holy Land, where the crusading movement
remained more international in character, and the naval
strength of Venice, Genoa and Pisa was more equally
divided.
To some extent Venetian naval power also contributed to
the rapid fragmentation of crusader states in Greece
during the fourteenth century. Patras, for example,
managed to retain its status as an independent lordship
and archbishopric answerable only to the pope by allying
itself to the Venetians. Thus in 1366 it was a Venetian
commander who led the defence of Patras against the forces
125 1236: see below, p.358. 1209: Andrea Dandolo,
Chronicum Venetum, pp.283-84; Tafel and Thomas, Urkunden,
II, 97-100.
126 L. de la c., c.190, p.68. See also L. de los f.,
c.211, p.48.
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of Hugh of Lusignan, a claimant to the principality by
virtue of his mother's marriage to Robert of Taranto
(ruled 1346 to 1364).127 Hugh of Lusignan's failure to
take Patras effectively ended his hopes of controlling the
Morea, but Venice still continued to send reinforcements
to the city during the 1370s, to prevent Hugh's rival and
successor, Philip II of Taranto, from launching a similar
attack to that of 1366. Thus the Venetians were able to
assist Patras in the same way that they had once assisted
Constantinople, only now they were fighting fellow west
Europeans rather than the Greeks.128
Like the Frankish troops at Cyzicus in the early
thirteenth century, rival claimants and pretenders to the
principality of Achaea also used coastal strongpoints as
bases from which to make territorial conquests. Perhaps
the best example of such a campaign dates from 1315. In
that year, Ferdinand of Majorca, who was married to the
granddaughter of William II of Villehardouin, invaded the
Morea. Ferdinand's claim was not as strong as that of his
Angevin rivals, because his mother-in-law had been the
second rather than the first daughter of Prince William,
but he was nevertheless prepared to use force to establish
his control over Achaea. He therefore landed near
Glarentza, occupied the city, and used it as a bridgehead
for further conquests inland. The following year Catalan
reinforcements also arrived at the northern port of
Vostitza, presumably hoping to march south so that all of
Achaea and Elis would eventually be overrun. By this
point, however, Ferdinand had already been killed in a
12 lacobo Zeno, Vita Caroli Zeni, ed. G. Zonta, RISNS,
XIX, part 6, (Bologna 1931-41), 10-11.
128 In 1373 Venice sent 2 galleys to Patras. See
Thiriet, Reestes, I, nos.520, 522, p.130. For more
details on the background to these events, see Bon, La
pp.247-51; Miller, The Latins in the
Levant, pp.287-90; Gerland, Neue Quellen, pp.39-42.
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pitched battle with the Angevins, but his failed
expedition nevertheless illustrates the vital role played
by fortified harbours in all invasion attempts, regardless
of whether they were undertaken by crusaders or rebellious
usurpers. 129 Returning to the earliest days of Frankish
rule in the Peloponnese, one last example can be cited to
sum up this point. During the campaign of 1204-05, the
crusaders advised their commander, William of Champlitte,
that 'you should try to take the fortresses which are by
the sea; for, if you have the ports and the entry points
into the country, then you can get reinforcements of
troops and supplies when you need them'. In this way, they
argued, 'you can easily have the rest of the
countryside' 130
By the fourteenth century, however, coastal strongholds
were not just expected to maintain seaborne links with the
west, thereby underpinning Latin rule in the east. After
a period of greater stability following Venetian expansion
in the Aegean, piracy was making a comeback, particularly
at the instigation of the Turks and the Catalans.
Reference has already been made to the kind of wholesale
devastation which these men inflicted on the Aegean,
causing entire islands and coastal districts to be
abandoned for years at a time. 13 ' The fact that the
Palaeologi emperors of Constantinople periodically both
employed and clashed with thousands of pirates manning
entire war fleets also gives some idea of the scale of the
129 L. de los f., c.555-69, pp.121-24, c.582-623,
pp.127-3 7 Ramon Muntaner, The Chronicle of Muntaner,
trans. and ed. A. Goodenough, (London, 1920-21), II,
c.267, pp.64O-4l, c.270, pp.648-50. For more details on
the	 ground to this dispute, see Miller, The Latins in
the Levan t , pp.252-57.
130 L.de	 c.108, pp.35-36.
131 See above, p.33.
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problem. 132
 At the time of the Fourth Crusade, therefore,
it seems that most islanders who had remained in the
eastern Mediterranean had retreated inland, to places such
as the fortress of Apalire on Naxos, captured by Marco
Sanudo in 1207.133
To a large extent the Latins continued to rely on this
tactic as a means of defence against piracy. As late as
the 1390s, the travelling pilgrim Niccolo da Martoni
described how the population of Thermia (Fermia) in the
Cyclades lived in an isolated settlement in the mountains,
which he himself had to flee to for a few days because of
the threat of pirates. 134
 According to one historian, the
Sanudo dukes of the Archipelago also built the castle of
Apano-Castro, located in the interior of Naxos, in direct
response to the Turkish fleet operating in the Aegean in
1390. This stronghold enabled both Greeks and Latins
living on Naxos to abandon the coast temporarily when the
Turkish threat was at its greatest.'35
However, the Latins, and in particular the Venetians,
relied on the sea far too much simply to turn their backs
on it. Whereas the native inhabitants of most islands only
regarded the Aegean as a source of food, and could
therefore afford to resettle permanently in the interior,
132 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, pp.132, 146. The fact that
Michael Palaeologus employed a former pirate as his
admiral (ibid, p.132n4) suggests that the Byzantine navy
was in decline and that its role was increasingly being
performed by paid mercenaries. To some extent this also
explains why the Venetians were so dominant in the Aegean.
133 See above, p.322.
134 Relation du Pelegrinage a Jerusalem de Nicolas de
MartonLi notaire italien, (1394-1395), ed. L. LeGrand,
ROL, III, (1895), 566-669, at 646-48; A. Luttrell, 'The
Latins and Life on the Smaller Aegean Islands: 1204-1453',
in L&tijas and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp.l46-
57, at p.l5l.
135 Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, p.78.
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the Latins needed fortified bases on the coast in order to
maintain their military and political power, and to
protect their lucrative international trade routes. One
such settlement has already been referred to at Naxos,
where it seems that the Sanudo dukes built a new harbour
as well as a castle. 136 Another stronghold which appears
to have been situated nearer the coast was that of Siros,
a small island to the north-west of Naxos. In 1286 its
lord, William Sanudo, purchased a branded ass stolen by
pirates during a raid on neighbouring Tinos and Mikonos.
As a result, Bartolomeo Ghisi, ruler of these latter
islands, attacked William and besieged him in the cast'e
of Siros using trebuchets and other siege engines. This
assault lasted for some time until WIllIam was finally
relieved by a fleet sent by duke Marco II of the
Archipelago and the admiral of Charles of Anjou, forcing
Bartolomeo Ghisi to withdraw and come to terms.'37
Although this particular incident only involved pirates
indirectly, it nevertheless illustrates the way in which
castles nearer the sea could protect islanders from
external aggressors and give them time to appeal for help
from elsewhere.
These observations also apply to many castles located on
the mainland, which were often just as exposed to
piratical attacks as those on islands. At Monemvasia, for
example, the harbour was situated on a vulnerable strip of
land facing the sea, but was protected by the impregnable
citadel above it. Thus a devastating Catalan raid during
the 1290s resulted in the destruction of the town, but its
inhabitants escaped, 'for they climbed up to the castle,
on the great rock which stands there'. In this way an
136 See above, p.323. Sauger, Histoire nouvelle,
extract cited in Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, p.115;
0 ringham, Marco Sanudo, p.71.
137 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, pp.113-14.
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important anchorage and its civilian population had been
prevented from falling into the hands of the dreaded
Catalans 138
Another mainland settlement which was often targeted by
pirates was Corinth. Indeed, from 1311 onwards this city
and its immediate surroundings must have been particularly
exposed to raids, for both the Catalans of Athens and the
Greeks of Mistra could easily reach it by land as well as
by sea. As a result living conditions in this area got so
bad that by the middle of the fourteenth century large
parts of the countryside had been com.pletely abamc^c.red.
The Angevin rulers of Achaea responded to this crisis by
granting the castellany of Corinth to Niccolo Acciajuoli,
a powerful Florentine lord who immediately set about
repairing the citadel's defences, and was granted special
privileges to help him meet the huge cost of maintaining
several smaller castles in the neighbourhood (1358). These
included that of St.George, situated near the frontier
with Mistra and 'valiantly' defended by its Latin garrison
during the 135Os. 39 Several years earlier Acciajuoli had
also been granted lands in Messenia, in the southern
Peloponnese, which were equally devastated by years of
Greek, Turkish and Catalan pillaging. In order to halt
this process, Acciajouli had used the same tactic as at
Corinth, and erected a new castle in the vicinity of
Kalamata which could protect the area against external
138 L. de la c., c.761, pp.301-2. See also Ramon
Muntaner, The Chronicle of Muntaner, trans. Goodenough,
II, c.117, p.292. The town of Monemvasia was eventually
fortified, either by the Venetians or the Turks, as
further protection against such raids. See Bon, La Morée
franq , p .492; Andrews, Castles, pp.202-3.
139 Buchon, Nouvelles recherches, II, no.25, pp.143-55
(Saint George, p.146), no.26, pp.153-55, no.27, pp.155-56,
no.28, pp.157-58, no.33, pp.204-7 (particularly at p.204)
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raiders.
Even further inland, castles could thwart more ambitious
piratical attacks, which sometimes amounted to virtual
invasions rather than mere raids. In 1292, for example,
Genoese troops fighting alongside Andronicus II's forces
landed on the east coast of Epirus, intending to attack
Arta, even though it was situated several miles inland.
Once they realized that their Byzantine allies had
withdrawn, however, the Genoese abandoned all hope of
taking Arta's powerful citadel, which was garrisoned by
Achaean Franks and Epirote Greeks. While retreating back
to their galleys, the Genoese were also badly mauled by
the pursuing Franks and Greeks, indicating why most
pirates preferred targets nearer the coast.'41
Castles, therefore, were an ideal way of protecting
important harbours or settlements against pirates, who
usually lacked the time, equipment or inclination to get
involved in lengthy sieges. But coastal strongholds such
as Naxos were also used as fortified bases from which to
launch naval counter-attacks against these aggressors.
Indeed, Naxos may well have been a port of call for the
large Angevin fleet sent into the Aegean by Charles of
Anjou during the 1280s, in order to curb the activities of
Roger de Luria, Peter III of Aragon's infamous Catalan
admiral. Roger in fact defeated this fleet, 42 although
part of it did at least come to the rescue of William
140 Buchon, Nouvelles recherches, II, no.15, pp.109-14,
and see no.29, pp.158-GO.
141 L. de la c., c.636-43, pp.253-56; L. de los f.,
c.456-463, pp.100-2. For the background to this conflict,
see also L. de la c., c.606-52, pp.243-6; Miller, The
Latins in the Levant, pp.178-8O.
142 Ramon Muntaner, The Chronicle of Muntaner, tr.
Goodenough, c.105, p.252, and see Lady Goodenough's
introduction, pp.xl-li. Roger de Luria had also been
responsible for the raid on Moneinvasia. See above, p.338.
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Sanudo, lord of Siros, in 1286. On this latter occasion
Charles's fleet had been anchored off Melos, another
island in the vicinity of Naxos, suggesting that naval
expeditions of this kind would spend many months
patrolling the waters around and beyond the Cyclades. The
fact that the harbour of Naxos also had an arsenal may
have made it particularly suitable for the maintenance and
safe provisioning of just such a force.143
Countless other naval expeditions were organized either
against pirates operating individually, or more powerful
figures such as Roger de Liuria, who were at least in
theory answerable to their lords and employers back home.
By the mid-fourteenth century the most formidable
opponents of this latter kind were the Turks, who were
ultimately hoping to conquer islands and convert them to
Islam, not just raid them for short term gain. In order to
deal with this threat the papacy, the Venetians, the
Cypriots and the Hospitallers of Rhodes formed a powerful
naval alliance known as the Holy League, which was not
only regarded as a military force, but a continuation of
the crusading movement once land based offensives against
Jerusalem itself had become unrealistic.144
The League's first and greatest victory was the capture of
Smyrna, on the coast of Asia Minor, in October 1344. This
was achieved by a fleet of Cypriot vessels sent from the
fortified harbour of Famagusta, Hospitaller galleys
stationed at the Order's heavily defended base on Rhodes,
and a large contingent from the formidable Venetian navy.
These forces all gathered at the Venetian port of
l43 Sanud0, Istoria, p.113.
144 For more details on the Holy League, see J. Gay,
Le pap_i- m 1t VI et les affaires d'Orient, 1342-1352,
(Paris 1904); Topping, 'The Morea, 1311-1364', p.l33.
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Negroponte on Euboea before attacking Smyrna itself.145
Although they have long since disappeared, Negroponte's
medieval defences at this time were extensive, and
included a fortified bridge connecting Euboea with the
mainland. This structure was divided by a drawbridge 'no
larger than to let a galley pass through' , so that
Venetian ships anchored opposite the city would be
protected from Turkish, Genoese or Catalan raiders.'46
Thus the security provided by sites like Negroponte,
Rhodes and Famagusta enabled the Holy League to launch its
successful offensive on Smyrna, and to maintain pressure
on the Turks throughout the eastern Mediterranean.'47
It is also interesting to note that Smyrna, along with
other Christian outposts in Asia Minor such as Corycos and
Bodrum, 48 were themselves further examples of the kind of
coastal strongholds already mentioned at Cyzicus, Naxos
and Monemvasia, which owed their very existence to a
combination of good sea links and powerful fortifications.
Between them, all these places created a network of safe
anchorages, which were not only used by major expeditions
such as Charles of Anjou's campaign against the Catalans
or the crusade against Smyrna, but could also protect much
145 Nicephorus Gregoras, B yzantina historia, II, 689;
Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales, (3 vols,
Paris 1958-59), I, no.1350, p.335; Marino Sanudo, Vite de'
Duchi, col.610; Johannis Villani, Florentini Historia
Universalis, ed. L.A. Muratori, HIS, XIII (1728), c.38,
col.917; Gay, Le Pape Clement, pp.32-43.
146 G. Wheeler, Journe y into Greece, (London 1682),
cited in Andrews, Castles, p.187. See also ibid, pp.18'7-
91.
147 Famagusta: see above, pp.l77-83. For a description
of the defences at Rhodes, see Ludoiph of Sudheim, De
itinere Terrae Sanctae, p.2'7; Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish
Greece', pp.231-40.
148 Corycos: see above, pp.259-60. For a description
of Bodrum, see Boase, 'The Arts in Frankish Greece',
pp.240-44.
343
smaller naval forces. During the latter half of the
thirteenth century, for example, the Venetians constantly
patrolled the waters around the Peloponnese with two of
their own galleys in order to reduce piracy in general,
rather than to deal with a specific threat. These vessels
no doubt operated between Venetian bases at Modon, Coron,
Negroponte and in the Cyclades, so that they never strayed
too far from a friendly port.149
Finally, it should be remembered that pirates themselves
normally used coastal strongholds as bases from which to
launch their devastating raids. One group which relied on
this tactic were the Catalans. After clashing with their
former Byzantine employers, but before estabttsbi_'ag,
themselves at Athens, these men withdrew to Gallipoli for
a few years at the very beginning of the fourteenth
century. They refortified this site by digging huge
ditches and erecting new wooden stockades, making it a
perfect headquarters from which to carry out naval attacks
on neighbouring harbours such as Panidos and Rodosto.
Indeed, on one occasion so many Catalans left Gallipoli on
a seaborne raiding party that the Greeks came close to
recapturing the town, which was almost empty.' 5 ° But the
Catalans survived this crisis, and Muntaner wrote that in
the following months 'except the cities of Constantinople
and Adrianople and Christopoli and Salonica, there was not
a town or city that was not pillaged and burnt by us, nor
any place, unless it was a castle in the mountains' p151
Clearly, this programme of systematic looting and
devastation was only made possible by the strength of the
Catalan defences at Gallipoli itself. In addition, this
statement to some extent confirms the conclusions reached
149 L. de la c., c.190, p.68, and see above, p.334.
150 Ramon Muntaner, L'ex pedició, c.208-22, pp.69-105.
See also c.223-27, pp.106-28.
151 Ramon Muntaner, L'expedici, c.228, p.129.
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earlier that the Byzantine fortifications of the four
cities mentioned by Muntaner were particularly well
preserved during the crusader period. Muntaner's reference
to the impregnability of mountain castles also illustrates
why most people sought shelter at sites such as Monemvasia
and Apano-Castro whenever a pirate attack seemed
imminent. 152
Many other pirates were also based on islands, which were
even less exposed to external attacks than headlands such
as Gallipoli. Corfu, for example, had to be cleared of
Genoese pirates before the Venetians could take control of
the island in the wake of the Fourth Crusade.153
Elsewhere, other Genoese forces acting in closer
cooperation with their native city used similar tactics
against their Venetian rivals. Hence during the 1340s and
50s Genoa tried to use her new colony on Chios as a
springboard for further expansion in the eastern
Mediterranean, including the conquest of Euboea from
Venice. This project came to an abrupt end, however, after
the Genoese failed to capture the port of Oreus along the
north coast of the island in 1351.154 Almost 150 years
earlier, the Genoese were equally unsuccessful in their
efforts to subjugate Crete, and to defend it against the
Venetians, who had bought the island from Boniface of
Montferrat in 1207. However, it was only by capturing the
heavily fortified castle and harbour of Palaeocastro,
situated on the north coast of Crete, that Venice finally
ousted the Genoese and prevented them from establishing a
base which could have posed a serious threat to Venetian
152 Monemvasia: see above, p.338. 	 Apano-Castro: see
above, p.337.
153 Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, pp.283, 367;
Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia, cols.986-87.
154 Nicephorus Gregoras, B yzantina historia, III, 46-
51.
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power in the Cyclades.' 55
 Although they fall outside the
time limits of this chapter, reference can also be made to
Genoese efforts to undermine Venetian rule in the
Messenian peninsula during the fifteenth century. Once
again this involved the construction of a fortified tower
at Old Navarino, which could be used to make both land and
sea raids against Modon and Coron to the south.156
The Genoese, therefore, were very similar to their
Venetian, Frankish and Catalan rivals, in that their
military activities in the Mediterranean were almost
entirely centred around the construction, capture or
defence of castles. Indeed, such structures were often the
only means by which the various Latin powers operating in
the eastern Mediterranean could hope to establish and
maintain their control over the islands and coastal
regions of the former Byzantine empire. Offensively,
castles were an ideal way of creating bridgeheads which
could be reinforced by sea and used to make further
conquests inland. In addition, they protected important
harbours which were needed for naval campaigns such as the
crusade against Smyrna. Defensively, they also provided
shelter against a whole variety of potential aggressors,
ranging from the invasion forces of Michael VIII and
loannitsa, to more localized pirates such as those based
at Corfu. Powerful strongholds like Monemvasia also
prevented strategic anchorages from falling into the hands
of pirates, who could use such sites to wreak havoc over
vast areas, in the way that the Catalans had done at
Gallipoli. This last point also highlights the immense
importance of coastal fortifications as a means of
155 Marina Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, cols.536, 543-45.
Also, see above, p.322, and Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo,
pp.81-8'?.
156 Thiriet, Réestes, II, no.1624, pp.145-46; Bon, La
Morée frang ue, p.285.
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protecting the sea routes between east and west, for well
defended settlements such as Glarentza were needed to
maintain the steady flow of arms, troops and supplies upon
which Frankish Greece depended. These factors explain why
coastal strongpoints were invariably the first to be
captured by the Latins, and also the last to fall, not
only in the Aegean but throughout the crusader states.
While they still controlled large parts of the interior,
however, the Latins also relied on countless inland
castles to perform many of the same military functions as
their neighbours nearer the sea. Hence crusader
fortifications were often used as starting points for land
based as well as seaborne incursions into enemy territory.
This was particularly true during the earliest years of
the conquest, when the expansion of Frankish power in the
interior often overlapped with the process of establishing
coastal bridgeheads. Thus the fall of Constantinople in
1204 provided the crusaders with an important and heavily
fortified harbour, but it also enabled them to regroup and
start conquering inland territories to the north and west.
In the summer of 1204, therefore, Boniface of Montferrat
left the new Latin capital, gradually seizing or occupying
castles as he marched through Thrace. This in turn enabled
him to obtain the surrender of Adrianople and Demotika,
two of the most important strongholds to the west of
Constantinople, opening up the route toward Christopoli,
Salonika and the whole of Thessaly. 157
 After the Greek
uprisings and Bulgar invasions of 1205-06, when virtually
all of Thrace was lost, this process had to be repeated by
the emperor Henry. On this latter occasion the fortified
city of Tchorlu, located relatively near Constantinople,
157 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp.154-66; Robert of
Clan, aConguête, c.99-111, pp.96-105; Aubrey of Trois
Fontaines, Chronica, P.885; Nicetas Choniates, Historia,
l.983-87; Nicephorus Gregoras, Byzantina historia, I,
14.
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also acted as an assembly point for Frankish troops
hastily collected from both sides of the Bosphorus.158
Another example of the way in which Latin control over one
castle often led to the capture of others dates from the
period of Catalan rule at Gallipoli. Once they had
established themselves here, the Catalans were not only
able to launch naval attacks against neighbouring coastal
settlements, but also expanded inland until they domicated.
the entire surrounding peninsula. This involved capturing
the Byzantine fortress of }4aditos, stuated a te
of Gallipoli. This castle only fell after an eight month
siege, when the Catalans managed to climb the walls during
the garrison's afternoon siesta! Such a prolonged campaign
would not have been possible without the use of Gallipoli
as a base from which to bring up food, supplies and troop
reinforcements 159
During the great resurgence of Byzantine power in the
second half of the thirteenth century, the Greeks had also
used similar tactics against their Frankish enemies in
Morea. In 1271, for example, Michael VIII sent 'a great
company of men-at-arms from the Levant, Turks, Cumans and
Greeks' to Monemvasia in order to invade the principality
of Achaea. 161 Although this particular campaign was
eventually cancelled because of a Latin counter-attack,
many similar expeditions were indeed launched from this
area, using Byzantine troops first brought to Monemvasia
and then assembled further inland at Mistra. In the 1320s
these attacks culminated in the fall of several Frankish
strongho lds to the north of Mistra, including Karytaina,
Akova (Mathegriffon) and Saint George. According to the
158 Villehardouin, La Con g uête, pp.198-200, 202-22.
159 gamon Muntaner, L'expedició, c.223, pp.106-9.
160 L. de la c., c.456, pp.l76-77, and see c.456-67,
PP 176_81.
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Chronicle of Morea, these places were captured through
bribery as well as warfare, suggesting that by this period
both the morale and the fighting strength of the Franks
was beginning to wane.161
Thus the history of Monemvasia and Mistra provides us with
yet another example of the way in which strong coastal
bridgeheads could lead to the acquisition of more castles
inland, which in turn facilitated the capture of yet more
territory. In the case of Mistra, this domino effect
ultimately resulted in the Greek reconquest of the entire
Peloponnese. But on many other occasions, strongholds such
as Mistra were also used for less ambitious campaigns,
which were not necessarily intended to make any permanent
conquests. As part of the emperor Henry's efforts to re-
establish Frankish control in Thrace, for example, no less
than 120 western knights were stationed in the walled town
of Rousion, to the south of Demotika. During the winter of
1205-06, these troops carried out a huge raid against
hostile Greeks in neighbouring territories, killing many
and capturing 40 horses. The purpose of this attack was
not to retake lost fortresses or land, but rather to
intimidate the local population and force it to accept
Frankish rule. 162 The lollowIng summer Henry used
Adrianople for a similar incursion into loannitsa's
territories to the north, even though the Franks clearly
lacked the numbers to occupy such a vast area permanently.
Instead, Henry simply hoped to gain some booty, inflict
economic damage on the region, and thereby deter his
powerful opponent from attacking the Latin empire again.
161 L. de la c., pp.404-5; L. de los f., c.641-54,
pp.140-43. Saint George later returned to Frankish
control. See above, p.339.
162 Villehardouin, La Conguëte, pp.240-42; Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, col.1018; Letter from the emperor
Henry to the west, September 1206, in RHGF, XVIII (1879),
527-28.
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These tactics are virtually identical to those used by the
Hospitallers of Crac des Chevaliers and the Templars of
Saphet to keep their Muslim neighbours in the Holy Land at
bay.163
Another example of this strategy has already been referred
to indirectly: as we have seen, in 1271 Michael VIII
Palaeologus hoped to launch a major attack on the Morea
using troops he had assembled at Monemvasia. On hearing
this news, William II of Villehardouin immediately
prepared for a pre-emptive strike against the area to the
north of Mistra, which was dominated by Byzantine troops
and rebellious local Greeks. William's forces therefore
marched to Glarentza, where they were joined by other
troops sent by Charles of Anjou, before moving east to
Karytaina. Along the way, other barons met them with
further contingents and supplies for two months, and at
Karytaina itself the lords of both this castle and nearby
Akova also joined the expedition. Once everybody had
arrived, William called a meeting to discuss tactics,
before setting off on a raid which not only halted Michael
Viii's own advance, but also brought the Franks much booty
and cattle. During the preliminary meeting William
remained camped along the river below the castle of
Karytaina, so that his army had a ready supply of food and
water, but could still find shelter quickly in case of a
Greek counter- attack. Hence the success of the entire
campaign relied upon the food, supplies and protection
provided by Glarentza and Karytaina.164
In describing William's preparations for this expedition,
163 Letter from the emperor Henry to the west, RHGF,
XVIII, 528-29; Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.2'7O; Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, col.1031.
164 L. de la c., c.461-65, pp.l'78-8O, and see also
c.466--70, pp.180-82; L. de los f., c.382-83, p.84.
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the Chronicle of Morea also implies that those barons who
joined the prince brought troop contingents drawn from
their own castle garrisons. The same source provides us
with more evidence that this was a common tactic used by
Greeks and Franks alike. Thus in 1259 the Franks decided
to confront their Nicaean opponents in open battle,
thereby hoping to destroy the Greek field army in one
blow. 'Those who were most experienced in warfare' argued
that this would leave the Greek castles in Thrace and
Macedonia completely unprotected, and that their
outnumbered defenders would be forced either to flee or
surrender. Similar circumstances had of course enabled
Saladin to overrun the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187, but
unfortunately the crushing defeat at the battle of
Pelagonia ended any Frankish hopes of emulating this
success in Greece. 165 Nor do the westerners seem to have
learnt from this lesson, for in 1311 they lost so many
troops at the battle of Cephissus that the Catalans were
able to do precisely what the Franks had planned to do
against the Nicaeans. At Livadia, for example, there were
not enough Latins left to prevent the local Greeks from
rebelling and opening the gates to the Catalans. Elsewhere
the invaders simply occupied former Frankish castles
without a struggle, and some even married the widows of
those barons who had fallen only a few weeks earlier.'66
The lack of westerners in general therefore made it risky
to commit too many garrison troops to major Frankish field
165 L. de la c., c.275, p.99. It seems William II of
Villehardouin was particularly keen to recapture Salonika
for the Franks. See L. de los f., c.250, pp.55-56.
Saladin: see above, p.126.
166 The Franks certainly lost many men, but the figure
of 700 knights given by Muntaner is surely an
exaggeration. See Ramon Muntaner, L'expedició, c.240,
pp.180-81. For Livadia, see A. Rubiá y Liuch, Diplomatari
de l'Orient català, (Barcelona 1947), no.186, pp.227-28,
no.268, pp.352-53; idem, 'Els Castells', 375.
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armies. If such forces were defeated, reinforcements were
hard to come by and strongholds were extremely vulnerable
to enemy counter-attacks. In 1187 and 1311 these factors
led to the destruction of entire crusader states.
Consequently, it was often more prudent to avoid pitched
battles altogether, and to rely on castles themselves as
a means of acquiring new territory. In Morea, William II
of Villehardouin used this strategy against the Melings,
a slavic tribe whose homeland in the Mani peninsula was so
mountainous and inhospitable that they still refused to
acknowledge Frankish overlordship as late as the 1240s.
William realized that it would be useless to send a force
of knights into such an area, and so he constructed (or,
as has been suggested, reoccupied) the castles of Mistra
and Old Mania at the northern and southern ends of the
peninsula. From here his troops could observe the Nelings
and, if necessary, launch punitive raids against them,
without having to carry out a systematic conquest of the
entire region. For their part, the Melings realized that
'pressured between these two castles, it was impossible
for them to resist the prince', and so they made peace
with him.' 67 Subsequently William also built a third
castle to the east called Beaufort (Leutron), 'all the
better to contain [the Melings] and place them under his
rule' 168
By constructing castles, therefore, William was able to
make up for the fact that he lacked the troops to suppress
the Melings through sheer weight of numbers. At other
times, however, the Franks did manage to defeat their
opponents in open battle,	 but still remained so
167 L. de la c., c.205-6, pp.73-74, quote from c.205F,
p.74, translated from To Chronikon tou Moreos, p.202; L.
de los f., c.215, p.49.
168 L. de la c., c.207, pp.74-75. See also L. de los
f., c.216, p.49; To Chronikon tou Moreos, p.202.
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outnumbered that they could not follow up their victories.
This problem most affected the Latin empire, where just a
few hundred westerners were regularly expected to guard
frontiers stretching for hundreds of miles, and the
emperor Henry found himself having to keep campaigning
almost continuously, because 'he could not raise enough
troops to defend his territories'. As a result, the Franks
were again obliged to rely on castles rather than soldiers
to maintain their borders. 169 After his spectacular
victory over 33,000 Cumans in 1208, for example, the
emperor Henry immediately occupied the castle of
Crucemont, about 30 kilometres west of Philippopoli. He
then rode south to Paruphilon, where he constructed a new
castle as quickly as possible before the onset of winter.
In so doing, Henry hoped to take full advantage of his
victory, secure his northern border, and prevent the
Cumans and Bulgars from simply reoccupying the region as
soon as he had withdrawn to Constantinop1e.	 Similarly,
during the 1260s Michael VIII Palaeologus enjoyed so much
success against the Latins because once he had harried
Frankish Greece with his land and sea forces, he
systematically 'occupied many places and built powerful
castles on mountains and in very strong passes'
Conse quently, the Franks would have to undertake several
lengthy sieges if they ever wanted to regain this
territory, and Michael knew that they lacked the resources
to do so.1
Half a century earlier, however, the situation had been
very different, and the victorious members of the Fourth
Crusade had had few qualms about besieging the last
remaining Byzantine outposts in Greece. On such occasions,
169 Villehardouin La Cong uête, p.250.
170 Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'empereur,
c.539-45' pp.4448 c.550, p.50, c.554, p.52.
171 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.116.
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the Franks often built their own temporary castles close
to the strongpoints which they were attacking. At Corinth,
two structures of this kind were erected on the eastern
and south- western sides of the citadel. Some traces have
survived of the south-western fort, known as Pendeskouphi,
showing that it amounted to little more than an isolated
keep of traditional Frankish design. It clearly dates from
the time of the Latin siege between 1205 and 1210.172 An
equally small fortification, built out of bricks, or
possibly even just earth embankments, was used by the
crusaders during the campaign against Patras in 1205,173
whilst at Constantinople, the land forces of the Fourth
Crusade established their camp around 'the castle of
Bohemond, which was an abbey surrounded by walls' 174
Clearly, these 'castles' were extremely temporary
structures which were probably abandoned at the end of a
siege. During a campaign, however, they fulfilled several
important military functions. At Corinth, for example,
early Frankish hopes of seizing the citadel were dashed
when its Greek defenders made a daring night time raid
against the crusaders stationed in the town below. This
sortie inflicted 'great damage' on the Franks, and
persuaded William of Champlitte to scale down his
activities here and concentrate on the conquest of the
Morea instead.' 75
 Likewise, during the first Latin siege
of Constantinople in 1203, the crusaders to the west of
the city were prevented from gathering enough supplies,
let alone attacking the ramparts, because of a series of
L. de la c., c.191-94, pp.68-69; L. de los f.,
c.101, p.25, c.106, p.26; Nicetas Choniates, Historia,
col.998; Andrews, Castles, pp.136, 140, 224; Boase, 'The
Arts in Frankish Greece', p.217.
173 L. de la c., c.91, p.30.
174 Villehardouin, La Con gute, p.92.
175 L.de la c., c.101, p.33; L. de los f., c.94, p.24.
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Byzantine sorties launched from within the capital.i?6
Hence one of the primary functions of fortifications like
the castle of Bohemond was to protect the besiegers
against the besieged, and provide them with a base where
food, water and other supplies could be stored in safety.
The crusaders' fort at Patras may be particularly
significant as far as this last point is concerned,
because it was located right at the water's edge,
suggesting that it was being reinforced by sea.177
Offensively, these forts were also used to blockade
besieged garrisons and prevent them from gathering
supplies, or worse still, contacting relieving forces in
other areas. The two strongholds erected by the Franks at
Corinth were specifically intended to ensure that the
besieged 'could not rush out from the walls to collect
water or any other supplies to sustain them'. If they
attempted to do so, the Franks could easily launch a
counter-raid from either of their forts in order to 'orce
the Greeks back inside the citadel. 178 Likewise, at
Constantinople Villehardouin wrote that 'never had so many
been besieged by so few in any city', and this explains
why the crusaders established their fortified camp
opposite one particular stretch of the defences, rather
than trying to spread out around. the hoX cJ it
would have been impossible for the Latins to surround vast
sites such as Corinth or Constantinople entirely, but by
gathering all their forces together inside one or more
fortified camps, they made the most of the few troops
available to them, and could still blockade far larger
castles for months, if not years. Once again, therefore,
176 Villehardouin, La Conguëte, pp.92-94.
177 L. de la c., c.91, p.30.
178 L. de la c., c.193, p.69, and see L. delos f.,
c.106, p.26
179 \Tillehardouin, La Cong uête, p.92.
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castles took the place of troops in the field. These
factors also explain why it took the crusaders five years
to capture Corinth; with so few soldiers available, an all
out assault on the walls was usually out of the question,
and if they could not bombard a fortress into submission,
the Franks simply had to wait until hunger or low morale
persuaded its garrison to surrender.18°
The tactics employed by the crusaders at the siege of
Corinth also reflects their military fragility in general.
Every Latin soldier, and in particular every knight, was
a precious asset for the Franks, who had enough trouble
raising adequate forces for their campaigns even at the
best of times. Hence one of the primary functions of all
castles in Frankish Greece was to protect the Latin field
army, especially during a military crisis. In the spring
of 1205, for example, the first Latin emperor of
Constantinople, Baldwin of Flanders, was captured outside
Adrianople, while his army suffered a heavy defeat at the
hands of the Greeks and the Bulgars. This disaster forced
the crusaders to flee south, past Pamphilon and toward the
coast. Indeed, it was not until they reached the fortified
city of Rodosto, situated along the Sea of Marmara, that
they finally found refuge from the pursuing forces of
loannitsa. Hence the walls of Rodosto had at least saved
the Frankish and Venetian army from total annihilation.18'
This incident may also explain why the emperor Henry chose
to fortify Pamphilon three years later. By this date,
Adrianople had returned to Frankish control, and Pamphilon
must have acted as a useful stopping off point for Latin
18U For the date of the fall of Corinth, see above,
p. 306n43.
181 Villehardouin, La Conguëte, pp.2l2-22; letter from
the emperor Henry to Innocent III, June 1205, RHGF, XVIII,
527, and see above, p.38.
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troops travelling from Rodosto or Constantinople toward
the northern frontier of the empire. Alternatively, Henry
knew that if Adrianople were ever recaptured by his
opponents, the new defences at Pamphilon could protect
westerners retreating south, who would otherwise have to
march all the way to Rodosto without any hope of shelter
along the route.'82
We have also seen how William II of Villehardouin's
campaign against the Greeks, undertaken in 1271, was
organized around the strongholds of Glarentza and
Karytaina. This latter castle was chosen as the starting
point for the raid on Mistra itself because it lay along
the main route between the west coast and the mountainous
interior. To the south- east, the narrow valley below
Karytaina also continued toward Mistra, Nonemvasia and the
east coast. Hence Karytaina, situated roughly halfway
between G.larentza and Monemvasia, guarded this strategic
line of communication through the heart of the
Peloponnese, and could protect any Frankish soldiers
operating in the area. This was particularly important in
a region where the terrain made it easy for Byzantine
troops or rebellious Greeks to ambush heavily armed
western knights.'83
Whenever it was possible, therefore, Latin field armies
tried to stay within easy reach of friendly castles. The
further they strayed into enemy territory, the greater the
risk of heavy losses, particularly if an opponent defeated
them in open battle. These factors explain why the
182 See above, pp .302, 352.
183 See above, p.349. The valley below Karytaina was
also used by Greek rebels attacking Achaea in 1302,
because this route was 'easier and safer than all the
others'• See L. de la c., c.927, p.365.
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Frankish campaign against the Bulgars and Cumans
undertaken by the emperor Henry in 1208 was so fraught
with danger. On the eve of his famous victory, Henry
advised his knights to put their faith in their horses,
shields, lances and above all God, for 'you are assembled
here in alien territory, and do not have a castle or
refuge where you can hope to find shelter'. 184 In these
circumstances, Henry knew that there would be no escape
for his followers if they were defeated, and he would
surely have suffered the same fate as his brother Baldwin,
or indeed the Latin force sent to recapture Serres during
the early 1220s. This latter expedition sustained heavy
losses as it hastily retreated all the way back to
Constantinople following the Greek victory at Pimaninon in
Asia Minor.'85
Thus inland castles were needed to protect troops in the
field, and the roads they travelled on, in the same way
that fortified harbours sheltered Latin warships and kept
important sea routes open. Similarly, the use of
fortifications rather than men to blockade enemy
strongholds and suppress newly conquered territories
minimized the threat posed to Latin troops, and enabled
the Franks to go on the offensive despite being so
outnumbered. But in the long run, even these tactics could
not compensate for the westerners' chronic lack of
manpower, and therefore Latin strongholds were normally
called upon to fulfil a defensive role rather than an
attacking one.
Various aspects of this role have already been mentioned
184 Henry of Valenciennes, L'Estoire de l'empereur,
c.523, pp.37-38, and see above, pp.36-37.
185	 See above, pp.30, 30n63.
358
in passing, including the use of heavily defended
strongpoints to stop invasion forces from making permanent
conquests. Thus in 1235 the Bulgar leader John Asen (1218-
41) overran all of Thrace, allied himself with John Ducas
Vatatzes of Nicaea (1225-54), and attacked Constantinople
itself with a huge besieging army. But the city's vast
ramparts held up the assault long enough for 160 Frankish
knights to organize a sortie, which scored an almost
miraculous victory against the Greeks and Bulgars. At the
same time the Greek fleet blockading Constantinople from
the east was decisively defeated by the Venetians, 186
 who
returned to save the capital during a second siege the
following year, when the Latins were also assisted by 120
warships sent from Achaea. 187
 During the next 25 years the
Franks rarely enjoyed any authority beyond the immediate
vicinity of Constantinople, but as long as they were
protected by its walls, the Greeks proved incapable of
wiping out the Latin empire completely.
Beyond Constantinople, the Franks quickly realized that it
would be useless for them to try to defend their entire
northern border, and so in 1205 the emperor Henry decided
to gather the majority of his knights in a few carefully
selected fortified settlements. These included Bizöe and
Rousion, garrisoned by 120 and 140 knights respectively,
as well as Selymbria, a port along the Sea of Marmara
which was defended by a further 50 knights. In addition,
the Venetians held Arcadiopolis, situated roughly halfway
between Rousion and Bizöe, so that these three sites
186 Philip Mousket, Chronigue Rimée, II, 614-16; Andrea
Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.295; Martin da Canal, La
Chroni gue des Veneciens, Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia,
col.992; George Acropolites, Annales, cols.1058-59,
181 Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, pp.938-39;
Philip Mousket, Chroni gue Rimée, II, 620.
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formed a kind of arc along the northern fringes of the
empire. By concentrating his forces in this way, Henry
knew that they would stand a better chance of survival,
and also of being able to defend their respective
strongholds, than if they had been spread out in a ratio
of five or ten knights per city.'88
However, when the Bulgar invasion which Henry had been
expecting came only a few months later, loannitsa's army
was so vast that both Rousion and Arcadiopolis had to be
abandoned disappointingly quickly. Indeed, as loannitsa
swept south toward Constantinople, destroying everything
in his path, things began to look ominous for the Franks.
But despite the appalling damage which the invaders were
inflicting on the countryside, the Frankish defenders of
Selymbria, Bizie and Constantinople stayed put, refusing
either to retreat or face loannitsa in the field.
Meanwhile, the Bulgars and Cumans were causing so much
destruction that cracks began to appear in loannitsa's
alliance with the Greeks, who suddenly refused to let his
troops inside Adrianople. This in turn gave Henry the
chance he had been waiting for, and he quickly mustered a
new army of 400 knights in Constantinople.., and atcd
north toward Bizöe. This latter stronghoLd no t
starting point for a Frankish revival, and as the Bulgar
advance faltered before Adrianople, Henry gradually
reoccupied Thrace and forced loannitsa to retreat. Thus
loannitsa's invasion collapsed because he had failed to
capture Selymbria, Bizöe or Constantinople. By withdrawing
into these three strongholds, the Franks avoided a pitched
battle which they would almost certainly have lost. They
also knew that they had time on their side, for
Joannitsa's vast army was deadly in the short term, but
politicall y unwieldy and difficult to keep together over
188 Villehardouin, La Conguëte, pp.240, 244-46.
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a longer period. Relations between loannitsa's Greek and
Cuman troops must have been particularly strained, because
the former hoped to reconquer Thrace intact, whilst the
latter were nomadic horsemen only interested in short term
pillaging •189
On other occasions, similar circumstances prevented the
Franks themselves from conquering new territories. In
1304, for example, the county of Cephalonia and the
principality of Achaea became involved in a dispute
between Charles II of Anjou and Anna Palaeologus, ruler of
Epirus, over who should inherit Anna's despotate after her
death. As a result, Charles sent a combined Italian and
Moreot army into Epirus to besiege Arta and settle the
crisis by force. But when they arrived, Charles's men
found that Arta had been abandoned, and that its defenders
had retreated into the citadel, taking as many arms and
supplies with them as possible. They had even demolished
all the houses which lay close to the citadel 'to have
space to fight' and prevent the Franks from using these
structures for shelter.' 9° Consequently the Latins
withdrew and made a brief attempt to capture another
castle in the vicinity of Arta, but it was situated on a
steep hill surrounded by water, and proved impossible even
to approach, let alone besiege properly. Meanwhile the
army was running out of food, but wherever they went the
Franks found that 'the people from the villages had
escaped to the mountains and the fortresses with all their
supplies, so that our people could not find anything to
eat' . Those who tried to follow the locals were simply
189 Villehardouin, La Con g ute, pp.240-62; Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, cols.1015-23, 1031-34; letter from
the emperor Henry to the west, September 1206, RHGF,
XVIII, 528-29.
190 The tactic of demolishing buildings and outer
defences which could be used by the enemy was also adopted
in the Holy Land. See above, p.131.
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attacked by Epirote troops hiding in the forests and
valleys of the interior. Consequently, as autumn set in
and the threat of starvation began to loom over them,
Charles's forces had no choice but to retreat. In this way
the most powerful warriors of the Morea and Cephalonia
were defeated not by a rival army, but by the strength of
the despotate's castles.191
Almost twenty years later the Catalans used the same
strategy to thwart an attempt by Walter II of Brienne to
recapture his father's old duchy. In 1331 Walter sailed
from Brindisi with an army of 800 French knights which he
had gathered together at great cost. During the ensuing
weeks Walter led this force into Attica and waited for the
Catalans to meet him in battle, confident that they would
be wiped out by his Frankish warriors. But the Catalans
'did not want to come out and fight', and simply waited
inside their castles until Walter, who had not come
prepared for siege warfare, ran out of money.192
Thus the Catalans emerged victorious, because they
understood that it would be more difficult for Walter to
hold his army together in the field than it would be for
them to wait inside their strongholds. Similarly, the
invasions of 1205 and 1304 collapsed through a combination
of political and logistical problems long before any real
fighting had taken place. But there were also other
advantages with this 'wait and see' strategy, for it meant
191 L.de la c., c.973-94, pp.380-89 (quote: c.991,
p.387). For the background to this dispute, see Longnon,
jpJ atifl, pp.285-86.
192 Johannis Villani, Florentini Historia Universalis,
c.190, col.7l7. The pope even treated this expedition as
a crusade, granting indulgences to those who went. See
John XXI I , Lettres Communes, ed. G. Mollat, (16 vols.,
Paris i90447), IX, no.49924, p.345. See also Buchon,
Nouvelle s recherches, i 30-33; Setton, Catalan
DQ9jflti On , pp.38-41.
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that a region could be defended effectively without the
use of thousands of troops stationed along its frontiers.
Hence in 1304 the Franks failed to conquer Epirus even
though they had been allowed to swarm across its borders
and reach Arta totally unhindered. As we have seen,
similar tactics were used against the Khwarizmians in the
Holy Land, showing that political boundaries in the modern
sense were to some extent meaningless during the crusader
period. 193 But the sheer amount of damage which invading
armies could inflict on an area still made it desirable to
stop such forces as quickly as possible, and this was the
primary function of frontier castles.
One of the most important such strongholds was Corinth,
which acted as a kind of buffer against any invasion
forces from the north, because of its location at the
entrance to the Peloponnese. In 1205, for example, it
brought Boniface of Montferrat's advance to a halt.
Although the subsequent campaign in Morea by William of
Champlitte and Geoffrey of Villehardouin showed that this
castle could be circumvented, the crusaders knew that it
was dangerous to leave such a powerful citadel in the
hands of the enemy. For as long as it remained uncaptured,
its garrison could cut off the Franks' retreat and leave
them stranded in the Peloponnese. These factors also
explain why Corinth retained its strategic importance
after the Catalans settled at Athens, and again during the
period of Turkish expansion, when the Acciajuoli spent
vast sums on maintaining its defences. Indeed, Corinth did
not finally fall to the Turks until 1458, by which time it
had been retaken by the Greeks.'94
193 See above, p.85.
194 L. de la c. , c.99-105, pp.32-4; L. de los f. , c.92-
106, pp.2326 Nicetas Choniates, Historia, cols.991, 998,
and see above, p.G52. For the history of Corinth in the
fifteenth century, see Andrews, Castles, p.137.
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Far to the north of Corinth, other Frankish castles also
guarded the equally strategic mountain passes which
connected northern Greece with the duchy of Athens.
Perhaps the most famous of these was Boudonitza, near
Thermopylae, where Leon Sgouros had tried to prevent
Boniface of Montferrat from entering Boetia in 1205. As we
have seen, Boudonitza's oldest medieval fortifications may
well date from this period, as well as the 1220s, when
Honorius III demanded that the castle should be
strengthened in response to Theodore Comnenus's invasion
of Thessaly. Like Corinth, however, Boudonitza could not
in itself prevent a hostile force from moving south, but
anyone wishing to control the area permanently would
sooner or later have to return and capture the castle, or
risk being cut off.195
The importance of frontier castles as a means of delaying
invaders and preventing them from making permanent
conquests also gave these fortifications a special
standing in the feudal structure of the principality of
Achaea. This is made clear in the Assizes of Romania, the
law code of Frankish Greece, which stated that any such
strongholds held by the prince could not be destroyed or
handed over to the enemy without the consent of the most
powerful vassals in Morea. This rule was strictly adhered
to in 1262, when the wives and widows of nobles captured
or killed at the battle of Pelagonia held lengthy debates
on whether to hand over Monemvasia, Mistra and Old Mania
as a ransom for prince William. In the end they agreed to
do so, although those who had argued that this would
enable the Greeks to 'throw us out of the country' were
195 Nicetas Choniates, Historia, col.991, and see
above, pp.325-26.
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ultimately proved right.196
Thus the history of individual strongholds could sometimes
determine the fate of entire crusader states. But for much
of the time, castles were likelier to come under attack
from aggressors whose intentions were less clear cut. Most
notably, it has been shown that the Catalans were involved
in all types of warfare, ranging from the kind of
systematic conquests which they undertook in Gallipoli and
Attica, to less ambitious raids whose primary r'as was
to acquire booty. SimiLarly, thirin the ourteerith terit'r-y
the Catalans, Greeks and Turks launched so many attacks
against Messenia, Arcadia and Corinthia that it is not
always easy to distinguish between individual pirate raids
and more extensive incursions carried out as part of an
overall war strategy. Consequently, the activities of
pirates, raiders and invaders often overlapped, and the
approach of Cuman horsemen or Catalan warships must have
been viewed with equal dread by the local Greeks and
Latins who lived in the countryside. For them, the
question of finding shelter was more important than the
exact intentions of their attackers, and so strongpoints
were often called upon to protect people as well as
territory.
In many cases, this meant that communities sprung up
within easy reach of castles. At Monemvasia, for example,
we have already seen how people living in the town managed
to survive a Catalan raid by climbing up to the citadel
above. 197 Likewise, in 1262-63 a large Greek force from
Mistra entered the principality of Achaea along the same
route which William II later used in 1271, past the castle
196 Assizes, article 19; L. de la c. , c.323-28, pp.120-
23 (quote c.325, p.121); L. de los f., c.291-95, pp.65-
66, c.299304' pP.6768.
197 See above, pp.338-39.
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of Karytaina and towards the city of Andreville. Along the
way they also stopped at the fortress of Veligosti, where
'they destroyed the market and left the castle intact'.
This implies that there was a settlement here, whose
inhabitants were saved because they could take refuge in
the fortress.'98
To the south of Veligosti, the new Messenian stronghold
constructed by Niccolo Acciauoli during the fourteenth
century fulfilled a similar function, for it was designed
to 'provide safety for the province of Kalamata'
suggesting that it acted as a refuge site during
emergencies, but only housed a core garrison in peace
time. 199 Their lack of heating, light or water storage
facilities also makes it likely that most isolated towers.,
such as those mentioned in central Greece and on Chios,
were only occupied during military crises. In 1307, for
example, Russian monks on Mount Athos saved themselves
from a Catalan raid by seeking refuge in a tower normally
used for storing wine.2H
However, many other fortifications were not just relied
upon to provide shelter temporarily. The city walls of
sites such as Glarentza, Modon and Coron protected
communities numbering several thousand, whilst most larger
castles incorporated entire villages situated within their
outer defences. In 1391, for example, a survey of Latin
settlements in the Peloponnese found that the north
Achaean castle of Saint Omer had the greatest population
in Morea with 500 hearths. It has been suggested that this
198 L. de la c., c.338A, p.128, translated from To
Chronikon tou Moreos, p.308.
199 See above, pp.339-4O.
200 Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', pp.l36-37;
account of the Serbian chronicler Daniel, in A. Soloviev,
'Histoire du Monastère Russe au Mont-Athos', Byzantion,
viii, (1933), 213-38, at 223-24.
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figure reflected the inaccessibility of the site, which
would have offered far more protection against the Greeks
and the Turks than low lying areas nearer the coast.
Today, it is still possible to see the remains of this
village, which was located to the north of the fortified
summit and surrounded by a long curtain wall. 201 The outer
walls of Boudonitza and Salona in central Greece probably
defended similar communities in the fourteenth century.202
The actual inhabitants of these fortified enclosures (or
bourgs) must have been a mixture of Franks, Greeks and
Italians. In some cases, however, the conquered were
segregated from the conquerors. At Nauplia, the Chronicle
of Morea recorded that there were two castles, one of
which was granted to the Greeks by the crusaders. This
suggests that the Franks occup!ied t\ie xper ca,
allowed the locals to live within the lower defences, for
if they had expelled them they would have been left with
a ghost town. 203 Similar concerns explain why the Sanudo
dukes of the Archipelago apparently encouraged the Greeks
to live within the lower bour at Naxos, whose outer
curtain wall could still be seen early this century. The
dukes themselves, along with their Venetian followers,
probably lived at a higher level inside the actual
castle. 204 In this way the Sanudos were able to protect both
their Greek and their Latin subjects, minimize the threat
of violence between the two peoples, and also perhaps
201 Survey of royal rights and properties in the Morea,
carried out for Amadeo of Savoy in 1391, reproduced in
Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.691-92, at p.692. See also ibid,
pp.279, 646-48.
202 Bon, 'Forteresses medievales' , 162, 184.
203 L. de la c., c.199, p.71,
204 Sauger, Histoire nouvelle, extract in Fotheringham,
Marco Sanudo, p.115; Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, p.71.
Generally, the inhabitants of Chios were segregated in the
same way, with the Genoese living in the actual citadel
and the Greeks inhabiting the surrounding bour g . See
Balard, La Romanie énoise, I, 226.
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stress the symbolic overlordship of the Venetians over the
locals.
In the long run, however, it was security against external
aggressors, rather than either of these latter concerns,
which really attracted people to bour g s. The fact that
these settlements were protected by an outer wall as well
as an adjacent citadel made them far safer than towns or
villages which merely lay close to, but not inside, castle
fortifications. In short, these places had two lines of
defence, the first acting as a deterrent against pirates
and minor raiders, and the second halting the progress of
more determined invaders. Thus when loannitsa attacked the
Macedonian stronghold of Serres in 1205, the defenders
eventually had to abandon the outer town, but could still
retreat into the castle, 'which was very strong'205.
In the end, however, the citadel of Serres could not hold
out against loannitsa indefinitely, and its garrison
suffered the same fate as hundreds of other Macedonians
who were killed by the Cumans and Bulgars, or led away in
chains. 206 Similarly, during the Frankish conquest of
Achaea the spirit of the local Greeks was finally broken
because they ran out of castles in which to take shelter.
Like the defenders of Serres, they also realized that
further resistance was useless once 'they could not get
help from anywhere else'. Thus the fate of these people
illustrates the importance of strongholds as refuge sites
in times of war. Without such places, the inhabitants of
bourgs, towns and villages had little chance of escaping
enslavement, pillaging and even death. 207
 Again, this
situation can also be compared with that of the Holy Land,
205 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.232.
206 Villehardouin,	 La Conguête,	 p.250;	 Nicetas
Choniates, Historia, col.1006.
201 L. de la c., c.133, p.48.
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where it has been shown that most of the Latin population
lived inside fortified houses, towers, castles or walled
cities, in order to protect itself against anything
ranging from vast Mamluk invasions right down to common
theft and burglary.208
But these incidents can also be used to show that castles
could not always be expected to withstand enemy attacks in
isolation. No fortress was powerful enough to resist a
determined besieging army indefinitely. e-nce it as
a matter of time before Serres had to capitulate, once it
became clear that there were no Frankish troops on their
way to relieve the castle. This realization must have ha
a negative effect on the morale of the garrison, thereby
bringing the fall of the citadel even closer. No doubt the
same fate would have befallen the castle of Janina, about
thirty miles north of Arta, if it had not been rescued by
a combined force of Achaean, Epirote and Cephalonian
troops in the summer of 1292. By this point Janina had
been besieged for some time by a Byzantine army hoping to
conquer the despotate of Epirus. However, when they heard
that Florent of Hainualt, ruler of Achaea, count Richard
of Cephalonia and Thomas the despot were all marching
toward them, the Byzantine Greeks decided to raise the
siege, rather than 'wait for battle and be defeated and
flee dishonourably'. In this way Janina, and ultimately
perhaps the entire despotate, were saved from a Byzantine
invasion 209
In certain circumstances, therefore, castles relied on
field armies just as much as field armies relied on
208 See above, pp.134-37.
209 L. de la c., c.607-32, pp.243-52 (quote: c.630,
p.251); L. de los f., c.456-60, pp.100-101. Once the
Byzantine Greeks withdrew, their Genoese allies were also
forced to retreat. See above, p.340.
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castles. Neither could survive indefinitely without the
protection of the other. However, this interdependence
between troops and fortifications could only be maintained
if there were enough soldiers available to raise new
armies quickly whenever castles came under threat. In
order to do so, besieged lords were even allowed to call
upon the assistance of their vassals without issuing the
customary fifteen day warning. 210 But in the case of
Serres, such precautions were useless, bec8use the Franks
still lacked the men and resources to confront loannitsa
in the open and force him to retreat. Similar factors
explain why the rest of Macedonia, Thessaly and indeed
much of the Latin ec ire ere acs ress vo reist.
the relentless invasions of the Bulgars and the Greeks.
From the early 1260s onwards the same fate befell the
hopelessly outnumbered Franks of Syria and Palestine, who
could only watch and wait as successive Mamluk sultans
picked off one Latin castle or city after another.211
In central and southern Greece, however, the ruggedness of
the terrain made it far easier for the Latins to defend
their territories without having to match their opponents
man for man. Indeed, geography probably had more to do
with the survival of crusader states in this area than
political considerations. As far as castles were
concerned, it is also obvious that mountain strongholds
were more difficult to capture than fortifications
situated in the open. But inaccessible sites such as
Karytaina were also better suited to defensive warfare
because they had good visibility. This was particularly
important for elevated frontier castles like Corinth,
whose defenders could spot an invasion force crossing the
nearby isthmus when it was still several miles away.
210 Assizes, article 26.
211 See above, pp.97-98.
370
Similarly, the citadel of Monemvasia enjoyed such
extensive views over the surrounding coastline that a
surprise attack on the site must have been out of the
question. This no doubt explains why the inhabitants of
the town below had plenty of time to escape the Catalans
in 1292. Further north, both Thebes and Salona were also
built on outcrops which dominated roads linking Boetia,
Thessaly and the Gulf of Corinth. Troops stationed in
these fortresses could therefore warn people living nearby
about imminent incursions or pirate raids, giving them
time to reach the nearest castle or tower.212
At other sites garrisons were able to send messages to
each other, not just neighbouring settlements. During the
1330s, for example, the German pilgrim Ludolf of Sudheim
referred to a network of fire signals between the
Hospitaller islands of Rhodes, Cos and Castellorizzo,
which would have acted as an early warning system against
Turks and pirates, and can therefore be compared with a
similar Cypriot system centred around the fortress of
Buffavento. Ludoif wrote that it was manned by brothers of
the Order, who used 'smoke by day and torches by
night'. 213 it is also possible that the citadel of Corinth
and the Frankish tower on the Athenian acropolis could
communicate with each other, in much the same way that
elevated castles such as Akkar, Crac des Chevaliers, Tumlu
and Anavarza could further east. 214 Indeed, the small
projecting turret visible in nineteenth century
photographs of the tower at Athens may have been
212 Corinth: Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.473; Andrews,
Castles, pp.136-37. Monemvasia: the defenders of this
castle 6ould even see Crete; see ibid, p.207. Thebes and
Salona: Bon, 'Forteresses medievales', 164, 187.
213 Ludolf of Sudheim, De itinere Terrae Sanct, p.28.
Cyprus: see above, p.218.
214 See above, pp.139, 244-45.
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specifically designed for the sending of fire signals.215
Other towers nearer the sea, such as those located around
the coastline of Euboea, could have served a similar
purpose. The fact that many Euboean towers had stone
vaulted, and therefore fire proof, roofs seems to confirm
this. However, these fortifications were not always
intervisible, or even placed particularly strategically.
Consequently, it is safer to assume that many were used to
guard individual settlements and farmsteads rather than
specified stretches of coastline.216
Nevertheless, although the exact function of many smaller
castles and towers continues to elude historians, it is
clear that keeping a lookout for the enemy remained one of
the most important day to day tasks of most garrisons.
This is also stressed in the Assizes of Rotanta, whJ.ch
stated that liegemen who performed annual service to their
lord should spend at least four months a year guarding
castles. Clearly, the purpose of this assize was to make
sure that strongholds were always ready to repel invaders
in an area that eventually suffered from almost constant
warfare 217
As if this were not enough, however, garrisons also had to
be prepared for rebellions and other acts of violence
committed by local Greeks. To some extent, the Franks
reduced the threat of such incidents by adopting a more
tolerant attitude toward the Greeks, and simply continuing
215 Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis,
Athens', 133; Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central
Greece', 112.
216 The towers on Euboea were once thought to be almost
purely strategic in design (Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of
Central Greece', 102), but this theory has since been
rejected as an oversimplification of the evidence (Lock,
'The Medieval Towers of Greece, pp.139-40).
217 Assizes, article 70; L.de la c., c.130, p.47; L.
de los f., c.138, p.32.
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the administrative practices of the former Byzantine
empire. In Achaea, for example, 'the Greek noblemen who
held fiefs and estates and the villages of the land' were
often allowed to keep enough earnings and produce to
maintain their social status, provided that they gave a
certain proportion to the Franks. It was also agreed that
'the people should pay and serve in the same way that they
had done during the overlordship of the emperor of
Constantinople.' 218 Thus rather than expelling or even
killing local people, which would have brought the rural
economy to a standstill, the Franks allowed the Greeks to
hold land and property in exchange for their taxes,
obedience and military service. Indeed, this latter
obligation was sometimes offered willingly, for the Greeks
feared certain aggressors, such as pirates, just as much
as the Latins.219
Fortunately, therefore, the Latin conquest of Greece did
not bring with it any of the horrors associated with the
fall of Jerusalem and the early years of crusader rule in
the Holy Land. This can be explained in terms of
political, military and economic necessities, and perhaps
also a limited amount of understanding between the
catholic and orthodox churches. But this did not alter the
fact that the Latins were unwelcome invaders, who
consequently had to use force as well as tolerance to
impose their rule over the area. The easiest way to do
this was to capture, repair or construct castles. Indeed,
it has already been suggested that the majority of Latin
fortifications in Frankish Greece were hastily erected
donjons or towers, because such structures could be built
218 L. de la c., c.106, pp.34-35. See also L. de los
f., c.13 8 , p.31.
219 That Greeks in Achaea performed military service
is implied in Assizes, article 71. The Greeks of Naxos are
said to have helped their Venetian conquerors combat
pirates. See Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, p.282;
Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, p.57.
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quickly and garrisoned by very few men. By relying on
these strongholds as their bases, and only venturing into
the countryside to collect taxes, or, if necessary, carry
out punitive raids, the Franks could suppress relatively
large areas without actually having to occupy them in
their entirety.22°
These observations are confirmed by the historical
sources. In Messenia, for example, the Frankish invaders
had terrible problems imposing their authority over the
local Greeks, but once they captured the strategic
fortress of Kalamata this situation changed dramatically.
'Afterwards' , wrote Villehardouin, 'more Greeks from the
country	 submitted to	 them than	 ever be1ore1.22
Eventually, Kalamata also became one of the many Byzantine
castles strengthened by new Latin fortifications, and a
similar process was going on all over the lorea during the
early years of the thirteenth century. The men responsible
for these changes were figures like William Aleman, newly
created barons who began 'to change their surnames and
take the names of the fortresses they were building'.222
In so doing, they were actively encouraged by the rulers
of Achaea, who specifically stated in the Assizes of
Romania that the twelve most powerful vassals of the
principality could build their own castles unhindered.
This policy ensured that the countryside was subjugated as
quickly as possible. It may also have been intended to
encourage Frankish nobles to stay in Greece and
consolidate their new baronies, thereby stabilizing the
political situation between fellow newcomers, not just
Greeks and Franks.223
22 See above, pp.316-17.
221 Villehardouin, La Con g uête, p.196.
222 L. de la c., c.218, p.79, and see above, p.304.
223 Assizes, article 94.
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The need to create strong and viable new lordships as
quickly as possible meant that other westerners relied on
the same tactics as those used by the Achaean Franks. At
Coron, the ever expanding thirteenth century
fortifications of the citadel enabled the Venetians to
dominate much of the surrounding countryside, not just the
city itself. 224 During the first three decades of Venetian
rule on Crete, castles and towers were also used to
protect Italian settlers against the locals, who resented
having to share their land with the newcomers. 225 The
mountainous areas of western Crete proved particularly
troublesome in this respect, and so the Venetians
eventually built the fortress of' Suda on the north-west
coast of the island to try to bring order to this region.
Gradually, this wore down the resistance of the Greeks,
but it is interesting to note that by placing Suda by the
sea, the Venetians still created an escape route for
themselves in case it ever became necessary to withdraw
from the area completely. Suda's location also suggests
that the Venetians were happy to contain rather than
conquer western Crete, in the same way that William II of
Villehardouin preferred to surround the Melings with a
ring of frontier castles.226
Hence, castles enabled the Latin conquerors of the former
Byzantine empire to impose their will on a far larger
native population. However, even though they normally
224 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.106.
225 Andrea Dandolo, Chronicum Venetum, pp.284-85, 288,
292 (see also p.304); Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia,
cols.987 92 Marina Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, cols.545, 547,
549 (see also col.557); Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, pp.87-
103.
226 Andrea Navagerio, Storia Venezia, col.991; Marino
Sanudo, Vite de' Duchi, col.549; Fotheringham, Marco
Sanudo, p.101.
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lacked the skill, discipline and equipment needed to
besiege castles, the Greeks still rebelled against their
new overlords with alarming frequency. Such uprisings
could be sparked off by the most trivial matters,
suggesting that relations between the two peoples were
often as bad as those between Christians and Muslims in
the Holy Land. In 1296, for example, an obscure argument
between a Greek lord and a Frankish knight led to a
massive insurrection in northen Laconia. This in turn
resulted in the fall of Saint George, an important Latin
frontier castle, after a traitor within the ramparts
lowered a ladder to Greek rebels waiting below. In
response, Florent of Hainault organized a lengthy campaign
against Saint George, which incidentally involved the use
of small forts similar to those built by the Franks at
Corinth between 1205 and 1210) This must have been
successful, for Saint George belonged to the Latins again
about ten years later, but the whole episode nevertheless
reflects the fragility of Frankish rule in Greece.228
Most other rebellions mentioned by contemporary sources
were caused by more specific grievances. Heavy taxation,
combined with a general feeling that the Latins were not
maintaining established Byzantine customs, seem to have
sparked off a second uprising around Saint George in
1302.229 Similar complaints probably led to numerous
disturbances on Crete, 23° whilst on Chios heavy handed
tactics by the Genoese led to so much local resentment
that between 1329 and 1346 they were forced to abandon the
221 L. de la c., c.801-27, pp.318-27.
228 This is made clear by the fact that a Latin
garrison defended Saint George during another Greek
rebellio n in 1302. See L. de la c., c.932, p.367, and
below, P.377.
229 L. de la c., c.920-26, pp.362-65, c.950, p.373.
230 See above, p.374, and Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo,
pp.89-92
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island altogether. No doubt the Genoese were encouraged to
do so because of the strong political support, and perhaps
even direct military assistance, given to the inhabitants
of Chios by Andronicus 11. External help of this kind also
explains why there were so many rebellions against
Frankish rule in the border region between Achaea and
Mistra, which, as we have seen, could easily receive
Byzantine troops and supplies through the port of
Monemvasia 231
Like the Muslim peasants who rebelled after the battle of
Hattin, the Greeks also took their chances whenever the
Latins had been defeated by an external foe, and were in
serious military trouble. 232 Hence the Thracian rebellion
of 1205 was clearly timed to coincide with loannitsa's
invasion of the area, whilst in 1207 the Greek capture of
the local Frankish lord precipitated a more spontaneous
uprising near Nicomedia. 233 Similar insurrections also
broke out in the wake of both Cephissus and Pelagonia,
devastating encounters which inflicted such heavy losses
on the Franks that it proved impossible for them to
maintain law and order.234
However, even if castles sometimes failed to prevent
rebellions, such structures could still minimize their
impact. This point is perhaps best illustrated by
returning to the uprising of 1302, which was caused by the
heavy taxes imposed on the Greeks by the Achaean prince
Philip of Savoy. This rebellion started well for the
231 John VI Cantacuzenus, Historiarum libri IV, ed. L.
Schopen' CHSB, (3 vols, Bonn 1828-32), I, 370-79; Balard,
'The GeZ oese in the Aegean', pp.162-63; Balard, La Romanie
génois' I, 121-23. Mistra: see above, pp.347-48.
132 See above, p.136.
233 Villehardouin, La Conguête, pp.288-92.
234 Cephissus: see above, p.G166. Pelagonia: Marino
Sanudo, ktoria, p.350.
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Greeks, who captured and destroyed the castles of Sainte
Hélène and Crevecoeur located near Karytaina, before the
Franks even had time to react. Interestingly, these
successes were achieved with the aid of troops sent from
Mistra. But by the time the rebels reached Beaufort
(another fortress near Karytaina, which should not be
confused with its namesake in the Mani peninsula 235 ), they
had already lost the element of surprise, and realized
that it would be impossible to storm the castle without
suffering heavy losses at the hands of the Frankish
crossbowmen stationed along the ramparts. They therefore
changed their minds and marched to Saint George, only to
find that they lacked the equipment to besiege it. In
order to solve the problem, they asked for a trebuchet to
be brought from Monemvasia, but by now they had lost so
much time that the initial impetus of the rebellion was
slipping away. Meanwhile, Philip of Savoy and his barons
were able to raise an army and march south toward Saint
George, forcing the rebels to retreat into the mountains
or back to Mistra. As a result, all resistance crumbled,
and Philip was able to rebuild or strengthen those castles
which had been attacked, collect any outstanding taxes,
and deal with the leaders of the uprising.236
Consequently, despite managing to destroy two entire
castles, the Greek rebels failed because they lacked the
resources to undertake a more extensive campaign involving
lengthy sieges. They needed the element of surprise to
succeed, and once this had been taken away from them, they
did not have any strongholds of their own in which to
regroup or take shelter. The Frankish defenders of Saint
George and Beaufort, on the other hand, knew that they had
time on their side, and were happy to adopt the same
235 Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.386-89, 504, 650-52.
236 L. de la c., c.927-53, pp.365-74.
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tactic of wait and see as that used by the Catalans
against Walter II of Brienne in 1331. In doing so they
prevented the rebellion from spreading any further, and
ultimately caused it to collapse entirely.
By retreating inside their castles rather than trying to
confront rebels in the field, the Franks were of course
also able to keep their casualties to a minimum. In 1302
this was only a temporary measure until P)iIip of Savoy
turned up, but on other occasions it was less clear if and
when a relieving army would arrive. This was certainly the
case for the unfortunate Renier of Tnt, lord of
Philippopolis and Stenimaka, a town and castle situated on
the northern fringes of the Latin empire. When Ioannitsa
invaded this area and the local Greeks rose up in arms
against the Latins, Renier found himself cut off at
Philippopolis with 120 knights. During the ensuing weeks,
small groups of these knights tried to leave the city and
make the dangerous nine day journey to Constantinople,
despite Renier's efforts to persuade them to stay. Most of
them probably suffered the same fate as Renier's son and
brother, who were captured and beheaded along with at
least thirty other knights soon after departing from
Philippopolis. As if this were not bad enough, however,
Renier also began to hear rumours that the inhabitants of
Philippopolis were planning to rebel and deliver the city
to Ioannitsa. He therefore hastily retreated to the castle
of Stenimaka with his fifteen remaining knights, and
stayed there, cut off from the outside world, until a
relieving force from Constantinople finally reached him in
June 1206. By this point Renier had been stranded for
thirteen months, but by refusing to leave his stronghold
he had avoided the fate of most of his companions, and had
survived one of the worst rebellions of the entire
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crusader period.231
Similar, if somewhat less spectacular tactics also enabled
the Genoese to withstand an uprising on Chios in 1347.
This rebellion had been organized by a local nobleman, who
had gathered together a force of Greeks and mercenaries
which may well have outnumbered the westerners on the
island. Rather than trying to confront these people,
however, the Genoese responded by withdrawing to the
powerful citadel of Chios. here they were besieged for a
while, until the arrival of reinforcements caused the
entire insurrection to fizzle out. Once again, therefore,
fortifications rather than superior troop numbers had
saved both the lives and the territorial claims of the
Latin newcomers, and had enabled them to wait in safety
until further assistance arrived from elsewhere.238
As far as the rulers of new crusader states were
concerned, however, the situation was not necessarily so
straightf.rward. For them, there was always the added
threat that their Latin as well as their Greek vassals
would rebel. The obvious way to prevent this was to make
sure that the most powerful castles in any given area
belonged to the local ruler rather than his barons. Thus
in the Catalan duchy of Athens, Thebes, Livadia,
Siderokastron, Neopatras and Athens all belonged to the
royal domain of the Aragonese dukes. 239
 As we have seen,
these sites were powerful mountain castles whose strength
237 Villehardouin, La Congute, pp.204, 236-38, 260-62;
letter from the emperor Henry to the west, September 1206,
RHGF, XVIII, 528-29. See also Nicetas Choniates, Historia,
cols.1015, 1031.
238 John Cantacuzenus, Historiarum libri IV, III, 83-
85; Balard, 'The Genoese in the Aegean', pp.164-65;
Balard, La Romanie génoise, I, 124-25.
239 Setton, Catalan Domination, pp.83-85; Rubió y
Lluch, 'Els Castells', 381-82, 389-90; Setton, 'The
Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380', pp.206-7.
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was such that Neopatras alone had withstood a Byzantine
besieging force of 30,000 men in 1275.240 Similarly, in
Achaea the strategic fortresses of Corinth, Kalamata and
Androusa, as well as Chiemoutsi and Glarentza, were all
held by the rulers of the principality. Between 1249 and
1262 these were joined briefly by Mistra and
Monemvasia. 241 Further east, the f ortified cities of
Constantinople and Thessaloniki were of course also royal
properties,	 although	 Constantinople	 in	 particular
contained a very large Venetian quarter.242
Having gained possession over important strongholds like
these, it was essential for individual rulers to maintain
their defences. Thus loannitsa's destruction of Serres,
which was a royal city, had not only led to the death or
captivity of its inhabitants, but had also undermined
Boniface of Montferrat's dominance over the entire
surrounding region. Consequently, Boniface refortified the
site as soon as he could, thereby re-establishing his own
authority over the local Greeks and Franks, and at the
240 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.121; George Pachymeres,
De Michaele, I, 342-48; Rubió y Liuch, 'Els Castells',
399; Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.l3l-35.
241 Geoffrey I kept Corinth after it finally
surrendered in 1210; L. de la c., c.194-95, p.69. Kalamata
was granted to Geoffrey I by William Champlitte in c.1205-
9; L. de la c., c.124-25, p.42; L. de los f., c.136,
pp.31-32. Androusa was built, or, as has been suggested,
reoccupied and repaired by William II; see above, pp.292-
94. Chiemoutsi was built from scratch by Geoffrey I; see
above, pp.3l7-l8. Glarentza's walls seem to have been
built from scratch in the thirteenth century; L. de los
f., c.217, p.49, and see above, p.313. Monemvasia was
garrisoned by William II's troops after it surrendered; L.
de la c, c.265C, p.73, translated from To Chronikon tou
Moreos, p . 198. Mistra was built or repaired by William II;
L. de los f., c.215, p.49, and see above, p.315.
242 Salonika: This city was occupied by Boniface of
Montferrat after he had come to terms with Baldwin of
Flanders. See Villehardouin La Con g uëte, pp.l'76-8O; Robert
of Clan, La Conguête, c.110, pp.104-5. Constantinople:
this city was included in the arrangements regarding the
establishment of the Latin empire.See above, p.25.
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same time protecting these people against future Bulgar
invasions 243
But in order to maintain their status, rulers also had to
be certain that their followers were as reliable as the
ramparts of their castles. As a result, garrisons were
often changed on the accession of new sovereigns. Thus in
1301 Philip of Savoy, ruler of Achaea by virtue of his
marriage with Isabelie of Villehardauin,	 'had the
castellans and constables and some of the sergeants
changed in all the castles of his principality of Morea,
and placed in them some of the peop2ae he haLo brozight Ire/i?
Piedmont and Savoy'. 244
 The purpose of this policy was to
avoid treachery and foster loyalty toward individual
rulers, but it did not always work. The traitor who let
Greek rebels inside Saint George in 1296, for example, had
the suspiciously Latin sounding name of
	 oniface.
Likewise, we have seen that individual Franks at Karytaina
and Akova (Mathegriffon) were prepared to hand these
castles over to the Greeks in return for financial
gain 246
These incidents show that even the strongest
fortifications were vulnerable if the men who guarded them
could not be trusted. But in general, rebellions and
internal struggles involving fellow westerners were caused
by far wider political disagreements. Thus during the
earliest days of Latin rule at Constantinople arguments
arose between Boniface of Montferrat and his overlord,
Baldwin of Flanders, regarding the kingdom of Thessaly.
Salonika in particular became a sore point between the two
243 Villehardouin, La Conguête, pp.232-34, 272.
244 L.de la c., c.854, p.338.
245 L. de la c., c.806-7, p.321.
"° See above, pp.347-48.
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men, because Boniface hoped to make it his new capital,
whereas Baldwin was well aware of the city's traditional
imperial status. 247
 Matters deteriorated even further in
the autumn of 1204, when Baldwin managed to seize Salonika
before Boniface could get to it. As a result, the latter
decided to rebel openly against his lord, and hastily laid
siege to Adrianople, which had also recently been captured
by Baldwin. The emperor's followers inside Adrianople
therefore appealed to Constantinople for help, and a
relieving army was despatched from the capital which
forced Boniface to raise his siege and come to terms.
Boniface was subsequently allowed to keep Salonika in
exchange for recognizing the emperor's overlordship and
territorial claims in Thrace. 248
 Thus Boniface had been
prevented from conquering Thrace, and perhaps even
overthrowing Baldwin, because he had failed to capture
Adrianople, whose role in the affair can be compared with
that of Beaufort or Saint George during the Greek
rebellion of 1302.249
Sometimes, however, the inherent weakness of Frankish
rulers in Greece meant that fortifications tended to erode
rather than consolidate central authority. This is hardly
surprising when one considers that many Latin nobles had
inherited immensely powerful Byzantine strongholds, which
had originally been designed to withstand far larger
besieging armies than anything the Franks could muster. If
vassals who held such castles were able to resist external
invasion forces numbering thousands of men, it must have
been tempting at times to defy a royal army composed of
247 Villehardouin, La Conciuête, pp.164-GG; Robert of
Clan, La Con guête, c.99, pp.97-98.
248 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp.166-78; Robert of
Clan, La Conguête, c.99-105, pp.97-100, c.110, pp.104-5;
Longnon, L'empire latin, pp.55-61.
249 See above, p.377.
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just a few hundred knights. This certainly seems to have
occurred to the Lombard rebels of Thessaly, who, as has
been mentioned, almost destroyed the emperor Henry's army
by refusing to allow it inside the walls of Christopoli or
Salonika. As a result, Henry's troops may have been unable
to collect supplies from the fleet sailing alongside them,
or indeed find adequate shelter from the terrible winter
weather. The Lombards must also have known that in these
circumstances Henry had no chance of storming Salonika's
vast ramparts, which explains why he had to use guile to
gain entry to the city. 25° Even then, however, Lombard
troops continued to defy Henry at Serres and Christopoli,
and later also Larissa and Thebes. In the end, Henry
failed to capture any of these strongholds by storm, and
had to fall back on a combination of threats, diplomacy
and victories in the field to obtain their surrender.251
When one considers the problems Henry had in dealing with
the bombards, it is easy to understand why the Aragonese
dukes of Athens, who did not even reside in Greece, found
it increasingly difficult to impose their rule over their
Catalan vassals. Indeed, by the early 1360s it appears
that vicars-general sent to Athens by king Frederick III,
who also held the ducal title, were no more than pawns in
the political power games of local Catalan barons. One of
the most important such figures was Roger de bluria, who
apparently seized and ruled Thebes between 1362 and 1366.
Lacking the means to remove Roger from this impregnable
citadel, Frederick III eventually had no alternative but
to acknowledge his status as the 'de facto' vicar-general,
250 See above, pp.330-31.
251 Henry of Valenciennes, L'Estoire de l'empereur,
c.605-87, pp.79-118.
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and he continued to rule until his death in c.1370.252
During the long and violent history of Frankish Greece
there were many similar instances of baronial disloyalty
involving castles. Indeed, during the mid-1250s Thebes had
been at the centre of another internal conflict, when its
lord Guy de la Roche, aided by his Venetian allies,
clashed with his overlord William II of Villehardouin in
a dispute over land on Euboea. William must have thought
that he had brought this struggle to an end when he
finally defeated Guy in 1258, but the latter managed to
escape and seek refuge at Thebes, which proved too strong
for William's besieging forces. As a result, Guy only
surrendered after Achaean troops systematically began to
ravage his lands and thereby threaten him with financial
ruin.253
We have also already seen how the powerful defences at
Patras put an end to Hugh of Lusignan's hopes of
controlling Achaea in 1366. Hugh's greatest rival in this
dispute was Philip of Taranto, younger brother of Robert,
who had ruled the principality between 1346 and 1364.
Shortly before the siege of Patras Philip had himself
launched a major attack on Hugh's headquarters at Old
Navarino, but he too had failed to make any progress. Thus
for a while Hugh and Philip were deadlocked, because
neither claimant succeeded in taking the other man's
252 Frederick III had recognized that Roger as vicar-
general by August 1366. See Rubió y Lluch, Di plomatari de
lOrient català, no.271, p.355. The pope also complained
about Roger's actions, and his use of Turkish mercenaries.
See Lettres secretes et curiales se ra pportant a la
France, ed. G. Mollat, (Paris 1955), nos.1047, 1050,
p.163; Setton, 'The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380',
pp.198-99, 202-4.
253 L de la c., c.234-35, p.85; L. de los f., c.224-
25, PP
. 50-51; Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.105.
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castles. Consequently Philip only emerged victorious after
Hugh was persuaded to leave Greece in return for a
substantial pay-off.254
Incidents like these illustrate how castles could prevent
lords from imposing their will on troublesome vassals or
rival claimants. But the chronology and frequency of
rebellions can also be used to shed more light on the
decline of central authority in general. It is interesting
to note, for example, that many of the rebellions
mentioned so far occurred in the latter half of the
fourteenth century, when the rulers of Latin states in
Greece were increasingly absent in western Europe. By
contrast, the fact that there were so few disturbances in
Achaea before the loss of Mistra, Monemvasia and Old Mania
in 1262, suggests that the principality enjoyed good
internal security during this period. To some extent, this
is confirmed by contemporary descriptions of Andravida
(Andreville), the thirteenth century capital of Achaea,
which was situated in the middle of an open plain,
'without any walls or a citadel'. Instead of trying to
rectify this situation, the earliest rulers of Achaea
preferred to reside at Chlemoutsi, which provided them
with shelter but still lay conveniently close to their
centre of government.255
This situation would have been unthinkable in most other
crusader states. If Constantinople, Salonika, Acre,
Antioch or Tripoli had not been protected by vast urban
fortifications, these cities, along with all the
territories around them, would have been overrun in a
254 L. de losf., c.690-702, pp.152-55, and see above,
pp.334-35.
255 L. de la c., c.92, p.30. See also Bon, La Morée
frangue, pp.318-20.
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matter of weeks. Indeed, the only Frankish settlement in
the entire eastern Mediterranean which was comparable with
Andravida was Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. Cyprus
itself was also similar to the principality of Achaea, in
that both were geographically isolated and therefore less
exposed to external invaders than Christian territories
which shared long borders with hostile Greek, Bulgar or
Muslim states. As a result Cyprus and Achaea enjoyed far
more peace and internal stability that their neighbours.
These factors explain why the Franks did not make any
efforts to fortify Andravida until the Greeks had taken
over Mistra, and were beginning to attack the principality
regularly. As we have seen, these attacks also encouraged
local people to rebel, thereby increasing the need for
urban defences even further. 256
 A similar process took
place on Cyprus, whose capital only had walls built around
it once the Genoese occupied Famagusta in the 1370s.257
Consequently, the more exposed a Christian lordship became
to hostile attacks from beyond its borders, the likelier
its native inhabitants were to rebel. As far as Frankish
Greece was concerned, this may also have had some effect
on military architecture in the region. So far, it has
been suggested that a combination of poverty, local
building traditions and the inherent natural strength of
sites such as Karytaina accounts for the rather poor
quality- of medieval castles in Greece. But it is also
possible that the political situation during the first
fifty years of Frankish rule, when most Latin
fortifications were built, had something to do with it. In
other words, the newcomers realized that there was no need
to construct massive defences against a native population
256 L. de la c., c.355, p.137.
157 See above, pp.192-95.
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which lacked the resources to put up any organized
resistance. In these circumstances, isolated towers, weak
curtain walls and uncut masonry were found to be more than
adequate. However, this theory does not account for the
fact that castles constructed long after uprisings and
invasions had become commonplace, such as the Catalan
defences in Boeotia, still relied on the same careless
building techniques. Consequently, it would be dangerous
to claim that this argument applies to all Latin
fortifications in Greece.258
What is clear, however, is that castles in general were
the most effective way of maintaining both internal and
external security, and that the crusaders would not have
been able to conquer the Byzantine empire without them.
Indeed, these structures were so good at defending and
suppressing newly captured territories that sometimes it
was considered safer to get rid of them altogether. In
1207, for example, the emperor Henry agreed to demolish
both Cyzicus and the fortified church at Nicomedia in his
peace treaty with Theodore Lascaris of Nicaea. By
insisting on the destruction of these two castles,
Theodore hoped to prevent the Franks from continuing to
use them as bases for raids on the surrounding
countryside. 259 Similarly, as soon as they heard about
Walter II of Brienne's invasion plans, the Catalans
demolished the fortress of Saint Omer at Thebes 'to make
sure that the duke of Athens would not take it in any way
and recover the duchy by using this castle'. 260 The
258 A similar theory has been put forward to explain
the rather primitive design of Frankish towers in Greece.
See Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 109.
259 Villehardouin, La Conguête, p.292.
260 L. de la c., c.554, pp.220-21; To Chronikon tou
Moreos, P.524.
388
systematic destruction of fortified sites in Thrace by
loannitsa seems to have been a similar attempt to prevent
the Franks and Venetians from reoccupying the area, and to
create a kind of no-man's-land between Constantinople and
the Bulgars. By adopting this policy loannitsa must have
realized that he had far less to lose than the Latins, for
he relied on weight of numbers rather than castles to
maintain his authority over the countryside.261
Beyond Frankish Greece, loannitsa's actions can also be
compared with the scorched earth tactics which Saladin and
Baybars employed in the Holy Land. 262 But whereas both
these sultans failed to wipe out Christian territories
entirely, Latin control over Thrace and Macedonia had
basically disappeared by the late 1220s. One reason for
this was that the crusader states of Syria and Palestine
received considerable assistance from the Hospitallers,
Templars and Teutonic Knights, whose vast military and
economic resources enabled them to construct and garrison
powerful frontier castles such as Saphet and Crac des
Chevaliers. In Greece, on the other hand, the Military
Orders kept such a low profile that the contemporary
sources rarely even mention them. According to the
Chronicle of Morea, for example, the three Orders each
owed the prince of Achaea four knights service annually;
a tiny amount when one considers that in Galilee the
castle of Saphet alone had a peace time garrison of 1,700
troops, including 50 Templar knights.263
261 Villehardouin, La Con guête, pp.246-50; Nicetas
Choniate s , Historia, cols.118-19.
262 See above, pp.169-70.
263 L. de los f., c.131, pp.3O-3l De constructione
castri Saphet, lines 204-10, p.384.
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The relative insignificance of the Military Orders in
Frankish Greece also makes it difficult to establish
precisely which castles and estates they held there. The
headquarters of the Teutonic knights, for example, appear
to have been situated at Mostenitsa, which, according to
a papal letter of Gregory IX, lay somewhere in the diocese
of Coron. 264 As a result, attempts by some historians to
link Mostenitsa with a ruined Frankish tower in southern
Elis have been rejected by those scholars who argue that
this site lies too far north of the Venetian colony. But
whether one believes that Mostenitsa was an isolated tower
in Elis, or indeed a totally different fortification which
has long since disappeared, both theories can be used to
show that this castle must have been remarkably small
considering its administrative status.265
The only other castle in Greece which can be attributed to
the German Order with any kind of certainty is
Châteauneuf, which was built by Isabelle of Villehardouin
toward the very end of the thirteenth century, in order to
protect the border region between Messenia and Arcadia
from Greek raiders. 266 In the Aragonese version of the
Chronicle of Morea, written about a hundred years later,
it was specifically stated that this stronghold had since
been granted to the Teutonic Knights. 267 Once again,
however, there is little at the supposed site of
264 Gregory IX: letter of 19th May, 1241, reproduced
in Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, pp.23'7-38, at p.237;
Assizes, article 48.
265 Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, pp.73-74; Bon, La
Morée frangue, pp.343-44, 429.
266 L. de la c., c.830, pp.328-29.
267 L. de los f., c.471, p.103.
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Châteauneuf, a simple rectangular enclosure flanked by
three square towers, to suggest that it once belonged to
a wealthy and powerful international Order. 268
 Moreover,
if the Teutonic Knights held any strongholds in the Latin
empire before 1261, or in the duchy of Athens until 1311,
all historical and archaeological evidence of their
existence has long since disappeared. 269
 The German
traveller Ludoif of Sudheim's claim that 'in Achaea, or
Morea, there are brothers of the Teutonic house guarding
very strong castles [and] constantly fighting against the
dukes of Athens (je the Catalans) and the Greeks' also
seems to exaggerate the Knights' role in the political
Struggles of the 1330s, although it does at least confirm
that the Order was still very active in Greece during this
period. 270 Indeed, the last known references to Mostenitsa
date from as late as the early fifteenth centciry, by which
time most of Messenia belonged to the Greeks of Mistra.2'11
The ev idence concerning the Templars and the Hospitallers
is, if anything, even sketchier. Occasional references to
these Orders, such as their contribution to William II of
Villehardouin's campaign against Guy de la Roche in 1258,
show that they were involved in the military activities of
the principality, but it is doubtful if they owned many
castles in the regions 272 Papal docuents fro tk. x
of Innoc er t III reveal that the Templars held Lamia
268 Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.656-58.
269 Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, pp.71-72.
270 Ludolf of Sudheim, De itinere Terrae Sanctae, p.23.
271 Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, pp.80-81.
272 L. de la c., c.225n3, p.82, translated from To
Chronikon tou Moreos, p.214.
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(Zeitoun) at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and
they were perhaps largely responsible for its
construction. This was yet another mountain castle built
around an ancient acropolis, whose location on the borders
of Boeotia and Thessaly gave it great strategic importance
under both the Franks and the Catalans. 273 In 1209,
however, Lombard rebels fleeing from the emperor Henry
probably took shelter there, and by the end of Innocent
III's life the entire area was already being swallowed up
by the despotate of Epirus. Consequently, it is difficult
to ascertain how and when the Templars left Lamia,
although it does seem clear that their occupation of the
castle was short lived and ineffectual
These observations probably also apply to Gardiki, a
Hospitaller lordship to the east of Lamia which the Order
seized from the local bishop despite the protestations of
Innocent III. Gardiki subsequently fell to the Greeks
of Epirus, only to return to Frankish control in the
1270s, when William de la Roche married the daughter of
the Greek ruler of Neopatras and received both Gardiki and
neighbouring Lamia as her dowry. 276 Almost half a century
later these strongholds were also captured by the
Catalans, ruling out any possibility that the Military
273 Innocent III, PL, CCXVI, Lib.XIII, no.136, col.323;
Rubj6	 Liuch, 'Els Castells', 393-98, and see above,
p.311.
274 Henry of Valenciennes, L'Estoire de l'empereur,
c.671,	 110n4, and see above, p.311.
275 Innocent III,
	 PL,	 CCXVI,	 Lib.XIII,	 no.120,
co1s.3O18 LIb.XV, no.69, cols.591-94.
276 Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.130; L. de la c., c.546,
PP.216_i7; Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.133-35.
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Orders ever returned to them.277
Further south, the Hospitallers appear to have become
increasingly involved in the defence of Christian
territories against the Turks and other aggressors
arriving from the north. In 1395, for example, the pilgrim
Niccolo da Martoni described his harrowing journey between
the east coast of Attica, where he had arrived by ship
from Euboea, to the Hospitaller castle of Sykaminon,
situated three miles inland. The entire region around this
castle was permanently threatened by the Turks, as well as
a group of Albanian robbers based at another stronghold
nearby. As a result Niccolo was greatly relieved both to
reach and to get away from Sykaminon without being
attacked. From these events it is clear that bJ the late
fourteenth century the castle acted as an isolated refuge
in a sea of lawlessness and virtual anarchy.278
The growing involvement of the Hospitallers in Greece also
reflected the diminishing power of the Templars, who were
dissolved early in the fourteenth century, and the
Teutonic Knights, who gradually transferred most of their
activities to Prussia after the fall of Acre. This process
can be illustrated by looking at the history of
Palaiopolis, a small village situated in central Elis. In
1210 this and two other settlements were granted to the
TemplarS by leading members of the Frankish invasion
force, including William of Champlitte. 279 After the trial
271 Marino Sanudo, Epistulae, in Gesta Dei per Francos,
II, Ep.'' 293.
218 Niccolo da Martoni, Relation du pèlerinae, pp.655-
56.
279 Innocent III, PL, CCXVI, Lib.XIII, no.149, col.329.
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of the Templars, however, the site was taken over by the
Hospitallers, who either inherited or constructed the
medieval tower situated on a hill near the village. The
present remains of this structure indicate that it was
rectangular, incorporated reused classical masonry, and
had been equipped with a large vaulted cellar or cistern.
In short, this was a typical Frankish tower of the kind
erected all over Greece, although the presence of a
cistern suggests that it was slightly more substantial
than the majority of such fortifications. 280
 Further
afield, Palalopolis can also be compared with the Red
Tower, a similar structure in Galilee which both the
Templars and the Hospitallers occupied during the
thirteenth century.281
Sixty years after the dissolution of the Templars, 'the
castle of Palaiopolis' still belonged to the
Hospitallers. 282 At this time the Order also held a castle,
or, more likely, a fortified tower, at Laffustan
(Phostena) in northern Achaea, another site originally
granted to the Templars. Presumably, therefore, Laffustan
evolved from a Templar village into a Hospitaller
stronghold in the same way that Palaiopolis did. 283
 As the
fourteenth century progressed, however, the Hospitallers
were also called upon to garrison many other castles, not
just their older possessions in the Peloponnese and at
280 L. de los f., c.588, p.129; Bon, La Morée frangue,
p. 338n7.
281 See above, p.158.
282 Survey of royal properties in the Morea, carried
out for Marie de Bourbon, 1371, reproduced in Bon, k
Morée frangue, p.690.
283 Survey of royal properties in Morea, 1371, in Bon,
La Morée frangue, p.690; Innocent III, PL, CCXVI,
Lib.XIII, no.150, col.330.
394
Sykaminon. Indeed, by 1356 the military situation in
southern Greece had deteriorated so much that Innocent VI
seems to have considered handing all of Achaea over to the
Order, or at the very least giving it a far greater role
in the defence of the principality. 284
 Although little
came of this suggestion at the time, Innocent's plan was
finally carried out twenty years later, when queen Joanna
of Naples granted the Morea to the Hospitallers for an
annual rent of 4,000 ducats over a five year period. By
the end of the five years, however, the Order had suffered
so many financial, military and political setbacks both in
Greece and on Rhodes that it did not attempt to renew the
contract. 285 But despite these problems, the Hospitallers
continued to show an interest in Greece, and were
prominent in efforts to defend Corinth and fortify the
nearby isthmus at the very beginning of the fifteenth
century. These projects, and indeed the history of Rhodes
in general, fall outside the limits of this chapter, but
they are nevertheless worth mentioning as further examples
of fortifications being used to protect territories
against numerically superior invasion forces. 286 It has
also been shown that during the fourteenth century the
Hospitallers turned Rhodes itself into a heavily fortified
284 Innocent VI, Lettres secretes et curiales, ed. P.
Gasnault, M.H. Laurent and N. Gotten, (4 vols., Paris and
Rome 1959-76), IV, no.2133, pp.75-'76, no.2134, p.76;
Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes', pp.296-97.
285 L. de los f., c.724-26, pp.159-60; Luttrell, 'The
Hospitallers of Rhodes', pp.301-3; Bon, La Morée frangue,
pp.253-54; A. Luttrell, 'Intrigue, Schism and Violence
among the Hospitallers of Rhodes, 1377-1384', Speculum,
XLI, (1966), 30-48.
286 Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes', pp.307-8;
A. Luttrell, 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives,
Problems, Possibilities', in idem, Latin Greece, the
Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291-1440, (London 1992),
c.1, pp.243-66, at pp.254-55.
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naval base, whose military role was similar to that of
Modon or Negroponte, and which made a significant
contribution to the successful crusade against Smyrna in
1344 287
Returning to the older and less extensive fortifications
which the Hospitallers and the other Orders had held in
Greece since the thirteenth century, the problem of
function still needs to be addressed. The scarcity of
evidence makes this a difficult task, but two roles, one
military and the other administrative, can at least be
suggested for these castles. Firstly, strongholds such as
Lamia and Châteauneuf may have been granted to the
Military Orders in order to prevent their capture and to
make sure that areas around them were properly defended
against hostile neighbours. Chãteauneuf in particular
evidently became a relatively important frontier castle in
the fourteenth century, and Ludolf of Sudheim's statement
regarding the Teutonic Knights suggests that its garrison
saw some heavy fighting during this period. Sykaminon
clearly performed a similar role by the time Niccolo da
Martoni visited it, even if this had not been the castle's
original function during the more peaceful years of
Frankish and Catalan rule. 288
 The strategic location of
Lamia and Gardiki implies that they too were occupied by
281 See above, pp.341-42.
288 The presence of other Hospitaller estates between
Sykaminofl and Athens suggests that this castle had in fact
originallY been intended as an administrative centre, just
like MosteflitSa and Palaiopolis, discussed below. Niccolo
da Martoni's account also refers to the 'port of
Sykaminon', (Relation du Pèlerinage, p.655), showing that
it had direct sea links with Rhodes for trade and
administration. See also A. Luttrell, 'La Corona de Aragon
y la Grecia catalana: 1379-1394', in idem, Latin Greece,
the Hospitallers and the Crusades, 1291-1440, c.11,
pp .219-52, at pp.241, 247-48.
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the Military Orders 'to defend the land' and secure Latin
frontiers. 289
 If this is the case, then westerners in
Greece were pursuing the same strategy as the Armenians
and the counts of Tripoli, who endowed these Orders with
many former baronial castles situated in exposed border
areas 290
However, the comparative insignificance of Greek
strongholds belonging to the Military Orders may also
suggest that their primary role was administrative rather
than strategic. This certainly seems to have been the case
at Mostenitsa and Palaiopolis, mere towers which were not
located anywhere near important frontiers before the loss
of Mistra in 1262. However, Mostenitsa did lie extremely
close to other German estates in Messenia, which became
the object of a land dispute with nearby 15odon auring the
early fifteenth century. Indeed, the fact that they were
later granted the royal castle of C).theauneaf, and had
also acquired a house inside the walls of Chlemoutsi in
1237, implies that the Teutonic Knights gradually became
relatively powerful landowners in the area, and were
clearly on good terms with the rulers of Achaea, their
principal patrons. When one views all this evidence
together, it seems that Mostenitsa must have acted as the
focal point of a large agricultural domain, and that it
was primarily designed to protect produce, cattle and farm
revenues rather than any major settlements or strategic
roadways.	 In	 these	 circumstances,	 the	 castle's
fortifications only needed to be strong enough to deter
local	 criminals	 and	 troublemakers.291	 Again,	 this
289 Innocent III, PL, CCXVI, Lib.XIII, no.136, col,323.
290 See above, pp.269-77, 45-47, 163.
291 Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.133, p.134;
Forstreuter, Der Deutsche Orden, pp.75, 77-78, 78n16; Bon,
La Morée frangue, p.429.
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arrangement had its parallels further east, and
particularly on Cyprus, where it has been shown that the
Hospitaller tower at Kolossi was used to house the
regional commander and safeguard local sugar plantations.
Similarly, the close architectural links between
Palaiopolis in Elis and the Red Tower in Galilee implies
that both were used to farm and administer neighbouring
estates. 292
The changing role of the Military Orders in Frankish
Greece, and in particular the f{ospitaLlers, who startci
off as fairly minor landowners in the years immediately
after the Fourth Crusade, but eventually controlled all of
Achaea between 1376 and 1381, also reflects the wider
political history of the region. Hence the relative
insignificance of the Orders early on confirms that the
crusader states of central and southern Greece did indeed
enjoy good internal stability at this time, for no ruler
would actively encourage the Hospitallers, Templars and
Teutonic Knights to build up vast castellanies and estates
unless it was absolutely necessary. This, of course, had
been the case in Palestine and Syria, where the three
Orders held virtually independent lordships whose presence
safeguarded Christian territories but eroded central
authority.
The startling success of the principality of Achaea and
the duchy of Athens during the first half of the
thirteenth century, and the ability of their rulers to
keep the Military Orders in check, can largely be
explained in terms of the ruggedness of the local terrain,
the lack of any organized resistance either internally or
292 Kolossi: see above, p.229. The Red Tower: see
above, p.158.
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externally' and the apparently greater concentration of
Frankish settlers here than anywhere else in mainland
Greece. 293 This in turn may account for the poor design and
weak construction of many Latin fortifications, and the
total absence of any defences whatsoever at Andreville
during this period. A similar combination of remoteness
and lack of resistance also illustrates why many islands
remained in Latin hands for so long, and their history can
be compared with that of Cyprus, the most successful
crusader state further east. It can be contrasted with
that of Thessaly and the Latin empire, however, where the
openness of the countryside, the sheer length of the
borders which the Franks were expected to defend, and the
overwhelming numbers which opposed them on both sides of
the Bosphorus meant that castles probably compensated for
troops in the field more than anywhere else in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Such problems did not affect Attica and the Peloponnese
until the loss of Constantinople in 1261, and Mistra the
following year. The Greek reoccupation of this latter
stronghold in particular meant that for the first time
southern Greece could be attacked with relative ease in a
direct land based assault, and had effectively lost its
physical isolation. As a result, Frankish rulers in the
region gradually found themselves in the same predicament
as their beleaguered Latin neighbours at Acre and Tripoli,
for they now had to shelter inside their castles just to
survive, were obliged to ask the Hospitallers and others
for more and more external assistance, and proved
incapable of preventing rebellions and the decay of royal
authority. As if this were not enough, the next hundred
years also witnessed a massive escalation in piracy, the
293 As many as five to six hundred knights may have
settled in the principality of Achaea. See Longnon,
L'emp ire latin, pp.203-4.
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rise of Ottoman Turkey and the arrival of new aggressors
such as the Catalans and the Navarese. But like the
defenders of Acre, the original Frankish and Venetian
invaders of Greece still held on by relying on their
fortifications to protect them. Such structures had made
the initial conquest of the Byzantine empire possible, and
from the mid-thirteenth century onwards they ensured that
many Latin outposts survived long after any realistic
chances of political unity or military counter-offensives
had disappeared.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE NON-MILITARY FUNCTIONS OF FORTIFICATIONS
Wherever they settled in the eastern Mediterranean, the
Latins (and to some extent the Armenians) tended to be
heavily outnumbered by their Greek and Muslim opponents,
and so they often lived in or near fortifications. As a
result, such structures fulfilled a whole variety of other
functions in addition to their more important military and
strategic uses, and It is these which will be discussed in
this chapter.
Firstly, it is clear that many Christian strongholds acted
as the permanent homes of local lords, some of whom lived
in far more luxury than their contemporaries in western
Europe. In 1211, for example, Willbrand of Oldenburg wrote
that the citadel of Beirut had mosaic floors designed to
look like gently lapping waves, and one room even
contained a marble fountain carved in the shape of a
dragon. 1 Other castles famous for their magnificent
appearance included the acropolis at Athens, whose
classical ruins were converted into a palace by the
Frankish, Catalan and Florentine lords of the city, 2 and
Thebes, whose walls were covered with murals depicting the
Latin conquest of Syria. 3 These murals have long since
disappeared, but traces of contemporary frescoes which
have been discovered at Margat and Crac des Chevaliers
suggest that most of the religious or communal rooms of
larger crusader fortifications were in fact decorated in
this way. 4 Additional features intended to make daily life
I Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, pp.204-6.
2 Niccolo da Martoni, Relation du Pèlerinage, pp.647-
53, 656; Setton, Catalan Domination, pp.227-32.
L. de la c., c.554, pp.220-21; To Chronikon tou
Moreos, p.524.
J. Folda, 'Crusader Frescoes at Crac des Chevaliers
and Marqab Castle', Dumbarton Oaks Pa pers, XXXVI (1982),
177-210.
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as comfortable and pleasant as possible included Turkish
baths, remains of which have been found at Paphos, Belvoir
and Pilgrims' Castle, 5 and gardens, which may have existed
at Athens, Montfort and the Hospitallers' headquarters at
Acre. These were no doubt used for recreation and
relaxation just as much as the cultivation of herbs and
vegetables 6
Thus the most powerful members of society enjoyed a
relatively high standard of living, and it would be wrong
to assume that the fortresses they inhabited were
inhospitable places lacking creature comforts.Inevitably,
this point is most applicable to the actual rulers of
latin states in the east, such as the princes of Achaea,
whose residence at Chiemoutsi contained an unusually large
amount of fireplaces, latrines and cisterns, and was built
on a far grander scale than any other Frankish castles in
Greece. This must have been a very pleasant place to live
during the reign of its builder, Geoffrey II of
Villehardouin, who is said to have 'constantly maintained
eighty knights with golden spurs' at his court, 'whom he
gave all that they required besides their pay'.7
Similarly, the kings of Cyprus had palatial accomodation
at both Kyrenia and Nicosia, whilst in the summer they
probably retreated to the much cooler and healthier
mountain fortress of St.Hilarion, whose upper baileys
housed extensive royal apartments. 8 However, the fact that
Megaw,	 'Supplementary	 Excavations',	 324-25;
Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.374-76.
6 Athens: Lock, 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis,
Athens', 133. Acre: Philip of Novara, The Wars of
Frederick II, p.17l. Montfort: Masterman, 'A Crusaders'
Fortress in Palestine', 96.
Marino Sanudo, Istoria, p.101; Bon, LaMorée
frangue, pp.608-22; Andrews, Castles, pp.154-58, and see
above, p.318.
8 K; Megaw, 'Military Architecture', pp.203, 204-5;
Enlart, L'art gothi gue, II, 525-38, 575-77, 590-95.
402
the royal family chose to shelter at Kyrenia during the
Egyptian invasion of 1426 suggests that this was in fact
considered to be the safest residence of all three.9
Further down the social scale, even some smaller castles
and isolated towers were clearly regarded as permanent
homes. At the Red Tower, for example, traces of mosaics
and red plaster have been found in the upper parts of the
structure. 10 Similar features are virtually unheard of in
the towers of Frankish Greece, many of which may well have
stood empty during peace time.	 ever, at Xeamt one
building is known to have contained numerous residential
rooms arranged over several floors, and to have had an
oven and a wine press attached to it. Clearly, this was a
fortified farm house rather than a mere refuge site, and
it has justifiably been compared with the ffospitaiier
complex at Kolossi. 11 The fact that this and many other
Greek towers were built in open, fertile countryside also
implies that they belonged to, and sometimes acted as the
day to day residences of, poorer Latin settlers, and were
therefore situated near rural estates rather than
strategic hill tops or roadways. In addition, it is
possible that these towers were status symbols, and that
their height reflected the sealth o the men 'no DuiXt
them. If this was the case, they can perhaps be compared
with similar structures in many medieval cities, including
Acre, where individual Orders and trading nations were
constantly trying to build towers which were slightly
Strambaldi, Chroni gu, p.282.
Pringle, The Red Tower, p.15.
11 Documents sur le régime des terres dans la
principauté de Morée au XIVe siècle, ed. J. Longnon and P.
Topping, (Paris 1969), pp.70-7l; Lock, 'The Frankish
Towers of Central Greece', 110. Kolossi: see above, p.229.
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taller than those of their rivals.12
The various facilities and decorative features mentioned
so far were primarily intended to make life as enjoyable
and convenient as possible for those who lived in the east
permanently, but they were also used to impress and
accomodate important guests and crusaders. During Louis
IX's crusade to Egypt, for example, his wife queen
Margaret spent much of her time at Pilgrims' Castle,
which, according to Oliver of Paderborn, contained an
entire 'palace' within its inner bailey.' 3 About forty
years earlier Andrew II of Hungary had also visited Margat
and Crac des Chevaliers, and was so impressed by these two
castles that he gave the Hospitallers certain estates in
his homeland to express his gratitude for their
generosity.'4
The arrival of important visitors, or other special
occasions such as weddings and coronation ceremonies, were
also accompanied by much feasting and celebrating, and the
halls of castles provided a fitting backdrop for these
events. Many such rooms were probably very similar to the
well preserved domestic hall situated in the valley below
the castle of Montfort, which was built by the Teutonic
Knights between 1229 and 1260. This structure measures
approximately 40 metres by 10 metres, and its vaulting,
windows and doorways are clearly the work of highly
skilled craftsmen following a typically gothic style.15
The remains of similar halls have been preserved at
Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 111;
Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece', p.138; REy, 'Etude
sur la Topographie', 137, and see above, pp.147-48.
13 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.l'll;
Gestes, p.741; Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p.282.
14	 Cartulaire,	 II,	 nos.1602,	 1603,	 pp.238-40;
Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.126-27.
15 Pringle, 'A thirteenth century hall', 60-75.
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Beaufort, Karytaina, ChiemoUtSi, Sidon, Crac des
Chevaliers and St.Hjlarion, most of which probably date
from the middle years of the thirteenth century.16
Reference should also be made to the 'auberge', a huge
banqueting hail which the Flospitallers owned in Acre's
suburb of Montmusard. This building witnessed fifteen days
of continuous feasting to celebrate the coronation of
Henry II as king of Jerusalem in 1286.17 Twenty years
later the castle of Corinth also played host to a famous
tournament organized by Philip of Savoy, prince of Achaea.
It was attended by virtually all the lords and knights of
Frankish Greece, and lasted for about three weeks.18
The security provided by fortifications meant that they
could also be used to incarcerate prisoners. Pilgrims'
Castle, for example, appears to have been the main prison
in the east for the entire Templar Order, and the Rule of
the Templars records several cases of violent or dishonest
brothers being locked up there. 19 Wilibrand of Oldenburg
also wrote that at Beirut troublesome citizens were placed
in the castle moat, suggesting that there were cells here
similar to that located in the famous rock cut ditch at
Saone 20
At other times, those kept in castles were political
16 Beaufort and Sidon: Deschamps, La Defense du
royaume de Jerusalem, pp.206-8, 232. Karytaina and
Chlemoutsi: Bon, La Morée fran gue, pp.614, 632.
St.Hilarion: Enlart, L'art gothi g ue, II, 591-94. Crac des
Chevaliers: Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.213-24.
17 Gestes, p.793.
18 L. de la c., c.1016-24, pp.397-99.
19 La Rè g le du Temple, nos.554, 573, 592, 593, 603.
The Hospitallers also had their own prison at Acre. See
Gestes, p.805.
20 Willbrand of Oldenburg, p.204; Deschamps, La
Defense du comté de Tripoli, p.231; Kennedy, Crusader
Castles, p.96.
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prisoners rather than common criminals. In 1307 or 1308
'monks and religious men, priests and deacons, as well as
doctors and bishops and many people, both men and women'
who rebelled against the Armenian catholicos Constantine's
decision to recognize papal overlordship, were either
exiled or imprisoned in the citadel at Sis. 21
 Indeed, some
of these people were subsequently executed, although even
this treatment seems mild compared with the punishment
meted out to Amaury of Tyre's supporters after his brother
Henry had been restored to the throne of Cyprus. Many of
Amaury's followers were held at Kyrenia, where they were
only fed a small amount of bread and water each day, and
were forced to share two metre square cells, until they
eventually starved to death!22
This episode may have been unusually grim, but the fact
that both Hugh IV and Peter I also imprisoned their
enemies at Kyrenia suggests that this fortress was in fact
the principal jail on Cyprus during the crusader period.23
At other times, Buffavento was also used to house
political opponents, including those followers of Amaury
of Tyre who had been lucky enough not to get sent to
Kyrenia. 24
 During the 1380s a knight imprisoned here by
king James I even managed to escape by resorting to the
classic trick of using a sheet as a makeshift rope. 25
 Some
years earlier, it seems that Peter I had also intended the
newly constructed Margarita Tower to replace Kyrenia as
Samuel of Ani, Chrono g raphie, pp.465-67, and see
above, p.285.
22 Florio Bustron, Chronigue, pp.143-45; Chronigue
d'Amadi, pp.386, 388, 390.
23 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.85, p.77, c.257,
pp.237-39; Chroni gue d'Amadi, p.408; Florio Bustron,
Chroni gue, p.257; Strambaldi, Chroni gue, pp.34-35, 101.
24	 Chronigue	 d'Amadi,	 p.393;	 Florio	 Bustron,
Chroni gue, p.245.
25 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.610-11, pp.601-3;
Strambaldi, Chroni gue, pp.255-56.
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the most important royal prison in the kingdom. Toward the
end of his reign, Peter even forced one of his disobedient
nobles to work alongside the slaves excavating the moat of
the tower, but this so enraged his other barons that it
may well have contributed to the king's subsequent murder.
At any rate, it seems that the Margarita Tower soon came
to symbolize Peter's oppressive rule, implying that he had
built it to intimidate his Nicosian vassals as much as to
defend his capital against the Genoese.26
Apart from criminals and political opponents, prisoners of
war were frequently held in castles, and during the reign
of Baybars, Ibn al-Furat reported that some Muslims were
imprisoned in the citadel at Acre. 27 In 1262, William II
of Villehardouin also inflicted such a heavy defeat on
Greeks attacking central Achaea that they Later had to b
distributed	 to	 several	 different	 neighbouring
strongholds. 2 Captives of this kind were subsequently
often reduced to the status of slaves, and were obliged to
work in order to survive. Hence Muslim prisoners of war
helped reconstruct the castle of Saphet during the 1240s,
whilst in 1265 the Frankish defenders of Arsuf were forced
to demolish their own citadel after it had been
surrendered to Baybars. 29 Even though they were fellow
Christians, the Cypriots were also happy to employ Genoese
prisoners during the fortification of Nicosia in the late
fourteenth century.3°
However, prisoners of noble birth were usually treated
26 William of Machaut, La Prise, pp.258-59, 265, and
see above, pp.195-96.
27 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, Il, 160.
28 L. de la c., c.385, p.149.
29 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 78, 88-89;
	 De
constructione castri Saphet, lines 115-24, pp.381-82.
30 Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.594-97, pp.591-93.
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with far more respect. Isaac Comnenus, the deposed Greek
emperor of Cyprus, ended up at Margat after 1191, where he
may have spent his time in one of the residential rooms
overlooking the Mediterranean. 3 ' Other important captives
were also considered an asset because they could be
released in exchange for Latin prisoners or large amounts
of money. Thus the Byzantine commander defeated by William
of Villehardoujn in 1262 did not join his troops in some
gloomy dungeon, but was sent to Chiemoutsi, where he
stayed for a while before being swapped for a Frankish
knight captured by the Greeks. 32
 Some years later Thomas,
heir to the despotate of Epirus, was also held hostage at
this castle to ensure that his father would honour his
alliance with the Franks. Once again, however, the
Chronicle of Morea makes it clear that Thomas was regarded
more as a guest than as a prisoner, and no doubt made use
of some of the extensive residential quarters already
mentioned at Chlemoutsi.33
The fact that many castles were either used as prisons,
residences or both meant that they often became centres of
justice and venues for local courts. In Achaea, article 43
of the Assizes of Romania suggests that lesser barons all
had such courts to deal with day to day cases of fighting
and stealing. Within the royal domain minor offences of
this kind were normally sorted out at Glarentza or
Androusa, 'where the lord has a captain to dispense
justice' . However, more serious cases were brought before
one of a select group of the most powerful barons in
Frankish Greece, for only they had the right to exercise
'blood justice', or justice over life and limb. These men
31 Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, II, 371; Deschamps,
La Defense du comté de Tri poli, 279-80.
32 George Pachymeres, De Michaele, I, 209.
L. de la c., c.613, p.245, c.615, p.246, c.621,
p.247, c.652, p.260.
Assizes, articles 43, 177, and see article 9.
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also formed the nucleus of the High Court, although this
institution probably met at Glarentza or the unfortified
city of Andravida, rather than a specific castle. 35 On
Cyprus, however, it is clear that the royal castellan of
Kyrenia presided over the local court of burgesses, which
served the town below the fortress. 36 A similar court was
also run by the Templars at Pilgrims'Castle, and another
may have been revived by the Hospitallers of Belvoir
during the early 1240s.37
By establishing courts in or near castles, the Franks
could store fines collected from criminals securely.
Similarly, taxes imposed on Greeks, Muslims or western
settlers were normally brought to the nearest Latin
stronghold. Indeed, tax collecting appears to have been
the primary role of Messenian Chteauneuf before t was
handed over to the Teutotxtc Knights. Th Coc 	 o
Morea recorded that this stronghold's estates	 clide
'all the villages as far as Arcadia and Old Navarino,
which were accustomed to paying taxes to the Greeks of
Mistra and Gardiki, for the Greeks did not hold any other
castles in this area at the time. And after Chãteauneuf
had been completed, it was agreed by general consent of
the barons and nobles and fiefholders who held land in
this castellany and had paid taxes to the Greeks, that all
the taxes which the Greeks had collected should be given
and paid to Chateauneuf for seven years'. Consequently,
Chãteauneuf's military and administrative functions
Assizes, article 94. In 1275, for example, the High
Court gathered at Andravida to hear an important land
dispute involving the barony of Akova. See L. de la c.,
c.502-31, pp.197-211; L. de los f., c.384-96, pp.84-87.
36 'Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre sous le
règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan' , ed. L. de Mas
Latrie, Bibliothè gue de l'Ecole des chartes, XXXV (1874),
120-21; Edbury, The Kin gdom of Cyprus, p.194.
Livre de Jean d'Ibelin, RHC Lois, I, 420; Riley-
Smith, The Knights of St.John, pp.415-16, 436-37.
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overlapped, for it enabled the rulers of Achaea to
reestablish control over an exposed frontier region, bring
local people whose loyalty had been wavering back into
line, and also regain a vital source of income which had
been lost to the Greeks.38
In the Holy Land, similar links between castles, internal
stability and taxation are revealed in a Hospitaller
document dating from 1263, which stated that a Muslim
settlement in lower Galilee was refusing to pay its taxes
to the Order, because of waning Frankish control in the
area. This example could be used to illustrate the
fragility of a system which relied on isolated
strongpoints rather than superior numbers to suppress a
hostile population. However, it also implies that until
the reign of Baybars, local people had been paying up on
time for decades, without ever voicing any complaints)9
Apart from fines and taxes, farm revenues and important
administrative documents were also kept inside castles. At
Saphet, for example, the seven towers of the inner bai1e'j
housed 'numerous offices for all necessary requirements'
and it was presumably from here that the Templars
administered neighbouring estates and organized the daily
running of their castle. 40
 Beyond major strongholds such
as Saphet, the cultivation of farmland would also have
been centred around smaller towers and fortified
structures. Hence during the twelfth century, and possibly
again after 1192, the tower of Qaqun was 'used to enforce
the lord of Caesarea's authority over his seigneury', even
38 L. de la c., c.830, pp.328-29.
Cartulaire, III, no.3051, p.64. See also Kedar,
'The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish Levant', pp.l60-74.
40 De constructione castri Sa phet, line 182, p.384.
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though he himself probably rarely visited this site. 41 As
has been mentioned, numerous smaller fortifications held
by the Military Orders, including Kolossi on Cyprus and
Mostenitsa and Palaiopolis in the Peloponnese, fulfilled
the same function.42
On a far larger scale, the administrative institutions of
entire crusader states could also be protected by
fortifications. Hence the principal mint of Achaea was
situated inside the walls of Glarentza, close to the
Villehardouin centres of government at Chlemoutsi and
Andravida. 43 On Cyprus, the secrete, which was basically
an archive recording royal debts, privileges, rents and
other earnings, had also been incorporated into the
partially fortified palace of the kings. During the 1390s
this important office was moved into the new castle built
by James I, making it far more secure against potential
Genoese or famluk incursions. Consequently, James's
citadel protected the infrastructure of his kingdom as
well as the inhabitants of his capital. During the
thirteenth century, strongholds in the east belonging to
the Military Orders performed the same function, for they
were used to administer vast estates both in Europe and
the Holy Land. Thus between 1204 and 1206 Margat played
host to a General Cnapter ol the entire )ospIta22er
Order.
As with taxation, the administrative and agricultural
41 Pringle, The Red Tower, p.13, and see p.GO. Tibble,
(Monarchy and Lordshi ps, p.l42) disagrees, and believes
Qaqun was held by the Templars until 1265.
42 See above, pp.229, 396-97.
Bon, La Morée fran gue, p.612.
Edbury, The Kingdom of C yprus, pp.l9l-92; J.
Richard, 'The Institutions of the Kingdom of Cyprus', in
, VI (1989), 150-74, at 162-63.
Cartulaire, II, no.1193, pp.31-4O.
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functions of castles also had much to do with their wider
military role, for the protection afforded by such
structures encouraged people to live and work close to
them, and to cultivate land nearby. Hence we have seen
that the rebuilding of Saphet enabled 10,000 peasants to
repopulate 260 villages which had previously been
uninhabited or dominated by the Muslims, and that farmland
close to Mont Tabor was no longer exposed to enemy raids
once the Templars were installed at Pilgrims'Castle.
Indeed, Mont Tabor itself eventually acted as the focal
point of Hospitaller estates stretching as far east as the
river Jordan, after the Order acquired it in the mid
1250s. 46 Travelling pilgrims such as Burchard of Mount
Sion and Wilibrand of Oldenburg frequently noted how lush
and fertile the areas around such castles were and how
intensively they were farmed by local peasants. This
applied most to regions nearest the coast, many of which
were famous for their wines, and were partially irrigated
by old Roman and Byzantine aqueducts. 47 Both Saphet and
Pilgrims' Castle also lay in areas abundant with woods,
fruit trees, rivers and streams, all of which could be
exploited and cultivated in safety. Consequently, the
construction of a single fortress could revitalize the
rural economy of an entire region.
Moreover, fortified sites tended to encourage agricultural
activities because they could protect crops and produce
just as much as farmers and peasants. Thus a document
dating from 1257 reveals that the Teutonic Knights used
Mhalia as a collection point for surrounding estates,
46 See above, pp.119-20, 168-69.
Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, pp.202, 206,
208, 210; Burchard of Mount Sion, Descri ptio, pp.23, 29,
33-34.
48 De constructione castri Saphet, lines 215-25,
pp.384-85; Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.171;
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, III, 14.
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whilst on Cyprus the Hospitallers may have stored sugar
cane in a fortified building next to the tower of
Kolossi. 49
 Another important industry which was often
organized around fortifications was the extraction of
salt. Salt mined near Pilgrims' Castle, for example, was
probably brought inside the walls of this fortress for
storage, export or consumption. 50
 Similarly, fourteenth
century salt works owned by the Venetians on Corfu and the
Hospitallers on Castellorizzo were supervised from nearby
towers, where both the salt and the men who extracted it
could be sheltered from the ravages of Tirks anci
pirates. 51
 This arrangement can also be compared with the
Hospitaller mill at Recordane, whose two storey tower may
have helped defend the southern approaches to Acre, as
well as the important mill complex itself.52
It is also important to remember that some fortifications
were not just safeguarding certain industries or
agricultural activities, but actually became integrated
with them. Hence the remains of a feeding trough in the
moat surrounding the bour g of Pilgrims' Castle confirms
that this ditch was used as a corral for cattle during
peace time. 53
 This example, combined with an earlier
reference to prisoners being held in the moat at Beirut,
indicates that castle ditches in general were seen as
useful places to keep animals or people who needed to be
contained. This did not of course apply to water filled
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.112, pp.91-94;
Enlart, L'art g othi gue, II, 694.
50 Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, p.171;
Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, p72.
51 Corfu: Thiriet, Ré gestes, I, no.850, p.202.
Castellorizzo: Le saint vo yage de Jhérusalem du seigneur
d'Ang lure, ed. F. Bonnardot and A. Longnon, (Paris 1878),
pp.89-91.
52 See above, pp.1O7-8.
	
Johns,	 'Excavations at Pilgrims Castle: the
Faubourg and its Defences', 120.
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ditches, but such defences could also be adapted for
various non-military functions, and were often used as
open cisterns. A cistern of this kind existed between the
inner and outer ramparts along the south face of Crac des
Chevaliers, and would have provided the Hospitaller
garrison with plenty of water for washing, cooking and
(perhaps) drinking. 54 Furthermore, the elevated position
of one of Crac des Chevaliers's outer towers made it an
ideal location for the castle's windmill, whilst many of
the vast undercrofts at the site served as storeroonis.!,
bakeries, kitchens and workshops. 55 For most of their
existence, therefore, fortified structures were actually
used for storage and other mundane domestic activities
rather than the waging of war.
Whenever a conflict did erupt, hoever, Latin 	 onts
were also expected to shelter valuable belongings which
would normally have remained in the countryside. ring
one of the many clashes between the Greeks of Mistra and
the Franks of central Achaea, for example, local peasants
took their cattle, produce and anything else they could
carry with them inside the nearest stronghold. 56
 This also
illustrates why frontier castles and strategic lookout
posts were so important, for if farmers did not receive
adequate warning of an imminent attack, they were forced
to leave many of their possessions behind. Hence the
Cumans and Bulgars had such a terrible impact on Thrace in
1205 because they did not simply overrun the area, but
'took the cattle in the countryside' with them when they
left. 57 Likewise, in January 1374 Genoese invasion forces
on Cyprus reached Kyrenia so quickly that they managed to
5 Kennedy, Crusader Castles, 99-100; Deschamps, Le
Craccies Chevaliers, p.189.
Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.l52, 203-4.
56 L. de la c., c.685, p.273.
Villehardouin, La Conguéte, p.250.
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capture the cattle grazing in nearby fields before it
could be brought inside the fortress. 58 Consequently, if
peasants were not alerted early enough, or were
subsequently unable to find shelter for their livestock,
the impact on the local economy could be disastrous, and
the fact that farmers had escaped death or enslavement
became immaterial if their only source of food and income
had been destroyed.
Castle garrisons were also keen to protect and participate
in agricultural activities because they relied on food
produced locally ,just as much as farmers and peasants did.
The Hospitallers of Margat, for example, collected more
than 500 wagon loads of crops annually from the fertile
slopes below the castle, and at Saphet fresh fish was
delivered daily from the river Jordan and the Sea of
Galilee. 59
 Other food which was not needed immediately
could be stored for use during the winter or a protracted
siege. Indeed, Margat was supposedly capable of
withstanding a five year blockade, during which time its
defenders would presumably have relied on supplies stored
in the kind of vast grain silos discovered by Deschamps at
Cave de Tyron. 60 Moreover, surplus crops which could not
be kept in this way could still be sold off at market.
This strategy provided the castle of Arcas near Tripoli
with 'considerable revenues, the annual income of its
lands coming from imposts, cane and cultivated fields, and
amounting to a large sum' .
Other essential items supplied to strongholds from
58	 Leontios	 Makhairas,	 Recital,	 c.470,	 p.453;
Strambaldi, Chroni gue, p.194.
Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.210; De
constructione castri Sa phet, lines 229-33, p.385.
60 Wilibrand of Oldenburg,	 Itinerarium,	 p.210;
Deschamps, La Defense du ro yaume de Jerusalem, pp.219-20.
61 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 85.
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surrounding territories included iron, steel and leather,
which were used to make clothing and armour, and fodder,
which was needed to feed warhorses and livestock. 62 In the
Assizes of Romania, one particular clause also stipulated
that certain forests were set aside 'to supply the
castles', so that their garrisons never ran short of
timber or firewood. 63 Indeed, the remains of aqueducts at
some sites, most notably Crac des Chevaliers and Baghras,
indicate that even water had to be channelled into castles
from nearby streams and springs.64
Clearly, therefore, crusader strongpoints relied on
neighbouring farms and estates for food and supplies, but
these goods could only be provided if peasants in the
countryside felt safe enough to go about their work. This
interdependence between peasants and garrisons was
extremely important to the Latins, and if it broke down,
their control over any given region could collapse
remarkably quickly. Hence during Baybars's raid on the
county of Tripoli in 1270, his soldiers' horses 'grazed on
the meadows and crops of Hisn al-Akrad (Crac des
Chevaliers), and this was one of the reasons why it was
captured, since its only provision came from its crops and
these were all used for pasture by the Muslim troops at
this time'. This implies that Crac des Chevaliers's
storerooms were virtually empty when Baybars returned the
following year, and took the fortress in a mere three
62 La Règle du Temple, no.126. In the 1930s a large
stables was discovered at Pilgrims' Castle. See C. Johns,
'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle ('Atlit): Stables at the
south-west of the suburbs', QDAP, V (1935-36), 31-60.
63 Assizes, article 159.
64 Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, p.155; Lawrence,
'The castle of Baghras', pp.58-59; Kennedy, Crusader
Castles, p.100.
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weeks. 65
 Similar circumstances led to the fall of
Montfort, whose territories were so eroded by enemy
incursions that by 1268 all but ten of its surrounding
villages had been lost to the Muslims. As a result, in
1270 Montfort's defenders made a temporary arrangement
with the Hospitallers, whereby they would be allowed to
grow crops for the coming year on land belonging to this
latter Order. Before the year was through, however,
Montfort fell to Baybars, who had effectively starved its
garrison into submission without even needing to undertake
a lengthy siege.66
These events also provide us with another reason why Latin
fortifications located inland were captured long before
their neighbours nearer the sea. The purely agricultural
sources of income which both Montfort and Crac des
Chevaliers relied on were far more exposed to land based
Mamluk offensives than the seaborne trading activities
conducted at Acre and Tripoli. Consequently, the primary
role of many coastal defences was to safeguard trade
routes rather than the rural economy. This point can be
illustrated by looking at the growth of Famagusta, which
quickly replaced Acre as the most important Latin port in
the eastern Mediterranean from 1291 onwards. As we have
seen, Famagusta acquired its first real urban defences
during this period, and according to Etienne of Lusignan,
Henry II deliberately constructed these fortifications in
order to attract more tradesmen to the city. This view has
been criticised by David Jacoby, who argues that Henry was
simply responding to the new Mamluk threat, and was not
consciously trying to create a fortified replacement for
65 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 139, and see above,
p.49.
66 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 130; al-Makrizi,
Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 56; Cartulaire, Ill, no.3400,
p.231, and see above, p.61.
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Acre. There seems to be no reason, however, why Henry did
not have both these concerns in mind, for Famagusta's
walls prevented the city from being captured until 1374,
and simultaneously protected a booming economic centre
where the lucrative trade between east and west could be
continued unhindered.67
Several other examples can be cited to show that in order
to be prosperous, coastal settlements needed to be
fortified. In particular, the walls of Acre and Tyre
clearly safeguarded the trading activities as well as the
inhabitants of these cities against the many Ayubid,
Khwarizmian and Mamluk incursions which have already been
referred to. 68 Further afield, the Achaean city of
Glarentza, whose defences protected the principal sea
route between Greece and Brindisi, became another boom
town from the mid-thirteenth century onwards. Indeed, a
document dating from 1350 records that it even had its own
set of weights and measures, suggesting that its status as
an international trading centre was growing, even though
the political situation in the Peloponnese was
deteriorating rapidly at this time. 69 This point also
applies to the heavily fortified Venetian colonies of
Modon and Coron, which were still thriving, wealthy cities
on the very eve of their capture in 1500, long after the
rest of the Morea had been overrun by the Turks. 7° Such
prosperity was only made possible by the presence of
massive urban defences, for settlements which were not
defended by walls or castles did not do as well. Thus
67 Etienne de Lusignan, Description, folio 24-25;
Jacoby, 'The rise of a new emporium', pp.149-50.
68 See above, pp.62-64, 66.
69 Buchon, Nouvelles recherches, II, no.9, pp.98-iO3;
Bon, La Morée frangue, pp.320-22.
Miller, The Latins in the Levant, pp.495, 498;
Andrews, Castles, pp.14, 59.
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Limassol was never fortified during the crusader period,
making it less popular with the Italians, and causing it
to go into a steady economic decline after the fall of
Acre.11
Apart from their far larger urban defences, many coastal
centres contained numerous smaller fortifications which
protected the maritime trade of individual nations. The
most famous such structures were built at Acre, where it
has been shown that the fortified quarters of the Genoese,
Pisans and Venetians effectively became independent
enclaves pursuing their own economic, military and
political goals. It is worth mentioning that at the
beginning of 1373 the Genoese were demanding a similar
base on Cyprus as a condition for not invading the island.
This implies that the Lusignan kings, having seen how
compounds of this kind had eroded central authority in
Acre before 1291, had prohibited their construction at
Famagusta. If this is the case, it provides us with yet
another example of the strict royal monopoly which the
rulers of Cyprus were able to maintain on castle
building.72
In general, however, the Italian city states were allowed
to construct far smaller towers and fortified houses which
were used to store goods, revenues and administrative
records. During the fourteenth century, the Venetians
probably held many such towers around the Aegean, 73 whilst
in 1294 Venice attacked a similar building belonging to
Jacoby, 'The rise of a new emporium', pp.147-54;
Enlart, L'art gothigue, II, 673-83.
Leontios Makhairas, Recital, c.372, p.353. Acre:
see above, p.148.
See, for example, Thiriet, Réestes, I, no.371,
p.97, and see Lock, 'The Medieval Towers of Greece',
p.139; Lock, 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', 108-
9.
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the Genoese at Limassol. This latter example also confirms
that although Limassol was not a major economic centre,
this city, along with many other smaller coastal
settlements, still played host to a certain amount of
seaborne trade. 74 In Cilician Armenia, it has also been
shown that this kind of trade was almost totally limited
to Corycos and Ayas, whose economic importance rose
dramatically after the decline of Antioch and the events
of 1291. The numerous customs dues and tolls imposed on
Italian merchants using Ayas were collected by a Captain
of Customs, whose administration may well have been
located in the land castle of the city. The fact that this
stronghold was pillaged by Venetian sailors in 1307 also
suggests that tolls were stored in it, and that it played
a major role in the running of the port.75
At some sites, fortifications were also designed in such
a way that they controlled the arrival and departure of
individual merchants and vessels. Thus during the 1260s
Venice and Genoa fought over the Tower of the Flies,
because it dominated the 85 metre wide entrance to the
port of Acre, and whoever occupied it could therefore
control much of the economic life of the city.76
Similarly, the fortified bridge connecting Euboea with the
Greek mainland was divided by a drawbridge, which the
Venetjans of Negroponte no doubt used to impose tolls on
certain vessels, whilst at the same time preventing
Genoese or Turkish ships from getting through.77
These observations also apply to land based trade, for
tolls could easily be collected from merchants as they
74 Gestes, p.829.
' Langlois, Le Tré, no. 23, pp.l7O-75, and see
pp.35-38, 49-50.
76 Gestes, pp.768-69, and see above, p.96.
See above, p.342.
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passed through city gates. In 1266, for example, John of
Ibelin decided to give the Order of St.Lazarus ten bezants
a year from the customs dues which he imposed on tradesmen
entering or leaving Beirut. 78 In a document intended to
clarify the various privileges of the bishop of Acre and
the Teutonic Knights, it is also stated that this Order
had the right to collect gate tolls at Acre, but was
exempt from paying any itself. Clearly, privileges of this
kind were highly profitable and well worth hanging on
to.
Once merchants had left the safety of the fortified cities
and were travelling across the countryside, smaller
Frankish strongholds offered them protection against
bandits and highwaymen. It has already been noted how
Destroit in the vicinity of Pilgrims' Castle, did just
that. This tower had been built at a point where the rocky
terrain forced the main coastal path into a narrow defile,
which could easily be used to ambush travellers. Moreover,
the restricted nature of the site also made it an ideal
place for levying tolls from tradesmen, and the Templars
may well have done so in the same way that the
Hospitallers did near Margat. 8 Here, a wall had been
constructed running from the fortress itself down to the
water's edge, so that people travelling between the county
of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch were obliged to
pass through a small gate and pay a fee before they could
continue their journey. This operation was supervised from
a tower near the gate, whose occupants therefore carried
out the dual task of protecting travellers against
robbers, and at the same time raising revenues for the
78 RHH, no.977, p.25?.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.112, pp.91-94.
80 Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, pp.94-98, and see above,
pp.135, 141.
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Hospitallers. 81
 It is possible that Hasanbeyli, the
lookout post at the entrance to the Amanus Gates,
performed a similar function, for an Armenian document
dating from 1271 implies that this structure was the Black
Tower, a toll station which the Teutonic Knights held in
the vicinity of Servantikar.82
Like merchants, pilgrims were another group of vulnerable
travellers who needed to be protected, but could also be
exploited financially. Once again, reference can be made
to Destroit in this respect, because of its strategic
location along the main road between Acre and Jerusalem.
Indeed, once it had been completed, Pilgrims' Castle
itself probably became a popular spot for visitors to
spend the night, so that its garrison could continue the
traditional Templar occupation of looking after Christians
travelling to the holy city. 83
 The author of De
constructione castri Sa phet also noted that this fortress
enabled pilgrims to visit a number of holy sites near Lake
Tiberias, including the spot where the feeding of the
5,000 took place. This area had obviously been too
dangerous to travel in before Saphet was reconstructed.84
Strongholds belonging to the Military Orders in particular
also provided medical care for pilgrims and foreign
visitors who fell ill in the harsh local conditions. The
Hospitallers, whose original purpose had been to carry out
such work, were probably most famous for their
infirmaries, which incorporated many of the most up to
81 Deschamps, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.284-
85. The Templars were exempt from paying when using this
gate. See Cartulaire, II, no.2058, pp.455-57.
82 See above, p.271.
83 See above, p.l35.
84 De constructione castri Saphet, lines 268-90,
pp.386-87.
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date medical discoveries from the Muslim world. Both the
Teutonic Knights and the Templars ran many similar
hospitals for sick and needy travellers, whilst all three
Orders were expected to feed and clothe local paupers as
often as they could. Hence castles became the focal points
of much charitable work involving both native and visiting
Christians .
Urban fortifications and individual strongholds could also
safeguard the buildings, assets and infrastructure of the
local Church. Hence after the destruction of Banyas
(Valania) in 1188, what remained of the town was so
exposed to further Muslim incursions that its bishop
transferred his see to the neighbouring castle of Margat.
The chapel of this fortress subsequently became the
bishop's new cathedral, serving both the surrounding
diocese and the inhabitants of the outer bourg . 86 Other
interesting examples of important church properties being
protected by crusader fortifications include the cathedral
of Caesarea, which was situated behind the town walls
erected by Louis IX, and the catholic church incorporated
into the Parthenon at Athens. 87
 In Syria, the Latin
patriarchs of Aritioch also managed to outlive the Mamluk
invasion of 1268 by taking shelter inside the fortress of
Cursat, which was situated fri the rugged interior of the
principality, and was not finally lost to Baybars until
85 La Rè g le du Temple, no.188, mentions paupers being
fed at castles. For more details on infirmaries, see
Sterns, 'The Teutonic Knights in the Crusader States',
pp.341-48.
86 Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium, p.212;
Burchard of Mount Sion, Descri ptio, pp.30-31; B. Hamilton,
The Latin Church in the Crusader States: the Secular
Church, (London 1980), p.215.
87 Caesarea: Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hpjy
Land, pp.144-45. The church in the Parthenon was visited
by the Latin emperor Henry in 1209. See Henry of
Valenciennes, L'estoire de l'empereur, c.681, p.115.
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1275.88 This castle had presumably been chosen as the
principal residence of the patriarchs, and the depository
of their treasure, because of its strength and
inaccessible location, in much the same way that the
Armenians later decided to make the impregnable mountain
stronghold of Vagha the home of their most important
relics. 89 By taking such precautions, both the Franks and
the Armenians hoped that their holiest possessions would
not share the same fate as the undefended church of
Nazareth, which was demolished by Baybars in 1263 in an
effort to undermine Christian morale.90
Moreover, several Frankish castles in the Holy Land were
themselves thought to be extremely important in the fight
against Islam. Thus by garrisoning Mont Tabor, the
Hospitallers were not just taking over a strategic vantage
point in central Galilee, but were also defending the
supposed scene of Christ's Transfiguration. 91
 At Saphet it
was likewise considered highly symbolic that the new
Templar castle stood on the ruins of a mosque and a
synagogue. 92 Similarly, Gregory IX was referring to the
religious as well as the military importance of Montfort,
when he spoke of its proximity to the Muslims and its
vital contribution to the defence of the Holy Land. Hence
crusader fortifications could take on great spiritual
significance as the furthest outposts of Christendom,
particularly when they were guarded by one of the three
Military Orders.93
88 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 126, 161-62, 165; al-
Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans, 1(b), 127; Cahen, La Syrie
du Nord, pp.697-98, 717.
89 See above, p.237.
90 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 56-57.
91 Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, pp.358-
59.
De constructione castri Sa phet, lines 124-128,
p.382.
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no.72, pp.56-57.
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This last point also serves as a reminder that the
Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights were all monks
as well as warriors. As a result, their fortresses were
monasteries, not just places of war, and were normally
provided with beautiful chapels which the brethren could
use for their daily services. Well preserved examples of
such buildings can be found at Margat, Crac des Chevaliers
and Chastel Blanc, where the 30 metre long chapel of the
Templars formed the lower floor of the keep itself. 94
 At
Pilgrims' Castle, and possibly Saphet, there were also
round churches of the type normally associated with the
Templars, although the theory that these structures were
copied from the Temple of the Lord in Jerusalem has been
questioned in recent years. 95
 What seems less doubtful,
however, is that the intricate gothic arcade added to Crac
des Chevaliers's central hail in the mid-thirteenth
century was deliberately designed to look like a monastic
cloister. Indeed, it has even been suggested that by
designing several of their earlier castles, including
Belmont and Belvoir, around a cloister-type central
courtyard, the Hospitallers contributed to the development
of concentric fortifications almost by accident, for an
isolated central keep clearly obstructed the traditional
monastic layout which this Order hoped to achieve.96
By building their own chapels within their strongholds,
the Military Orders also excluded themselves from the
Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.197-201;
idem, La Defense du comté de Tri poli, pp.254, 277-78; Hey,
Etude, pp.26-28, 48-49, 88-89.
Johns, Guide to 'Atlit, pp.52-58; Pringle,
'Reconstructing the castle of Safad', 147-48; E. Lambert,
L'architecture des Templiers, (Paris 1978), pp.5-19, 30-
31, 92-93.
96 Deschamps, Le Crac des Chevaliers, pp.216-24;
Harper and Pringle, 'Belmont Castle', 104, 116.
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authority of the local clergy. The papacy encouraged this
process by granting them a series of privileges, including
the right to appoint chaplain brothers, whose powers were
effectively greater than local archbishops. As a result,
their castles gave the Hospitallers, Templars and Teutonic
Knights ecclesiastical as well as military independence,
and made them answerable only to the pope. In these
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that Latin
churchmen in the east resented the Orders, and were most
vocal in calling for their privileges to be withdrawn.
This must have been a complex issue, however, for it has
already been shown that some members of the clergy, such
as the bishops of Tortosa, relied on fortifications
garrisoned by one of the Orders to protect them against
the Muslims.97
Moreover, this dilemma probably reflected public opinion
in general, for although the Hospitallers, Templars and
Teutonic Knights were envied for their wealth and power,
it was clear that their castles were needed to defend
Christian territories. Indeed, such structures were so
important that it became popular for crusaders who lacked
the troops and resources to attack the Muslims to spend
their time in the east constructing and financing new
Latin fortifications. Hence Sidon's sea castle was built
by German crusaders waiting for Frederick II to arrive
from the west, and Pilgrims' Castle was so called because
European members of the Fifth Crusade largely paid for its
construction. 98
 Both Louis IX and Richard I also took part
in castle building, because it was another way of
expressing their piety once further campaigns against the
Muslims had become impracticable. Indeed, Louis IX
For more details on these issues, see Riley-Smith,
The Kni ghts of St.John, pp.375-420.
98 Sidon: see above, p.JT19. Pilgrims' Castle: Oliver
of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, pp.168, 207.
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specifically helped his men to construct Jaffa's citadel
'to earn his indulgence', confirming that this activity
was officially recognized as a means of fulfilling one's
crusading vows.99
Ultimately, therefore, Latin fortifications became linked
with the religious ideas which underpinned the entire
crusading movement, for contemporaries did not distinguish
between the more down-to-earth military functions of such
buildings, and their highly symbolic role as fortified
monasteries and outposts of Christianity. In addition, it
has been shown in this chapter that their lack of troops
forced the Latins to organize many administrative
activities, such as tax gathering and law enforcement,
around their strongholds. The security provided by these
structures also meant that they were commonly used as
residences and prisons, and could encourage merchants and
farmers to open up new trade routes or cultivate
previously unavailable stretches of land. Finally, it is
important to remember that all these activities were
inter-connected both with each other and the military uses
of fortifications, for taxes could not be collected unless
the native population had been suppressed, and crops could
not be harvested until external enemies had been driven
out of the countryside. Only then could Christian
pilgrims, merchants, farmers and craftsmen go about their
daily business in safety.
Joinville, Histoire de Sait Louis, p.284. Richard
I: Itinerarium, p.317.
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CONCLUSION
In general, Latin and Armenian fortifications fulfilled
the same military functions throughout the eastern
Mediterranean. Offensively, they were used to establish
coastal bridgeheads, to conquer and suppress new territory
further inland, and to provide shelter, troops and
supplies for both naval and land based attacks against
various opponents. Defensively, they could also prevent
external invaders from making any permanent conquests,
whilst at the same time protecting local people, along
with their cattle, produce and personal belongings, from
the ravages of war. In addition, fortifications were vital
to the political, economic and social infrastructure of
all Christian states, for they maintained internal
security and minimized the damage caused by local
insurrections, whilst at the same time performing a whole
variety of non-military tasks as prisons, residences,
courtrooms and administrative centres.
Within these general categories, however, there were
certain important differences between the various
territories covered in this thesis. Cyprus and southern
Greece, for example, were physically isolated, and were
therefore less likely to be attacked by major invasion
forces. As a result, fortifications were not as important
in these areas until the political upheavals of the late
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when massive new
defences were needed to halt the Muslims, the Greeks and
the Genoese. On the other hand, northern Greece, the Latin
empire and the Frankish states of the Holy Land shared
long and vulnerable borders with numerically superior
enemies throughout this period, and therefore relied on
castles and town walls to protect them from the very
beginning.
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Geography also had a lot to do with the internal security
of Christian territories. Hence the native peoples of
exposed frontier regions, and in particular the Greeks of
Thrace and Macedonia, found it easier to seek external
assistance, and were therefore likelier to rebel against
their Latin overlords. Likewise, it is clear that the
massive incursions made into the Holy Land by Saladin and
Baybars contributed to the breakdown of law and order, so
that the Franks were in a sense besieged inside their
castles all the time. This problem did not arise in the
Peloponnese until the Franks lost Mistra in 1262, whilst
in Cyprus Greek rebellions only occured during the shaky
period shortly after 1191, and again following the
Egyptian invasion of 1426.
These factors also affected the links between castles and
the internal politics of individual Latin states. In those
areas where the chances of an external invasion were
remote, rulers invariably enjoyed far more control over
their vassals, who did not need to build extensive
fortifications for their own protection. This situation
was most prevalent on Cyprus, where the Lusignan kings
enforced an almost total monopoly on castle building, and
theeerefore survived the crises of 1228-33 and 1306-10.
Further north, the Villehardouin rulers of Achaea also
faced very few challenges to their authority before the
loss of Mistra, and did not even deem it necessary to
fortify Andravida at this time.
In the Holy Land, however, Latin rulers found it
increasingly difficult to assert their authority over
vassals whose castles had been built to withstand Muslim
armies far larger than anything the Christians could
muster. It has been shown that during the fourteenth
century a similar process also took place in Frankish
Greece, whilst in Cilicia the Armenians' preference for
isolated mountain fortresses enabled nobles like the lords
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of Lampron to become virtually independent. Similarly, the
internal stability of any given region can often be guaged
by how many castles the Military Orders held there, for no
ruler would willingly give up vast castellanies and
estates unless it was absolutely necessary. This problem
was most apparent in fourteenth century Achaea, and also
in the Holy Land, where all three main Orders held vast
lordships whose presence safeguarded Christian frontiers
but eroded central authority.
Changing political circumstances also account for the
appearance and design of many Latin fortifications built
at this time. Hence a combination of poverty and physical
isolation help explain why the Latins in Greece were
either unwilling or unable to build strong and
sophisticated fortifications. In the Holy Land, on the
other hand, the sheer power of the Muslims and the far
greater resources of men like Louis IX ensured that
strongpoints tended to be larger and more complex. Both
these areas can be contrasted with Cilicia, however, for
the Armenians did not need to maintain direct sea links
with the west in order to survive, and therefore
constructed mountain castles which were far more effective
against the vast land armies of the Mamluks. These
observations also confirm that military architecture did
not evolve in distinct chronological stages, and cannot,
therefore, be studied in isolation, without regard for
various political, geographical and economic factors.
Finally, it should be remembered that regardless of their
design and location, virtually all the fortifications
which have been mentioned in this thesis were expected to
make up for inadequate troop numbers. Both the Armenians
and the Latins found themselves massively outnumbered by
their Muslim, Greek and Bulgar opponents, while the latter
group also had to deal with the problem of suppressing a
hostile native population. Realizing that they lacked the
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resources to overcome these difficulties through sheer
weight of numbers, they therefore built fortifications in
huge numbers, and on an unprecedented scale. To some
extent this tactic worked, and there can be little doubt
that sites such as Pilgrims' Castle enabled the Franks to
retain territory without needing to match their opponents
man for man. In the long run, however, this problem could
only have been solved by encouraging far greater numbers
to settle in the east permanently, for, as Baybars
observed, 'towns are not guarded !crJ a'e
citizens protected by trenches, but by swords together
with resolution' •1
1 Ibn al-Furat, Selections, II, 54.
431
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
1) Western sources.
Actes relatifs a la principauté de Morée, 1289-1300, ed.
P. Charles and J. Longnon, (Paris 1967).
Amadi, Francesco, Chroni ques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, ed.
R. de Mas Latrie, (Paris 1891).
Ambroise, L'Estoire de la uerre sainte., ed G. Patis,
(Paris 1897).
Annales de Terre Sainte, ed. R. Röhricht and G. Raynaud,
in Archives de l'Orient latin, II (1884), 429-61.
Anti q uitates Italicae Medi! aevi, ed. L. A. Muratori, (6
vols., Rome 1738-42), V.
Arnold of Lübeck, Chronica Slavorum, ed. J. Lappenberg,
MGH SS, XXI, (1868).
Assizes of Romania: P. Topping, 'Feudal Institutions as
revealed in the Assizes of Romania; the Law Code of
Frankish Greece' , in idem, Studies on Latin Greece,
(London 1977).
Aubrey of Trois Fontaines, Chronica, ed.P. Scheffer-
Boichorst, MGH SS, XXIII, (1874).
Bans et Ordonnances des rois de Chyp re, RHCLois, II.
Barbaro, Daniele, Cronica del Trivisano della Citta di
Venezia, short extract in J.K. Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo,
Conqueror of the Archi pelag o, (Oxford 1915), p.106.
Benvenuto di San Giorgio, Historia Montisferrati, ed. L.A.
Muratori, RIS, XXIII (1733).
Boniface VIII: Re g istres, ed. G. Digard et al, (4 vols.,
Paris 1884-1939).
Burchard of Mount Sion, Descri ptio Terrae Sanctae, ed. J.
Laurent, in Pere g rinatores medii aevi q uator, (Leipzig
1873).
Bustron, Florio, Chronique de l'Ile de Ch ypre, ed. R. de
Mas Latrie, (Paris 1886).
Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St.Jean
de Jerusalem (1100-1310), ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (4
vols., Paris 1894-1906).
432
Cartulaire général de l'ordre du Temple, 1119?-1150, ed.
G. Albon (marquis d'), (Paris 1913).
'The Cartulaire de Manosque: a Grant to the Templars in
Latin Syria and a charter of King Hugh I of Cyprus', ed.
P.W. Edbury, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical
Research, LI (1978), 174-81.
Clement VI:Lettres closes, patentes et curiales, ed. E.
Deprez, (3 vols., Paris 1958-59).
Continuation de Guillaume de T yr de 1229 a 1261, dite du
manuscrit de Rothelin, RHCOc. II.
Cronica Antica di Venetia, short extract in J.K.
Fotheringham, Marco Sanudo, Conq ueror of the Archipelago,
(Oxford 1915), p.110.
Dandolo, Andrea, Chronicum Venetum, ed. E. Pastorello, RI.
NS, XII, part 1 (1938).
Daniel, Russian abbot; account of journey to Mount Athos
summarised in A. Soloviev, 'Histoire du Monastère russe au
Mont-Athos' , B yzantion, VIII (1933), 213-38.
De constructione castri Saphet: R.B.C. Huygens, 'Un noveau
texte du traité De constructione castri Saphet' , Studi
Medievali, 3rd series, VI, part 1, (1965), 355-87.
Diplomatari de l'Orient català, ed. A. Rubió y Liuch,
(Barcelona 1947).
Documents chypriotes des archives du Vatican (XIVe et XVe
siècles, ed. J. Richard, (Paris 1962).
Documents chypriotes du debut du XIVe siècle, ed. C.
Kohler, in ROL, XI (1905-8), 440-52.
Documents nouveaux servant de preuves a l'histoire de
l'Ile de Chypre sous le rè gne des princes de la maison de
Lusi gnan, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, in Collection des
documents inédits: Mélan g es histori q ues, IV (1882).
Documents sur le régime des terres dans la principauté de
Morée au XIVe siècle, ed. J. Longnon and P. Topping,
(Paris 1969).
Ernoul, Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier, ed.
L. de Mas Latrie, (Paris 1871).
L'Estoire d'Eracles empereur et la con q ueste de la terre
d'Outremer, RHCOc. I-IT.
Etienne de Lusignan, Descri ption de toute l'isle de Cypre,
(Paris 1580).
433
Fuicher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, ed. H.
Hagenmeyer, (Heidelberg 1913).
Geoffrey of Villehardouin, La Con guéte de Constantinople,
ed. N. de Wailly, (Paris 1882).
Gesta Re g is Henrici Secundi Abbatis, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls
Series, (2 vols., 1869).
Les Gestes des Chiprois, RHCArm. II.
Henry, Latin emperor: various letters sent to Innocent III
and the west, in RHGF, XVIII (1879), 525-33, and XIX
(1880), 514.
Henry of Valenciennes, Histoire de l'em pereur Henri de
Constantinople, ed. J. Longnon, (Paris 1948).
Honorius III: Regesta Honorii papae III, ed. P. Pressutti,
(2 vols., New York 1978).
Innocent III: Innocenti III Romani Pontificus O pera Omnia,
ed. J.P. Migne, PL, CCXIV-CCXVII.
Innocent III: Die Register Innocenz III, ed. 0. Hagender
and A. Haidacher, (2 vols. so
 far, Graz and Cologne,
1964)
Itinerarium Pere g rinorum et Gesta Re g is Ricardi, ed. W.
Stubbs, Rolls Series, (2 vols., 1864), I.
James of Vitry, Lettres de Jacques de Vitry, ed. R.B.C.
Huygens, (Leyden 1960).
John XXII: Lettres communes, ed. G. Mollat, (16 vols.,
Paris 1904-47).
John of Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, ed. N. de
Wailly, (Paris 1874).
Libro de los fechos et conq uistas del principado de la
Morea, ed. A. Morel-Fatio, (Geneva 1885).
Livre de Jean d'Ibelin, RHCLoIs I.
Livre de la con q ueste de la princée de 1'Amorée: Chronique
de Morée (1204-1305), ed. J. Longnon, (Paris 1911).
Ludolf of Sudheim, De itinere Terrae Sanctae, ed. F.
Deycks, in Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in
Stuttgart, XXV (Stuttgart 1851).
Martin da Canal, La Chroni q ue des Veneciens, ed. G.
Galvani, in Archivio storico italiano, VIII, (1845).
434
Matthew Paris, Chronica Maiora, ed. H.R. Luard, Rolls
Series, (7 vols, 1872-83).
Muntaner, Ramon, L'expedició del	 atalans a l'Orient, ed.
L. Nicolau d'Olwer, (Barcelona 1926).
Muntaner, Ramon, The Chronicle of Muntaner, trans. A.
Goodenough, (2 vols., London 1920-21).
Navagerio, Andrea, Storia Venezia, ed. L.A. Muratori, RIS,
XXIII, (1733).
Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistmus
Patras, E. Gerland, (Leipzig 1903).
Niccolo da Martoni, Relation du Pèlerinage a Jerusalem de
Nicolas de Martoni, notaire italien (1394-1395), ed. L.
LeGrand, in ROL, III (1895), 566-669.
Nicholas IV: Registres, ed. E. Langlois, (2 vols., Paris
1886-1905)
Nouvelles preuves de l'histoire de Chypre sous le règne
des princes de la maison de Lusi gnan, ed. L. de Mas
Latrie, in Bibliothè gue de 1'Ecole des chartes, XXXII
(1871), 341-78, XXXIV (1873), 47-87, XXXV (1874), 99-158.
Nouvelles recherches historigues sur la principauté
française de Morée et ses hautes baronnies a la suite de
la Quatrième Croisade, J.A.C. Buchon, (2 vols. , Paris
1843).
Oliver of Paderborn, Historia Damiatina, ed. H. Hoogeweg,
in Bibliothek des litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart,
CCII, (TUbingen 1894).
Philip Mousket, Chroni gue Rimée, ed. baron de Reiffenberg,
in Collection de chroni gues bel ges inédites, (2 vols.,
Brussels 1838). II.
Philip of Mézières, The Life of St. Peter Thomas, ed. J.
Smet, (Rome 1954).
Philip of Mézières, Le Son ge du vieil pèlerin, extracts in
L. de Mas Latrie, Histoire de l'Ile de Ch ypre sous le
rè gne des princes de la maison de Lusi gnan, (3 vols.,
Paris 1852-61), II, 332-33.
Philip of Novara, The Wars of Frederick II a gainst the
Ibelins in S yria and C yprus, ed. and trans. J.L. LaMonte,
(New York 1936).
Re gesta re gni Hierosolymitani, 1097-1291, ed. R. Rhricht,
(Innsbruck 1893).
435
Ré g estes des délibérations du sénat de Venise concernant
la Romanie, ed. F. Thiriet, (3 vols., Paris 1958-61).
'A Register of the Cartulary of the Cathedral of Santa
Sophia of Nicosia', ed. J.L. LaMonte, in Byzantion, V
(1930), 439-522.
La Rè g le du Temple, ed. H. de Curzon, (Paris 1886).
Richard of Devizes, Cronicon de Tem pore Re g is Ricardi
Primi, ed. J.T. Appleby, (London 1963).
Robert of Clan, La Con quête de Constantinople ed. P.
Lauer, (Paris 1924).
Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, (4
vols, 1868-71).
Le saint voyage de Jhérusalem du seigneur d'Anglure, ed.
F. Bonnardot and A. Longnon, (Paris 1878).
Sanudo, Marino (Torsello, or the Elder), Istoria del regno
di Romania sive re gno di Morea, ed. C. Hopf, in Chroniques
gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues, (Berlin 1873).
Sanudo, Marino (Torsello, or the Elder), Liber secretorum
fidelium crucis, ed. J. Bongars, in Gesta Dei per Francos,
sive orientalium expeditionum et re gni Francorum
Hierosolimitani Historia a variis, sed illius aevi
scriptoribus litteris commendata, (2 vols, Hannau 1611),
II.
Sanudo, Marino (Torsello, or the Elder), Epistulae, ed. J.
Bongars, in Gesta Dei per Francos, (2 vols., Hannau 1611),
II.
Sanudo, Marino (the Younger), Vite de'Duchi di Venezia,
ed. L.A. Muratori, RIS, XXII (1733)
Strambaldi, Diomedes, Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi,
ed. R. de t4as Latrie, (Paris 1891).
Sauger, Robert, Histoire nouvelle des anciens ducs de
l'Archi pel, (Paris 1699), extract in J.K. Fotheringham,
Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the Archipelago, (Oxford 1915),
PP . 113-22.
Surveys of royal properties in the Morea undertaken for
Marie de Bourbon (1377) and Amadeo of Savoy (1391),
reproduced in A. Bon, La Morée fran que: recherches
histori ques, topographjques et archéolo g i ques sur la
principauté d'AchaIe (1205-1430), with a volume of plates
and plans, (Paris 1969), pp.689-92.
436
Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, ed. E. Strehike, (Berlin
1869)
'The Templars and the Castle of Tortosa in Syria: an
unknown document concerning the acquisition of the
Fortress', ed. J.S.C. Riley-Smith, EHR, LXXXIV (1969),
278-88.
Urban V: Lettres secretes et curiales du pape Urbain V se
rapportant a la France, ed. G. Mollat, (Paris 1955).
Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatseschichte der
Republik Venedi mit besonderer Beziehun auf B yzanz und
die Levante, ed. G. Tafel and G. Thomas, (2 vols., Vienna
1856).
Villani, Johannis, Florentini Historia Universalis, ed.
L.A. Muratori, RIS, XIII (1728).
Vinsauf, Itinerary of Richard I and others to the Holy
Land, extract in Supplementary excerpts on Cyprus, or
further materials for a histor y of Cyprus, trans. and ed.
T.A.H. Mogabgab, (Nicosia 1941).
Wilibrand of Oldenburg, Itinerarium Terrae Sanctae, ed. S.
de Sandoli, in Itinera Hierosolymitana Crucesignatorum, (4
vols., Jerusalem 1978-84), III.
William of Machaut, La Prise d'Alexandrie, ou Chroni gue du
roi Pierre ler de Lusignan, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, (Geneva
1877).
William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, (2 vols.,
Turnhout 1986).
Zeno, lacobo, Vita Caroli Zeni, ed. G. Zonta, RIS NS, XIX,
part 6, (1931-41).
2) Greek sources.
Acroploites, George, Annales, ed. J.P. Migne, PG, CXL
(1887).
Cantacuzenus, emperor John VI, Historiarum libri IV, ed.
L. Schopen, CSHB, (3 vols., Bonn 1828-32).
Choniates, Nicetas, Historia, ed. J.P. Migne, PG, CXXXIX,
(1894)
Gregoras, Nicephorus, yantina historia, ed. L. Schopen
and I. Bekker, CSHB, (3 vols., Bonn 1839-55).
437
Makhairas, Leontios, Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of
Cyprus, Entitled 'Chronicle', ed. and trans. R.M. Dawkins,
(2 vols., Oxford 1932).
Pachymeres, George, De Michaele et Andronico Palaeo1ois
libri XIII, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB, (2 vols., Bonn 1835).
To Chronikon tou Moreos: the Chronicle of Morea, ed. J.
Schmitt, (London 1904).
3) Armenian and S yriac sources.
Bar Hebraeus, The Chronogra phy of Gregory Abu'l Fara.j, the
Son of Aaron, the Hebrew Physician Commonl y Known as Bar
Hebraeus, trans. E.A. Wallis Budge, (Oxford 1932).
Constable Sempad, La Chronigue attribuée au connétable
Smbat, ed. and trans. G. Dédéyan, (Paris 1980).
Constable Sempad, Chronigue du Ro yaume de la Petite
Arménie, RHCArm I.
Hethoum the Historian, Table Chronolo g i g ue de Héthoum,
comte de Gorigp, RHCArm I.
Jean Dardel, Chronigue d'Arménie, RHCArm II.
Lettres pontificales concernant l'histoire de la Petite
Arménie au XIVe siècle, ed. C. Kohier, (Paris 1909).
Mardiros of Crimea, Liste Rimée des Souverains de la
Petite Arménie, RHCArm I.
Michael the Syrian, Chronigue, RHCArm I.
Nerses Balientz, short extract in L.M. Alishan, Sissouan
ou l'Arméno-Cilicie, (Venice 1899), p.469.
Samuel of Ani, Extrait de la Chronographie de Samuel,
RHCArm I.
Le Trésor des chartes d'Arménie, ou cartulaire de la
chancellerie ro yale des Rou péniens, ed. V. Langlois,
(Venice 1863).
4) Muslim sources.
Abu'l-Fida, Annales, RHCOr I.
Abu Shama, Le Livre des Deux Jardins, RHCOr IV-V.
438
al-'Ayni, Le Collier de Perles, RHCOr II.
Baha'-al-Din, Anecdotes et beaux traits de la vie de
sultan Youssof, RHCOr III.
Histoire des patriarches d'Alexandrie, extracts in J.F.
Michaud, Bibliothègue des Croisades, IV (1829).
Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim, Vie de Kalavun, extracts in J.F.
4ichaud, Bibliothègue des Croisades, IV, (Paris 1829).
Ibn al-Athir, Kamel Altevarykh, RHCOr I-TI.
Ibn al-Furat, Selections from the Tarikh al-Duwal wa'l-
Muluk, in Ayyubids, Mameluks and Crusaders, ed. and trans.
U. and M.C. Lyons, with an introduction by J.S.C. Riley-
Smith, (2 vols., Cambridge 1971).
Ibn Jubair, Extrait du vo ya g e d'Ibn Diobeir, RHCOr III.
Kamal ad-Din, L'Histoire d'Alep, trans. E. Blochet, in
ROL, V (1897).
al-Makrizi, 1-listoire d'E gypte, trans. E. Blochet, in ROL,
IX (1902).
al-Makrizi, Histoire des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Egypte,
trans. M.E. Quatremère, (2 vols. in 4 parts, Paris 1845).
439
SECONDARY SOURCES
1) Books and chapters in books.
Alishan, L.M. , Sissouan ou l'Arméno-Cilicie, 	 (Venice
1899)
Andrews, K., Castles of the Morea, (Princeton 1953).
Angold, M., A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government
and Societ y under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204-12S1),
(London 1975).
Arbel, B., B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby, eds., Latins and
Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, (London
1989)
Balard, M., La Romanie génoise (XIIe-début du XVe siècle),
(2 vols., Rome and Genoa 1978).
Balard, M., 'The Genoese in the Aegean (1204-1566), in
Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204,
ed. B. Arbe1 B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby, (London 1989),
pp.158-74.
Balard, M. , 'L'activité commerciale en Chypre dans les
années 1300', in Crusade and Settlement, ed. P. Edbury,
(Cardiff 1985), PP.251-67.
Benvenisti, M, The Crusaders in the Hol y Land, (Jerusalem
1970)
Boase, T.S.R. , Kjndoms and Stron gholds of the Crusaders,
(London 1971).
Boase, T.S.R. , ed. , The Cilician Kin gdom of Armenia,
(Edinburgh 1978).
Boase, TS.R., 'Military Architecture in the Crusader
States', in HC, IV (1977), 140-64.
Boase, T.S.R., 'The Arts in Frankish Greece and Rhodes',
in	 IV (1977), 208-50.
Bon, A., La Morée fran gue: recherches historigues,
topo g raphigues et archéologigues sur la principauté
d'AcaIe (1205-1430), with a volume of plates and plans,
(Paris 1969).
Cahen, C., La S yrie du Nord a l'épogue des croisades et la
princjpauté fran gue d'Antioche, (Paris 1940).
Der Nersessian, S., 'The Kingdom of Cilician Armenia', in
jj , II (1962), 630-59.
440
Deschamps, P., Les Châteaux des croisés en Terre Sainte:
I, Le Crac des Chevaliers, (Paris 1934); II, La Defense du
royaume de Jerusalem, (Paris 1939); III, La Defense du
comté de Tri poli et de la principauté d'Antioche, (Paris
1973).
Dunbar, J.G., and W.W.M. Boal, 'The Castle of Azgit', in
The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia, ed. T.S.R. Boase,
(Edinburgh 1978), pp.85-91
Edbury, P.W., 'The Crusading Policy of King Peter I of
Cyprus, 1359-1369', in The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in
the Period of the Crusades, ed. P. Holt, (Warminster
1977), pp.90-105.
Edbury, P.W., ed., Crusade and Settlement, (Cardiff 1985).
Edbury, P.W., The Kingdom of C yprus and the Crusades,
1191-1374, (Cambridge 1991).
Edwards, R.W., The Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia, in
Dumbarton Oaks Studies, XXIII (Washington DC 1987).
Enlart, C., L'art gothigue et de la Renaissance en Chypre,
(2 vols., Paris 1899).
Fedden, R. , and J. Thomson, Crusader Castles, (London
1957).
Forey, A.J., The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the
earl y Fourteenth Centuries, (London 1992).
Forstreuter, K., Der Deutsche Orden am Mittelmeer, (Bonn
1967).
Foss, C. and D. Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications: an
Introduction, (Pretoria 1986).
Fotheringham, J.K. , Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the
Archi pelago, (Oxford 1915).
Gay, J., LePape Clement VI et les affaires d'Orient
(1342-1352), (Paris 1904).
Geanakoplos, D.J. , Em peror Michael Palaeolo gus and the
West, 1258-82: a Study in Byzntine-Latin Relations,
(Cambridge MA, 1959).
Godfrey, J., 1204: the Unhol y Crusade, (Oxford 1980).
Hamilton, B., The Latin Church in the Crusader States: the
Secular Church, (London 1980).
441
Hellenkemper, H., Buren der Kreuzritterzeit in der
Grafschaft Edessa und im K6nigreich Kleinarmenien, (Bonn
1976).
Hill, G., A History of Cyprus, (4 vols., Cambridge 1940-
52).
Holt, P. , ed. , The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the
Period of the Crusades, (Warminster 1977).
Holt, P., 'Baybars's Treaty with the Lady of Beirut in
667\1269', in Crusade and Settlement, ed. P. Edbury,
(Cardiff 1985).
Holt, P., The Me of the Crusades: The Near East from the
Eleventh Century to 1517, (London 1986).
Inalcik, H. , 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1329-
1451' and 'The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades, 1451-1522',
both in HC, VT (1989), 222-275, 311-353.
Irwin, R., The Middle East in the Middle Mes: the Early
Years of the Mamluk Sultanate. 1250-1382, (Beckenham
1986).
Irwin, R., 'The Manduk Conquest of the County of Tripoli',
in Crusade and Settlement, ed. P. Edbury, (Cardiff 1985),
pp.246-49.
Jacoby, D. , Studies on the Crusader States and on Venetian
Expansion, (Northampton 1989), containing 'Crusader Acre
in the Thirteenth Century: Urban Layout and Topography',
c.5, pp.1-45, and 'Montmusard, Suburb of Crusader Acre:
the first stage of its Development', c.6, pp.205-17, and
'The rise of a new Emporium in the Eastern Mediterranean:
Famagusta in the Late Thirteenth Century', c.8, pp.145-79.
Johns, C.N., A Guide to 'Atlit, (Jerusalem 1947).
Johnson, E. , 'The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and
Henry VI', 1i, II (1962), 87-122.
Kedar, B.Z. , 'The Subjected Muslims of the Frankish
Levant', in Muslims under Latin Rule, 1100-1300, ed. J.M.
Powell, (Princeton, 1990).
Kennedy, H., Crusader Castles, (Cambridge 1994).
Lawrence, A.W., 'The Castle of Baghras', in The Cilician
Kingdom of Armenia, ed. T.S.R. Boase, (Edinburgh 1978),
pp.34-84.
Lawrence, T.E. , Crusader Castles, ed. D. Pringle, (Oxford
1988).
442
Lock, P. , 'The Medieval Towers of Frankish Greece: a
Problem in Chronology and Function' , in Latins and Greeks
in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204, ed.B. Arbel, B.
Hamilton and D. Jacoby, (London 1989), pp.129-45.
Longnon, J., L'empire latin de Constantino ple et la
principauté de Morée, (Paris 1949).
Longnon, J., 'The Frankish States in Greece, 1204-1311',
HC, II (1962), 235-74.
Longnon, J., Les Coinpagnons c1e Villehardouin: recherches
sur les croisés de Ia guatrizne crosa±e,	 eea
Paris 1978).
Luke, H., 'The Kingdom of Cyprus, 1291-1369' and 'The
Kingdom of Cyprus, 1369-1489', both in , III (1975),
340-60, 361-95.
Luttrell, A., Latin Greece, the Hospitallers and the
Crusades, 1291-1440, (London 1982), containing 'La Corona
de Aragon y la Grecia catalana; 1379-1394', c.11, pp.219-
252, and 'The Crusade in the Fourteenth century', c.16,
pp.122-54, and 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes: Prospectives,
Problems and Possibilities', c.1, pp.243-66.
Luttrell, A., 'The Hospitallers of Rhodes, 1306-1421', HC,
iii (1975), 278-313.
Luttrell, A., 'The Latins and Life on the Smaller Aegean
Islands: 1204-1453', in Latins and Greeks in the Eastern
Mediterranean after 1204, ed. B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and
D.Jacoby, (London 1989), pp.146-57.
Luttrell, A., The Hospitallers' Interventions in Cilician
Armenia: 1291-1375', in The Cilician Kingdom of Armenia,
ed. T.S.R. Boase, (Edinburgh 1978), pp.118-44.
Marshall, C., Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291,
(Cambridge 1992).
Mas Latrie, L. de, Histoire de l'Ile de Ch ypre sous le
règne des princes de la maison de Lusi gnan, (3 vols.,
Paris 1852-61).
Mayer, H.E., The Crusades, trans. J. Gillingham, (Oxford
1972).
Megaw,	 A.H.S.,	 'The Arts	 in Cyprus:	 B Military
Architecture, in HC, IV (1977), 196-207.
Miller, W., The Latins in the Levant: a History of
Frankish Greece (1204-1566), (London 1908).
Miller, W., Essa ys on the Latin Orient, (Cambridge 1921).
443
Mogabgab, T.A.H., Supplementar y Excerpts on Cyprus, or
further materials for a Histor y of Cyprus, (Nicosia 1941).
Muller-Wiener, W., Castles of the Crusaders, trans. j.
Brownjohn, (London 1966).
Nicol, D.M., The Despotate of Epirus, (Oxford 1957).
Powell, J.M., Anatomy of a Crusade, (Philadelphia 1986).
Prawer, J., The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, (London 1972).
Prawer, J. , Crusader Institutions, (Oxford t90
Pringle, D., The Red Tower, (London 1986).
Pringle, D., 'Magna Mahumeria (al-Bira): the Archaeology
of a Frankish New Town in Palestine' , in Crusade and
Settlement, ed. P. Edbury, (Cardiff 1985).
Rey, E.G., Etude sur les monuments de l'architecture
militaire des croisés en S yrie et dans l'Ile de Chypre,
(Paris 1871).
Richard, J., 'The Institutions of the Kingdom of Cyprus',
in	 , VI (1989), 150-74.
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., The Knights of St.John in Jerusalem
and Cyprus, c.1050-1310, (London 1967).
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., The Feudal Nobilit y and the Kingdom
of Jerusalem, 1174-1277, (London 1973).
Riley-Smith, J.S.C., 'The Templars and the Teutonic
Knights in Cilician Armenia' , in The Cilician Kingdom of
ArmnI, ed. T.S.R. Boase, (Edinburgh 1978), pp.92-li7.
Rüdt de Collenberg, W., Familles de l'Orient latin, XIIe-
XIVe siècles, (London 1983), containing 'L'empereur Isaac
de Chypre et sa flue, 1155-1207', c.1, pp.123-77.
Runciman, S., A History of the Crusades, (3 vols.,
Cambridge 1951-54).
Runciman, S., Mistra, (London 1980).
Setton, K.M., Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388,
(Cambridge MA, 1948).
Setton, K., general ed., A Histor y of the Crusades, (6
vols., Madison 1955-89).
Setton, K.M., 'The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380' and 'The
Catalans and Florentines in Greece, 1380-1462', both in
HC, III (1975), 167-224, 225-77.
444
Small, R.C., Crusading Warfare, 1097-1193, (Cambridge
1956).
Sterns, I., 'The Teutonic Knights in the Crusader States',
in MC, V (1985), 315-78.
Thorau, P., The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the
Near East in the thirteenth century, trans. P.M. Holt,
(London 1992).
Tibble, S., Monarchy and Lordshi ps in the Latin Kingdom of
Jerusalem, 1099-1291, (Oxford 1989).
Topping, P., 'The Morea,1311-1364' and 'The Morea, 1364-
1460', both in MC, III, (1975), 104-40, 141-66.
Van Cleve, T. , 'The Fifth Crusade' and 'The Crusade of
Frederick II', both in HC, II (1962), 377-428, 429-62.
Van Millingen, A., B yzantine Constantinople: the walls of
the city and adjoining sites, (London 1899).
Wolff, R.L., 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-
1261', in MC, II, (1962), 187-233.
2) Articles.
Ayalon, D. , 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army'
Bulletin of Oriental and African Studies, XV (1950) 203-
28, 448-76, XVI (1954), 57-90.
Bon, A, 'Forteresses médiévales de la Grèce centrale'
Bulletin de Correspondance héllenigue, LXI (1937), 136-
208.
Canard, M., 'Le Royaume d'Arménie-Cilicie et les Mamelouks
jusqu'au traité de 1285', Revue des etudes arméniennes, IV
(1967), 217-59.
Deschamps, P. , 'Les entrées des châteaux des croisés en
Syrie et leurs defenses', S yria, XIII (1932), 369-87.
Deschamps, P., 'Le Château de Servantikar en Cilicie, le
defile de Marris et la frontière du comté d'Edesse',
S yria, XVIII (1937), 379-88.
Du Mesnil du Buisson, R., 'Les Anciennes defenses de
Beyrouth', S yria, II (1921), 235-57, 317-27.
Dunbar, J.G., and W.W.M. Boal, 'The Castle of Vagha',
Anatolian Studies, XIV, (1964), 175-84.
445
Edbury, P., 'The Murder of King Peter I of Cyprus (1359-
1369)', Journal of Medieval Histor y , VI, (1980), 219-33.
Edwards, R.W. , 'The Crusader Donjon at Anavarza in
Cilicia' , Abstracts of the Tenth Annual B yzantine Studies
Conference, (Cincinnati 1984), 53-55.
Edwards, 'Bagras and Armenian Cilicia: a Reassessment',
Revue des etudes arméniennes, XVII (1983), 415-55.
Folda, J. , 'The Crusader Frescoes at Crac des Chevaliers
and Marqab Castle', Dumbarton Oaks Pa pers, XXXVI, (1982),
177-210.
Forey, A.J., 'The Military Order of St.Thomas of Acre',
ERR, XCII (1977), 481-503.
Frech, F., 'Die armenischen Burgen', Zeitschrift der
Gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, IX (1915), 576-80.
Geanakoplos, D.J. , 'Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of
the Byzantine Restoration: the Battle of Pelagonia, 1259'
Dumbarton Oaks Papers, VII (1953), 101-41.
Gill, J., 'The Tribulations of the Greek Church in Cyprus,
1196-1280', Byzantinische Forschun g en, V (1977), 73-93.
Gottwald, J., 'Die Kirche und das Schloss Paperon in
Kilikisch-Armenien', BZ, XXXVI, (1936), 86-100.
Gottwald, J., 'Die Burg Til im sudöstlichen Kilikien', BZ,
XL (1940), 89-104.
Gottwald, J., 'Burgen und Kirchen im mittleren Kilikien',
BZ, XLI, (1941), 82-103.
Gough, M. , 'Anazarbus (Anavarza)' , Anatolian Studies, II,
(1952), 85-150.
Grabois, A., 'La Cite de Baniyas et le château de Subeibeh
pendant les croisades' , Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale,
XIII, (1970), 43-62.
Harper, R., and D. Pringle, 'Belmont Castle: a Historical
Notice and Preliminary Report of Excavations in 1986',
Levant, XX (1988), 101-18.
Heffening, W. , 'Eine Burgruine im Taurus' , Reportium für
Kunstwissenschaft, XLV (1925), 179-89.
Hubatsch, W., 'Der Deutsche Orden und die Reichslehnschaft
über Cypern', Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaft im
Göttingen. Philolo g isch-Historische Kiasse, (1955), 245-
306.
446
I'Anson, E., 'Medieval and other buildings in the island
of Cyprus', Transactions of the Ro yal Institute of British
Architects, Session 1882-83, (London 1883), 13-33.
Jacoby, D. , 'The Encounter of two societies: Western
Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnesus after the
Fourth Crusade', American Historical Review, LXXVIII
(1973), 873-906.
Jackson, P., 'The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260', EHR,
XCV (1980), 481-513.
Jackson, P., 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria',
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, LIX
(1986), 20-36.
Jackson, P., 'The Crusades of 1239-41 and their
Aftermath' , Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African
Studies, L (1987), 32-60.
Johns, C.N., 'Excavations at Pilgrims' Castle ('Atlit):
the Faubourg and its Defences', QDAP, I (1932), 111-29;
'The south-eastern Cemetary', QDAP, II (1932-33), 41-104;
'The ancient Tell and the outer Defences of the Castle',
QDAP, III (1933-34), 145-64; 'An unfinished Church in the
Suburbs', QDAP, IV (1934-35), 122-37; 'Stables at the
south-west of the Suburbs', QDAP, V (1935-36), 31-60.
Johns, C.N. , 'The Citadel, Jerusalem: a Summary of Work
since 1934', QDAP, XIV (1950), 121-90.
Lock, P., 'The Frankish Towers of Central Greece', ABSA,
LXXXI (1986), 101-23.
Lock, P., 'The Frankish Tower on the Acropolis, Athens.
The Photographs of William J. Stiliman', ABSA, LXXXII
(1987), 131-33.
Longnon, J., 'Problèmes de l'histoire de la principauté de
Morée', Journal des Savants, (1946), 77-93, 147-61.
Luttrell, A., 'Intrigue, Schism and Violence among the
Hospitallers of Rhodes, 1377-1384', S peculum, XLI (1966),
30-48.
Luttrell, A., 'Venice and the Knights 1-lospitallers of
Rhodes in the Fourteenth Century' , Pa pers of the British
School at Rome, XXVI (1958), 136-42.
Luttrell, A., 'Greek Histories translated and compiled for
Juan Fernandez de Heredia, Master of Rhodes, 1377-1396',
S peculum, XXXV (1960), 401-7.
447
Masterman, E.W.G. , 'A Crusaders' Fortress in Palestine',
EQ, (1928), 91-97.
Megaw, A.H.S., 'Excavations at Sandra Kolones, Paphos:
Preliminary Report on the 1966-67 and 1970-71 Seasons',
Report of the De partment of Anti quities, Cyprus, 1971,
(Nicosia 1971), 117-46.
Megaw, A.H.S. , 'Supplementary Excavations on a Castle Site
at Paphos, Cyprus, 1970-71', Dumbarton Oaks Papers, XXVI
(1972), 322-45.
Pringle, D., 'A thirteenth century hail at Montfort Castle
in Western Galilee', Antiquaries Journal, LXVI (1986), 52-
81.
Pringle, D., 'King Richard I and the Walls of Ascalon',
Q, CXVI (1984), 133-47.
Pringle, D., 'Review article: Reconstructing the Castle of
Safad',	 Q, CXVII, (1985), 139-49.
Pringle, D., 'Survey of Castles in the Crusader Kingdom of
Jerusalem, 1989: Preliminary Report' , Levant, XXIII
(1991), 87-91.
Pringle, D., A. Petersen, M. Dow and C. Singer, 'Qal'at
Jiddin: a Castle of the Crusader and Ottoman periods in
Galilee', Levant, XXVI (1994), 135-66.
Rey, E.G. , 'Etude sur la Topographie de la ville d'Acre au
XIIIe siècle', Mémoires de la société nationale des
antiquairies de France, XXXIX (1878), 115-45.
Richard, J. , La Revolution de 1369 dans le royaume de
Chypre', Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des chartes, CX (1952),
108-23.
Robinson, F.C.R. , and P.C. Hughes, 'Lampron: Castle of
Armenian Cilicia', Anatolian Studies, XIX (1969), 183-207.
Rubió y Liuch, 'Els Castelis catalans de la Grècia
continental', Annuari de l'Institut d'estudis catalans, II
(1908), 364-425.
Sinogowitz, B., 'Zur Eroberung Thessalonikes im Herbst
1224', BZ, XLV (1952), 28.
Smail, R.C., 'Crusaders' Castles of the Twelfth Century',
Cambridge Historical Journal, X (1951), 133-49.
Thomson, J., 'Castles in Cilicia' , Geographical Magazine,
XXIII (April, 1951), 569-77.
448
Traquair, R., 'Laconia: I, Mediaeval Fortresses' ABSA, XII
(1905-6), 259-76.
Traquair, R. , 'Mediaeval Fortresses of the North-Western
Peloponnesus', ABSA, XIII, (1906-7), 268-81.
Traquair, R. , 'Frankish Architecture in Greece', Journal
of the Ro yal Institute of British Architects, XXXI (1923-
24), 33-48, 73-86.
Vickers, M., 'The Byzantine Sea Walls of Thessaloniki',
Balkan Studies, II (1970), 261-78.
von Wartburg, M-L., 'The Medieval Cane Sugar Industry in
Cyprus: Results of Recent Excavations', Antiquaries
Journal, (1983), 298-314.
Wolff, R.L., 'Mortgage and Redemption of an Enperor's Son:
Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople', Speculum,
XXIX (1954), 45-84.
Wolff, R.L., 'Politics in the Latin Patriarchate of
Constantinople 1204-1261', Dumbarton Oaks Papers, VIII
(1954), 225-303.
Youngs, G.R., 'Three Cilician Castles', Anatolian Studies,
XV (1965), 113-34.
